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ABSTRACT
The NGO-donor relationship has become understood as exceptionally volatile. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in developing countries rely heavily on foreign
donor funding and potential over-reliance on donors becomes apparent. The research at
hand concentrates on the relationship between environmental non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) and international donor agencies in the local setting of a
developing country. It explores the potential impact of changing funding priorities on
NGO behavior and decision-making. It raises two questions: How do NGOs respond to
changes in donor funding objectives? Why do NGOs react the way they do?

NGOs react to changes in the external environment in different ways (Thompson 1967;
Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Scott 1981; Pfeffer 1982). The first phase of the dissertation
explores the NGO-donor relationship when donors revise funding priorities and partner
NGOs try to adapt. There is a variation in the way NGOs respond to changes in funding
manifested or applied in a variety of ways. The study draws on qualitative research to
study the decisions of four NGOs in response to shifts in funding, and analysis reveals the
following variations in NGO responses to such shifts: suspend the relationship, reach
common ground and maintain the relation, automatically execute the donor’s interests,
and voluntarily and deliberately adapt to the situation. The research builds on
Hirschman’s (1970) individual self-interest theory and considers NGOs as ‘consumers’ in
their relationship with donor agencies. Using Hirschman’s (1970) typology, three modes
of NGOs’ response are identified: exit, voice, loyalty, and a fourth mode, adjustment, is
proposed.

Furthermore, the dissertation integrates resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik
1978) and the theory of weak ties (Granovetter 1973, 1983) to construct a more
parsimonious theory to predict organizational responses to changes in the surrounding
environment. Each of the two theories is reviewed separately to provide a theoretical
justification for NGO behavior in a changing funding environment. Resource dependence
determines NGO behavior. Therefore, we expect that NGOs characterized with high
resource dependency will comply with donor interests. Furthermore, the behavior of the
NGO could also be determined by the presence of strong or weak ties, such that an NGO
centrally located in a dense network with strong ties is likely to comply with donor
interests.

This investigation also recognizes that organizations vary in terms of tolerance for
resource dependency and the nature and structures of their network relations. The study
accepts Salancik’s (1995) argument that control over resources is not the only source of
power in an inter-organizational relationship; network positions are related to power.
Accordingly, the study presents an alternative perspective that integrates the two theories,
stipulating that an organizational response to changes in its external environment depends
on the level of resource dependence tolerance as well as the strength of ties in a network
of actors. The likelihood of an organization adopting exit as a response to shifts in donor
funding is higher with lower resource dependence and weaker network ties. The
likelihood of an organization practicing voice is higher with lower resource dependence
and stronger ties. The likelihood of an organization practicing adjustment is higher with

higher resource dependence and weaker network ties. Lastly, the likelihood of an
organization adopting loyalty as a response to shifts in donor funding is higher with
higher resource dependence and stronger ties.

The integrated theory is supported with in-depth qualitative analysis of multiple cases of
NGOs and their relations with stakeholders, specifically donors. It is verified by
translating propositions into hypotheses. These key hypotheses are tested using
multinomial regression analysis based on measurements derived from network analysis
that plots network maps of environmental NGOs in Lebanon. The results provide good
support for the predictions of the integrated theory. Variation in resource dependence has
no effect on the choice of voice over exit, while higher centrality increases the tendency
towards voice. There is a higher tendency for adjustment with higher resource criticality
and concentration while tie strength has a weak effect on the choice of adjustment over
exit.
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CHAPTER ONE: FRAMING THE ISSUE
This introductory chapter serves two purposes. First, it articulates the research problem
investigated in this dissertation. Specifically, this dissertation develops a conceptual
framework of organizational behavior and provides preliminary data testing on a new
theory of how non-governmental organizations (NGOs) respond to changes in their
resource environment. Second, the chapter outlines the contents of the dissertation,
providing a brief overview of each chapter.

INTRODUCTION
Since the early 1980s, Western donors have been redirecting funds to developing
countries away from national governments towards local non-governmental organizations
(NGOs). As funding continues to increase for various economic, developmental, and
political reasons, the aid channeled through NGOs has been rapidly increasing
(Abdelrahman 2004; Kakarala 2001; Kharas 2007), with the consequence of increased
NGO dependence on foreign aid.

The influx in foreign aid has been associated with changes in the discourse surrounding
development, and, consequently, with changes in the focus of foreign assistance to
developing countries. Calculating aid in monetary value, Kharas (2007) reports that the
total volume of international funding going to developing countries topped US$100
billion in 2006 compared to US$41.3 billion in 1974 (expressed in real 2005 dollars). In
1999, US$12.4 billion out of the US$46.6 billion of aid assistance (around 21.6%) was
transferred through NGOs (Kharas 2007). U.S. foreign non-military aid expenditures
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increased from around $10 billion in 1996 to $32 billion in 2004 (Verweij and Gyawali
2006). Aid transfers by American, Canadian, and European nonprofits to developing
countries totaled $2.7 billion in 1970 and increased by 166% in 1990 to $7.2 billion—in
constant 1986 dollars (Edwards and Hulme 1996). When private financial flows are
added, the total sum of assistance channeled from the North to the South stood at US$200
billion in 1992 (Hook 1995). This influx of aid was coupled with changes in NGOs’ role
in the development process. With a heavy reliance on donor funding, NGOs find
themselves in what has been referred to as ‘a dependency trap’ (Bieber 2002).

My own professional experience working with a donor agency in Lebanon and
researching Lebanese NGOs confirms this dependency trap. Many NGOs have had to
modify the nature of their activities to secure funding from international donors, and new
NGOs have been created to attract funding. The NGO sector in Lebanon has been
undergoing a disguised transformation; the core value of solidarity that characterized the
sector for a considerable period of time has been replaced with a culture of individualism.
The general mission of serving the people and the public good has been gradually
replaced by personal gains and organizational survival.

This dissertation is a theory-developing and theory-testing study. It focuses on
organizational behavior, specifically seeking to understand the modes of responses of a
funding-dependent NGO to changes in the funding objectives of donors and the reasons
underlying these responses. The dissertation finds its theoretical grounds in Hirschman’s
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(1970) individual self-interest theory, Pfeffer and Salancik’s (1978) resource dependence
theory, and Granovetter’s (1973, 1983) theory of weak ties.

The research focuses on NGOs in Lebanon. Lebanon has a vibrant and dynamic NGO
sector. There are as many as 15,000 NGOs serving a population of approximately 4
million. NGOs have been active in all domains of public life. During the country’s civil
war (1975-1990), and with a shattered public bureaucracy, they assumed responsibility
for providing most basic public services (AbouAssi 2006). As Chapter Three elaborates,
one distinctive feature of Lebanese NGOs is their ability to secure funding from various
sources—including international donors—with no interference or control from the central
government. For these and other reasons, the Lebanese NGO sector is an interesting case
study of how NGOs in developing countries that do not face government control respond
to changes in donor strategies.

The remainder of this introductory chapter provides an overview of the dissertation. The
first section scopes out the challenge of shifting grounds and provides a general definition
of NGOs and donor agencies. The second section discusses the broader context of this
research, namely development assistance and the aid industry. The third section lays out
the central questions of the dissertation. The fourth section sketches the research design,
focusing on the dissertation’s conceptual framework and methodology, and addresses its
limitations and contributions. Finally, the overall organization of the dissertation is
outlined chapter by chapter.
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SHIFTING GROUNDS
The NGO-donor relationship is volatile because of inconsistency in donors’ funding
priorities and consequent confusion and instability among partner organizations. As
Doornbos (2003) states, “donors develop their programs, preferences and priorities and
revise them at an ever-increasing pace, while at best NGOs try to figure out how they
might fit in or if they meet the criteria underlying the latest preoccupation of donors”
(15). Many NGOs in developing countries modify the nature of their activities to secure
or sustain financial resources, usually at the expense of their core mission. For example,
in their study of Palestinian NGOs, Hanafi and Tabar (2003) argued that organizations
that had followed donor funding became “[disconnected…] from the popular movement
[and were] not able to articulate between their own aspiration [and overarching] agenda”
(205). Rahman (2006) addresses an opposite cycle in Bangladesh where the NGO sector
shifted its focus from promoting political mobilization to delivery of basic services. In
both cases, the domestic environment was not very conducive for political activism, and
international donor pressure turned the wheel towards ‘depoliticization’ of the NGOs.

Therefore, a policy decision to channel funding in a direction that primarily serves the
donor’s strategic and political interests leads to unintended consequences in the political,
economic, and social settings of aid-recipient countries. These consequences are
paralleled with changes in the behavior and actions of the local NGOs who are partners
and implementers of donor aid programs.
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To frame this observation as a research agenda, it is both intriguing and important to
understand NGO responses to shifts in donor agencies’ funding. When a donor modifies
its funding objectives, how does a partner organization react? A traditional African
proverb provides an immediate answer to these questions: “if you have your hands in
another man’s pocket, you must move when he moves” (Edwards and Hulme 1996: 961).
This reflection on human relationships can be applied to the relationship between donor
agencies and NGOs in developing countries.

To better understand the relationship between donors and NGOs, this research adopts a
scientific approach that tests an amalgamated model of several theories, including
Hirschman’s (1970) individual self-interest theory, resource dependence theory (Pfeffer
and Salancik 1978), and the theory of weak ties (Granovetter 1973, 1983). Before
examining these theories, however, it is necessary to define key actors.

Defining Actors
One purpose of defining actors is to avoid confusion in the analysis of findings. This
procedure is a form of delimitation (Creswell 2002; Holloway 1997), defined as
“[setting] boundaries [to] limit the scope of research” (47). Delimitation is used for
practical and theoretical reasons. Boundaries can be controlled by researchers themselves
or are ‘inherent in the research questions.’ At the same time, these boundaries signal to
readers the confines of the research.
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The literature lacks a universally accepted definition of NGOs, but for the purposes of
this research, the structural-operational definition of NGOs is acceptable. This definition
uses six main characteristics: 1) degree of formality or institutionalization; 2)
independence from the government; 3) non-profit distribution (but not necessarily
generation); 4) self-governance according to certain internal procedures and mechanisms;
5) voluntary participation; and, 6) public benefit driven “by the desire to articulate and
actualize a particular social vision” (Diamond 1994; Lewis 2001; Najam 2000; Salamon
1999; Salamon and Anheier 1992; Vakil 1997).

This dissertation adopts the definition of an NGO as a self-governing, non-governmental,
not-for-profit, and non-political organization “concerned with improved services and
wider social change, including both public benefit and self-help” (Lewis 2001: 60; Vakil
1997). The dynamics involved in the processes of decision-making, resource-generation,
and relationship-building of these organizations differentiate them from other types of
organizations such as community-based organizations, informal associations, and
universities. In addition, professional associations1 should also be distinguished from
NGOs, since they “operate as comprehensive and well-legitimated representatives of
their constituencies and are routinely engaged in formulating rules and principles of their
respective spheres” (Boli 2006: 341).

Other terms to be clarified are ‘donor’ or ‘donor agency’, which are used interchangeably
in this dissertation. In general, there are three kinds of donors. First, bilateral donors are
1

Examples of professional associations in Lebanon include Bar Associations, Labor Unions, Physician
Associations, etc…
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governments of developed countries providing development aid and assistance to
developing countries. Usually, the aid is provided through the foreign aid agencies of
donor countries, but not necessarily to the government agencies of recipient countries
(Edwards and Hulme 1996; Van Rooy and Robinson 1998). Examples of bilateral donors
include the Canadian International Development Agency, the UK’s Department for
International Development, and the United States Agency for International Development.
This dissertation strictly focuses on this type of donor.

Second, there are the multilateral agencies, such as World Bank and United Nations
agencies, which channel and allocate funds from various sources to developing countries
(Edwards and Hulme 1996; Van Rooy and Robinson 1998). Kharas (2007) counts around
230 multilateral donors, which outnumber bilateral donors and recipient countries
combined, even though they only disburse 12 percent of total development aid.

There are major differences in the characteristics, purposes, and stipulations of
development assistance between bilateral and multilateral donors. Alesina and Dollar
(2000) suggest that “the determinants of bilateral and multilateral aid are quite different
and one cannot explain the two together” (35). In essence, the motivations for providing
assistance vary with the type of donor (Gounder 1994). McKinlay and Little (1997)
suggest two-distinct models: the ‘recipient need’ model explains multilateral aid that is
provided to “compensate for shortfalls in domestic resources” (Maizels and Nissanke
1984: 881). A ‘donor interest’ model explains the motivations of bilateral donors where
aid assistance serves primarily or only donor interests.
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Third, there are the international organizations and foundations. Some individual
philanthropists and private donors were dismayed with the use of their taxes or donations
in a game of political power and negotiations; thus, they looked for other means to ensure
their donations reached the right beneficiaries in developing countries, and were
encouraged with tax exemption laws that favor philanthropic giving. Transnational
NGOs, international alliances, and philanthropic foundations such as OXFAM, the Ford
Foundation, and the Gates Foundation have been established to work on specific issues or
in specific areas around the world with private sources of funding.

As noted above, this research focuses exclusively on the relationship between
organizations strictly defined as NGOs in developing countries and bilateral donors.
However, there are several opportunities for future research that examines the
relationship among other types of NGOs and donors. Such research could be carried out
to test and verify the findings of this dissertation. For example, future research could
focus on NGOs’ relationships with private donors and foundations, or on the relationship
between other types of organizations, especially community-based organizations, and
donors. Such a research agenda could provide a more complete understanding of donorrecipient relationships.

THE CENTRAL RESEARCH QUESTIONS
This dissertation research is framed within a broad literature on NGO theory and
management, and on organizational theory. It concentrates on NGO-donor relationships
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in the developing country of Lebanon. The study centers on two primary research
questions, which are addressed in two phases.

In Phase I, the first question examines organizational decisions vis-à-vis an existing
relation with a donor agency. As a donor decides to change funding objectives, a fundingdependent NGO is compelled to react to such a decision; the NGO goes through an
internal deliberation process to decide how to react and what specific course of action to
take. The process might be linear or not, and decisions might be monolithic or manifold.
Specifically, the first research question asks:

1) How does a funding-dependent NGO react to the decision by a donor to change
funding objectives?

A subsidiary question is, do NGOs react in different ways towards different donors?
These primary research questions are addressed by building on Hirschman’s (1970)
typology of exit, voice, and loyalty in an attempt to present a comprehensive conceptual
framework that captures the range of reactions.

Recognizing that there may be several underlying reasons or existing conditions that
shape NGO reactions and decisions, Phase II seeks to explore and analyze the variables
used to justify organizational choices. Thus, the second research question asks:

2) Why does an NGO react the way it does?
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Several theoretical perspectives might be used to predict NGO reactions. This dissertation
argues that resource dependence theory (RDT) (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Pfeffer 1982)
and the theory of weak ties (Granovetter 1973, 1983) separately identify external
environment pressures and constraints—resource control and location in a network,
respectively—to provide explanations for variation in organizational behavior.

As this research digs deeper into understanding NGO behaviors, it provides insights on
possible implications for NGOs’ identity, governance, and management. It also sheds
light on how an organizational decision yields greater or lesser chances of survival and
sustainability without risking autonomy and undergoing identity transformation. The next
section focuses on the analytical process for exploring changes in NGO-donor relations
and explains the underlying variables.

Research Design
Maxwell’s (2005) interactive model of research design, which is primarily developed for
qualitative research, guides this dissertation. The research design (exhibited in Figure 1.1)
has five main components: 1) the central research questions—discussed in the previous
section, 2) the conceptual framework, 3) validity, 4) methodology, and 5) goals. At the
center of the research design are the research questions. The different components are
connected to and from the center. Two-way arrows indicate an interactive relationship
where each component influences and is influenced by the others.
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Component B is a summary of the conceptual framework chapter; it emerges from three
areas of scholarship and practice, with the literature on NGO management as the
underlying foundation: 1) Hirschman’s (1970) self-interest theory which is used in Phase
I of the dissertation, 2) resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978), and 3)
theory of weak ties (Granovetter 1973, 1983), both of which are employed in Phase II.
The overarching focus of this dissertation is to explore the responses of environmental
NGOs in Lebanon to shifts in donor funding. The shifts resemble a change in the quality
of the relationship between an NGO and a donor: when an NGO becomes dissatisfied
with the course of action the donor takes, it adopts a certain response. This observation
brings Hirschman’s (1970) individual self-interest theory into the discussion.
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E. Goals

B. Conceptual Framework
Phase I
1. Hirschman’s (1970) typology
of exit, voice, & loyalty
Phase II
2. Resource dependence theory
(Pfeffer & Salancik 1978)
3. Theory of weak ties
(Granovetter 1973, 1983)

Phase I

1. Present a conceptual
framework for NGOs’
responses to shifts in funding
Phase II
2. Provide a better
understanding of variables
underlying differences in
NGOs’ behaviors

A. Central Research Questions
Phase I
How does a funding-dependent
NGO react to a decision by a donor
to change funding objectives?
NGOs react in different ways
towards different donors
Phase II
Why does an NGO react the way it
does?
Underlying reasons or existing
conditions shape such a decision

D. Methods
1. Exploratory/qualitative (Phase
I): Process tracing, Discourse
analysis, Content analysis
Multiple cases; embedded units of
analysis (NGOs decisions)
Semi-structured interviews with
NGOs, donors, and experts
2. Network Analysis (Phase II)
Mapping networks; regression
analysis to test hypotheses
Survey, interviews, secondary data

C. Validity
1. Limit researcher’s bias through
pursuing alternative explanations
2. Bridge the gap in the
descriptive nature of network
analysis using regression analysis
3. Protect research ethics &
informant’s confidentiality
4. Argue for generalizability by
carrying out additional research,
replicating methods, & comparing
results

Source: Based on the Interactive Model of Research Design (Maxwell 2005).
Figure 1.1: Research Design
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Hirschman (1970) argues that an individual consumer seeks a service that is in his/her
best interest. If the service provider demonstrates a decrease in quality or associated
benefit in the service it provides, then the consumer might consider declining the service
and shopping elsewhere (exit). The consumer can attempt to repair or improve the
relationship through exercising voice and communicating a complaint or a proposal for
change to the organization. Nevertheless, there are consumers who are attached to a
product or its provider and decide to continue purchasing the service despite
dissatisfaction (loyalty). Scholars have moved beyond individual consumers and used
Hirschman’s (1970) typology in studies of various types of organizations, especially
NGOs (e.g., Pickvance 1987; Ebrahim 2003b; Ishkanian 2006; Benjamin 2008). Phase I
of the dissertation applies Hirschman’s typology to environmental NGOs in Lebanon.

Resource dependence theory (RDT) (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) and the theory of weak
ties (Granovetter 1973, 1983) provide explanations for variation in NGOs’ responses.
RDT suggests that organizations are resource-insufficient and rely on external
stakeholders who control resources and make certain demands on the recipient
organization; the heavier the dependence of the organization on external resources, the
more influential the demands of the donors are (Oliver 1991; Pfeffer 1982; Pfeffer and
Salancik 1978). Since NGOs deal with volatile needs and demands, and face instability in
the flow of internal revenues, they often heavily rely on external funders (Bebbington
2004; Saidel 2000).
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Granovetter (1985) argues that organizations are embedded in “a wide variety of
networks that both constrain their actions and provide them with opportunities to achieve
their goals” (Guo and Acar 2005: 348). Networks are constructed relationships and ties
between actors; these ties are either strong or weak (Granovetter 1973, 1983). Strong ties
form a dense network with redundant relations, close interaction, and resource sharing,
while weak ties characterize an open network with more entities, less frequent
interactions, and less restricted behaviors (Granovetter 1973, 1983). The focus here is on
the structure of relationships or, in other words, the relational context (Rowley 1997).

In Phase II, the dissertation provides a mechanism for describing the simultaneous effects
of the organization’s dependence on external resources and its ties within a network, and
for predicting an organization’s response to a change in the external environment—in this
research, a shift in donor funding. The purpose here is to put forward certain propositions
based on theoretical arguments made in this dissertation. These propositions are then
translated into testable hypotheses.

The methodology (Component D) applied in this dissertation consists of a mix of
qualitative and quantitative network analysis. Phase I of the dissertation uses an
exploratory approach, drawing on qualitative analyses of multiple case studies. Data
collection consisted of 30 semi-structured interviews with representatives of NGOs,
donors, and experts, as well as document analysis and focus groups. Results from
different sources were compared and triangulated to ensure consistency, reliability, and
validity. Data analysis relied on process tracing (Checkel 2007; Pierson 2000; Schutt
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2009) and discourse analysis (Johnston 2002; Neumann 2008), which are commonly used
in the qualitative social science research to analyze processes and understand variations
in interpretations (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007). The purpose of using these approaches
is to develop some typologies and to arrive at more generalizable conclusions about the
modes of decisions NGOs might resort to in response to shifts in donor funding.

The explanatory approach in Phase II relies on network analysis as a methodology (Diani
2002; Knoke and Yang 2008; Scott 2000; Tichy, Tushman and Fombrun 1979). Network
analysis involves mapping and analyzing different attributes and measures within
networks; in this case, the network analysis focuses on environmental NGOs in Lebanon
and their stakeholders. Several techniques, including surveys and desk research, are used
to carry out this exercise. Finally, multinomial regression analysis is used for hypotheses
testing. All of the analytic techniques overlap and supplement each other, and help to
ensure validity and accuracy.

Component C considers validity issues and other design limitations. One limitation is the
researcher’s bias, which in this case could be heightened because the research is
conducted in the researcher’s native hometown (Beirut, Lebanon). I have work
experience in the Lebanese NGO sector and connections with many local organizations.
The research methodology imposes several measures to control for the researcher’s bias.
A second design limitation is that the descriptive nature of social network analysis is not
necessarily statistically testable, although it does allow for a deeper understanding of
interactions. A longitudinal study would be ideal, as network analysis would then clearly
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reveal how the behavior of an organization changes as it moves in and around the
network, close to or away from the center. Steps to address these limitations and other
threats to validity are discussed in subsequent chapters.

Another issue of concern is the confidentiality and privacy of informants. Key
stakeholders in NGO-donor relations are representatives of NGOs and donor agencies in
Lebanon; other stakeholders are experts on the NGO sector and representatives of
government agencies. The research is designed in a way that respects the best interests of
stakeholders and does not jeopardize current relations. Procedures to ensure ethical
conduct by the researcher and confidentiality of identity and information are integrated
into the study.

Finally, there is the limitation of generalizability. Two issues are important here. First,
the research focuses on one industry within the NGO sector—the environment.
Nevertheless, this does not mean that NGOs operating in other industries are substantially
different in their behaviors. Second, the research focuses on Lebanon, and variations in
recipient countries’ conditions, whether historical, political, social, or cultural, and in
donor countries’ ideologies and interests might limit the applicability of this study in
other developing nations. However, other studies (Bebbington 2004; Loung and Weinthal
1999; Stiles 2002) exhibit similar trends among NGOs in other developing countries or
regions (Latin America, Kazakhstan, and Bangladesh, respectively), thus reducing
concerns about generalizability based on this issue.
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The goals of this research (Component E) are inherently related to the central research
questions. Two goals are identified. The first is to capture NGOs’ responses to shifts in
donor funding in a comprehensive/rigorous conceptual framework. The second is to
provide a better understanding of variables underlying differences in NGOs’ behaviors.
These goals are shaped by aspirations for NGOs to regain agency in the volatile political
economy of aid relations, beyond polarized perspectives of NGOs being either ‘good’ or
‘bad’ (Hemment 2004).

The previous sections related the study to a larger context, framed the challenges,
presented and explained the main research questions, and sketched the research design.
The last section outlines the organization of the dissertation.

ORGANIZATION OF THE REMAINDER OF THE DISSERTATION
The dissertation focuses on both theory-developing and theory-testing, and is accordingly
composed of two parts or phases. Phase I seeks to answer the first research question:
How does a funding-dependent NGO react to a decision by a donor to change funding
objectives? This phase is exploratory and applies Hirschman’s (1970) typology. Phase II
seeks to answer the second research question: Why does an NGO react in one way or
another? This explanatory phase offers a potentially powerful explanation of the forces
and factors that influence NGOs’ behaviors and decisions by integrating resource
dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) and the theory of weak ties (Granovetter
1973, 1983). Phase I is covered in Chapters Two through Four and Phase II in Chapters
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Five through Seven. Chapter Eight provides a concluding discussion and directions for
future research. Each chapter is discussed briefly below.

Chapter Two reviews the relevant literature on which Phase I of the dissertation draws.
The chapter commences with the conceptual framework that guides the research. It
moves into a full review of the relevant literature on NGO-donor relations, relying on the
broader context of the aid industry and management discussed earlier in this chapter.
Hirschman’s (1970) typology of exit, voice, and loyalty is then elaborated. Its application
to organizations (as opposed to individual consumers) is justified and relevant research
findings are discussed.

Chapter Three lays out the qualitative methodological approach. The discussion of the
research methodology includes an overview of the research design, the researcher’s
ontological and epistemological orientation, and issues of subjectivity. A full explication
of the research design is provided, from data generating, to the selection of cases and
informants, and to the methods of analysis. Ethical considerations and other concerns
about the protection of human subjects are presented, particularly with respect to the
Institutional Review Board process. Limitations of the research design for reliability and
validity are weighed and explained. Finally, the chapter concludes with a summary of the
significance of this research for the field.

Chapter Four provides the analysis of Phase I of the dissertation. Using the qualitative
data to augment the literature review on NGOs, the chapter positions Hirschman’s (1970)
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typology at the heart of the analysis and explores Lebanese NGOs’ behaviors in a
changing environment of shifts in donor funding. The chapter presents brief profiles of
four environmental NGOs in Lebanon and then reports and analyzes findings from the
field based on qualitative data collected through in-depth semi-structured interviews.
Using process tracing, the analysis outlines the decisions or responses of each NGOs at
critical junctures in their funding relationships with donors. Based on an analysis of these
profiles, the chapter then proposes a modified Hisrchman’s (1970) typology as a
comprehensive framework that could capture variations in NGOs’ responses to shifts in
donor funding. The four elements of the framework are expanded and justified based on
additional evidence from the field, collected through interviews with representatives of
other NGOs and experts. The chapter concludes with additional analyses of alternative
responses and processes.

Chapter Five marks the beginning of Phase II of the dissertation. It provides a
comprehensive review of two theoretical perspectives on organizational behavior:
resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Pfeffer 1982) and the theory of
weak ties (Granovetter 1973, 1983). These two theories provide the conceptual constructs
embedded in this phase of the research. In addition to reviewing the literature on these
two theoretical perspectives, this chapter reviews the conceptual framework and provides
propositions about variations in NGOs’ behavior or responses to shifts in donor funding.
The chapter also generates an integrative theory based on the two perspectives. The
integrated theory is articulated and verified through scoping out specific relevant cases
drawn from the qualitative data.
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Chapter Six moves into the explanatory phase of the dissertation. It discusses the
dependent and independent variables, as well as the respective measurements that are
used in the network analysis. Additional details about the network analysis are also
covered, and visual diagrams of the networks of the NGOs and their stakeholders are
used in descriptive analysis. The limitations of this research methodology are also
discussed.

Chapter Seven reviews the results of the explanatory analysis, which seeks to test and
verify the integrated theory of how NGOs respond to changes in their resource
environment. Specifically, the key hypothetical arguments that underpin the integrated
theory are tested using multinomial regression based on measurements derived from the
network analysis. The main findings are discussed and alternative or competing
explanations are considered.

Chapter Eight, which concludes the dissertation, serves multiple purposes. First, the
chapter reprises the conceptual framework. Second, it highlights the main contributions
of the research study. Finally, it expands on unexpected results and basic limitations and
suggests areas for future research.

CONCLUSION
This dissertation approaches the study of NGO-donor relations through an examination of
NGO reactions to changes in donor funding. The research responds to the need for indepth understanding of NGOs’ desires for more effective relationships and greater
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balance between the interests and agendas of both parties. The research is grounded in
NGO management, and the research questions derive from Hirschman’s (1970) typology,
resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978), and the theory of weak ties
(Granovetter 1973, 1983). The research adopts a mixed-methods combining qualitative
and network analysis elements.
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CHAPTER TWO: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE
REVIEW
INTRODUCTION
As explained in Chapter One, this dissertation explores NGO responses to changes in
their resource environment. The first phase focuses on the impact of shifts in donor
funding on NGO decisions and behaviors. Qualitative data will show how Hirschman’s
(1970) typology could be modified and applied to explain the variation in organizational
responses. The second phase of the dissertation proposes a new theory that integrates
resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) and the theory of weak ties
(Granovetter 1973, 1983) to explain variation in organizational behavior. Network
analysis provides preliminary data to test that new theory.

The conceptual framework for this dissertation is bounded by scholarly inquiry and
policy debate and action on NGO-donor relationships and the consequent implications on
NGOs’ governance and management. Figure 2.1 shows the theoretical domains:
Hirschman’s (1970) self-interest theory, Pfeffer and Salancik’s (1978) resource
dependence theory, and Granovetter’s (1973, 1983) theory of weak ties. The chapter
delves first into scholarly debates about the NGO-donor relationship and then discusses
Hirschman’s (1970) self-interest theory. The other two theoretical domains are discussed
in Chapter Five and mark the beginning of the second phase of this dissertation.

23

Hirschman’s
(1970) selfinterest theory

Dissertation

Theory of
Weak Ties
(Granovetter
1973, 1983)

Resource
Dependence
Theory (Pfeffer
and Salancik
1978)

Figure 2.1: Theoretical Domains

SCHOLARLY DEBATES ON NGO-DONOR RELATIONS
Approaches to development have evolved from simply looking at economic growth to
also accounting for social and human development. This was reflected in the shift of
foreign assistance to developing countries from meeting basic human needs in the 1970s
to good governance, which has been dominant since the late 1990s (Hook 1995). The
alternating approaches to development, and consequently the flow of foreign aid to
developing counties, have been associated with a resurgence of NGOs.
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Development of NGOs’ Role and Number
Two indicators of this resurgence are the amount of money being channeled through
NGOs and the exponential growth in the number of these organizations in developing
countries. As a matter of fact, “the proportion of total aid from member countries of
OECD channeled through NGOs rose from 0.7% in 1975 to […] at least 5% in 1993-94”
(Edwards and Hulme 1996: 962). In monetary terms, if military assistance is excluded, by
1999 around 22% (US$12.4 billion) of the US$46.6 billion of Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) aid assistance was transferred through NGOs in
developing countries. In early the 1990s, 50% of the World Bank’s project funds and
40% of USAID’s project funds were channeled through these organizations (Kakarala
2001). Illustratively, “if the nonprofit sector in [the 35 countries covered by the John
Hopkins research project] were a separate national economy, its expenditures would
make it the seventh largest economy in the world” (Anheier and Salamon 2006: 95).

The numbers of NGOs in developing countries have also been growing. From 1990 to
1993, the number of NGOs in Nepal increased by 450%, from 220 to 1,210, and in
Tunisia, the number of NGOs increased by 175% from 1,886 in 1989 to 5,186. The
growth in both countries reflected a ‘donor spending spree’ (Edwards and Hulme 1996:
962). In Egypt, the number of NGOs more than doubled from 7,593 in 1976 to 16,000 in
1999 (Abdelrahman 2004), while in Armenia, they increased by 100 times from 44 in
1994 to 4500 in 2006 (Ishkanian 2006). At the international level, there were 1,987 active
international NGOs in 1960; the number increased to 9,937 in 1981 and jumped to 25,269
in 2000 (Boli 2006).
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Channeling of aid assistance through NGOs is not a new practice. Although Germany
claims to be the originator of the idea in the 1970s, it was not until the World Bank Board
of Directors adopted a policy to forge partnerships with NGOs in 1981 that donors started
redirecting their funding from the national governments to local NGOs in developing
countries. Over time, development initiatives have led to four successive generations of
NGOs: relief and welfare, small scale local development and empowerment, institutional
and policy change and, most recent, complex networks and international and national
advocacy (Fowler 1997).

The decision resembled a political statement of distrust in the capabilities and integrity of
the official apparatus (Mitlin, Hickey and Bebbington 2007). Succinctly stated, “the
government is seen by many as a source of problems rather than as a solution [...]
favoring political ends rather than development concerns” (Kharas 2007: 4). NGOs
became the favored alternative for a number of reasons. First, advocates of this approach
argued that NGOs are able to efficiently deliver results at a cheaper cost than the private
sector and with less coordination expenses than the government. Second, NGOs are able
to more readily accommodate donor preferences than are governments (Stiles 2002).
Third, NGOs’ values also make them natural vehicles of inspired change. These
organizations are perceived to be the ‘good guys’ with whom donors could partner to
reinstate the legitimacy of assistance in developing countries. Finally, it is easier for
funders to dissolve a government-NGO or donor-NGO relationship than it is to dissolve
complicated and binding bilateral government-government or donor-government
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agreements (Smith and Lipsky 1993; Robinson 1995; Edwards and Hulme 1996; Kharas
2007; Van Rooy 1998; Thomas 2008).

Impulses of Development
Three main impulses in the policy environment have shaped the NGO sector worldwide
and stimulated its evolution. The first impulse is globalization. The end of the cold war
led to the rise of a multi-polar world with several international forums for
communication. Vast developments in technology and communication have also
propelled globalization. These developments opened a global organizational space for
interaction and activism (Anheier and Salamon 2006; Boli 2006). The integration of a
global culture of universalism and world citizenship became dominant; a new class of
educated elites frustrated by lack of political and economic opportunities emerged. The
ideology of global corporations and market capitalism expanded to “[undercut] traditional
social institutions that might offer potential resistance to powerful market forces and
weaken[ed] support of state institutions that might tax capital on behalf of disadvantage”
(Anheier and Salamon 2006: 105).

The second impulse is democratization and social capital. Studying government
decentralization in Italy, scholars concluded that political stability, government
effectiveness, and economic growth were higher in regions where civic engagement and
levels of trust were also higher; these features were traced back to the presence and
activism of voluntary associations in Northern Italy (Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti
1993). NGOs’ role in building social capital has become consequential; they are
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increasingly considered to be a social capital asset, particularly in terms of “bonding”
social capital (Bryce 2006).

The third impulse is a growing emphasis on efficiency and effectiveness. The motive here
is arguably the availability of different alternatives and choices to citizens. Under the
New Public Management paradigm, government is to steer rather than row and provide
public services though outsourcing and/or partnerships. NGOs were identified as
alternative providers of public services, and particularly services pertaining to socialwelfare problems (Osborne and Gaebler 1992; Terry 1998; Pearce 2000; Kettl 2002).
Thus, NGOs were pulled into market dynamics and found themselves at the center of
debates about the role of government.

Within this last impulse lie recent efforts made by industrial countries to harmonize
development assistance and make donor aid more effective and responsive to the needs of
developing countries. Such efforts came in response to growing public scrutiny of
development assistance. Two key milestones are the Paris Declaration on Aid
Effectiveness (2005) and the Accra Agenda for Action (2008). These efforts focused on
adhering to and applying the principles of local ownership, national priorities and
development strategies, harmonization of donor practices, mutual accountability, and
results management. It is expected that these efforts will result in more authentic,
realistic, and sustainable development, as well as a more effective aid process.
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The Nature of the NGOs-Donors Relationship
One of the peculiarities of development is the reliance on international donors for policies
and funding. Development managers in developing countries, including NGOs, face a
critical dilemma. They must maintain a consistent stance on values that emphasize selfdetermination, empowerment, and an equitable distribution of benefits, while also acting
to fulfill the political agendas of donors who act on their own national interests (Hook
1995; Brinkerhoff and Coston 1999; Martens 2008). This dilemma dominates the NGOdonor relationships.

Approaches to the Relationship
It is hard to make generalizations about the nature of the relationship between donors and
their recipient local partner organizations. NGOs play many roles in the relationship, such
as implementers of donors’ policies and programs, catalysts of change in their respective
communities, and partners in the development process and aid industry (Carroll 1992;
Evans 1996; Lewis 2001). Although the degree of agency and autonomy varies among
these categories, donors usually dominate the relationship.

The supply-led approach is the most dominant in the donor-NGOs relationship. Donors
have interests to accommodate besides those of their beneficiaries (Martens 2008). In the
realist perspective on foreign assistance, precedence is given to the donor’s national
interests. Development assistance and aid policies are seen as tools for implementing the
foreign policies of donor countries. Easterly (2007) argues, “the prevalence of ineffective
plans is the result of Western assistance happening out of view of the Western public”
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(17). In their study on who gives to whom and for what, Alesina and Dollar (2000: 55)
confirm that aid allocations are “very effective at promoting strategic interests [of
donors], but the result is that bilateral aid has only a weak association with poverty,
democracy, and good policy.”

Mitchell (1991) argues that development is crippled by those who claim to support it.
Donors situate themselves outside of the local context, while in reality they are an
integral part of it. Specifically, donor agencies approach recipient countries as objects and
conceive themselves as outsiders “[standing] above the map… to measure and make
plans” (Mitchell 1991: 30). Not only are donor agencies acting as governmental
organizations executing the policies of their countries, they are also key players in
shaping the national policies of aid recipient countries. Donor agencies shape the national
policies of recipient countries directly and indirectly by negotiating priorities and
controlling aid. They also establish direct and indirect partnerships and networks with
local actors, which leads to, in some cases, the introduction of programs and strategies at
odds with the local environment, and in other cases, the reinforcement of existing social
and economic inequalities.

The process of goal displacement can be insidious. Bebbington (2004) uses the term
‘intentional’ development to describe international aid channeled into programs with
specific goals set by donor agencies and their partners—including NGOs. Carothers and
Ottaway (2000) note that the donors follow the same approach everywhere; funding
objectives are created in donors’ headquarters, a completely different context and
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environment than where programs will be implemented (Lindenberg and Bryant 2001).
Some of the assistance programs take what the local people are familiar with and actually
know and formulate it into well-developed ideas that appeal to funding strategies and fit
within current development paradigms. The local people become sole recipients of
assistance instead of being the agents of change (Schlesinger 2007: 60).

This is coupled with changes in the political economy of aid. Development assistance
retains a spotlight in the international policy agenda, but must jockey for resources and
attention amidst concerns around peace, security, and anti-terrorism (Bryant and Kappaz
2005). The general commitment to aid is being challenged. With a new global poverty
agenda, countries had to review their funding strategies and aid distribution (Bebbington
2004; Malhotra 2000). NGOs had to ‘explore market-based approaches to development’
to sustain funding for services provision. More emphasis has been placed on the scrutiny
of funds, and consequently on demonstrating evidence about the impact of development
programs.

Arguably, the intended result was to quickly find success stories, satisfy the interests of
donors, and demonstrate impacts to secure additional funding. However, some argue that
these funding procedures and evaluation requirements incentivize ‘quick wins’ and ‘lowhanging fruit’ rather than investments that will yield more effective results over the long
run (Robinson 1995; Brinkerhoff and Coston 1999). These views align with Bebbington’s
(2004) criticisms and Easterly’s (2007) observation that donors opt for non-risky and
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low-return interventions that are highly visible to their constituencies as a means of
protecting the development industry.

In one example of implementing agencies and fund-recipients, western donors launched
the ‘NGO-isation’ of Kenyan society “as part of an ambitious attempt at societal
engineering to redefine the central relationships between the state, society and external
actors” (Hearn 1998: 90). NGOs have become more motivated to demonstrate some
impacts and satisfy their funders (Schlesinger 2007); they became less encouraged to
expand their networks or localities of services or to reach the less poor (who are usually
less accessible). Bebbington (2004) duly describes geographies of development
intervention, where development becomes concentrated in the areas where intervening
NGOs have already established networks. The result is that the same group of people is
continuously targeted with development initiatives, limiting the breadth of impact.
Development does not have the snowball effect that is hoped for.

This effect has become more evident as social and economic exclusion has become
complexly intertwined with the geopolitical priorities of peace and stability (and
counterterrorism); all of these priorities are now presented as a single, integrated package
in development initiatives (De Haan and Maxwell 1998; Bryant and Kappaz 2005). Many
donors condition their assistance on how funding is dispersed, who is going to benefit—
or more likely who should be excluded—and how programs are implemented (Chambers
and Pettit 2004). Many observers would link the purpose of selecting a certain locale or a
specific program to the source of funding; had it been a different funder, the targeted
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group and/or area would have been different. This political sensitivity of foreign aid
undermines sustainability of efforts (Basombrío 2000). Again, it is a challenge to
reconcile foreign assistance agendas and procedures with what is actually needed to
promote socio-economic status of the beneficiaries (Brinkerhoff and Coston 1999).

The second approach in the donor-NGOs relationship is the demand-led model. Golub
(2000) calls for more “home-grown ideas of individuals and organizations most likely to
blend dedication, innovation and flexibility” (158). After all, “development happens
mainly through homegrown efforts” (Easterly 2007: 29). In a demand-led model, NGOs
assume responsibility and take the initiative in designing and presenting their agenda and
preferences; donor agencies would then place “consolidated resources at the disposal of
local institutions that decide on and own the uses to which they are put” (Edwards,
Hulme and Wallace 1999: 123). This recipient-donor approach is a process of mutual
learning, transparency and participation, and equal partnership (Ottaway 2000; Doornbos
2003).

The demand-led model in the donor-NGO relationship is participatory. Participation
challenges any monopoly in development and plays an essential role in creating local
buy-in, targeting efforts to community needs, enhancing chances of sustainability and
appropriateness of initiatives, and ensuring the voice of NGOs and their accountability to
beneficiaries (Escobar 1995; Michener 1998; Scott 1998; Doornbos 2003; Easterly 2007;
Chambers 2007). In this approach, “NGOs appear rather immune to strategic
considerations, as the influence of the institutional donor that funds them is very weak
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[…] and seem to keep up their promise of being advocates of the poor and vulnerable”
(Nancy and Yontcheva 2006: 16). This approach has received less attention compared to
the supply-led approach, since, admittedly, it is rare in the world of development aid.

The Management of the Relationship
According to Lewis (2001), NGOs face a challenge in the management of their interorganizational relations, as they need to develop relations where they can both influence
and be influenced by others. Accordingly, the management of donor-NGO relations can
yield rigid patterns of partners and priorities.

The dominant supply-led approach in the donor-NGOs relationship has serious
management implications for NGOs. A salient feature of the relationship is the role of
intermediaries (Van Rooy and Robinson 1998; Stiles 2002; Martens 2008). In several
cases, Northern NGOs are brought into the ‘aid chain’ to serve as a link between the
donor and the recipient organizations, while indigenous intermediary NGOs “usually act
as brokers with local groups at the grassroots level” (Smith 1998: 217; Oller 2006). On
one hand, intermediary NGOs carry out activities, provide technical assistance, help build
the capacity of domestic organizations, and buffer the demands and render advice on
implementation to the donors. On the other hand, a hierarchy is erected in the aid
industry: “such relationships are usually vertical or of the ‘patron-client’ type, as
Northern NGOs are not willing to decentralize decision-making or allow negotiation
among the parties” (Koslinski and Reis 2009: 716). Such a hierarchy entails a certain
degree of control over the flow of resources, as well as the exchange of information, and
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imposes additional overhead costs as the recipient country becomes oversaturated with
Northern NGOs and their foreign personnel or local staffs who are attracted away from
the NGO and public sectors (Smillie 1995; Smith 1998; Lister 2000; Sanyal 2006;
Birdsall 2008).

Furthermore, the dire economic situation in developing countries increases the supply of
qualified human resources. With the availability of funding, local NGOs recruit and train
personnel at competitive rates mainly to solicit grants (Henderson 2002; Petras and
Veltmeyer 2001). There are several associated risks in such an approach. First, the donors
have come to satisfy “an economic survival strategy for many middle-class intellectuals
and professionals” (Ishkanian 2006: 737), which makes it hard for organizations to resist
donors’ interests. Second, as Knack and Rahman (2008) reprove, less qualified personnel
are available to the public sector. Third, there is an overlooked aspect of internal power
struggle within the NGOs between grant writers and fund solicitors on the one hand, and
employees and volunteers who have been with the organization for extended period
working at much lower rates on the other. Fourth, there is a revolving door between local
NGOs and donor missions or intermediary organizations; the donors become interested in
recruiting qualified local staff experienced in the NGO sector and can provide inside
information and insights (Stiles 2002). In short, in addition to their financial autonomy
being jeopardized, NGOs risk losing their human capital.

Another implication is that the relationship is principally one-way: NGOs serve as
contractors to donors for their preferred channel of funding (Vakil 1997). There has been
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a huge push on behalf of donors towards professionalism in the NGO sector in
developing countries. Professionalism comes in different forms and shades:
standardization, planning, evaluation, monitoring, and reporting (Mawdsley, Townsend,
Porter and Oakley 2002; Wallace, Bornstein, and Chapman 2006). While the push was
framed in terms of promoting greater managerial and policy expertise for NGOs, and
transparency and efficiency in the appropriation of funding, several studies showed that
NGOs were diverted from their main focus to attend to these time-consuming, culturallyinsensitive, and complicated quantifiable data systems and procedures, which together
depleted good intentions or purposes (Antrobus 1987; Carroll 1992; Perera 1997;
Carothers and Ottaway 2000; Henderson 2002; Markowitz and Tice 2002; Jellinek 2003;
Martens 2008).

It is often overlooked that the aid chain in itself is set up in a way that undermines
effectiveness and transparency. Svensson (2008) argues that there is a broken feedback
loop between beneficiaries in developing countries who receive the aid and taxpayers in
developed countries who fund aid. This broken loop allows donor agencies to manipulate
information and exaggerate results and success stories to satisfy their voters and elected
officials (Easterly 2007). The same argument can be made down the aid chain. There is a
broken loop between donor agencies and beneficiaries, regardless of the donors’ strong
presence in the recipient country. NGOs serve as brokers and benefit from the broken
loop to magnify and exalt the work they are doing and the impact the donor funding is
generating (Ebrahim 2005b).
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Dependency Trap and Uncertainty in the Relationship
Some argue that the donor-NGO relationship becomes trapped in dependency, where the
same funder continues to work with the same group of NGOs (Bebbington 2004; Hearn
1998). This aid cycle becomes exclusive and restricted. More alarming is the fact that
“poverty concentration is not the primary factor determining the geographies of the
resource flows” (Bebbington 2004: 733).

The geographies of NGO interventions have become further restricted (Bebbington
2004); policies intended to serve the poor and needy became watered down so as to
include some benefits for the better off, and/or to have those benefits diverted away from
the poor during implementation. The interest in immediately quantifiable outcomes and
small superficial changes dilutes attention from quality of results, long-term sustainable
impact, and systemic changes (Lindenberg and Bryant 2001; Markowitz and Tice 2002).
Barr and Fafchamps’s (2006) research on Uganda and Fruttero and Gauri’s (2005) work
on Bangladesh show a clustering of NGOs and their interventions. Koch, Dreher,
Nunnenkamp, and Thiele (2009) confirm Bebbington’s (2004) observation in their study
on the allocation of projects by NGOs. The authors conclude that NGOs do not
complement, but rather replicate, the work of national governments; more importantly,
they follow other NGOs, resulting in aid being clustered.

Stiles’s (2002) research on NGOs in Bangladesh provides more support to the argument
that NGOs have become part of ‘transnational networks’ that traverse national and
geographical boundaries. Institutional histories (including religious missionaries),
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political tendencies and ideologies, personal relations, and social networks have led to the
inclusion of these local organizations, along with international donor agencies and
various domestic private organizations, in what Stiles (2002) identifies as the ‘intermestic
development circles’. These social structures gradually emerge from an initiation stage to
institutionalization and finally to maturation.

The initiation stage is characterized by bargaining and negotiation, and usually potential
conflict and disputes. Each side expresses interests and outlines goals though projects.
Donors always want to do more with less, while NGOs aim for more with more (Stiles
2002). Institutionalization is characterized by basic contract arrangements when the
donor approves funding and the NGO commences to work on a project that is monitored
and evaluated by the donor. NGOs are driven toward institutionalization,
bureaucratization, and professionalization, reflecting donors’ practices in terms of
managerial accounting and reporting systems. More important is the development of
personal relations between donors and NGOs, and donors’ attempts to bridge partner
organizations and encourage them to collaborate (Chambre 2001; Ebaugh, Chafetz, and
Pipes 2005; McCarthy 2004; Vanderwoerd 2004).

The prolonged relationship of ongoing interaction and coordination signals a possibility
to move to the maturation stage, a stage that often distinguishes among so-called ‘donor
darlings’ and ‘donor orphans’ (Koch et al. 2009). This stage of maturation is
distinguished by a coherent social structure that separates itself from the rest of society.
All members of the donor-NGO circle undergo certain changes to fit within the emerging
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structure; however, the degree of change is relative. Donors must reposition themselves
to accommodate the demands of others members; however, the change they undergo is
subtle compared to that initiated by domestic organizations. Stiles (2002) calls this
change the ‘universalization of like-mindedness’, where the policies and objectives of
donors and domestic organizations start to converge or reflect each other.

On the receiver end, NGOs are compelled to dramatically transform their operation and
organizational cultures to the extent that they lose much of their local identity, as well as
their touch with constituents. For example, Chambre (2001), Ebaugh, Chafetz, and Pipes
(2005) and Vanderwoerd (2004) argued that faith-based organizations did not only
adopted professional practices but also became more secular due to reliance on external
funding. The further down the maturation stage, the less is the ability of these NGOs to
work on their own and compete for resources. Participants in the circle become relatively
less attached to actors that are peripheral to the circle (Stiles 2002). The circle then gets
smaller, rotating around only a few of the many players. With the convergence of donor
objectives, these organizations inevitably merge or form a long-term consortium to do
work.

Inconsistency in the Relationship
Within this dependency lies inconsistency. The NGO-donor relationship is especially
volatile because of the inconsistency in donors’ funding and the consequent confusion
and instability among partner organizations. Landell-Mills (1992) emphasized that
“external funding should always take the form of supplementary assistance and ought
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never be the main source of what is needed” (Landell-Mills 1992: 554). Otherwise, the
sustainability of the organization becomes highly questionable.

In developing countries, “donors develop their programs, preferences and priorities and
revise them at an ever-increasing pace, while (at best) NGOs try to figure out how they
might fit in or if they meet the criteria underlying the latest preoccupation of donors”
(Doornbos 2003: 15). This tendency is also found in developed countries among
philanthropic foundations that “shift funding priorities rapidly and dramatically on a
continuing basis, leaving funded agencies in the lurch” (Grønbjerg, Martell and Paarlberg
2000: 25). Frequent fluctuation in funding priorities entrenches uncertainty in the
surrounding environment of the NGOs and leads to additional pressure on and confusion
among these organizations (Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen 2003). Extant
research on nonprofits has noted the incongruence between the goals of nonprofits and
the interests of funders, whether corporations or individuals or governments (Alexander
1996, 1998; Barman 2008; DiMaggio 1986a, 1986b; Edwards and Hulme 1996;
Grønbjerg 1993; Milofsky and Blades 1991; Ostrander and Schervish 1990). This
incongruence might be on basic issues such as the format and content of museum
exhibition (Alexander 1996) or on substantial policy options such as fighting health
epidemics (Morfit 2011).

The consequences take different forms. As the disjuncture between the interests of
nonprofits and funders increases, the flexibility and discretion of allocating resources that
the funder used to enjoy further expand (Alexander 1998; DiMaggio 1986a, 1986b).
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Another consequence is the drive towards changes in the governance, management, and
culture of recipient organizations. Here we are talking about the adoption of
professionalism in the work of nonprofits (Mawdsley, Townsend et al. 2002; Wallace et
al. 2006), changes in governance structure (Guo 2007), and modifications in
organizational culture (Chambre 2001; Ebaugh et al. 2005; Stiles 2002; Vanderwoerd
2004). Another consequence of the incongruence between funders’ interests and
nonprofits’ missions is a growing trend toward ‘designation’, by which a funder earmarks
or specifies where the contribution is to be spent and which beneficiaries are to be
targeted, instead of allocating an unrestricted grant (Barman 2008; Grønbjerg et al. 2000;
Helms, Henkin, and Murray 2005). Such a practice is at the heart of international
development assistance, evidenced through the conditionality of grants in terms of
targeted (and excluded) beneficiaries and locales and types of services to be delivered or
brands of products purchased (Basombrío 2000; Brinkerhoff and Coston 1999; Chambers
and Pettit 2004). The most critical consequence is that as the NGO adjusts and conforms
to the agendas, expectations, and interests of donors, it loses touch with its mission and
constituency. Froelich (1999) defines this practice as goal displacement, which “occurs
when goals and activities are modified to satisfy the wishes of contributors” (250).

When an NGO shifts its programs to appeal to and appease the donor’s appetite, its role
and practices are “determined … by donor fashion and demands according to ideas and
designs imposed and imported from outside” (Edwards, Hulme and Wallace 1999: 130).
Despite an NGO’s candid emphasis on or attempt to serve beneficiaries, NGOs’ reliance
on foreign resources shifts their sights and priorities to align with donor interests
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(Chambers and Pettit 2004). In the expressively titled article, ‘AIDS is Money’, Morfit
(2011) asserts that to maintain credibility and viability among international donors, SubSaharan African NGOs had to ‘do AIDS’ because this was the priority of international
funders. While the status of these NGOs rose vis-à-vis other organizations working on
other sectors, attention was also diverted away from other critical problems faced by
African communities (Morfit 2011). Thus, when the NGO sector becomes heavily
dependent on donor agencies, such as in Kenya where 90% of NGOs’ funds come from
foreign aid (Hearn 1998), NGOs find themselves in a dependency trap; “they needed the
financial resources provided by donors in order to survive” (Bieber 2002: 27).

Because they are dependent on inconsistent donor funding, NGOs have to struggle with
balancing normative development imperatives and institutional imperatives. Most
theories on nonprofits (Weisbrod 1977, 1998; Hansmann 1980, 1996; Salamon 1999;
Wagner 2000; Clemens 2006; Smith and Grønbjerg 2006;) directly or indirectly highlight
a normative imperative as a bottom line approach that compensates for the failures of
other sectors, empowers marginalized groups, encourages voice, focuses on stakeholders,
highlights flexibility and risk taking, and invests in impact-oriented programs towards
long term goals that ensure sustainability and critical mass. However, institutional
imperatives lead to a hierarchical relationship, with bureaucratization and duplication of
initiatives, falloff in flexibility and innovation, a compromised ability to articulate ideas
and values, a critical suspicion by and isolation from local interests, loss of small-scale
comparative advantage, and conflicting accountability mechanisms (Sanayal 1997;
Carothers and Ottaway 2000; Edwards 2008).
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The abundance and inconsistency of funding constitute a twofold risk. Abundance of
funding might attract “unscrupulous organizations possessing agendas which are
antithetical” to donors’ priorities or to the community’s needs and interests (Robinson
1995: 76). Inconsistency in funding exhausts NGOs and forces them to pay attention to
donors rather than to their consistencies. Here is the problem. NGOs could capture the
voice of the people instead of echoing that voice (Edwards and Hulme 1996; Edwards
2008).

Edwards (2008) uses the ‘elephant in the room’ metaphor to describe the current situation
of the NGO sector. Basically, foreign aid channeled to and through NGOs might become
oversized—like an elephant in a small room. It is hard to get the elephant out of the room
and a challenge to deal with the elephant inside the room. I invite you to use some
imagination here. If the elephant does not move, we should be concerned; but if the
elephant does move, then we have a problem: we need to see where and how it is moving
to know how we should move and where we should position ourselves.

This simple analogy is what this dissertation tries to unveil. If a donor agency (the
elephant) decides to switch or shift the focus of its funding (move) as it clearly does, how
does an NGO working with that donor react? How does the NGO move, and where does
it position itself? Two assumptions are recognized here. First, the ‘elephant’ metaphor
does not suggest there is one single elephant. Typically there are multiple donor agencies
operating on the same ground at the same time. The second assumption is that with
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several elephants in the room, the distance from these elephants is not the same. It is very
likely that an NGO takes different positions vis-à-vis different donors; after all, there is a
certain degree of uniqueness in organizational relationships. Nevertheless, there might be
a certain degree of correlation between these relationships.

Brouwer (2000), Doornbos (2003), Hanafi and Tabar (2003), and Rahman (2006) make
the argument that shifts in donor funding have transformed the NGO sector in developing
countries. The transformation is perceived as being holistic and deterministic in that a
single NGO cannot swim against the flow and has to exhibit the same behavior as others.
However, this might not be—and is more likely not—the case. One way to understand
NGOs’ behavior is to consider shifts in funding as a form of deterioration in a
relationship between a consumer (NGO) and a producer (donor). Consequently, this
dissertation—and the following section—turns to Hirschman’s (1970) individual selfinterest theory.

INDIVIDUAL SELF-INTEREST THEORY:
EXIT-VOICE-LOYALTY
Forty years after its publication, A.O. Hirschman’s (1970) Exit, Voice, and Loyalty:
Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States retains popularity, potency, and
simplicity in its ability to explain discontent with and deterioration in existing personal,
professional, organizational, and economic relationships. According to Hirschman
(1970), to address a decrease in quality or associated benefit of a certain service provided
by an organization, an individual can exit, express voice, or remain loyal. These
responses are discussed below.
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Exit and Voice
Given a deteriorating quality services or benefits provided by an organization,
Hirschman’s (1970) typology postulates that an individual customer can make the neat
and impersonal decision to exit: that is, the customer can use the market to defend her/his
welfare and shift to another organization. Alternatively, rather than to escaping from it,
the consumer can attempt to repair or improve the relationship by exercising voice and
communicating a complaint or proposal for change to the organization.

Hirschman (1970) equates exit primarily with market systems and voice primarily with
political systems, but finds applications and combinations of the two concepts in both
fields. Exit is favored by economists as a predictable, individual, self-interested choice,
while voice is a political action par excellence; moreover, exit is a dichotomous variable,
while voice is a continuous variable (Dowding, John, Mergoupis and Van Vugt 2000).
More specifically, “voice is a far more messy because it can be graduated […]; it implies
the articulation of one’s critical options rather than a private secret vote” (Hirschman
1970: 16).

Although exit is the more dominant response, both reactions are of strictly equal rank and
importance. This creates tension between exit and voice in several cases. To Hirschman,
exit and voice are not always available simultaneously. When both options exist, exit will
be more likely affected by the perception of effectiveness of voice as an option. If
consumers are “sufficiently convinced that voice will be effective, then they may well
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postpone exit... [T]herefore, exit can also be viewed as depending on the ability and
willingness [….] to take up the voice option... Once you have exited, you have lost the
opportunity for voice, but not vice versa” (Hirschman 1970: 37). Gehlbach (2006) agrees:
“the more discontent is dissipated through exit from the organization, the less likely it is
to manifest itself in voice within the organization” (Gehlbach 2006: 395). In short,
selecting exit because it is an easier and less costly response means that consumers will
not have the opportunity to become familiar with and practice voice as a mechanism for
expressing discontent (Dowding et al. 2000; Light, Castellblanch, Arredondo, and
Socolar 2003).

The Choice between Exit and Voice
The choice of mode between exit and voice depends to a large extent on the elasticity of
demand for a particular product or service; “if demand is inelastic then the exit signals of
consumers’ concerns about quality deterioration will not appear; if demand is very elastic
and exit too spontaneous the firm may not have time to react before bankruptcy”
(Dowding et al. 2000: 470). Other factors affecting the choice between exit and voice
include: the stage and form of deterioration in product quality or relationship; the
readiness to trade certainties of exit with uncertainties of voice; the extent of dedicated
investments and opportunities; the availability (or lack) of standards and mechanisms for
interfacing with the organization; the availability and access to information by consumers
or members; the price of entry and reentry; and the penalty for a certain response or
behavior (Dowding et al. 2000; Farrell and Rusbult 1981; Gehlbach 2006; Hirschman
1970; Light et al. 2003; Matland 1995; Nooteboom 1999). To illustrate, using game
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theory to analyze the collapse of East German communism, Gehlbach (2006) explains
that the high cost associated with expressing voice and discontent in East Germany
(execution or concentration camps) outbalanced the life-threatening risk of crossing the
Berlin Wall to the West (the penalty on exit). In West Germany, those immigrants
automatically became normalized citizens and were allowed to retain their language and
culture; the price of entry was low.

The choice is also dependent on available capabilities. Voice requires bargaining power
and the accessibility of various mechanisms, such as access to and availability of
information, adequate communication structures, and a certain degree of trust and
openness (Hirschman 1970; Nooteboom 1999; Dowding et al. 2000; Gehlbach 2006).
Hirschman (1970) argues that in developing countries, for example, voice is less
practiced due to such factors as limited choices and scarcity of resources and information
(Hirschman 1970). On another hand, Groenewegen (1997) makes the observation that the
“exit model applies, to a greater or lesser extent, to Anglo-American countries, and the
voice model applies, to a greater or lesser extent, to continental European countries and
Japan” (Groenewegen 1997 in Nooteboom 1999: 846-7). This is due to differences in the
legal, economic, and market structures among the counties, although globalization makes
this distinction increasingly blurry.

Specifically, the less significant factors impeding exit as an option, the less likely voice
will be used; “exit drives out voice and assumes a disproportionate share of the burden
involved in guiding the firm back to efficiency after the initial lapse” (Hirschman 1970:
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120). In some cases, Hirschman argues, voice is a complement of exit; in other cases, it
substitutes for exit. Exit can increase the effectiveness of voice because it increases
bargaining power. Members of an organization can manipulate management by
threatening to exit the organization if the situation does not improve; they can also use
the exit decision of another member to their benefit to exert such pressure (Farrell and
Rusbult 1992; Dowding et al. 2000; Light et al. 2003; Gehlbach 2006). Voice, hence, is
most effective when “backed up by the threat of exit” (Hirschman 1970: 82).
Nevertheless, management may not concede but rather encourage exit for two reasons.
First, management is interested in reducing pressure from within; by encouraging exit,
internal demands drop. Second, if we buy the argument that threatening to exit increases
voice, management should also be interested in the threat being ignited to a certain limit
to restore voice among members (Gehlbach 2006).

However, one should be careful here. The distinction between exit and voice, as
alternatives, is not always sharp. Three arguments are made towards this end. First,
referring to the literature on whistle blowing, Hoffmann (2006) provides evidence of the
tension between voice and exit. Dissatisfied members of an organization attempt to
remedy the situation from the inside through expressing voice, but might then go outside
the organization and whistle blow (Hoffmann 2006; Kato 1998). It is not clear here
whether voice becomes a pure form of exit and consequently demonstrates a destructive
attitude among members who practice voice by going outside the organization (exit) to
whistle blow.
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Second, Gehlbach (2006) draws on the case of East Germany before the fall of Berlin
Wall to argue that voice and exit could develop simultaneously; this is specifically the
case when private information supposedly restricted to leaders becomes public in a way
that “the leadership’s response to exit may provide information about its willingness to
crack down on voice” (Gehlbach 2006: 412). Consequently, both modes (exit and voice)
are shaped and refined by the public.

Third, Dowding and colleagues (2000) assert that exit and voice are not exclusive. Some
people exit by practicing voice or practice voice by exiting to express their complaints;
voice through whistle blowing is a good example here (Hoffmann 2006; Kato 1998).
Therefore, there is not as clear a line between voice and exit as Hirschman (1970) wanted
to draw. This issue is exacerbated because Hirschman (1970) focuses more on the
behavior as an outcome and unit of analysis and not as a process leading to the outcome.
People may try and move between modes of behavior. They may choose voice first and
wait to see if they were successful in conveying their complaints (Rusbult, Farrell,
Rogers, and Mainous 1988; Withey and Cooper 1989; Dyck and Starke 1999). That is
why Dowding and colleagues (2000) propose a decision tree to understand the
deliberative process and not just the modes of actions and to analyze the final outcome
and associated repercussions (Light et al. 2003). The point of departure should be voice,
since practicing exit does not require further action by the organization.
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Loyalty
In addition to exit and voice, Hirschman (1970) acknowledges a third distinct behavior:
loyalty. There are consumers who are attached to a product or its provider and decide to
continue pursuing the service despite any dissatisfaction; they “suffer in silence,
confident that things will soon get better” (Hirschman 1970: 38). This behavior is called
loyalty. Loyalty “means strong attachment to an organization that does not seem to
warrant such attachment because it is so much like another one that is also available”
(Hirschman 1970: 81).

Hirschman left his discussion of loyalty underdeveloped, opening the door for a
continuous debate on the concept. Scholars do not see eye to eye on this specific mode
(Dowding, et al. 2000; Whitney and Rusbelt 1995; Gehlbach 2006; Leck and Saunders
1992; Organ 1988; Withey and Cooper 1989). Hoffmann (2006) succinctly summarizes
the debate: “sometimes loyalty is defined as a possible action, while others read loyalty as
a contingency that shapes outcomes, rather than an outcome itself” (2314).

Referring to Hirschman’s (1970) statement that “a member with a considerable
attachment to a product or organization will often search for ways to make himself
influential” (77), Dowding and colleagues (2000) argue that there are two concepts of
loyalty that are inherently different: ‘loyalty to a product’ and ‘loyalty to an organization’
(476). One major difference between attached to a product and being attached to an
organization has to do with the associated dynamics of exit and voice. Even if one is
attached to a product as a matter of preference, an alternative to that particular product is
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likely to be easily found; thus, a smooth and silent exit is both possible and practical. In
contrast, it is not as easy to forge a new relationship with another organization; thus,
voice is a more practical option. These associated dynamics and implications prompt
reconsideration of loyalty as a mode of reaction.

Leck and Saunders (1992) explicate interpretations of loyalty and suggest renaming it as
patience. In their view, loyalty could be an attitude that deters exit and promotes voice or
a distinct behavior that results from dissatisfaction, not different from exit and voice. In
the first case, a consumer who is loyal to a producer is more likely to be inclined to work
on remedying a deteriorating situation through expressing voice than switching to another
producer (Withey and Cooper 1989). In the second case, loyalty is a much more passive
behavior of blind commitment and personal investment in the organization or product
(Rusbult, Zembrodt, and Gunn 1982). However, the dispute of loyalty as an alternative to
exit and voice remains; “loyalty is less visible than the other responses” (Drigota,
Whitney, and Rusbelt 1995: 596), especially when the focus is on behavioral responses to
dissatisfaction rather than on the psychological conditions that more adequately
characterize loyalty (Withey and Cooper 1989). Loyalty should thus be understood as
both; it helps to redress the balance between voice and exit as much as it characterizes a
distinctive reaction (Hirschman 1970: 80). This interpretation becomes clearer in the
concept of unconscious loyalist behavior that is “free from felt discontent [and] will not
lead to voice” (Hirschman 1970: 91). Unconscious loyalist behavior is highly prized by
organizations.
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Finally, Hirschman (1970) “is concerned with the interrelationships of these options and
asks whether pursuing the voice option diminishes the possibility of adopting the loyalty
option” (O’Leary 2006: 13). Voice and loyalty are far from independent. On one hand,
“the likelihood of voice increases with the degree of loyalty” (Hirschman 1970: 77); on
the other hand, the distinction between the two becomes blurry when “the conviction that
one has to stay on to prevent the worst grows stronger all the time” (Hirschman 1970:
103). This is evident in behaviors that are best described as opportunistic or when
“loyalists are especially vocal” (O’Leary 2006: 13). However, loyalty impedes voice
when the cost of exit is much greater, as the management of an organization does not find
the need to concede to complaints; it is when “loyalty is associated with less costly
exercise of voice [that] members may be better off if they are more loyal” (Gehlbach
2006: 397).

Exit-Voice-Loyalty In Application
The exit-voice-loyalty (E-V-L) typology has been broadly adopted with respect not only
to the economic market but also to sociopolitical values. The typology is frequently used
in studies of democracy, participation, and decentralization (Ackerman 2004; Andrews
2005; Dowding and John 2008; Feld 1997; Hirschman 1978; 1980; 1993; Moynihan
2007; Paul 1992; Sharp 1984, 1986; Wilson and Taub 2006). For more elaboration,
please refer to Appendix A.

The E-V-L typology became very popular in the field of human resources management,
specifically when Farrell and Rusbult (1981) and Farrell (1983) studied employee
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dissatisfaction. The typology then witnessed two major modifications. First, the typology
was extended beyond external organizational relationships, and applied to internal
organizational relationships between management and labor, (Nooteboom 1999). Second,
Farrell and Rusbult (1981) and Farrell (1983) expanded the typology by adding neglect.
Neglect is defined as “passively allowing conditions to deteriorate through reduced
interest or effort, chronic lateness or absences, using company time for personal business,
or increased error rate” (Farrell and Rusbult 1981: 202). Such a behavior leads to
“developing negative attitudes to the partner or relation” (Dowding et al. 2000: 480),
which makes neglect closer to exit than to voice (or loyalty).

Rusbult and Farrell (1982) and Rusbult and Zembrodt (1983) pointed out three
determinants of employees’ response to dissatisfaction: 1) the degree of satisfaction prior
to the emergence of the dissent; 2) the size of investment in the job; and, 3) the presence
of other alternatives. The authors postulate that greater prior satisfaction and greater
personal investment in the job will encourage voice and loyalty. On the other hand, the
presence of good alternatives provides opportunities for dissidents to engage in exit and
voice, since they will not be risking much of their security. This modified four-fold
typology has been used extensively to study employee dissatisfaction using different
models. The typology was further applied to romantic relations (for more, see Boroff and
Lewin 1997; Farrell 1983; Farrell and Rusbult 1992; Hoffmann 2006; Rusbult et al. 1982;
Rusbult, Johnson, and Morrow 1986; Rusbult, Farrell, Rogers and Mainous 1988;
Rusbult, Verette, Whitney, Slovik, and Lipkus 1991; Withey and Cooper 1989).
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O’Leary (2006) also revisits the typology in her book, The Ethics of Dissent: Managing
Guerrilla Government. The author argues that the dissent among public managers yields
a range of responses that are not captured by the modified typology. Specifically, the
conflict resolution literature suggests several additional responses to bad situations,
including avoidance, or not taking action; collaboration, through negotiation or thirdparty mediation; appeals to a higher authority, for example by referring the problem up
the chain of command; and unilateral power plays, exemplified by physical violence,
strikes, and so on. Finally, O’Leary (2006) suggests guerrilla government as a mode of
response to dissent (O’Leary 2006: 97). There are bureaucrats who neither quit their jobs
nor express their complaints internally or publicly; they are also not loyalists, passively
waiting for things to get better or passively detached from what is going on around them.
Rather, some bureaucrats are guerillas, working against decisions and orders from within.
According to O’Leary (2006: 90), guerrilla government is here to stay and its “potential
power to influence policy and programs is immense” (O’Leary 2006: 90).

In an attempt to further understand the typology and the interrelation of the various
modes of behavior, Lyons and Lowery (1986; 1989) find that the mode of behavior varies
in two ways: 1) the type of behavior (i.e., active or passive) and 2) the tendency or type
of expected attitudes (i.e., constructive or destructive). In terms of behavior type, exit and
voice require active behavior, either to stop the relationship or to communicate voice
through participation or voting. Loyalty and neglect demonstrate passive behavior and are
possible with minimal effort on the behalf of a dissatisfied consumer or member; a local
resident does not need to participate in local elections—or any other form of
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engagement—to express loyalty or neglect. These modes of behavior also differ in their
expected attitudes. Exit and neglect are negative or regime/organization-destructive since
they do not enhance the relation or the situation. Voice and loyalty are positive or
regime/organization-supportive since they are hopeful and reflect faith in the possible
reverse in the organization’s decline (Dowding et al. 2000; Dyck and Starke 1999; Lyons
and Lowery 1986).

The juxtaposition of the types of behavior and expected attitudes produces a matrix with
the four modes along two dimensions: active-passive and constructive-destructive.
According to Rusbult and colleagues (1991), “constructiveness/ destructiveness refers to
the impact of the response on the relationship, not to its effect on the individual [and]
activity and passivity refers to the impact of the response on the problem at hand, not to
the character of the behavior itself (Rusbult et al. 1991: 54). In this matrix, voice is
considered active-constructive; exit is active-destructive; loyalty is passive-constructive;
and neglect is passive-destructive. While this matrix has been widely used and praised, it
does not dismiss the possibility that voice, for example, might be destructive when
aggressively expressed, and that people can also exit one underprivileged social group to
move up in social mobility (Dowding et al. 2000). Moreover, Gammage (2004) argues
that the typology is uniquely gendered. Women are challenging traditional gender roles in
Haiti and contributing to an emerging transnationalism by practices of exit through
migration and expressions of voice and loyalty.
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In terms of nonprofits, Hirschman (1970) considers these to be examples of organizations
where both exit and voice are strongly practiced by members (Hirschman 1970: 121).
Pickvance (1987) refers to the typology to understand the relationship between the state
and nonprofit organizations through funding cuts of local governmental expenditures in
Britain. These findings reveal that perceptions of cost associated with exit and voice, and
not actual cost, hinder nonprofits’ ability to exercise these responses.

Elsewhere, the typology is partially utilized; Ebrahim (2003b) and Benjamin (2008) use
the typology to understand the NGO relationship with donors. Making sense of NGOs
accountability, Ebrahim (2003b) asserts that NGOs are limited to exit and voice as the
only mechanisms they use with donors; voice is expressed through exchange of
information and exit is practiced through suspension of funding. Benjamin (2008)
considers exit to be a consequence of funders rejecting the accounting records of granteeorganizations, whereas voice is neither an option nor a consequence. Finally, Anderson
(2007) studies choices of humanitarians under ‘tainted’ political and military conditions.
Exit and voice are both available to humanitarian workers and volunteers. This
availability creates a potential of increasing the capacity of these human elements
towards exerting influence and improving the situation for those living under oppressive
or inhumane arrangements.

More Variations on Exit and Voice
Hirschman’s (1970) typology continues to witness further elaboration, with scholars
developing several variations, especially around exit and voice. Dowding and John (2008)
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and Farrell and Rusbult (1992) explored mild variations of exit through the practice of
voice, for example threatening to exit or expressing the intent to exit. Hirschman (1970:
86) offers boycotting as an example of a “phenomenon on the borderline between voice
and exit.” Boycotting is used by consumers who are dissatisfied with a certain
relationship, but do not have available alternatives. The clearest example is with certain
public goods that are impossible to exit, such as security or education. In some cases,
boycotting involves practicing loud voice to express dissatisfaction and force the
organization to take actions. In other cases, boycotting leads to loud voice followed by
exit—such is the case of whistle blowing, which begins with voice and becomes a pure
form of exit (Hoffmann 2006).

Similarly, Lehman-Wilzig (1991) and Mizrahi and Meydani (2003) entertain the idea of
‘quasi-exit.’ In some cases, the inability to exit or express voice leads those dissatisfied
with the efficacy of public goods to create an alternative supply source. An illustrative
example is Mizrahi and Meydani’s (2003) work on the political role of the Supreme
Court in Israel. The authors observe the behavior of citizens who no longer use or believe
in the efficiency and efficacy of democratic practices, and who are definitely unable or
unwilling to exit the society. Those citizens use legal channels to express dissatisfaction
and to reverse the decline in the political system. Instead of using available processes and
participating in elections, dissatisfied citizens partially exit these common political
mechanisms and instead appeal to the courts for a specific and explicit purpose. This
quasi-exit creates a substitute supply of a certain public good, i.e., democracy, to
accommodate dissatisfaction and demands (Mizrahi and Meydani 2003).
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Variations of voice have also been generated. Several probes of this mode of behavior
have been undertaken, using different approaches. The first approach is based on the
reaction of the management. In their study of breakaway organizations, Dyck and Starke
(1999) present multiple forms of voice: 1) a tolerated voice when complaints are
welcomed by leadership or management and dissidents are actively participating and
involved in finding remedies; 2) a resisted voice when management rejects complaints
and dissidents; and 3) a militant voice, which reflects the emergence of conflict in the
relationship.

A second approach is based on the level of formality. Olson-Buchanan and Boswell
(2002) examine unfair treatment at work among a sample of university staff employees.
The authors note the practice of two forms of voice: formal and informal. Formal voice is
channeled through organizational structures and hierarchies to directly reach
management. Informal voice is the expression of dissatisfaction to colleagues, which may
or may not indirectly reach management. These two forms of voice differ in terms of the
degree of allegiance to the organization and the underlying conditions of the workplace.
Employees who are committed and can endure the working conditions may prefer
informal methods to express discontent. This situation reflects a lower intention to
engage in job search activity and to quit (Olson-Buchanan and Boswell 2002).

A similar approach is based on the direction of communication. O’Donnell (1986)
compares ‘vertical voice’ and ‘horizontal voice’. The former involves communicating
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and complaining to peers and colleagues, which may then transform into the vertical
voice, or communicating and complaining up the chain of command. Vertical voice is
sometimes called organized voice (Light et al. 2003) or collective voice. Dowding and
colleagues (2000) make the distinction between individual voice, which reflects “actions
where the intention of the individual in acting is to bring about the desired effect solely
through that action” and collective voice which reflects “actions where the intention of
the individual in acting is to contribute to the desired effect through that action” (473).
Hirschman (1970) did not consider collective action in his original explanation of the EV-L typology; however, revisiting this issue, Hirschman (1986: 82) wrote, “horizontal
voice is a necessary precondition for the mobilization of vertical voice.” The logic of
collective action highlights heterogeneity among consumers or members of an
organization (Dowding and John 2008). “Individuals differ both in the value they attach
to exit […] and in the share of the cost of collective action […] that they bear in the
development of voice” (Gehlbach 2006: 411).

The perception of the management or leadership here is critical. The management or
leadership can develop different reactions for each organizational member, and the
multiple reactions might be used for the benefit of the organization, for example, by using
the different modes of behavior to play members against one another. To demonstrate,
Dyck and Starke (1999) used two cases to study the processes leading to group exit and
the formation of breakaway organizations. In their research, the authors find that
members of organizations come together to express exit, voice, or loyalty. The logic of
collective action can find a place in Hirschman’s typology. The results show the
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possibility of applying the typology to the group level of analysis, and not just to the
individual level. Therefore, the behaviors of organizations—namely behavior of NGOs in
their relationships with donors—that fall under the group level of analysis can be
explained using the typology of exit, voice, and loyalty.

CONCLUSION
Scholarly debates on NGO-donor relationships suggest that NGOs are trapped in a
financial dependency while they try to serve their local constituents. Nevertheless, there
are sincere attempts—and mounting hopes—for a breakout. A window of opportunity
opens when a donor decides to shift its funding focus in a particular developing country.
Hirschman (1970) would perceive this window as deterioration in the relationship
between a customer (i.e., an NGO) and a producer (i.e., a donor) and prescribe exit, voice,
and loyalty as three possible modes of responses. Chapter Four is dedicated to identifying
and developing a framework for the various NGO responses to shifts in donor funding.
First, however, Chapter Three explains the exploratory research approach used in that
endeavor. Exploratory research “seeks to find out how people get along in the setting
under question, what meanings they give to their actions, and what issues concern them.
The goal is to learn what is going on and to investigate social phenomena without explicit
expectations” (Schutt 2009: 14).
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CHAPTER THREE: CONTEXT AND METHODS

INTRODUCTION
In the preceding chapter, I laid the foundation for a better understanding of organizational
behavior as reflected in NGOs’ responses to shifts in donor funding. Donors develop
policies and priorities and revise them at an ever-increasing pace; NGOs must then figure
out how to adapt to the revisions and how to meet the new criteria of donor funding. Yet
not all NGOs respond in the same way; the next chapter applies Hirschman’s (1970) exit,
voice, and loyalty typology to explain the variation in NGO responses this dissertation
focuses on. This chapter explains the research design that is used for that application.

First, I present in detail the qualitative research approach and analytical methods used in
this dissertation. I begin by describing the contextual background, specifically focusing
on Lebanon and its NGO sector. Second, I explain the exploratory and qualitative
orientation of the research. Third, I explain the case study approach. Fourth, I present the
methods for data generation, a term more suitable than “data collection” because a
qualitative researcher is not so much “looking for what is already there” but rather seeing
what will emerge from researcher-informant interaction (Mason 2002). Fifth, I discuss
data analysis and ethical considerations. I conclude with a discussion about potential
methodological limitations.
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LEBANON
Lebanon is relatively a small country in the Middle East with an area of 4,035.5172
square miles and a population of around 4 million (CSA 2007). Due to its geographical
location, Lebanon has served as a bridge between the East and the West. This fact,
coupled with the country’s limited natural resources, has shaped Lebanon’s serviceoriented economy. The country also enjoys a higher level of freedom and liberties
compared to other countries in the region (AbouAssi 2006).

Lebanon is a struggling democracy. Popular elections are held every four years, although
representation is based on religious proportional divisions. The country has witnessed a
series of political tumults and security unrests, earning it a ranking between 132 and 134
among all countries of the world on the Global Peace Index (GPI) since 2008.

Democracy is manifested through the freedoms and liberties Lebanese enjoy in a
neighborhood of dictatorships and oligarchies. Lebanon recognizes the rights of
association and expression. Associations can be formed easily and function without direct
control or supervision by the government. Citizens are engaged in wide array of civic
activities, including demonstrations and strikes. Lebanon has one of the most active
media sectors in the region. There are tens of newspapers, hundreds of journals, and
dozens of local TV stations and other broadcasting companies in the country.

Lebanon is a developing country with a weak economy. The Lebanese economy is
service-oriented with a strong commercial tradition and heavy reliance on tourism. The
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country also heavily relies on external sources of revenues rather than on nationally
generated tax revenues; this is reflected in the foreign currency debt, which totaled
US$21.25 billion in 2008. Around 9% of that debt is in the form of foreign loans and
more than 65% is in market-issued treasury bonds. In periods of crisis, foreign funding
takes the forms of grants or soft loans. Following the 2006 summer war, US$590.2
million was pledged for relief and reconstruction efforts in the form of grants and
US$121 million in the forms of soft loans.

Added to this, widespread corruption in Lebanon exacerbates the nation’s vulnerability.
The public sector has been perceived with distrust, in part because nepotism, favoritism,
and bribery are common practices for which there is no control or reprimand. The public
sector is oversized, with many vacancies and a high average employee age; many
ministries are unable to perform duties effectively due to lack of human and technical
resources or due to duplication of work and authorities.

In light of this brief country background (supplemented with more detailed information in
Appendix B), one can argue that both the political and economic situations in Lebanon
are ripe for work by NGOs. The political theoretical perspective of nonprofits
underscores political liberties and freedoms of speech and association as the basis for
NGO sector growth (Brown and Kalegaonkar 2002; Clemens 2006). Lebanese society
enjoys a degree of freedoms and liberty predicted by the social culture of communal
support and solidarity (AbouAssi 2006). The economic demand model for nonprofits
contends that offsetting the failures of one sector leads to the evolution and growth of
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another (Hansmann 1980, 1996; Smith and Grønbjerg 2006; Steinberg 2006; Wagner
2000; Weisbrod 1977, 1998). Lebanon has experienced market and government failures
when both government and the private sector were unable to meet societal demands
during the civil war (1975-1990). NGOs took over the delivery of services, including
some public goods such as education and health. Lebanon continues to face a failure in
trust when the government is perceived with suspicion and alienation. NGOs are in a
suitable position to fill that void.

Despite this national context, however, readers should not be deterred from trying to
replicate this research in other contexts. On the contrary, the purpose of discussing the
unique political and economic situation in Lebanon (and the different features of the
NGO sector in the next section) is to pave the way for the possibility of replicating and
comparing findings for the purposes of broader generalization.

NGO SECTOR IN LEBANON
Lebanon has a vibrant and dynamic NGO sector, with roots tracing back to the late 19th
century. During the country’s civil war (1975-1990), with a shattered public bureaucracy,
NGOs assumed primary responsibility for most service provision (AbouAssi 2006: 23).
In general, the number of registered NGOs is around 5,000, although only 700
organizations are active on a regular and sustained basis (AbouAssi 2006: 26). Lebanese
NGOs are active in all aspects and domains of public life, including, for example, the
environment, women’s rights, democracy, animal rights, technology, and consumer
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protection. In this subsection, I address NGOs’ governance, management, programs,
human resources, financial resources and inter-organizational relations.

NGO Governance
Lebanese NGOs are membership-based, which means that a group of individuals come
together to form an organization with membership open to others (Moukheiber 2004).
The organization does not necessarily serve the interests of its members only, and might
also work for the broader public benefit. The members of an organization form its general
assembly, which elects an administrative committee to serve as the decision-making
authority in the organization.

The formal NGO registration process is fairly simple and inexpensive. NGOs are legally
required to submit written mission statements to the Ministry of Interior. Specialization in
NGOs is rare; thus mission statements are typically left as broad as possible (El-Haraka
2004; Moukheiber 2004). It is easier to have a general mission statement than to go
through the bureaucratic process of revising it at the Ministry, noted one interviewed
expert in the NGO field. Beneficiaries, staff, and volunteers do not necessarily know a
particular NGO’s mission, and often the NGO either does not have an organizational
structure or its existing structure does not fit the stated mission and goals.

Eighty-two percent of NGOs have an elected leadership (AbouAssi 2006). However, this
is associated with several setbacks. Most NGOs do not separate the chair of the
administrative committee position from the executive director position (Baroud 2004).
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Leadership succession planning is not established nor properly understood among most
NGOs. The chair remains the same for several terms or the ratio of turnover in elected
offices does not exceed 25% at any election. The role of the administrative committee is
fulfilled by a ‘ruling core’, which “turns many Lebanese NGOs into entities run like
personal businesses” (UNDP 2009: 18).

The CIVICUS 2006 report on the state of civil society in Lebanon reveals that 36% of the
Lebanese population are members of NGOs, with only 3% belonging to environmental
NGOs (AbouAssi2006). The depth of participation in Lebanese NGOs can be understood
through the role of members and the responsibilities of the general assembly. Members of
only 53% of NGOs have substantial influence on decision-making processes (AbouAssi
2006). They are mainly expected to attend public activities and contribute financially
through membership fees. However, members do not fully commit themselves to the
goals of the NGO. Many members do not attend meetings or pay membership fees. They
serve a ceremonial role (UNDP 2009), which explains some of the challenges
encountered by the NGOs studied in this dissertation. As for the general assembly, its
focus is on electing the administrative committee and approving the annual report and
budget (Baroud 2004). The responsibility to hold management accountable or to provide
guidance to the organization is not recognized (UNDP 2009).

The diversity of participation is linked to the form the membership takes. In many cases,
membership in Lebanese NGOs is limited and based on religious and political affiliation
or is selective and conditional (AbouAssi 2006). Some NGOs are hesitant to expand their
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membership basis, fearing the possibility of takeover by or dominance of politicized
members. These organizations are interested in maintaining the ‘homogenous core’ that
gathered around a common goal and worked with the NGO (UNDP 2009). Other NGOs
are so concerned with maintaining the internal power base that membership is further
restricted only to newcomers who express loyalty. This has resulted in the exclusion of
marginalized groups such as women or people with disabilities (AbouAssi 2006; UNDP
2009).

Management and Programs
Management and governance are not clearly separated in the majority of Lebanese
NGOs. It is common for some NGOs to employ incumbent members of the executive
committee (the governing body) as full-time staff. This sacrifices separation of authorities
and intensifies conflict of interests. The situation is exacerbated by the absence of written
managerial procedures, the lack of program performance appraisals, and non-transparent
budget expenditure systems and reporting (AbouAssi 2006; UNDP 2009).

Many NGOs claim their projects are tied to their mission. However, “the value and
clarity of programs implemented today was dependent on the clarity by which the
mission was laid out at the time of the NGO’s establishment” (UNDP 2009: 24). Since
many missions are originally vague or have become outdated, the link between an NGO’s
mission and activities is more likely to be loose, and the synergy between activities more
likely to be lacking. In many cases, the integration of project design and selection into the
mission is “compromised to suit the requirements of potential donors or to allow for the
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implementation of activities that will maintain the NGO’s presence and visibility”
(UNDP 2009: 15). Moreover, most NGOs lack strategic plans; very few have carried out
such an exercise in the past few years, and when they did, the exercises were generally
funded by donor agencies (UNDP 2009).

The real challenges to Lebanese NGOs are twofold: 1) their inability to adopt systematic
participatory approaches in their work and 2) the absence of needs assessments. NGOs
often claim they are consulting with and involving their beneficiaries, and in a few cases,
some participation mechanisms are in place. However, the effectiveness of this whole
approach is questioned. One expert in the NGO sector in Lebanon stated, “I do not see
how an NGO can claim its beneficiaries are participating when the mechanism in place is
on its website and most of its beneficiaries are poor people in remote areas” (personal
communication). On the other hand, needs assessment studies are costly and NGOs do
not have the human or financial resources to implement such studies given that donor
agencies prefer to allocate funding to on-the-ground activities, rather than to research
studies (AbouAssi 2006; UNDP 2009; personal communications).

Human Resources
The CIVICUS 2006 report also notes that Lebanese NGOs have barely adequate human
resources. Only 56.5% of NGOs have paid staff, with the average number of staff in
standing at 10. Others rely exclusively on volunteers (AbouAssi 2006). The NGO sector
offers easier access to jobs compared to the public or private sectors in Lebanon;
however, salaries are relatively less competitive and benefits are limited (Helou 2004). A
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career path does not exist within the sector, and shifting employment between NGOs is
criticized. Some NGOs prefer contracting staff on a project-by-project basis to avoid
paying the required social security allowances. “People use the sector as a trampoline;
they join an NGO to develop skills and contacts and gain experience while serving a
cause; then they move to another sector” (personal communication). Thus, in general,
there is no interest among NGOs in recruiting highly qualified staff; qualified people are
usually attracted by international organizations or donor agencies (AbouAssi 2006).

The majority of NGOs do not implement proper human resource management (Masri
2008; UNDP 2004). A human resource policy either does not exist or is not shared with
staff. Staff is hired in non-transparent processes and without clear job descriptions,
formal inductions, or even employment contracts. NGOs do not usually invest in human
capital. Staff is somehow marginalized; they are not usually involved in decision-making;
training is not planned according to needs, but rather is assigned on an ad-hoc basis—
influenced by either personal favoritism or staff availability regardless of position, skill,
or training compatibility (AbouAssi 2006; UNDP 2009; personal communications).

Volunteering has cultural roots in the Lebanese society, related to the value of solidarity
and the social obligation of involvement in the local community. In general, 57% of the
Lebanese have done volunteer work, but not necessarily on a regular basis or within the
framework of an organization (AbouAssi 2006). However, NGOs have a multi-faceted
volunteerism challenge. There is a poor understanding of the concept of volunteerism.
Some NGOs do not rely much on volunteers in their activities; others are not active in
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recruiting volunteers. The management capacity of NGOs that attract volunteers lags
behind the supply of volunteers. There is a great confusion about how to treat and
manage volunteers versus staff. Thus, in general, volunteers are underutilized resources
(UNDP 2009).

Financial Resources
One of the distinctive features of Lebanese NGOs is their ability to secure funding from
various sources, including international donors, without any interference or control from
the central government. The major sources of funding for Lebanese NGOs are
membership fees, international donors, and government (Helou 2004). The percentile
distribution of these financial resources should be looked at with scrutiny, taking into
account an influx of donor money due to increased interest in Lebanon for various
political and economic reasons. UN agencies have a strong presence in Lebanon, along
with bilateral donors including the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA),
the Department for International Development (DFID), the European Union (EU), the
United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Italian Cooperation,
and other international organizations. As donors prefer to work with NGOs rather than
the government “which is often thought to be a drain on funds” (AbouAssi 2006), many
local organizations try to diversify and tap these different sources of funding, but at the
expense of their own internal revenues.
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Lebanese NGOs manage a financial portfolio of more than one billion US dollars a year
(excluding periods of emergencies such as the 2006 War)2 (AbouAssi 2006; Masri 2008).
These financial resources come from a range of different sources. As Figure 3.1 indicates,
estimates reveal that in 2007 international donor funding was the largest single source of
NGOs’ revenues (Masri 2008). This is the result of international donors’ preference for
dealing with and channeling aid and assistance to NGOs rather than to the public sector
(AbouAssi 2006). Combined internal resources (e.g., membership fees, service fees, and
product sales) were about 38% of the total resources, with the rest of funding coming
from donations, government, and other sources.
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Figure 3.1: Percentile Distribution of Lebanese NGOs’ Revenues by Source of
Funding
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  The accumulated budget of social welfare NGOs is five times the budget of the Ministry of Social Affairs
(AbouAssi 2006). The 2009 national budget allocates US$694.283 million for education, US$293.165
million for health and US$127.144 million thousands for social services out of the total US$10.869 billion.	
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Private funding does not exceed 10% of NGOs’ financial resources (Masri 2008). The
Lebanese income tax law, issued in the 1950s and now outdated, does not incentivize
private philanthropy. Because it specifies the types of NGOs which one can donate to and
receive a deduction, new forms of NGOs are automatically excluded. Further, individuals
or corporations benefit from the exemptions if they contribute up to 10% of their net
annual profit (or 1 out of 1000 of their gross annual profit in some cases) as long as the
exempted donations do not exceed a fixed amount of $10 (AbouAssi 2006). The value of
$10 in today’s market is not worth the cost of the bureaucratic transactions to get tax
exemptions.

However, individual donations, including the Lebanese Diaspora, political contributions,
and religious giving, provide NGOs with around one fifth of their revenues (Masri 2008).
Charitable giving has a long history in Lebanon. According to the CIVICUS 2006 report,
71% of Lebanese donated money or made other contributions to charity at an average of
US$ 136 per year, with more than one third of the citizens donating less than US$ 50.
With an estimated individual annual income of $8,336, this average constitutes 2% of a
citizen’s income (AbouAssi 2006). It is a common practice for individuals or families to
give in-kind or monetary donations to organizations (and individuals) as social
obligations or religious duties, especially during religious feasts. That is why religious
organizations receive the bulk of charitable donations, which questions the civic
motivation behind charitable giving versus obligatory religious titles.
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According to the Capacity Assessment Report (UNDP 2009), these sources of funding
are classified according to 1) easiness of accessibility and reporting, and 2) associated
conditions or expectation. ‘Easy funding’ requires no managerial structure, since there is
open and direct access; no monitoring and reporting on funding is necessary, and
therefore accountability is weak. Easy funding appears to constitute the majority of
funding for community-based organizations, in both rural and urban areas (UNDP 2009).

‘Difficult funding’, on the other hand, requires an elaborate managerial structure and
organizational capabilities to secure the funding, implement projects, and then report on
expenses, achievements, and impact. Funding could also be associated with certain
expectations, such as political loyalty and support, or be conditional—for example
requiring adherence to certain norms such as anti-terrorism attestations. The combination
of these classifications, depicted in Table 3.1 below, could restrict or jeopardize NGOs’
financial resources.

Table 3.1: Classification of Sources of Funding3
Source
Sales from social events and fundraising
Government contracts
Diaspora and community members
Political figures/parties
Religious-duties
Membership fees
Income-generating activities
International donors

3

Accessibility
and Reporting
Easy
Difficult
Easy
Difficult
Easy
Easy
Difficult
Difficult

Expectations
of donors
Low
High
Low
High
Low
Low
Low
High

	
  The separate classifications are adopted from the UNDP’s Assessment of Capacity Building Needs of
NGOs in Lebanon (2009).	
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The Assessment of Capacity Building Needs of NGOs in Lebanon (UNDP 2009) clearly
reveals the influence of donors on NGOs, even when it comes to program design. Many
NGOs are dependent on donor funding; “NGO management is approached by a funding
agency that already has its own set agenda or plan and looking for a partner to implement
it. Alternatively, an NGO’s management would scope the funding priorities and design a
program that bridges these priorities and its own mission or area or expertise” (UNDP
2009: 24).

NGOs in Lebanon do not perceive the tension between different accountability
mechanisms as a challenge (AbouAssi 2010). In their view, aid dependency and the
politicization of assistance do not negatively impact their work. NGOs continue to
present themselves as the anchor of change and the main actors in leading the
development process in the country (AbouAssi 2010). To many NGOs, the impact of
their work should be perceived more holistically. First, their work is described as one
continuous set of programs. Second, their impact can only be realized when you connect
the dots of all development efforts; each dot represents one set of programs each NGO in
Lebanon is implementing. However, the counterargument is that NGOs do not focus on
sustainability, which “is rather thought of as the sustainability of the NGO itself and the
continuous implementation of services, rather than dealing with the root causes of the
problems that cause these needs, or holding state institution accountable for improved
services” (UNDP 2009: 26).
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In general, NGOs are capable of submitting adequate financial and taxation documents as
required by law or stipulated in grant agreements with donor agencies. However, the
authenticity of some reports is questioned, as rumors of corruption within the NGO sector
continue to surface. What is evident is that many NGOs: (1) lack adequate financial
management as they work with simplified balance sheets and not necessarily with
budgets; (2) are more interested in acquiring assets than in planning to utilize and
maintain them; and (3) continue to use basic tools of fund development, such as hosting
social events compared to more advanced tools such as solicitation campaigns or grant
proposals (UNDP 2009).

In turn, funding shapes NGOs’ governance and managerial structures and dynamics.
Members with close contacts to funding sources are allowed an increasing role in NGOs;
NGOs that rely on external financial resources undermine the role of the general
assembly for the sake of funders. Furthermore, the Capacity Assessment report reaches
this conclusion:
The source of funding for NGOs is crucial to deciding what projects an
NGO actually implements and how it assesses the impact. NGOs relying
on donations or religious funding tend to think more of reaching out to a
larger number of beneficiaries and seem not to be questioned about the
value or the quality of the work they are providing. NGOs that depend on
international funding follow project-based implementation and are
encouraged to follow systemic planning, implementation, and monitoring
and evaluation; they are frequently under pressure to justify the rationale,
value, and impact of their activities (UNDP 2009: 25).
Inter-organizational Relations
Networking among NGOs is weak (AbouAssi 2006). Networking bodies or umbrella
organizations exist, but their membership is relatively small or the assessment of their
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effectiveness is negative. Many Lebanese NGOs are members of national and
international networks; this is not necessarily true of small rural NGOs (Abdelsamad
2004). The effectiveness of these networks is questioned by the NGOs themselves, with
network activation being more evident in periods of crisis and less evident at all other
times. Few NGOs are involved in theme- or case-based networks and campaigns; the
successful example is during elections when tens of small and big NGOs came together
to monitor and ensure free elections.

Communication and collaboration among NGOs is generally inadequate, with instances
of collaboration remaining isolated and temporal (AbouAssi 2006; UNDP 2009). NGOs
tend to cooperate on time-sensitive initiatives such as crises or elections, under donor
pressure, or due to personal relations among NGO managers. A mild form of
coordination occurs through sharing of information and facilities; this is frequently
practiced by small NGOs that lack resources (AbouAssi 2006; UNDP 2009). In general,
competition and individualism are more dominant among NGOs.

NGOs’ relationships with the Lebanese government are unclear or unstable. This stems,
in part, from the process of NGO registration, which has been interpreted by the Ministry
as a form of control over these organizations (AbouAssi 2006). In turn, this shapes
NGOs’ relationships with the government, which are characterized by limited dialogue,
considerable distrust, diversion of perspectives, suspicion over intentions, and lack of
collaboration (Abdelsamad 2004; AbouAssi 2010). However, some mechanisms to
ameliorate this situation are in place. In particular, government agencies provide some
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financial support to NGOs. For example, the NGO Support Unit at the Ministry of Social
Affairs provides basic technical support, especially for small NGOs, and the Social and
Economic Council, a consultative body to the government, includes representatives of
NGOs (AbouAssi 2006; UNDP 2009).

Many NGOs are hesitant to engage in the public policy process at the national level
(Abou Daye 2008). The few involved are mostly advocacy oriented or are politically
supported or connected. In many cases, these organizations rely on donor funding to
implement projects aiming at impacting public policy. In other cases, NGOs seize the
opportunity of international pressure on the government to delve into policy issues
(AbouAssi 2010; Abou Daye 2008; UNDP 2009). At the local level, the relationship of
NGOs to government is not much better. “[NGOs] tend to monopolize development; they
consider themselves as the primary actor in a certain area and [as having] the right to set
priorities and activities” (AbouAssi and Trent, forthcoming). Although several NGOs
note good working relationships with local governments, tensions remain around
development priorities and perspectives; local governments in Lebanon focus on basic
infrastructure, while NGOs, especially the local ones, prioritize social and economic
needs. One side tries to exclude or work independently from the other actors at the local
level (AbouAssi and Trent, forthcoming; UNDP 2009).

NGOs’ relationship with the private sector can take any of three forms: sponsorship of
events, in-kind donations, and formalized corporate social responsibility (CSR).
However, in general, NGO-private sector relationships are not institutionalized and
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influenced by personal contacts and relations. Moreover, NGOs rely on ‘shopping list’ or
‘begging’ approaches to dealing with the private sector, rather than on a clear outlined
proposal of aligning missions and interests (personal communications). Although private
businesses express a growing interest in CSR, their relationships with NGOs are not
developing quickly for two main reasons. First, some private companies implement CSR
independently and do not rely on or partner with NGOs working in the same field
(personal communications). Second, and more important, the private sector lacks
incentives for engaging in philanthropy because current laws dealing with this issue are
either outdated or ineffective (AbouAssi 2006).

In summary, Lebanese NGOs are still struggling with their effort towards
institutionalization. It is difficult to balance or bridge the gap between the need for
voluntary membership, efforts to serve a common goal, and the desire for
institutionalized professionalism needed to effectively implement programs. Financial,
human, and technological resources continue to be insufficient, despite the volume of
funding channeled to NGOs and the fact that professionalism and human capabilities
were considered to be behind the main driving force of the sector (AbouAssi 2006).
NGOs’ inter-organizational relations are underdeveloped and unbalanced, characterized
by tension with the government, indifference towards the media, amateurism towards the
private sector, and submission to donors.

The political and security situation in Lebanon also takes its toll. NGOs tend to halt their
activities in periods of political conflict to avoid being affiliated with any side; in cases of
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emergencies, some NGOs shift their interests and focus on relief efforts. Disappointingly,
NGOs continue to fail civil society in their efforts to ease political tensions (Kantar
2009). In addition, some NGOs feel pressured by political or religious groups that do not
agree with their mission and objectives, which sometimes leads to suspension of their
activities.

While these features of the Lebanese NGO sector might seem to be unique, when
reframed, they more easily lend themselves to generalizability. Should one wish to
replicate this study, other countries where the NGO sector works on a wide array of
subjects, enjoys a relative degree of autonomy, has diverse and easy access to resources,
maintains moderate governance and management capacities, and benefits from limited
human resources and inter-organizational relations should be identified. When viewed
this way, it becomes more possible to advocate for the generalizability of such research.

QUALITATIVE METHODS
The first phase of this dissertation adopts an exploratory and qualitative orientation to
understand how NGOs in a developing country respond to shifts in donor funding.
Several arguments support using an exploratory approach (Babbie 2004; Peshkin 1993).
First and foremost, this research examines a ‘persistent phenomen[on]’ that requires
examination and explanation. Second, it contributes to developing new concepts and
elaborating current ones. Third, it addresses ‘curiosity and desire for better
understanding’ of NGOs’ decisions so that we can refine our knowledge about broader
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organizational behavior. And fourth, it helps to explain and yield patterns and insights
that could change behavior or identify problems.

Qualitative research scholars generally assume that social reality is subjective, as opposed
to objective, because “one can only understand the social world by obtaining first-hand
knowledge of the subjects… getting close to one’s subject and exploring its detailed
background and life history… [and emphasizing] the analysis of the subjective accounts
which one generates by ‘getting inside’ situations” (Burrell and Morgan 1979: 6; see also
Mason 2002). The exploratory qualitative methods used in this dissertation serve two
major functions. First, this approach is designed to explore NGO responses to shifts in
donor funding and to develop a conceptual framework for capturing variations in
responses. Second, this exploratory approach sets the stage for the explanatory approach
used in phase 2 of the dissertation. Specifically, the explanatory phase will draw on the
conceptual framework and the variables identified in the exploratory approach to test
hypotheses about the reasons underlying variations in NGO responses to donor shifting.

This research does not aim to assess the generalized causal weight of each specific
variable on the formation of observed outcomes. Therefore, even though present in the
next explanatory phase of the research, statistical methods are not employed in this
exploratory part. Rather, the qualitative research used here examines multiple cases to
develop and verify the proposed framework. The structuring of the case studies in this
dissertation is guided overall by Yin (2003), as is reflective of extant research that uses
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case studies to examine organizational decisions (for example, George and McKeown
1985; Huber and McDaniel 1986; Salancik and Pfeffer 1974).

A case study is a research strategy that focuses on understanding the dynamics present
within single settings (Eisenhardt 1989; Yin 2003). Yin’s (2003) case study structuring
scheme offers either a mix of single or multiple case designs with holistic or embedded
units of analysis. “The evidence from multiple cases is often considered more
compelling, and the overall study is therefore regarded as being more robust” (46). The
benefit of multiple cases is that each case might “serve a specific purpose within the
overall scope of inquiry” (Yin 2003: 47). Furthermore, within each case, there might be
one or more subunits. The advantage of an embedded design is that it identifies logical
subunits. Another key determinant of the selection of the design is “the relevant theory
underlying the case study is itself of a holistic nature” (Yin 2003: 45).

This research focuses on organizational decisions, which means there are several logical
subunits within each case. Yin (2003) recommends using multiple-case studies to
“predict similar results or predict contrasting results for predictable reasons” (Yin 2003:
47). This is important for capturing variations in NGOs’ responses across time and across
organizations. Accordingly, this research relies on an embedded multiple-case design.

Sample Design
To control for the variable of industry, or the area in which NGOs work, this research
targets environmental NGOs in Lebanon as the general population. The rationale for
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focusing on environmental NGOs is that, compared to NGOs working other industries,
environmental NGOs have a focused mission and scope of work. Given this population,
the next task was to construct a sample of environmental NGOs.

Yin (2003) recommends using replication or purposive sampling, as opposed to random
sampling, when conducting multiple case studies. Purposive sampling is justifiable in
light of the pitfalls of sampling cases. First, sampling logic is used in studies “to
determine the relevance or frequency of a particular phenomenon” (Yin 2003: 48).
Second, sampling does not necessarily cover both the phenomenon and its context, both
of which are important in case studies. Finally, sampling logic might risk important
topics being overlooked or not empirically investigated (Eisenhardt 1989). In Yin’s
(2003) words, “each individual case study consists of a whole study, in which convergent
evidence is sought regarding the facts and conclusions for the case; each case’s
conclusions are then considered to be the information needing replication by other
individual cases” (Yin 2003: 50). Therefore, purposive sampling serves the replication
goal. This strategy should “help … develop theoretically and empirically grounded
arguments … each of which says something different about the relationship of the sample
to the wider universe” (Mason 2002: 123).

A pilot case was initially selected to help cover both substantive and methodological
issues and to provide conceptual clarification (Yin 2003). The pilot case confirmed that
purposive or replication sampling was needed for this study, and identified several
features that should be shared by the environmental NGOs selected for the case studies to
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allow for multiple observations within each case. First, the pilot case suggested that the
environmental NGOs selected for the case studies should be the same size and have at
least 12 years of experience with donor funding. Selecting cases based on size allowed
for the control of obvious differences in the potential capacity of organizations to seek
donor funding, and controlling for years of experience helps ensure a reasonable time
frame within which to look for shifts in donor funding priorities and consequent reactions
by NGOs. A second set of criteria include focusing on NGOs with bilateral donors, as
opposed to multilateral or private organizations, suggesting the selection of cases that
have at least two common bilateral donors. These selection criteria ensure comparability
within and across cases, since NGO decisions are juxtaposed against shifts in the funding
priorities of common donors. Finally, to control for the variables of geography and
location, the sample was limited to environmental NGOs operating in the same region,
Mount Lebanon, which is the largest region in the country, with the largest number of
NGOs. Together, these selection criteria significantly reduced the size of the target
population.

Given the small target population, the amount of work involved in constructing case
studies, and the limited time and funds available for the research, the sample size was
limited to four environmental NGOs. As discussed above, these four NGOs “share some
attributes in common and are variants of some larger, encompassing category” (Snow and
Trom 2002: 160; see also, George and Bennett 2005; Eisenhardt 1989; Yin 2003).
Eisenhardt (1989) and de Porta (2002) warn that increasing the number of cases may lead
to increasing the number of third variables for which the research has to control. Hence,
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selecting only four NGOs served the purpose of this research, as this allowed data
collection and analysis within the constraints of time and resources.

To avoid selection bias, the search engine on the Ministry of Environment’s website
(www.moe.gov.lb) was used to identify NGOs. The online database (www.lebanonsupport.org) helped verify the status of each organization. If any of the selected
organizations did not meet the criteria (size, years of experience, bilateral donors, and
location) they were removed from the sample. As potential NGOs were identified, they
were contacted about their willingness to participate in the study. If, when approached,
the NGO declined to participate in the research, it was removed from the sample. This
process was repeated until four environmental NGOs were selected.

The appropriate unit of analysis should be “related to the way you have defined your
initial research questions” (Yin 2003: 23). In the first phase of this dissertation, my
research question examines how a funding-dependent NGO reacts to changes in donor
funding. The focus of this exploratory part of the dissertation is, then, on NGOs’
decisions or responses. In addition, the unit of analysis should be as specific as possible;
“specific time boundaries are needed to define the beginning and end. [And finally,] the
unit of analysis should either be similar to those previously studied by others or should
innovate in a clear, operationally defined way” (Yin 2003: 26). Therefore, the unit of
analysis in this research design is an NGO’s decision in response to a change in donor
funding. This decision is observable in its outcome. In other words, as much as the

84
process of decision-making is important, the end result is also critical for addressing the
exploratory research question posed before.

As such, the research was designed around multiple cases: four cases of NGOs
interacting with multiple donors. Each case provided an opportunity to record multiple
observations during the period of 15 years this dissertation studied (Eisenhardt 1989;
Snow and Trom 2002; Yin 2003). Each donor funding cycle extends—on average—over
three years, after which the funding objectives are likely to shift. Thus, the 15-year period
of research in this study includes at least three shifts in the funding objectives for each
donor and three concomitant reactions by each NGO. Therefore, this design yields 24
embedded units of analysis: four NGOs reacting to three shifts in funding of each of two
donors. This design ensures a literal replication where similar results are more likely to
be predicted and the same conclusion would be reinforced (Eisenhardt 1989; Yin 2003).

Data Collection
To apply the methodology described above, data were collected through archival research
and semi-structured interviews. These approaches allowed for data triangulation and
better substantiation of findings (Eisenhardt 1989; Yin 2003).

Archival research is a non-interactive form of data collection that allows accessing
information that is not subject to personal discourses (Johnson, Wilde, and Polillo 2008;
Thies 2002; Trachtenberg 2006). Archives include documents produced by the
organizations (annual and financial reports, minutes of meetings, decisions), donors
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(grant applications, annual reports, website information), and other actors (media
clippings, NGOs’ registration documents).

Semi-structured or focused interviews provide a longitudinal window on the decisionmaking process in NGOs regarding donor funding and diversifying the sources of
funding. This study required interviewing more than one person from each organization.
Thus, some organizational members were interviewed twice over the two years of this
study to further verify the conceptual framework. This process is further explained in the
data analysis section, which renews the importance of discourse analysis in qualitative
research (Johnston 2002; Neumann 2008). The semi-structured interviews were
conducted with representatives of four environmental NGOs, two bilateral donors, and
four experts in the field. Interviewees were invited to discuss historical events related to
the organization (its establishment and changes or challenges encountered) and the
processes that the NGO went through to decide how to respond to shifts in donor funding.
These shifts potentially represent critical points or junctures in the relationship between
an NGO and a donor. Semi-structured interviews helped capture the perspectives of this
diverse group of practitioners and allowed a better understanding of the ‘semantic
context’. Interviews also allowed efficient scrutiny of the meanings assigned to the
various concepts (Blee and Taylor 2002; Eisenhardt 1989; Leech and Goldstein 2002;
Merton, Fiske, and Kendall 1990; Rubin and Rubin 2005; Yin 2003).

Representatives of NGOs serving marginalized groups (women and people with
disabilities) were also selected and interviewed. The logic of this additional step was to
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explore the possibility of replicating the findings and generalizing the results across
various NGO industries. Moreover, additional key informants who have knowledge and
expertise about civil society in Lebanon were also interviewed. These informants
provided valuable input about the information gathered and the conclusions generated in
this study. Table 3.2 shows the breakdown of completed interviews.

Table 3.2: Completed Interviews
Organization
Donor 1
Donor 2
Environmental NGO 1
Environmental NGO 2
Environmental NGO 3
Environmental NGO 4
Key informants (Experts)
Key informants (research
institutes)
NGO of marginalized groups
(women)
NGO of marginalized groups
(disability)
Total

Number of
Interviews
5
4
3
3
2
2
4
3

Total combined number of
interviews by organization
9
10
4
3

2
2
30

4
30

Interviews and meetings were conducted face-to-face and held primarily in Lebanon.
Telephone interviews and electronic mail responses to questions were avoided, since
face-to-face interviews enhanced the dialogic construction of knowledge. Interview and
meeting sites included: NGOs’ and donors’ offices, research centers, and public places
(e.g., cafes). All interviews were tape-recorded for later transcription; permission to do so
was given by all the research informants and meeting organizers. This step was important
as it generated verbatim transcripts and minimized reliance on notes or memory. These
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transcripts were supplemented with notes taken during or immediately after the
interviews. Interviews and meetings were tracked with contact sheets (Miles and
Huberman 1994). Within one week of each interview, memos were transcribed and
analyzed (Emerson, Fretz and Shaw 1995). This procedure helped streamline
categorizing information and cases. The transcription process resulted in 280 pages of
qualitative data.

Eisenhardt (1989) advises that more than one person should carry out the case studies to
reduce bias and personalization, add complementary insights from different perspectives,
and ultimately enhance confidence in the results. However, due to the constraints of time,
language, and funding, this study was conducted by only one interviewer. To ameliorate
this limitation, Yin’s (2003) recommendations on desired skills (listening, adaptiveness
and flexibility, and grasp of issues being studied) and on the principles of data collection
(multiple sources of evidence, creation of case study database, and maintenance of a
chain of evidence) were scrupulously applied.

Finally, the preliminary results were shared in a focus group that comprised different
stakeholders. As it is difficult to formulate a focus group that is representative of the
population of a study (Gamson 1992), participants were selected to represent different
NGOs and donor agencies,4 experts in the field, and academicians. Selection bias in a
focus group is hard to avoid. The focus group was an arena for direct interaction and
discussion among key players, each coming from a different background and with a

4

To allow further verification and diversity of input, organizational representatives interviewed during the
research were not included in the focus group.
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distinct perspective on the issue. The focus group helped to shape understanding of the
situation and to identify any gaps in the reconstruction of the arguments (Johnston 2002;
Morgan 2002; Short, Perecman, and Curran 2006). In addition, the focus group was one
way to address the limitation of the researcher’s bias and, consequently, the possibility of
encountering Type I and II errors. The deployment and triangulation of various sources of
data, such as interviews with different stakeholders, archives, and focus groups, should
help alleviate the potential for these errors (Morgan 1997, 2002; Blee and Taylor 2002).

Interview Protocol and Questions
Interviews were set up by directly contacting interviewees via phone or email.
Interviewees were provided with a summary of the project, the researcher’s CV, and the
interview protocol (see Appendix C). Interviewees were asked if they were interested in
participating. If the respondent was willing to participate, the researcher set the date and
time for the interview. If at any time an interviewee declined to participate; s/he was
thanked for their time and not contacted again. Non-respondents were contacted no more
than two more times via email or office phone. All requested interviews were set up in a
timely manner (Barrett and Cason 1997; Carapico, Clark, Jamal, Romano, Schwedler,
and Tessler 2006; Leech and Goldstein 2002; Rubin and Rubin 2005).

Interviews lasted on average 1.5 hours5 depending on the interviewees’ interest and time
constraints. The detailed interview protocol (Appendix C) served as a guide, but the
interview was a free-flowing conversation. Follow-up questions were addressed via email
or phone. Except for those with representatives of donor agencies, all interviews were
5

	
  The interviewees had the right to withdraw from the research at any time.	
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conducted in the Arabic language, which is the local language at the research site—
Lebanon. The researcher is a native speaker of the language.

To maintain research informants’ confidentiality and trust, I assumed the responsibility of
generating and reporting the research findings and concurrently protecting the
authenticity and confidentiality of the information and the informants. Ethical
considerations and other matters of protection of human subjects are imposed and
governed by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) review process at Syracuse University.

Interview recordings, interview transcriptions, and notes from meetings/events were
assigned coded numbers and saved on the researcher’s work computer, which is
password protected. In this dissertation or any subsequent publications, all references to
interviewees, their organizations, or any other identifying information are not associated
with respondents. In cases where there was a chance that someone may be able to identify
an interviewee, the interviewee was sent the text ahead of time and s/he had the
opportunity to request that it be changed or excluded from the publication. Interviewees’
wishes were followed.

The interview questions started with the interviewee’s brief biography, career position,
and role in the organization, and then eased into more complicated questions. As the
interview progressed, transitional questions were used to lead into different sections in a
logical sequence (Sudman and Bradburn 1982). The questions covered a wide array of
subjects falling under the following categories:
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•

Organization’s Mission Statement and Scope of Work: definition and
interpretation of the mission statement, the evolution of and changes in the
mission statement, the decision-making process, the contextual environment upon
any change, previous and current activities and their relatedness to the mission,
organizational infrastructure and capabilities;

•

Financial Autonomy of the Organization: the definition/interpretation of
autonomy and dependency, the reliance on external resources, sources of funding,
and the need for diversified sources;

•

Type and Nature of Relationships with Donor Agencies: the perception, form, and
dynamics of the relationships, the evolution of the relationships, the strengths and
weaknesses in the relationships, the degree, direction and level of communication,
the response to demands and changes in funding opportunities, the information
that was available, the rationale behind the changes, the reactions to the decisions,
and the expected consequences); and,

•

Assessment of the role of Lebanese NGOs and the impact of donor agencies on
both this role and the community.

Data Analysis
Data analysis started with coding the transcripts. An initial list of codes was created at the
beginning of the analysis process, but the coding process was iterative and ongoing
throughout the analysis process (Miles and Huberman 1994; Mason 2002; Maxwell 2005;
Poland 2002). While specially designed computer software is sometimes used in
qualitative research to expedite and increase accuracy in data coding, I elected to conduct
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the coding process with Microsoft software programs (a combination of Word and Excel)
since the volume of data was manageable and the complexity of the codes was moderate.

The data analysis followed the recommendations of Eisenhardt (1989) and Yin (2003)
with regard to within-case and cross-case analysis. Within-case analysis focuses on each
case by itself. A detailed case-study write up was prepared and then triangulated with
other archival sources to ensure reliability and validity. Familiarity with each case as a
stand-alone entity allows for greater understanding about the unique patterns within the
case, which then facilitates cross-case analysis, which involves searching for, comparing,
and generalizing patterns across cases. Cross-case comparison helps avoid human errors
or tendencies, such as bias, leaps to conclusions, being influenced by the last case, or
ignoring case elements (Eisenhardt 1989). Several techniques are used to implement a
cross-case pattern search, including comparisons according to categories, in pairs, or by
source. In this research, cases were compared in pairs; similarities and differences in
decision-outcomes were listed. The underlying logic here was that such a comparison
would allow checking subtle similarities and differences that are difficult to detect
otherwise.

This exploratory research uses process-tracing, discourse analysis, and content analysis.
Process tracing is commonly used in qualitative research to analyze complex processes,
understand variations in interpretations, and assess causality (Bennett 2008; Checkel
2007; George and Bennett 2005; Pierson 2000; Schutt 2009; Vennesson 2008).
Considered an indispensable tool for theory development, process tracing focuses less on
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the causal ‘effects’ of variables (shifts in donor funding) in predicting an outcome (NGO
response) than on the causal ‘connections’ among the variables and outcomes leading to a
certain phenomenon.

More specifically, there are six reasons process tracing is valuable and effective for this
research. First, process tracing is appropriate for analyzing complex phenomena if using a
reasonably small number of cases (George and McKeown 1985; Tilly 1984). Second,
process tracing allows for an exploration of the chain of events or the decision-making
processes by which initial conditions (inputs) are translated into outcomes. Third, process
tracing suits a theory-guided analysis, in this case using Hirschman’s (1970) individual
self-interest theory. The main analysis is narrative: specifying actors, their goals,
preferences, decisions, and the events that directly influenced them. It permits
understanding the ‘off-the-path’ behavior by narrating and analyzing decisions and
actions that were taken, considered but not taken, and the consequences of both
(Capoccia and Kelemen 2007). Fourth, process tracing potentially identifies multiple
intertwining narratives and permits explanations and qualification of their degree of
relevance. It captures potential alternative causal paths or equifinality (Bennett 2004).
Most likely, a shift in donor funding is a decisive factor in an NGO’s response; the
challenge is to understand if the response could come about by accident or could be a
proxy or a side effect (Abbott 2001). Fifth, process tracing provides a unique opportunity
to ascertain which factors were critical and possibly generalizable in the NGO’s decision
and which were more peripheral. This allows me to understand how these factors relate to
the integrated theory I develop in the second part of the dissertation; relevant factors are
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incorporated while irrelevant factors are dropped (George and Bennett 2005). Sixth,
process tracing acknowledges multiple sources of evidence for the verification of a single
inference (Gerring 2007); this is particularly important to ensure construct validity.

Therefore, such an approach is particularly appropriate for this dissertation since the
phenomenon of interest (impact of shifts in donor funding on NGOs’ responses) is
suspected to have multiple causal pathways, which allows a gradual construction of a
typological theory to explain the variation of outcomes (George and Bennett 2005;
George and McKeown 1985; Gerring 2007; Ragin 1987; Vennesson 2008). As indicated
in the previous section on sample selection, it is important to select cases for their value
in providing evidence of the processes connecting causes with the observable outcome of
interest (Ragin and Becker 1992).

To facilitate process tracing analysis, I started by analyzing evidence drawn from withincase process tracing (Hall 2003) using primary sources. I then compared across cases
using secondary archival sources to analyze whether my theoretical framework holds in
those cases and thereby provides evidence of theoretical plausibility (George and Bennett
2005; Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003). The process tracing method helped identifying
the intervening steps that led to the outcome (that is decision outcome vis-à-vis shifts in
donor funding) in the four cases selected. It involved figuring out the initial conditions
from which sequences of events evolved, and included multiple interaction effects to see
how these events led to some outcome (George and Bennett 2005; Gerring 2007).
Therefore, the sequence and timing of events were important for the understanding of
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regularities and irregularities in the relationship between donors and partner NGOs upon
the shift of funding focus.

Within-case research examined the interaction between one actor (the NGO) and another
(the donor), where the dependent variable is the NGO’s decision and the independent
variable is the decision of the donor to change the focus of funding. This independent
variable becomes dependent in itself at some point prior to or later in a different sequence
of events. To help address the question of interaction and explain any possible causation,
I applied process tracing “to trace the operation of the casual mechanism at work in a
given situation” (Checkel 2007: 116; Pierson 2000; Schutt 2009). I anticipated that
process tracing would help clarify any compounding effects or connections between
NGOs’ modes of responses or decisions.

As Figure 3.2 shows, the sequence of events is as follows: donor’s policy change—
donor’s new aid strategy—donor modified local approaches—NGO internal discussion—
NGO reaction. In this sequence, one event leads to the event that follows. My objective is
to illuminate an internal organizational process whereby a decision is made in response to
a shift in donor funding. Through process tracing, I reconstructed the decision-making
processes of four environmental NGOs at moments of change (shifts in donor funding)
over an extended period of 15 years. This helped refine a more theoretically oriented
explanation (George and Bennett 2005; Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003).
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Figure 3.2: Sequence of Events

Process tracing answers the central question of this research, as it allows the collection
and analysis of qualitative data along the following points of inquiry:
1) A response an NGO decides on at each turning point (shifts in donor funding)
2) Possible alternatives to the response
3) Process of selecting the particular response:
a. If notified of donor shifts, by whom and how
b. If a response is favored, by whom and how
c. If a response was opposed, by whom and how
d. If a response is adopted, by which level of assertion (or last resort)
e. Assessment of potential consequences of the response and its alternatives

In addition to process tracing, discourse analysis was also used. Discourse analysis refers
to the “emergent and socially constructed nature of textual production” (Johnston 2002:
67). All meaning is context specific, multifaceted, and ever evolving. People use and
define certain terms with certain implicit assumptions in the background. They
understand certain things in certain ways and act on their understanding (and frame it
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accordingly) (Hardy, Harley, and Philipps 2004; Hopf 2004; Johnston 2002; Neumann
2008). In discourse analysis, one should focus on what is actually meant rather than on
“the knowledge embodied in mental structures that textual production presumes”
(Johnston 2002: 67).

In this research project, discourse analysis was used to examine how relationships
between specific NGOs and donors have come to exist, endure, change, or end. The
course of action is socially constructed in the context within which actions are embedded
rather than in an objective reality that lasts permanently. Discourse analysis serves to
confirm or reject the implied results of the ‘how possible’ story, born of responses to
critical junctures, set out by the process tracing analysis. In analyzing inter-organizational
relations, it is critical to examine how each organization understands and presents the
relationship (Johnston 2002; Neumann 2008).

In particular, discourse analysis questions whether organizational behavior is a reflection
of text produced by the organization or of interpretations delivered by senior officials. Do
actors within the same organization speak the same language and equally represent their
organization, or are there shades of language and meanings? People working in the same
field or for the same organization may approach the same subject matter in diverse ways.
A mission statement, or a decision, or a reaction is read in different ways by different
people and might be understood in ways other than intended. Therefore, the issue of
representation of NGOs or donors was also critical. That is why at least two members of
the same organization—and preferably of the same position level—were interviewed to
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examine the organizational values that are espoused by its members to give both meaning
to and justification of decisions and actions that were taken (or omitted) within its
institutional environment (Marshall 1994; Sussman, Ricchio and Belohlav 1983).

According to Neumann (2007), discourse analysis should follow three main steps: 1)
limiting text because discourse analysis is all about text and large volumes of text will be
troublesome; 2) mapping representations of realities in terms of how NGOs’ decisions
and outcomes are portrayed or presented by different people; and 3) layering discourses
where some of the representations are more important than others (representations made
by the head of an NGO versus a program officer). Discourse analysis was applied to
documents published by NGOs and donor agencies and to the transcripts of the
conducted interviews. This procedure helped isolate gaps identified by particular
discourses. Subtle representations were significant in outlining the type of relationship
that is made possible and what types are automatically excluded (Hermann 2008).
Primary attention was given to the mention of terms such as ‘change’, ‘modify’, ‘shift’,
‘adapt’, ‘compromise’, ‘negotiate’, ‘stop’, ‘suspend’, ‘attach’, ‘continue’ and the like in
reference to NGOs’ responses vis-à-vis changes in donor funding. Likewise, terms like
‘own identity’, ‘own decision’, ‘forced’, ‘obliged’, ‘preferred’, ‘encouraged’ and the like
were sought to begin understanding agency behind organizational decisions (Fairclough
2003).

The concept of agency is important since it is at the core of analysis in Hirschman’s
(1970) typology (Harrison 2010). Agency here refers to the capacity to make decisions
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and put them into practice. The issue to examine is whether these courses of action are
adopted by free choice or by other processes (Bandura 2001). Does the donor have
agency in its relationships with NGOs, graciously granting these organizations the ability
to respond to shifts of funding, or are NGOs granted agency in their own right and made
free to enter into a relationship with donors? Discourse analysis can point to the answer.

While discourse analysis helped analyze how common decisions are justified and
explained by interviewees, content analysis (Hardy, Harley, and Philipps 2004; Hermann
2007; Herrera and Braumoeller 2004; Hopf 2004) was also used as a supplementary tool
to analyze documents (including interview transcripts). Content analysis refers to the
analysis of official documents to attempt to understand the meaning of the
communications by assuming that the ‘meaning of text is constant.’ Content analysis
provided an analytical tool to identify the meaning and values of the terms listed above,
especially in archival material. I concentrated on words or combinations of words.
Usually, a numerical count of each word provides a measure of meaning sufficient for
content analysis. The frequency of such terms in discourse becomes relevant to social
structural articulation when compared to the actual practices of agency (Fairclough
2003).

Validity, Reliability and Potential Limitations
Maintaining construct validity and reliability are two key concerns in designing case
studies (Eisenhardt 1989; Yin 2003). Construct validity is the correct operational
measurement of the intended concepts being investigated, and reliability is an accurate
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measurement to ensure that “the operation of a study can be repeated with the same
results” (Yin 2003: 34). To maximize construct validity and reliability, this research
adopts an iterative approach and multiple cases of embedded units of analysis, relying on
a variety of triangulated primary data including those collected in interviews and focus
groups, as well as contextual secondary data sources.

The iterative approach involves tabulation of evidence. It is based on a logical,
transparent sequence of analytical steps for identifying, coding, validating, and
systematically comparing the emergent frame with the evidence from each case. Here,
active reflexivity is critical (Mason 2002; Maxwell 2005), and requires the researcher’s
ongoing scrutiny of own perceptions and preconceived notions. The comparison of
evidence from different sources within and across the multiple cases continues until
results finally converge into a well-defined construct (Eisenhardt 1989; Yin 2003).
Hence, this research relies on multiple sources of data to generate evidence. A chain of
evidence within and across the four cases is established. Finally, key informants were
invited to focus groups to review the results and verify the framework.

Reliability is reflected in replication of the operations of the study. In this study, all of the
operational procedures are documents. The research was conducted according to a study
protocol and a database for the four cases was developed (Yin 2003). For each NGO, the
database includes the audio recording of the interviews as well as their transcriptions,
other information provided by the interviewees, secondary archival data (website
downloads, reports, media clippings, etc.), and email communications. The fact that the
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research has been expanded to include other NGOs from different sectors enhances
confidence in its reliability. The limitation of intercoder reliability remains pending, due
to the use of basic Microsoft software programs in the coding process instead of relying
on qualitative data analysis software such as Atlas.ti and NVivo.

Another key concern in designing case studies is external validity (Yin 2003), or
generalizability. Being qualitative in nature, findings from this exploratory research
might be limited to theoretical generalizability. However, Yin (2003) downplays such
assumptions: “case studies rely on analytical generalization” (37) through replicating the
findings on second or even third cases. If the replication generates the same results,
generalization might be made to some broader theory. This research uses multiple cases
that allows within- and cross-case analysis of results; the results are not confined to one
particular distinctive case. Furthermore, with the inclusion of NGOs from other sectors,
the research enhances the potential for generalizability by recognizing broader contextual
factors.

CONCLUSION
With the proposed methodological approach, I have assembled analytical tools in a
logical sequence. I have elaborated on the broad contextual background and the
characteristics of the NGO sector in Lebanon. I have also discussed various components
of case selection and data collection and analysis, as well as limitations of my proposed
research design and procedures. A qualitative, embedded multiple-case design that
employs process tracing and discourse analysis suits this exploratory study. Data from
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interviews, focus groups, and archival research contribute rigorous and interesting
insights about NGOs’ responses to shifts in donor funding, with Lebanon as the site for
this research. The next chapter turns to presenting and analyzing the findings of the
qualitative data towards developing a conceptual framework that captures variations in
NGO responses to shifts in funding.
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CHAPTER FOUR: UNDERSTANDING NGOS’ BEHAVIORS
A MODIFIED HIRSCHMAN’S TYPOLOGY
INTRODUCTION
In Chapter Two, I discussed Hirschman’s (1970) typology of exit, voice, and loyalty at
length. The typology has been broadly adopted by scholars not only with respect to the
economic market, but also with respect to sociopolitical values. The typology is
frequently used in studies of political science, accountability and public service, human
resources management, and nonprofit studies. I reviewed the vast body of literature that
applied the typology to highlight key elements that are relevant to this research. In
Chapter Three, I elaborated on the qualitative research methods that were used to collect
and analyze data for this exploratory phase of the dissertation.

This chapter addresses the research question of how NGOs in developing countries react
to shifts in donor agencies’ funding. It explores whether all NGOs react in the same way.
If not, the focus of the study will turn to capturing variations in these reactions in a
conceptual framework that builds on Hirschman’s (1970) individual self-interest theory.
First, the profiles of the four environmental NGOs under study are presented to provide
the reader with substantive information used in the analysis. Second, NGO responses to
shifts in donor funding are traced and analyzed using the qualitative data collected; the
relationship between these four NGOs and their donors are hammered out at length and in
depth. Third, using Miles and Huberman’s (1984) method of first- and second-order
concepts, the results are tied to Hirschman’s (1970) typology, which is modified in a
proposed conceptual framework that captures variations in NGOs’ responses to shifts in
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funding. The proposed modified framework is fourfold: exit, voice, loyalty, and
adjustment. Each fold in the framework is expanded and explained relying on further
evidence from the field. Finally, the chapter considers the possible outcomes of these
various reactions.

CASES PROFILES
This subsection presents summary profiles of the four cases studied. To recap the analytic
reasoning behind the selection process: the four NGOs are environmental organizations
of the same size and with at least a 12-year experience with donor funding. For the
purpose of comparability, I focus on two bilateral donors (as opposed to multilateral or
private organizations) that are common to all four NGOs.

Detailed profiles are available in Appendix D. Table 4.1 below categorizes the different
characteristics of these NGOs and provides a quick snapshot for comparison. Each profile
covers the history of the NGO, including the reasons behind its establishment and key
turning points in its development. In addition, the NGO’s governance, organizational
structure and management, programs, human resources, financial resources, and interorganizational relations are addressed. The profiles were developed using archival data
(e.g., published information) and interview materials, particularly in terms of the
perspectives of interviewed NGO representatives. Special attention is devoted to NGO
representatives’ perceptions of stakeholders, accountability, legitimacy, and credibility.
For the purpose of confidentiality, the four NGOs are labeled as NGO1, NGO2, NGO3,
and NGO4.
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NGO1: the NGO of ‘No’.
NGO1 was established in 1991 by a group of university graduates who shared a common
interest in sustainable development. NGO1’s mission is to ensure environmental
suitability and the protection of natural resources through a scientific framework
designed to engage local communities. NGO1’s projects address environmental hazards,
exploitation of natural resources, air pollution, and climate change, all of which directly
threaten natural resources, the public environment, and human health. In many of these
projects, NGO1 conducts scientific research and studies and provides technical assistance
through its specialized members and volunteers.

Currently, NGO1 is headed by a female member who presides over an executive
committee of seven members; the committee is elected by the 100 members of the
organization. Five different people headed the NGO over 17 years. Activities are
managed by a team of volunteers and headed by a member of the executive committee
who serves as a coordinator. Only two paid staff are on the payroll of the organization.
The work of the organization is guided by annual plans, along with a set of best practices,
professional standards, and, more importantly, informal ethical values and principles.

NGO1 is not in a dire financial situation. The organization has been making an impact
with limited internal resources (membership fees and volunteers’ efforts) such that
external resources are not essential to sustain its work. NGO1 secures funding from eight
donors, including three bilateral donors. The relationship with donors is based on mutual
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benefit, capacity building, and idea exchange. NGO1’s donors are perceived to be
partners when “the agendas are compatible, objectives of funding match our goals, and
donor’s plans accommodate our programs” (Interview #7).

NGO1 has been involved in a confrontational relationship with government, politicians,
and the private sector. One of the founders portrayed the general picture: “unlike other
NGOs, the essence of our role is raising voice. You talk about the problem as well as
about who is causing it or hindering the solution. You should be proactive to find a
solution or to influence your surrounding towards change” (Interview #1). This
perspective echoes into weak and sporadic collaboration with local NGOs and reflects
NGO1 as an organization that does not concede.

NGO2: An Institutionalized NGO
NGO2 was formed in the early 1990s by a group of energetic youth drawn together by an
environmental emergency at the local level. Their successful work attracted attention and
encouraged them to become a formally recognized NGO with a certain specific vision
aiming at protecting natural resources through fighting forest fires and planting trees. The
NGO works with local communities as its main stakeholders, develops its activities based
on needs assessments and Participatory Rural Appraisals (PRA), and implements projects
in a decentralized fashion through local voluntary units and in partnership with local
groups.

NGO2 is composed of 50 members who elect an executive committee of 5. With a high
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turnover in leadership, the organization is currently managed by a female director with
around 20 full-time staff and short-term consultants. This human capacity allows the
organization to implement several projects at the same time, many of which are donorfunded. NGO2 has nine donors, without being reliant on one more than others and
without being completely donor-dependent. To gain income besides membership fees,
NGO2 has launched several projects to generate profits for the organization while
supporting local communities. “We think like a business,” said an NGO2 member;
“businesses make capital investment; we did the same. We are aware about our ability to
survive without the external funding which is like begging to a great extent” (Interview
#6). This conscious decision to follow a business model is echoed into a driving motive
to become an institution, and not just a small NGO.

NGO2 has benefited from its close work with local communities, and its partnerships
with local organizations have boosted its legitimacy. The NGO tries to adhere to high
standards of professionalism, which further contributes to its credibility and positions the
organization as a leader in the environmental field. One outcome of the NGO’s
legitimacy and credibility is strong and ongoing relationships with donors. Another
outcome is well-developed relationships with government agencies with which NGO2
has established partnerships and cooperated on policy formulation and implementation.

NGO3: An NGO of a Struggling Commitment
NGO3 was established to formally organize the voluntary civic engagement of its
members. The organization had a shaky beginning, with founders and members joining
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and leaving over time. Currently, with 60 members, NGO3’s mission focuses on
developing environmental awareness. Specifically, NGO3 focuses on awareness
campaigns and implements environmental projects funded by international donors and
organizations; advocacy efforts are more localized and target municipalities unless
channeled into issue-based national coalitions with other organizations.

An elected executive committee of seven members runs the organization. The committee
chair, who also serves as the president, has been elected to office for more than five
terms. However, members feel they are equally involved in the decision making process
when decisions are made by consensus. NGO3 does not recruit any full-time paid
employees; however, temporary staff and consultants are hired on donor-funded projects.
This is because NGO3’s financial health depends on funded projects; membership fees
are the only source of internal revenues, and are used to cover basic operational costs.

All projects are implemented through donor grants. However, NGO3 has a limited pool
of donors, mostly bilateral donors. NGO3’s president noted, “if we have projects we
work on them and if there are no projects, we do not have expenses or work” (Interview
#11). The organization still struggles in its relationship with the donors. NGO3
representatives describe these relationships as formal and limited to submitting proposals
and implementing projects. In their view, a donor is a funder, not a partner. The inability
to develop these relationships could be related to the lack of specialized human capacity
and underdeveloped professional practices and systems.
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The NGO’s interaction with the government is also limited. However, the government is
not necessarily perceived as being an adversary. The president discussed his opinion
towards the government, saying,
The work of the NGO is important but should not take over the
responsibility of the government. […] We created parallel or substitute
agencies during the civil war; this should be over now. Instead of
bypassing public agencies, things need to pass through them and NGOs
and donors should work with them and invest in developing the capacities
of these agencies (Interview #11).
The relationships with other NGOs are limited to exchanging support and coordinating on
specific environmental issues. NGO3 has yet to establish long-term partnerships, but is
more active in exploring, with caution, national and international networking
opportunities.

NGO4: The NGO of a Ruling Core
NGO4 was established in the mid-1990s by a group of professionals who wanted to
promote environmental development that ensures sustainable development. The NGO
executed projects on solid waste and environmental awareness at a local level; youth
were the main target group for these projects. What is peculiar here is that all projects are
managed by the same person. Not too long after the establishment of the NGO, several
founding members became less involved in the work of the organization. The bulk of the
responsibilities were shared by a president playing a more ceremonial role and a member
who was the driving force. Although NGO4 has around 30 members and an elected 5member executive committee, the same two persons have been elected to several terms.

NGO4 has two full-time paid staff, project-based part-time employees and expert
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consultants, and several volunteers when needed. The organization, however, lacks
strategic and annual plans and has not conducted any needs assessments. As one member
of the organization explained, project ideas emerge “through brainstorming or even
personal experience; we then develop a proposal and look for funding. Sometimes it
works and sometimes it does not. Once you score then things roll” (Interview #17). Thus,
most of the work of NGO4 is project-based.

All projects are funded through bilateral donor grants due to the absence of any strategy
to attract alternative funding. With a limited pool of 3 donors, NGO4’s financial health is
always at stake. Membership fees add to a small amount of the annual budget, and
operating costs are high such that the ‘ruling core’ has to cover expenses from their own
pockets. Donors are not perceived to be partners; rather, they are seen as funders who
provide financial support according to specific guidelines. As such, relationships with
donors are framed and confined. Furthermore, the founders did not utilize their personal
professional contacts to help strengthen the NGO’s inter-organizational relationships.
This reflects certain distrust in other NGOs, which originally motivated the establishment
of NGO4 to ‘do a better job’. On the other hand, the relationships with government
agencies, and specifically with the Ministry of Environment, are bitter sweet, although
NGO4 aspires to develop stronger relationships in the future.

Table 4.1: Summary of Profiles of Four Environmental NGOs
NGO1
Mission
Reason for establishment
Key turning points
Identification of
stakeholders
Participatory approach
Perception of legitimacy
and credibility
Number of members
Membership conditions
Members’ role (in
addition to voting)
Executive committee
Internal governance
Decision-making process

Sustainable environment
Group commitment
Diminished grassroots work
Drop down in volunteers

NGO2
Protection and conservation
of natural resources
Local need
Rapid growth in work

NGO3

NGO4

Environmental awareness

Environment development

Natural progression
Drop down in members
Advocacy campaign

Personal interest
Withdrawal of founders
Framing of mission

Members and volunteers

Local communities

Projects’ beneficiaries

General public

Formal mechanism

In practice

None

None

Distinctive values

Effectiveness

Representativeness

Effectiveness

100
Open
Decision making and
implementation
7 members
High leadership
turnover/clear division of
authorities

50
Open

60
Open

30
Closed

Implementation

Decision making

Voting

5 members
High leadership
turnover/clear division of
authorities
Strong leadership and
voting

7 members
Low leadership
turnover/clear division of
authorities

5 members

Debate and voting

No leadership turnover/no
division of authorities

Agreement and consensus

Influential leadership

Self-regulation
Mechanism

Voluntary standards

Voluntary standards

Voluntary standards

None

Transparency

Members’ access and
public reporting

Members’ access and
public reporting

Members’ access and
internal reporting

Reporting to donors and
government

Male

Female

Male

Male

Graduate

Graduate

Graduate

Graduate

Volunteers

Paid and volunteers

Project-based and
volunteers

Few paid and no volunteers

Gender representation in
leadership
Educational level in
leadership positions
Human resources
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Professional Expertise

Needs assessment
Strategic planning
Annual plan
Use of technology

Internal
Awareness, Advocacy and
Scientific research
Scientific assessment
Frequent
In place
Good

Internal revenue sources

Membership fees/donations

Type of activities

Percentage from
total 2008 budget
Number of external
donors
Reliance on Donor A
Reliance on Donor B
Fund raising
Involvement in donors’
consultations
Perception of donors
Description of relationship:
with donors
with government

with private sector
with media
with other NGOs?
Networking

External
Awareness, Advocacy and
Projects
Formal assessment
Frequent
In place
Advanced
Membership fees/income
generating projects

Internal
Awareness, advocacy and
projects
Knowledge of local needs
None
None
Below Average
Membership fees

Membership fees

21%

17%

6%

9%

8

9

3

4

Low
Low
Ad-hoc

Low
Low
Planned

Medium
Medium
Members’ initiatives

High
Medium
None

Occasional involvement

Serious involvement

Not approached

Never

Partners

Partners

Funders

Funders

Mutual benefit
Confrontational

Strong and stable
Cooperative
Corporate social
responsibility
Partnership
Strong
International and national

Formal
Limited complementarity

Relative to projects
Limited complementarity

Sponsorship of activities

Sponsorship of activities

Activities reporting
Weak/limited
International and national

Partnership
Limited
None

None
Supportive
Weak/limited
International and national

External
Awareness and projects
None
None
None
Average
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FINDINGS AND PATTERNS
The sequence and timing of events are important for the understanding of regularities and
irregularities in the relationships between donors and partner NGOs upon shifts in the
focus of funding. Thus, process tracing is used to analyze these processes, understand
variations in interpretations, and assess causality (Pierson 2000; Schutt 2009).

As explained in Chapter Two, donors revise their aid strategy for a certain country and
consequently modify funding priorities. NGOs that have been receiving donor funding
need to react to these developments. In most cases, an NGO carries out an elaborated
internal discussion to decide how to deal with the changes taking place in the surrounding
environment. The end result of the internal discussion is an organizational decision. Thus,
in this research, there is an interaction between two actors: an NGO and a donor. The
dependent variable of interest is the NGO’s decision about how to react, and the
independent variable is the decision of the donor to change the focus of funding. As such,
one event has led to the event that follows. To help address the question of interaction
and explain any possible causation, process tracing is applied “to trace the operation of
the casual mechanism at work in a given situation” (Checkel 2007: 116; Pierson 2000;
Schutt 2009).

Process tracing allows taking one step back to study the decisions NGOs adopted at the
moments of change over an extended period of time (15 years). Process tracing also helps
clarify any links between the responses of exit, voice, loyalty, and adjustment. The four
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responses can be interrelated; they can be branches and/or consequences in a decision
tree; and they can fall on a continuum of organizational behavior.

Before discussing the donors’ objectives and NGOs’ activities, several caveats are in
order. First, the donor base of the four studied organizations is relatively small; however,
two of these organizations have more diversified sources of funding than the others. As
the profiles of these organizations show, NGO1 currently receives funding from around 9
external sources, NGO2 from 8, NGO3 from 4—all bilateral, and NGO4 from 3. For the
purpose of comparability, the focus is on two donors that are common to all four NGOs
as funding sources. The two donors are foreign aid agencies of the governments of
developed countries that provide bilateral development assistance to Lebanon.

Second, according to interviewed donor representatives, bilateral and multilateral donors
working in Lebanon coordinate their development assistance at both micro and macro
levels. At the micro or implementation level, bilateral donors hold regular meetings to
share ideas and exchange information on priorities and programs. Multilateral donors are
involved in meetings around specific subjects. In these venues, donors express their
interests in certain priorities and coordinate implementation plans to avoid duplication of
work. Donors can also seek or disseminate information on success stories and NGO
performance or promote successful partner NGOs. One representative pointed to the use
of these meetings, saying “occasionally, we do a mistake that we fund something to find
out during our coordination meetings that another donor is doing something similar.
However, this is a rare case. When it happens it is because NGOs are not always candid

114
in their work” (Interview #8).

However, representatives of both NGOs and donors in Lebanon tend to agree that donors
coordinate at the macro or policy level. As scholars argue, development assistance is
usually associated with foreign policies (Alesina and Dollar 2000; Easterly 2007;
Hancock 1989; Hook 1995). These policies are coordinated through higher political
channels. Funding then reflects political priorities. That is why common themes dominate
the agendas of different donors in Lebanon. These themes have become very similar to
one another, although they might lag or be labeled differently.

Third, donors revise their strategic objectives periodically. In principle, the revision
process involves consultations with local partners and government agencies. However,
few NGO representatives confirmed participating in these consultations, and describe
them as a procedural requirement more than a conviction of the importance and benefits
of NGOs’ participation and involvement. “Sometimes we spend more time meeting with
donor delegations to assess needs; at the end, we find out that what we asked for is less
important than what they asked us about” (Interview #15). NGO3 member added another
observation,
When you send a team of experts in a particular field, let’s say education,
what strategy do you expect the team to recommend other than education?
The Donor is already framing its strategy. This is again a supply-driven
approach; you are supplying a selective group of experts as well. NGOs
involved in the process only provide feedback on issues and ideas that the
experts focus on based on his/her specialization. So donors’ consultations
are issue-feedback and not situational or needs assessment (Interview
#16).
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Other representatives questioned the involvement of some local organizations. “When
Donor A wants to develop a new country strategy, it is the same group of local NGOs
that have already been working with and close to the donor and know what the donor
wants or even thinks. The NGOs will use or repeat the same language. It is like listening
to each other in a revolving channel of communication” (Interview #16). A donor
representative admitted the same weakness, pointing out the irregularity in holding
consultations and the inability to involve all NGOs. This means that donor consultations
do not necessarily serve the desired purposes and that not all NGOs are necessarily aware
of donor plans and what is being prepared.

Finally, the donor-NGO relationship is marked by confusion on both sides. Such
confusion takes different forms. Some donors’ priorities are not public, not easily
accessible, or intentionally vague. An expert in the NGO field argued that “the
assumption that posting your priorities on a website makes it accessible to everyone is
wrong, so is the assumption of providing broad objectives to guide the NGOs. We are
interested in working on environment does not tell much because what in the
environmental sector you want to focus on.” This confusion manifests itself in few wellinformed NGOs, but is common in many small organizations approaching a donor with
different ideas that do not necessarily meet funding objectives. Donors might perceive
such an approach as a lack of professionalism in the NGO sector. Donors organize
outreach and information sessions and training to resolve this confusion.

A second form of confusion has to do with the organizational mission. Lebanese NGOs
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are not encouraged to have specific missions because the process of amending a mission
at the Ministry of Interior can be long, cumbersome, and problematic. Contrary to the
simple notification needed for registering an organization, the process for amending an
organization’s mission requires a written approval from the Minister of Interior
(Moukheiber 2004). The NGO needs to submit a detailed request to justify the need for
an amendment along with copies of its file. The fact that the decision is in the hand of a
minister means the process might be delayed and the NGO cannot proceed with the new
line of work. It also risks the possibility of politicizing the request. According to
interviewed experts, some NGOs even had to pay bribes to expedite the process.
Therefore, many NGOs are inclined to adopt broad mission statements and general
purposes. Thus, donors are confused with NGOs’ scope of work and question their
motives and professionalism.

Donors’ Objectives
Before diving into the findings, it should be noted that there is a common perception
among Lebanese NGOs that donors’ priorities do not necessarily meet local needs,
although these needs are not properly assessed in the first place (AbouAssi 2010).
Interviewed NGO representatives often asserted that each donor decides on its strategy
based on national policies and not necessarily local needs. In a report, the UNDP (2009)
takes a similar stand: “funding agencies come with ready-made suggestions, and it is
really hard to negotiate with them the value of these projects in terms of social impact”
(30). Therefore, in this view, funding is an implementation tool used in a supply-driven
approach that sometimes includes pre-packaged ideas and projects (Bebbington 2004;
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Edwards, Hulme and Wallace 1999).

One interviewed donor representative argued against such claims, asserting that donors
do actually react and respond to local dynamics or developments and shift funding
accordingly.
We must confess that to some extent, donor priorities become dominant on
and adapted by NGOs. However, let me say these priorities develop
through what donor representatives learn from being in Lebanon. We do
see and hear the problems and can identify needs. How much these
priorities align with the needs of the recipient depends on how you
identify the recipient. If you mean by recipient is Lebanon, then definitely
yes. If the recipient is an actor, be it a government or NGO, then maybe
not (Interview #9).
The four interviewed experts could not confirm whether funding priorities are demanddriven or already determined by donors. One expert provided a balanced assessment,
stating:
Lebanon needs everything. Our society is well prepared and open to any
and all topics. What happens is some donors throw some big ideas to test
the water. For example, donors introduced good governance as a big
slogan and local NGOs captured it. This priority was not imposed per se
but introduced with promised incentive, i.e., funding. So, the approach is
not hierarchical, neither top-down nor bottom up. It is a cycle here: test the
waters, generate response, provide funding, and implement projects
(Interview #3).
Both of the two donors covered in this research (Donor A and Donor B) made numerous
shifts to their funding objectives for Lebanon since 1990. In the early 1990s, Donor A
and Donor B focused their efforts on livelihood support in Lebanon before peace was
fully reinstated and reconstruction was launched. The themes of rural development and
development in general were dominant. In the mid-1990s, as the Lebanese government
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started regaining power and providing services to its people, the focus of most funding
shifted to the support of government efforts in services provision. Donor A launched
welfare services funding programs and Donor B funded social development projects.

By the late 1990s, Lebanon witnessed presidential and municipal elections.6 Donor A
shifted to focus on good governance, and Donor B shifted to a focus on institutional
development; both were themes championed by donors and appealed to the interests of
local politicians and organizations. Since 2000, Lebanon has been witnessing insecurity,
instability, and political turmoil. The Israeli army pullout from Southern Lebanon after 22
years of occupation was followed by political divisions over the extension of the term of
the president and the assassination of a national leader. In 2005, the rise of the ‘cedar
revolution’ brought civic participation and engagement to its highest levels until the 2006
war between Israel and Hezbollah and the political upheavals of 2007 and 2008. All
donors were compelled to respond to the Lebanese government’s call for emergency and
relief assistance during and after these events. When the war settled down, the two donors
started preparing for the next phase of their aid priorities, and democracy and human
rights found their way to the top of the funding agenda, with Donor A focusing on the
former, and Donor B focusing on the latter.

NGOs’ Activities
Before discussing the NGOs’ activities and responses to the changes in donor funding
objectives, it is important to stress that the four organizations in this research are

6

	
  The first municipal elections after 35 years took place in 1998.	
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environmental NGOs. This means that their mission statements are primarily focused on
the environment. To preserve confidentiality, these mission statements cannot be
explicitly quoted. However, the overarching themes in these statements include:
protection of the environment and conservation of natural resources; combating
environmental threats and abuses; promoting environmental well-being; raising
environmental awareness; and building capacities for better environmental management
and engagement. Another objective mentioned in these mission statements is
development, which is directly associated with and linked to the environment,
environmental protection, promoting better living standards, and ensuring sustainable
social development.

Again, to protect confidentiality, only the general purpose of activities carried out by the
four NGOs is described. Specific details about these activities and on-the-ground
implementation are important and might constitute an interesting subject for future
research. The purposes of these activities are stated in the NGOs’ grant applications,
project documents, annual reports, and/or websites. As noted, all of the NGOs’ activities
are funded by the two donor agencies; however, no activities are co-funded by the two
donors.

Responses to Donor A
As discussed above, Donor A revaluated its funding objectives for Lebanese NGOs
several times during the period covered by this research. Specifically, over several
funding cycles, Donor A’s funding objectives shifted from rural development, to welfare
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services, to good governance, and finally to democracy. Figure 4.1 captures the shifts in
Donor A’s funding objectives and the concomitant changes in the activities of the four
NGOs.
Activities
Donor A
Objectives

NGO1

NGO2

NGO3

NGO4

Irrigation

Basic Environment

-

Elderly

Citizenship

Citizenship

Youth Participation

Elections

Funding Cycle 1
Rural
Development

Agriculture
research

Reforestation

Funding Cycle 2
Welfare Services

-

Income-generating
projects

Funding Cycle 3
Good Governance

-

Environment
advocacy

Funding Cycle 4
Democracy

-

Environment
Participation

Figure 4.1: Diagrammatic Representations of Changes in Activities vis-à-vis Donor A

NGO1. In the early 1990s, NGO1 conducted research on the agriculture sector in
Lebanon. The research was funded by Donor A as part of its rural development program
and was one of the very first projects NGO1 implemented after its establishment. The
research focused on the environmental impact of introducing certain modes of production
into agriculture. Donor A’s funding shift to welfare services constituted a challenge for
NGO1, in part because the organization had only recently been established and was short
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on resources. A former director of the NGO explained the decision to not seek funding in
this cycle,
We noticed that no one was interested in scientific research. The interest
of the donor was welfare service. To tell you the truth, another board
member and I were in favor of considering the possibility of seeking
funding to provide some service in high-polluted areas. We discussed that
with other members and tried to argue that we would still be working
along our environmental mission. However, at the end, we decided
against. It would not be NGO1 anymore, as if we would be wearing
others’ clothes and not our own (Interview #1).
The relationship between NGO1 and Donor A was not only suspended for funding cycle
1, but also for the remaining funding cycles, which focused on good governance and
democracy. As an interviewed NGO1 member explained,
We are an environmental group and cannot just hop around from one place
to another according to donor wishes. Every time Donor A revised their
funding objectives, someone contacted and encouraged us to apply. […]
We studied the criteria but could not really relate to good governance or
democracy according to what the donor wanted. We said no thank you
(Interview #7).
NGO2. The organization worked on reforestation with funding from Donor A under the
rural development objective. The organization did a remarkable job and the public was
satisfied and demanded more, as one member of the organization recalled. Although
reforestation was the main motive behind the NGOs establishment, “we started doing
more advanced projects other than basic planting and we expanded vertically and
horizontally” (Interview #6).

Hence, NGO2 was able to sustain funding when Donor A shifted to welfare services,
even though the NGO did not have a substantial role or expertise in that domain.
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However, the organization approached the donor to find comfortable common ground. As
the current director claimed,
We agreed on an income-generating program. All projects were both
environmentally friendly and oriented. The production of goods for
example was from recycled materials or local agricultural ingredients. To
the donor, the project would still fit under welfare services; to us, we were
working in our field and within our environmental mission. We did not
have to conceal or twist the project but worked with Donor A (Interview
#2).
When NGO2 heard speculation that Donor A was going to shift to a new funding priority
in the next cycle, it approached the donor with questions. The NGO was able to convince
the donor to allow it to work on a specific issue, and was able to secure both financial
support and technical expertise. Thus, with the introduction of good governance as
Donor A’s main focus in the third funding cycle, NGO2 launched an environment
advocacy campaign to motivate the public to work with their elected representatives and
ask them to take necessary actions to protect the environment.

This mutually beneficial and balanced relationship between NGO2 and Donor A
continued into the next funding cycle, which focused on democracy. Specifically, NGO2
received funding for a project that promoted youth participation in environmental
debates, a project that satisfied Donor A’s interest in democratic and change processes.
An NGO member involved in designing that project said, “The donor found itself heavily
involved; financial and technical support reflected a great deal of commitment. Our
efforts and the donor’s support yielded very positive results” (Interview #6).

NGO3. The relationship between NGO3 and Donor A evolved as funding objectives
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shifted. The relationship started when Donor A funded a small irrigation project that
NGO3 successfully executed during the first funding cycle for rural development.
However, this experience did not translate into another project when funding objectives
shifted to focus on welfare services. The president of NGO3 clarified what happened:
“Donor A insisted on something that we did not see any relevance in. First, we are not a
charity. Second, service provision is a government responsibility. And third, why be
involved in something that has no long-term benefit for the whole society?” (Interview
#11). Thus, during this funding cycle, NGO3 did not seek any funding from Donor A.

However, when Donor A shifted funding to focus on good governance, NGO3
approached the donor with a project on citizenship. A representative of Donor A
explained that many NGOs applied for funding, regardless of their field of work.
“[NGO3] submitted a compelling proposal on citizenship: a creative idea and the right
partner. The NGO had some management capacity to implement the project but
technically does not fit the profile we needed. We accepted the proposal on citizenship
because other evaluation points outweighed organizational capacity and relevance
criteria” (Interview #14).

During the last funding cycle, which focused on democracy, NGO3 received a grant to
promote youth participation in elections. The representative of NGO3 justified these
activities, which are not necessarily related to its environmental mission, by noting “we
saw other organizations taking money from the donor. We decided to do the same to
sustain our programs knowing that we were committed to and could perform an excellent
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job” (Interview #16).

NGO4. The organization was able to sustain its relationship with Donor A throughout the
four funding cycles. With funding under the donor’s rural development objective, NGO4
conducted environmental activities such as planting trees and cleaning campaigns. When
Donor A shifted to welfare services in the next funding cycle, NGO4 launched a project
that provided services for the elderly. The director of NGO4 explained this decision,
We thought that the people we had been serving were in need of such
services and there was the money. I am not saying that we amended our
mission but, rather, our understanding of the mission has developed. If you
are working on environment, you need to work with people. You cannot
approach people just through environment; you need to approach them
through their daily activities. It is not just about the tree (Interview #13).
NGO4 pursued funding for a citizenship project during the next cycle when Donor A
launched its good governance strategy. An NGO expert who consulted with the
organization explained what happened,
I was working on a service-provision project to a marginalized group. The
NGO decided to start projects on citizenship when the theme emerged and
there was funding. We had to work on a proposal without any prior
expertise or knowledge. We transformed the whole focus from one
domain to another. I did not fit and resigned (Interview #27).
During the last funding cycle, which focused on democracy, NGO4 secured a grant from
Donor A for a project on education youth about voting during elections. A representative
of Donor A explained its decision to fund this project, which was well out of the realm of
the NGO’s focus on the environment,
We could work with any NGO as long as the project idea satisfies our
objectives. [NGO4] was not planting trees but rather was providing
training on certain skills. They are not experts in the field. However, we
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are bound with the location and whoever exists in that location. If they are
interested in working with us, we will work with them regardless of their
field of operation (Interview #25).
Responses to Donor B
Like Donor A, Donor B also sustained its funding to Lebanon through local NGOs and
shifted its priorities in various funding cycles. Specifically, Donor B’s funding objectives
shifted from general development, to social development, to institutional development,
then to human rights. Figure 4.2 captures the shifts in Donor B’s funding objectives and
the concomitant changes in the activities of the four NGOs.

Activities
Donor B
Objectives

NGO1

Development

Environmental
Awareness

NGO2

NGO3

NGO4

Basic Environment

Waste
Management

-

-

Environmental
Lobbying

Access to
Information

-

Youth
Empowerment

Funding Cycle 1

Funding Cycle 2

Social
Development

-

Institutional
Development

Environmental
Rules

Eco-tourism

Funding Cycle 3
Capacity Building

Funding Cycle 4
Human Rights

-

-

Figure 4.2: Diagrammatic Representations of Changes in Activities vis-à-vis Donor B
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NGO1. The relationship with Donor B is not substantially different from its relationship
with Donor A. Under its development program, Donor B funded NGO1’s activities to
promote and raise environmental awareness among university students. However, the
shift of funding to social development did not appeal to NGO1, so the organization
decided not to pursue funding. The former director explained,
We did not assemble a project on gender and social development just to
chase a donor and get the funding. When one donor approached us to work
on these themes, we immediately rejected the suggestion. Social
development was not our job. Other NGOs are specialized and do better
job. NGO1 takes pride in not diverting into other themes unrelated to
environment even at its early stages of operation, although these themes
are all related to development (Interview #1).
When the donor shifted its funding objectives to focus on institutional development,
NGO1 applied for and received a grant to work with on environmental standards and
regulations with municipalities and some members of parliament. A member of NGO1
clarified,
We were able to align both interests [NGO1’s and Donor B’s] under
environmental institutional development… The project has different
components of interest to the donor and others were to us. We approached
the donor after we found our comfortable place within the framework the
donor is working on. That was not the case before or after such as donor’s
human rights interest which was not something we wanted to get involved
with (Interview #7).
However, when Donor B shifted its funding priorities to human rights, NGO1 again
decided not to apply for funding. In sum, the NGO1-Donor B relationship was active
during the first and third funding cycles, but inactive in the second and fourth funding
cycles.
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NGO2. The relationship with Donor B did not start until the second funding cycle when
the donor introduced social development as its main funding objective. During this
second funding cycle, and in parallel with its income-generating program funded by
Donor A, NGO2 cooperated with local communities to promote eco-tourism. The
director of NGO2 recalled how this project emerged,
Donor interest was in social policies. I was in that meeting when the donor
agreed to allow a small component for eco-tourism projects. We argued
that we would target the same areas these social policies should primarily
serve. When they noticed we did not have capacity problem or hidden
agendas and we always had some positive results, they agreed with us
(Interview #2).
The NGO2-Donor B relationship continued into the third funding cycle, which focused
on institutional development. Specifically, NGO2 crafted an activity to build the capacity
of small environmental clubs and groups by providing training on management,
computer, and accounting skills and techniques. A member of the NGO justified the
capacity building project, by saying
Such a project does not necessarily fit our mission but we believe it served
it. In Lebanon, you cannot draw a straight line and follow its path; you
might need to go through allies and take several shortcuts. I thought we
needed to develop the capacity of local NGOs if we wanted their help
serving our mission and ensuring better environmental monitoring and
management (Interview #6).
However, with Donor B’s shift to human rights, NGO2 “found it impossible to be
convinced that a project on human rights would not transform its whole identity. Many
human rights organizations were more eligible and could do a better job” (Interview #26).
Thus, NGO2 decided not to apply for any funding.
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NGO3. The relationship between NGO3 and Donor B began when the donor funded a
project to implement basic environmental awareness campaigns at the local level under
the general development objective. The NGO3 team hoped to build a strong relationship
with Donor B, but was faced with the reality that the donor had objectives that did not
always correlate with the NGO’s mission. Thus, when Donor B shifted to the theme of
social development, the NGO refrained from applying for funding.

However, when the donor shifted to institutional development in the third funding cycle,
NGO3 argued that it was able to meet the donor’s new requirements and received funding
for the implementation of a lobbying project on environmental issues at the municipal
level. A representative of Donor B commented on that project. “I am glad we listened to
the organization. The NGO figured a great idea and found the best way to implement it.
All it needed was us nurturing the project although we originally did not consider
lobbying, let alone environment, without our framework” (Interview #9).

With Donor B’s shift to human rights in the fourth funding cycle, NGO3 did not attempt
to secure funding. The president of the organization defended the decision saying, “If
there were a need, we would have considered developing a project. We saw other NGOs
working on human rights. Unlike citizenship [(which was funded by Donor A)], there
was only so much you could do in human rights without duplicating other activities”
(Interview #11).

NGO4. The reactions of for NGO4 to shifts in funding differ little from Donor A to
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Donor B. During the first funding cycle, Donor B focused on general development and
funded NGO4’s community waste management project. When the donor shifted to focus
on social development, NGO4 chose not to apply for funding. Interestingly, the NGO was
conducting a welfare service project funded by Donor A at that time. According to the
NGO director, the decision to not apply for funding from Donor B had nothing to do with
the strategic focus of the funding cycle, but was rather a function of the NGO’s lack of
“capacity to simultaneously carry out two new projects. That would have actually drained
our efforts and resources. We decided to try one project out” (Interview #13).

When Donor B’s funding focus shifted to institutional development, NGO4 secured a
grant for an access to information project that disseminated information on government
transactions to the public. In this instance, organizational capacity was used to justify the
organization’s pursuit of funding. The manager of the project framed the justification,
We altered the focus of our work as long as we had the capability. I firmly
believe that the access to public information project was important. It was
relevant to everyone and that was we should be working on as an NGO. It
was not directly related to environment, but we were able to professionally
and effectively execute a project that had huge impact (Interview #17).
During Donor B’s last funding cycle on human rights, NGO4 implemented a project to
empower youth to protect and defend their rights, which ran in parallel to the youth
voting project funded by Donor A. The direct of NGO4 confessed,
We try to fit our ideas into the donor’s clothes. We might submit the same
project idea to multiple donors. The proposal will be different based on the
donor. We present it in a different manner based on the perception of how
it might be accepted. For example, Donor B was interested in human
rights. We had to tweak our project idea to demonstrate to the donor that it
fits the funding criteria (Interview #15).
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When taken as a whole, these findings indicate a variation in NGOs’ responses to shifts
in donor funding. One mode of response is when an NGO decides to no longer seek
funding from a particular donor due to incongruence between donor’s new objectives and
the NGO’s interests. With this mode of response, the relationship between the two is
suspended during that funding cycle. A second mode of response is when an NGO
approaches the donor to discuss the possibility of continuing their relationship despite the
donor’s decision to change its funding objectives. The NGO relays its concerns to the
donor with the intention of influencing the donor to waive certain criteria. Such an
arrangement allows the NGO to sustain the source of funding for its environmental
activities. In a third mode of response, an NGO starts new activities, perhaps even outside
of its domain of expertise, in an attempt to secure the funding. The organization
voluntarily decides to reshuffle its priorities to account for emerging donor preferences. I
propose that Hirschman’s (1970) individual self-interest theory can be applied to classify
these various modes of response into a conceptual framework.

MAKING THE CASE FOR
EXIT-VOICE-LOYALTY
NGOs operate in an environment dominated by other actors, namely government and
donors. To perform effectively, these organizations need to exercise some influence over
the environment, manage the pressures of the environment, and be appreciated by the
environment. To do so, an NGO sometimes needs to strike a balance “between sufficient
integration with its environment to be efficient and sufficient distance from it to be
effective” (De Graaf 1987: 297; Lewis 2001). At other times, NGOs need to either
distance themselves from or become transformed by the surrounding environment
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(Bebbington 2004; Hearn 1998; Stiles 2002). These kinds of responses to environmental
pressures are evident in the different ways the four NGOs responded to shifts in donor
funding.

Hirschman (1970) constructed the typology to understand consumers’ responses to
deteriorating conditions in their relationship with an organization. In the original theory,
an individual can respond to organizational decline in three ways: 1) s/he can exit and
seek a better service, product, or condition elsewhere; 2) s/he can practice voice by
communicating a complaint to the organization and hoping for improvement; and 3) s/he
can be loyal and passively wait for the situation to improve.

According to Hirschman (1970), the consumer uses the market to defend her/his welfare.
Here lies the reason why this typology resonates with this present research. Researchers
refer to development assistance as an aid industry or market of supply and demand
(Bebbington 2004; Kharas 2007; Van Rooy 1998; Van Rooy and Robinson 1998). A
donor representative described the situation: “Lebanon is a highly saturated market. You
have international donors competing to find suitable local NGOs to fund. In reality, there
is abundance in financial resources that NGOs can afford to pick and choose their
funders” (Interview #10). Therefore, there is ‘market similarity’, which supports the
application of Hirschman’s (1970) typology and its extension in this research. More
specifically, in this situation, NGOs can be seen as consumers of a product (i.e., funding)
from donors. Changes in the supply of these financial resources lead to dissatisfaction
among NGOs because they are dependent on the donors for external sources of funding.
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Another aspect that should be highlighted here is that the exit-voice-loyalty typology (and
its subsequent modifications and applications) operates at the level of the individual. The
research on hand applies the typology to aggregates of individuals, i.e., organizations
(Pffefer 1982). Organizational studies encompass the perspective of organization as an
open system, a “coalition of shifting interest groups that develop goals by negotiation [...]
influenced by environmental factors” (Scott 1987: 23, Baum and Rowley 2002). Scholars
maintain that organizations and organizational behavior could be understood by
considering the behaviors of individuals within the organization (Collins 1981; Schelling
1978). In other words, “there is a relation between the behavior characteristics of the
individuals who compose some social aggregate and the characteristics of the aggregate”
(Pffefer 1982: 19).

Khalil (1997) argues that a firm needs to be directed by goals, and it can be treated as an
individual under the condition of consented goals. The idea of consented goals “stipulates
that the member has already consented to the right of the organization to override his/her
right concerning what is the common good” (Khalil 1997: 538). The consented goals
condition is applicable to NGOs. These organizations are established for a public benefit
or a broader common good, driven by the ethos of voluntarism and public service and by
the desire to articulate and actualize a particular social vision (Salamon and Anheier
1992; Vakil 1997). An NGO’s mission is the result of the goals and a small set of
interrelated values of the individuals that constitute the organization (Padaki 2000, 2002).
The mission represents aggregate preferences and interests.
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In brief, as Scott (2003) succinctly frames the argument, “organizations must be viewed
as actors in their own right. They take action, utilize resources and can own property” (7).
That is why we can speak of both “natural persons (you and me) and juristic persons (Red
Cross and General Motors)” (Scott and Davis 2007: 6). Accordingly, it is possible to
apply Hirschman’s (1970) typology to organizations.

However, this is where the issue of agency becomes a factor, complying with
Hirschman’s analysis but at the same time challenging or imposing a limitation on it.
Agency refers “not to intentions people have in doing things but to their capacity of doing
things in the first place.... agency concerns event of which an individual is the
perpetrators, in the sense that the individual could, at any phase in a given sequence... act
differently” (Giddens 1984: 9; Caldwell 2006).

Agency is the core of analysis in Hirschman’s (1970) typology. The typology begins with
the assumption that the individual is driven by her/his personal interests and therefore
s/he uses the market to defend her/his welfare and benefits (Hirschman 1970). Basically,
the consumer is practicing agency in making the suitable decision that serves his/her
interest. Several factors may influence the decision of a consumer in response to the
deterioration of a situation. However, it is within the capacity of the individual to assess
these factors and take a necessary course of action that serves his/her self-interest at a
certain point in time. For example, a consumer might be willing to take the risk at an
early stage of deterioration in product quality or relationship, and explore the possibilities
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of practicing voice rather than exit. However, the same consumer might later prefer to
look for other options elsewhere due to lack of interest in waiting for the uncertainties of
voice (Dowding et al. 2000; Farrell and Rusbult 1981; Gehlbach 2006; Hirschman 1970;
Light et al. 2003; Matland 1995; Nooteboom 1999).

Scholars in organizational theory (Baum and Rowley 2002; Donaldson 1999; Eisenhardt
1989; Hannan and Freeman 1977; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Scott 2003; Shapiro 2005;
Thompson 1967) consider that organizations are driven by some form of self-interest, be
it to reduce uncertainty in the environment, to protect core technology, to change to better
fit its context, or to actually survive. Therefore, organizations also enjoy a certain degree
of agency in their actions. Even from the new institutional perspective, DiMaggio (1988)
asserts the impact of interest and agency on the institutional environment processes by
which organization change, grow or erode. However, like individuals, organizations are
restricted by constraints, contingencies and variables that lead to bounded-rationality.
Bounded-rationality helps organizations decide on the most satisfactory alternative
instead of continuing the process of searching and assessing all other options (Pfeffer
1982).

This assumption can be applied to nonprofit organizations. These organizations do enjoy
agency and are driven by a certain degree of self-interest that determines their behaviors.
Several studies (Alexander 1996; Barman 2002; Edelman 1992; Grønbjerg 1993;
Tschirhart 1996) highlight this issue. Nonprofits are more proactive in managing their
institutional and resource environments than we might assume. Barman (2002), for
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example, uses the United Way as a case study to argue that a nonprofit can protect its
interests by actively differentiating itself from its rivals when competition over external
resources emerges. Edelman (1992), on the other hand, relies on a nationwide survey of
346 organizations to show that organizations have a relative degree of agency in
responding to employment regulations. Surveyed organizations constructed various
meanings and symbols of compliance following the 1964 Civil Rights Act in a way that
complied with the Act but at the same time served and protected organizational interests.
In her study on nonprofit arts organizations, Tschirhart (1996) argues that nonprofit
managers can leverage different strategies to respond to stakeholder problems. These
strategies fall under two broad approaches: improve congruence of interpretations of
values and outcomes with the stakeholders to resolve the problem or attempt to reduce
the negative consequence of problems. The author recommends the nonprofit manager to
“proactively search for stakeholders who hold more compatible values and norms” (79)
in order to avoid any potential problem of incongruence in values or norms. While this is
not always possible or practical, such a strategy would be a clear manifestation of agency.

However, nonprofits might also challenge the assumption, at least partially. These
organizations exist as non-profit distribution entities that work for the benefits of
members and non-members, or a public benefit at large (Salamon 1999; Salamon and
Anheier 1992; Vakil 1997). Organizational missions serve broader interests and decisions
are not necessarily made based on limited preferences of the members of the
organization. Rather, the management of a nonprofit accounts for the interests and needs
of, and possible implications on, constituents beyond the organization (Wallace et al.

136
2006). Therefore, when an NGO is in the process of making a decision, it can practice
agency but it might not be driven by self-interest. This is where agency in nonprofits
might challenge Hirschman’s (1970) analysis.

In his analysis, Hirschman (1970) links agency to economic factors, which shape
individual behavior. His attempt to incorporate non-economic factors into the decisionmaking process falls short of being comprehensive. On one side, exit and voice are
separately associated primarily with market systems and political systems, respectively.
Although there are some applications of the two concepts in both fields, exit is an
economical self-interested choice and voice is a political action (Dowding et al. 2000;
Hirschman 1970). This allows the reader to conclude that a decision to exit is more than
likely driven by economic considerations than any other factors. On another side,
Hirschman’s (1970) analysis relates the choice between exit and voice to the elasticity of
demand for a particular product or service. Inelasticity in demand does not favor the
practice of voice, making exit a more favorable option (Dowding et al. 2000). Therefore,
there is some limitation in using such an approach.

To juxtapose, Wallace and colleagues (2006) consider that compliance to external actors
in accordance with organizational interests might be mediated by commitment to
stakeholders. In a study that addresses the same subject of this present research, the
authors use three concepts, coercion, compliance, and commitment, to understand the
relationship between NGOs in the Global South and their foreign donors. In this
relationship, donors have the upper hand. They leverage the power of providing funding
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and determining grant criteria and requirements to force NGOs to act in specific ways
(Markowitz and Tice 2002; Wallace et al. 2006). However, the authors note that coercion
and compliance usually go hand-in-hand. Compliance is more related to the NGO’s
agency and self-interest than simply to external force imposed by donors. “Compliance
with [...] the terms and regulations of a grant are seen as an enviable outcome of the aid
chain” (Wallace et al. 2006: 4). In other words, interest in funding and in being part of the
aid industry result in the NGO’s acceptance of donor requirements.

Interest in financial resources is the obvious economic factor that might influence an
NGO’s decision. Nevertheless, the authors stress another concept, commitment, which
illuminates the agency of the organization on the one hand, and the non-economic factors
on the other. Reflected in the mission of the organization and the dedicated work of its
staff, commitment “is the reason for doing the work that goes beyond day-to-day
monetary or status rewards, or even organizational survival” (Wallace et al. 2006: 5). An
NGO might be motivated by moral and social obligations that counterbalance, if not
outweigh, its need for financial resources. Commitment to a cause allows the
organization to respond in multiple ways beyond automatic compliance to donors.
Therefore, economic factors are not a sufficient and necessary determinant.

Regardless of the power dynamics that some researchers (Ishkanian 2006) forewarn
against, NGOs enjoy agency in their behavior. The accumulation of non-economic
factors (including power and politics) is what exposes and entrenches variations in
behavior and in selection of the mode of responses to shifts in donor funding. Therefore,
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Hirschman’s (1970) typology might be useful, but to a certain extent since it does not
adequately account for all variations in behaviors of organizations—particularly that of
NGOs. The present research uses this limitation as an argument to suggest modification
to the typology before applying it to organizations.

Other scholars have suggested amendments to the exit-voice-loyalty typology. For
example, Rusbult and Farrell (1982) added the category of neglect, which describes “lax
and disregardful behavior” (Farrell 1983: 598), and O’Leary (2006) suggests guerrilla
behavior, which is when an actor works against decisions from within the organization.
While both are useful concepts, neither works as an addition/modification for the cases
under study here, because NGO activities are under scrutiny. First, the work of NGOs is
usually public and covered by the media, which makes it hard for these organizations to
seek funding from a donor to do one thing but continue to do another. Second, donor
attention to visibility and publicity of the funding, as all interviewed NGO representatives
confirmed, makes any such intentions harder. Third, donors have elaborate systems to
track funds, monitor programs, and evaluate success through criteria such as number of
beneficiaries and program cost-effectiveness. Finally, working against the decision from
within is not fruitful, let alone possible. The only way an NGO can work against the
donor decision from within is through the consultation process. However, as discussed
earlier, this process is not perceived by NGO representatives as effective or participatory.

To modify Hirschman’s (1970) typology in a way that captures NGO responses to shifts
in donor funding, I modestly reinterpret some categories and introduce a fourth category

139
that I label ‘adjustment’. Adjustment occurs when NGOs willingly and voluntarily decide
to adjust their activities in an attempt to meet the changes in donor funding priorities. To
elaborate, I commence with additional interpretation of the findings.

ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF FINDINGS
Further analysis of the findings relies on qualitative research methodology suggested by
Miles and Huberman (1984: 15), which is “practical, communicable, and non-selfdeluding - in short, scientific in the best sense of that word.” To give specific meaning
and precision to words and expressions that might be difficult to compare in qualitative
research, the analysis must focus on identifying and understanding concepts, patterns, and
themes in the data. This is done in two steps.

First, the research needs to construct a data display, which is used to “assemble and
organize information in an immediately accessible, compact form, so that the analyst can
see what is happening and either draw justified conclusions or move on to the next-step
analysis which the display suggests may be useful” (Miles and Huberman 1984: 21).
Second, the research needs to reduce the data into specific observations based on quality
and recurrence. This iterative process results in compiling specific data, or first-order
concepts, which are then used to help generate second-order concepts. The “first-order
concepts – the so-called facts of a qualitative study, never speak for themselves and the
second-order concepts are the notions used by the researcher to explain the patterning of
the first-order concepts” (Miles and Huberman 1984: 145).
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In this approach, facts are the observations made or the data collected, and notions or
patterns are the analytical categories or meanings a researcher gives to the facts using
specific codes for interpretation. As certain patterns become associated with each other
and occur concurrently, they emerge into themes that are either identified through
theoretical assumptions or induced by the researcher. Based on the 30 interviews that
were conducted for this research, Table 4.2 shows the concepts and patterns that emerged
during this qualitative data analysis process. The proposed themes rely on a theoretical
framework.

Table 3.2: Progression from Concept-Structures to Patterns and Themes
First Order Concept-Structures
Does not want to go into this maze
Decided against any change of activities
Not do what the donor wants
Committed to working on specific causes and do not change their objectives and goals
Not like other NGOs that deviate from their route into other routes
Not do projects that restrict or even redefine our scope of work
Not gear their interests to donors’ agenda
Do not shift my identity
Not after funding if it does not fit under our objectives
Does not divert into other themes unrelated to environment
Never change focus of proposed projects
No compromise... No concession
Why bother shifting or soliciting funding?
Does not shift to another target if and when a donor wants
Does not apply if funding focus is very far from its own focus
Declines to respond to donors’ new priorities
We have the power to say NO
More resistant to change
No longer securing funding from donor
Not apply for funding if it knows where it is heading
Not interested
Refused to apply
Not working with the donor anymore
Not to reenter again in a relationship with donor
Stop relationship with a donor
Prefer to stop work and not change the mission

Second Order
Categories-Patterns

Theme

Divergence of interests

Exit
Not apply for funding

Suspend relationship
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Brainstorm
Reach out and talk more to the donor
Open to ideas from groups we have relationships with
Discuss things with the donor- in dialogue and not debate
Listen more to what the NGO is saying
Approach donor and make a strong argument
Able to convince donor to work on this theme
Know what we and the donor want
Combining our priorities
Reach some middle ground with it
Demonstrate that our work still fits donor’s new interests
Find a comfortable place within the framework of the donor
Bridge between our work and donor interests
Find a balance
Find a match between interest and donor’s objectives
Continue the work
Interested in sustaining the relationship with the donor
Stabilize the relationship
Donor decision to make the move
Adopt donors’ identity
Change color to match the donor’s
Just act upon the donor’s commands
Only do the work when donor decides
Work on something completely irrelevant to previous work
Shadows of donors
Donor worshipers
The creation of the donor
Donor is their mother and father
Established by a donor to execute the donor agenda

Negotiation and
dialogue

Voice
Balanced interests

Maintain relation

Dilution of interest
Comply automatically
Loyalty
Attach to donor
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Do not want to say no
Change projects according to donor priorities
Respond favorably to donors
Abandon stated mission, working on something totally new
Gear activities towards donor criteria
Bending its mission
Flexible enough to accommodate almost anything
Generate ideas relevant to funding objectives

Accommodation of
interest

Adapt to conditions dictated by donors
Act abruptly to get funding
Added another component to what it used to do
Adopt new themes
Projects not in its areas of expertise
Such NGOs are changing their mentality according to the donor’s interests
Tweaks or twist its work
Branches out or moves away from mission
Shift focus entirely to a new domain
Enters into an alien domain
Hop from one activity to another
Spreads itself too thin
Transfers green into yellow and yellow into blue

Alter activities

Get donor funding
Chase donors
Keep the flow of money
Run after the money
Knows what to do: stretch, write a proposal and apply for funding
Ready to say yes to any funding
Need resources

Retain funding

Adjustment
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PROPOSED CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF
EXIT, VOICE, LOYALTY, AND ADJUSTMENT
Based on this coding protocol, we can now return to the NGOs’ responses to shifts in
donor funding and examine them in light of a modified Hirschman (1970) typology,
which now includes exit, voice, loyalty, and adjustment. Using the four categories in the
modified typology, Figure 4.3 captures the responses of the four NGOs to shifts in
funding by Donor A and Donor B. These responses are discussed in detail below.

Nature of Activities
Donor
A
B
A
B
A
B

Funding
Objectives
Rural
Development

NGO1

NGO2

NGO3

NGO4
Funding
Cycle 1

Baseline for Comparison

Development
Welfare
Services
Social
Development
Good
Governance
Institutional
Development

Exit

Voice

Exit

Adjustment

Exit

Voice

Exit

Exit

Exit

Voice

Adjustment

Adjustment

Voice

Adjustment

Voice

Adjustment

A

Democracy

Exit

Voice

Adjustment

Adjustment

B

Human
Rights

Exit

Exit

Exit

Adjustment

Funding
Cycle 2

Funding
Cycle 3

Funding
Cycle 4

Figure 4.3: Diagrammatic Representations of NGO Responses

The first mode of response discussed in the cases is when NGO1, for example, decided
not to apply for funding when Donor A shifted from Rural Development to Welfare
Services then to Good Governance and finally to Democracy. The same response
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occurred when the NGO decided not to apply for funding from Donor B in funding cycle
2 (Social Development) and funding cycle 4 (Human Rights). The former director of the
organization elaborated on the decision:
Decisions on funding evolved from personal conviction based on
principles and values into an organizational policy. First, we do not see
any donor as a continuous source of funding. Second, we do not believe
whenever there is money we have to get part of it. Third, a donor should
not impose any agenda on us, nor should be contributing to pollution or
violations of social justice. […] That was why we did not seek additional
funding from Donor A after our first project and this is how we now still
decide on donors to approach (Interview #1).
The same mode of response was used by NGO2 and NGO3 during the course of their
relations with Donor B. Specifically, NGO3 did not seek funding during cycle 2 (Social
Development) and both NGO2 and NGO3 did not seek funding during cycle 4 (Human
Rights). Similarly, NGO3 did not pursue funding when Donor A shifted to focus on
Welfare Services during funding cycle 2. Regarding the developments in its relationship
with donors, the president of NGO3 president expressed frustration, asserting, “it should
not be the case that because a donor had funded one small project it gained the full right
to make and impose decisions. We faced that with some donors and left them for a while”
(Interview #11).

This first mode of response corresponds with the notion of exit. According to Hirschman
(1970), exit occurs when an individual customer expresses dissatisfaction with a decrease
in quality or benefit of a certain service or condition by no longer seeking the service
from its provider and shifting to another. How, then, does an NGO exit?
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In the cases recapped above, NGO representatives expressed dissatisfaction and
frustration with the relationships with donors, especially when donors decided on new
funding objectives that these organizations perceived as incongruent with their
organizational or broader interests. As one NGO representative framed it, “we did not see
ourselves anywhere in the new scheme of funding” (Interview #15). This dissatisfaction
becomes manifested in an organizational decision about whether to seek donor funding.
Therefore, when an NGO loses interest in complying with the associated modified
criteria of new donor funding, it decides to no longer seek funding from that particular
donor. Accordingly, the relationship between the two is suspended during that funding
cycle. In such a case, the NGO does not apply for funding from that particular donor and
may pursue other funding sources that the organization perceives as a match that could
possibly provide more satisfactory conditions.

As Table 4.2 displays, this mode of behavior was common among the NGOs studied.
NGO and donor representatives and experts in the NGO field repeatedly used terms and
expressions such as ‘not gear interests to donors’ agenda’, ‘funding focus is very far from
focus’, ‘not do projects that restrict or even redefine our scope of work’, ‘decided against
any change of activities’, ‘refused to apply’, ‘do not change their objectives and goals’,
‘not to reenter again in a relationship with donor’, and ‘prefer to stop work’. Certain
patterns emerge from these observations. First, there is a divergence of interests between
the NGO and the donor as funding priorities change. Second, and as a result, the NGO
decides not to apply for funding. Finally, the NGO’s relationship with a particular donor
is suspended. These patterns feed into a common theme: a response of exit.
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A second mode of response applies to NGO1 and NGO3 in their relationship with Donor
B when the funding focus shifted to Institutional Development. NGO1 was able to
convince the donor to fund a project to develop environmental rules with local
municipalities, while NGO3 implemented a project on environmental lobbying at the
local level, although the environment and lobbying were not considered of integral
interest to Donor B, as one official indicated.

NGO2 shared the same experience with both donors, A and B, throughout the four
funding cycles (except one). NGO2 implemented four different programs, all related to
the environment, under new donor conditions. Specifically, with funding from Donor A,
it launched an income-generating program under Welfare Services, an environmental
advocacy project under Good Governance, and an environmental participation project
under Democracy; with funding from Donor B, it launched an eco-tourism program
under Social Development. A donor official commented,
We are open to listen to the NGOs within certain margins. In several
cases, we were approached by local organizations making compelling
cases. They were able to bring their ideas down from a dream to a plan,
and still paint a nice picture for us. We listened to them and were not able
to turn them down. With some flexibility on our side, we were able to
meet their requests within the funding scheme in place (Interview #8).
This second mode of response reflects practicing voice. Hirschman (1970) talks about
consumers who become dissatisfied with a certain service and complain to the service
provider. By practicing voice and communicating with the provider, those consumers
hope to be heard as they are interested in maintaining the relationship, rather than to
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escaping from it. So how does an NGO practice voice?

Voice can be used as a mechanism by an NGO interested in pursuing its relationship with
an existing donor despite changes in funding objectives and without sacrificing its own
goals and objectives. When a donor shifts the focus of funding, an NGO decides that it
needs to address its concerns about the shifts with the donor instead of escaping the
situation and avoiding the donor. The intention here is to influence the donor’s agenda by
aligning the donor’s priorities as closely as possible with the organization’s own interests.
Voice is practiced here to allow the NGO to secure funding for project ideas that do not
divert far from its stated objectives and mission. The two determinants of voice are
secured funding and an environment-related program. As an expert on the NGO sector
remarked, “donors agreed to waive certain criteria which allowed these organizations to
continue doing whatever they have been doing with a sustained source of funding”
(Interview #18). This was the case for NGO2’s income-generating program, for example.
Donor A’s interest was welfare service; NGO2’s interest was the environment. The
discussion between the two sides allowed NGO2 to implement a program that was not
‘welfare’ as typically defined by the donor. The implemented program supported small
projects that served the environment through using recycled material, producing organic
products, and establishing plants and seeds nurseries, which, at the same time, generated
income (i.e., welfare) for beneficiaries.

As Table 4.2 shows, the interviewees reported many observations that describe this mode
of behavior. In particular, there were recurring terms and expressions such as ‘discuss
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things with the donor’, ‘brainstorm’, ‘reach some middle ground’, ‘accommodate
interests’, ‘find a match’, ‘bridge between our work and donor interests’, and ‘interested
in sustaining the relationship.’ Here, a different set of patterns is noticeable. First, the
NGO engages with the donor in negotiation and dialogue on ideas and activities. Second,
as a result, there is a balance between NGO interests and donor priorities. Finally, an
NGO’s relationship with a particular donor is maintained and stabilized. The theme that
emerges from these patterns is the mode of voice.

Following Hirschman’s (1970) typology, an assumed third mode of response is loyalty.
Loyalty is a passive response to the deterioration in a service, product, or relationship. A
loyalist waits in silence hoping that a product or a product provider will go back to the
original favorable condition. Loyalty “means strong attachment to an organization that
does not seem to warrant such attachment because it is so much like another one that is
also available” (Hirschman 1970: 81). That means that the consumer sticks with an
organization due to some favorable characteristics peculiar to the organization and not
necessarily to the product it is providing, which could ostensibly be found elsewhere.

As Hirschman left loyalty underdeveloped, several scholars have attempted to expand on
the concept (Dowding, et al. 2000; Drigota et a. 1995; Gehlbach 2006; Hoffmann 2006;
Leck and Saunders 1992; Organ 1988; Withey and Cooper 1989). To some, loyalty is just
an attitude that encourages voice and deters exit. Applying this argument to the third
mode of response mentioned above is challenging. The reported cases of NGO reactions
clearly show that these organizations did not exit their relationship with the donor.
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However, the NGOs did not engage in active communication with donors to discuss
concerns and convey feedback, which is what practicing voice is all about (Hirschman
1970). Therefore, loyalty here cannot be perceived as an attitude that materializes into an
active practice of voice. This then credits the counterargument that loyalty is a distinct
behavior, just like exit and voice (Rusbult, Zembrodt, and Gunn 1982; Withey and
Cooper 1989).

However, there is a practical limitation in fully accepting this argument and applying
loyalty to the third mode of NGO response. First, loyalty is described as a passive
behavior (Hirschman 1970; Rusbult, Zembrodt, and Gunn 1982), while the findings
indicate that the NGOs neither remained patient nor were silent. These organizations had
to react to certain disturbances in their relationships with donors caused by shifts in donor
funding. Their responses were active. For example, NGO2 had to follow a new path
when it launched the capacity building program during Donor B’s third funding cycle on
Institutional Development, and NGO4 had to develop its expertise and knowledge to
pursue a project on citizenship during Donor A’s third funding cycle on Good
Governance. Second, Hirschman (1970: 77) alludes to a distinction between attachment
to a product and attachment to an organization as a product provider. Dowding and
colleagues (2000: 476) endorse this distinction, asserting that “loyalty to a product is
surely very different from loyalty to an organization.” Basically, a product might be
sought elsewhere, but an organization might be irreplaceable, particularly if the
organizational niche is poorly populated (Hannan and Freeman 1977, 1984). In the
findings, NGO representatives referred to local needs and organizational interests as
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motives for this particular form of behavior; they did not reference an attachment to the
donor as an entity or source of funding. The interest was in funding as a product or in
retaining the benefits of a relationship with the donor.

Having said that, loyalty should not be dismissed as a mode of response, although it does
not characterize any responses to funding shifts in the findings. Here, I underscore
Drigota and colleagues’ (1995: 596) reasoning that “loyalty is less visible than the other
responses” because it is more associated with complicated conditions than just a
behavioral response to dissatisfaction. I attempt to explain loyalty based on observations
made by experts in the NGO field in Lebanon.

As a response to shifts in donor funding, I interpret loyalty as attachment to an
organization or a relationship and not to a product or an outcome resulting from the
relationship (cf. Dowding et al. 2000). With this distinction, the exercise of loyalty is
likely to be particularly prevalent among so-called ‘donor-organized NGOs,’ that is,
NGOs that are directly set up by donors to carry out their agendas in developing countries
(Loung and Weinthal 1999; Vakil 1997). Although limited in number, these DonorNGOs are established as ‘local’ NGOs; they are registered like any other NGO in a
particular nation, and are considered to be part of the NGO sector. Sometimes these
Donor-NGOs receive a substantial amount of aid funds channeled to a certain country. As
such, loyalty to their creator, the donor, is likely to be the salient characteristic of these
NGOs.
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Several experts in the Lebanese NGO sector supported this proposition. One remarked,
“Some NGOs became the shadow of the donors. These organizations work at the very
local level without a clear vision. One day they worked on environment and the next day
they started women empowerment projects. Local areas need such projects but it was a
donor decision to make the move” (Interview #3). Another observant called for
evaluating the activities of these organizations to grasp their loyalty to donors. First, these
NGOs have more activities when the donor has more funds and very minimal activities
when the donor allocates funding to other qualified NGOs. Second, these NGOs are more
visible than other well-established NGOs. Being linked to donors, their activities are well
attended and publicized. And third, “these NGOs are donor worshipers. They adopt the
donors’ identity. […] One changed the color of its own website to match the donor’s”
(Interview #12).

Another NGO expert highlighted a known case of a group of people who were brought
together by a donor to establish an NGO to serve a new donor agenda:
The NGO received a big grant from the donor to implement a series of
activities. When funding ended, the NGO stopped its activities, as if the
NGO was established for that purpose only. A few years later, we heard
that NGO received a new grant from the same donor to work on
something completely irrelevant to its previous work. Following that, the
NGO became inactive once again (Interview #22).
These organizations, usually labeled by donor representatives as implementers (not even
sub-contractors), swing with the shift in donor funding regardless of whether the new
funding is channeled to areas close or alien to their original field of work, or whether
there is a local need or organizational interest. This is a clear manifestation of the top-

153
down or supply-led approach to development assistance, wherein a donor comes with
pre-packed projects to fund ideas that the local partners have little say about, either in
terms of planning or implementation (Bebbington 2004; Doornbos 2003; Edwards et al.
1999; Hearn 1998; Lindenberg and Bryant 2001; Ottaway 2000; Schlesinger 2007).

In short, these Donor-NGOs relinquish autonomy and the ability to decide on what to do
and how to react. The descriptive meanings in Table 4.2 show certain patterns in this set
of observations. First, there is a strong attachment to the donor, as an institution as well
as a source of funding. Second, there is a dilution of NGO interests and a favoring of
donor interests. Third, there is automatic compliance with changes in funding priorities.
These patterns well reflect Hirschman’s (1970) unconscious loyalist behavior ‘free from
felt discontent.’ This behavior is reflected in automatic responses to donor interest,
associated with a lack of agency or active reaction (Hirschman 1970). Therefore, the
loyalty category in the proposed conceptual framework is exclusively limited to these
Donor-NGOs. I recognize the limitations related to loyalty as treated here and,
particularly, the difficulty in identifying and researching these types of organizations.
However, loyalty is expected to be a less common behavior among NGOs who are not a
direct affiliate of a donor.

The cases also revealed a new category for the typology—adjustment. Adjustment occurs
when NGOs reshuffle activities and priorities to accommodate changes in donors’
funding preferences. Examples of adjustment abound in the cases. During Donor B’s
Institutional Development funding cycle, NGO2 practiced adjustment in implementing its
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capacity building program. Likewise, NGO3 practiced adjustment during Donor A’s
funding cycles on Good Governance and Democracy. NGO4 exercised adjustment more
than the other organizations. Specifically, it used this mode of response for funding
cycles 2, 3, and 4 of Donor A, and for cycles 3 and 4 for Donor B. A donor representative
provided an observation and a justification of adjustment:
Do not forget. We evaluate proposals and not applicants. We are
evaluating what is presented on paper and not what might be the reality.
[… T]his procedure might ensure transparency and avoid bias. However,
we notice shifts among NGOs. Environmental NGOs try to come up with
governance or institutional development programs while before that they
were working on planting trees. This is a shift whether they admit it or not.
They are bending their mission to the limit to get the funding. During
implementation, they will be surprised with their inability or lack of
understanding of the project and its deliverables (Interview #19).
Interviewees provided abundant observations to describe this mode of behavior. As
shown in Table 4.2, there were numerous recurring terms and expressions, such as ‘adapt
to conditions’, ‘change’, ‘adopted new themes’, ‘tweaks or twist its work’, ‘gear’, ‘bend
mission’, ‘flexible enough to accommodate’, ‘ready to do anything’, ‘stretch’, ‘steps
away from the mission’, and ‘ready to yes to any funding’ that continuously recurred to
form certain patterns that could not go unnoticed. The first pattern is the accommodation
of donor interests, usually at the expense of organizational mission. The second pattern is
altering the nature of activities, and the third pattern is the retention of the funding
stream. These patterns justify the emergence of adjustment as a mode of NGO response
to shifts in donor funding.

Adjustment is an active response to deterioration in the quality of a service or
relationship. An individual or organization does not look elsewhere, or complain, or
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remain silent and faithful, or even neglect the situation. The individual or organization
actively and deliberately decides to alter attitude or behavior according to the changes in
the environment. Adjustment means that a consumer might need to lower expectations or
alter standards to accommodate the changes or interests of the service provider. In the
cases herein, the NGOs altered their activities. There is a vested interest in the service or
the relationship—due to the associated benefits—more than an attachment to the source
or provider.

Adjustment can (and should) be clearly distinguished from loyalty by examining and
verifying the nuances in the NGOs’ responses. There are two main ways to do this. First,
if loyalty refers to unconscious decisions to remain in a relationship (Hirschman 1970)
and dilute self-interest, then adjustment, in contrast, applies to conscious or discretionary
decisions to accommodate donor interests. Because these are conscious decisions, they
can be made only after an internal deliberative process about how to react to a shift in
funding objectives. In this case, the NGO’s response is neither imposed nor required, but
rather made at the full discretion of the organization. This reasoning was expressed by a
representative of one NGO undergoing such adjustment, “If we want to implement a
project, we need funding. We need to work not just according to donor criteria. It is like
applying for a private loan. You really need to think about it and consider the options. For
us, we considered these options and deliberately decided to broaden the scope of our
work” (Interview #16).

Second, if loyalty is the attachment to a relationship or organization (Dowding et al.
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2000), then adjustment is the attachment to the funding an organization (i.e., a donor)
provides. In this case, an NGO does not practice adjustment because it wants to retain a
relationship with a specific organization. The motive is the benefit from the relationship
that the NGO might have to give up. An NGO representative supported this observation
by explaining that the organization benefits by serving its constituency. “We needed the
funding because we thought it is better for our organization and the people we are serving
to have our feet in several playgrounds at the same time” (Interview #13). However, an
interviewed NGO expert was critical of such justification, labeling these organizations as
funding-driven. “They go to where the money is. The motive behind their behaviors is
funding and the excuse is the need. The claim is the broad mission and the local need to
do more in that field. However, where is the track record? And where are your
assessment studies?” (Interview #20).

Many NGOs working in different fields ‘ride the fashion waves’ set into motion by
donors (Challand 2005). This is not peculiar to environmental organizations; funding is
attractive to many NGOs. It is used not just as a respirator for work, but also as a
compass to expand operations. To obtain funding, some NGOs are willing to change
everything—their names, policies, and activities—to adhere to the new ‘fashion.’ For
example, welfare NGO, ‘Charitable Welfare’, when it noticed that millions of dollars
were coming for microcredit changed its name to be ‘Better Livelihood’. ‘Care for
Elderly’, as a name, did not suit the funding that another NGO was seeking. It created
another generic name. A third NGO, ‘Needs of Disabled’, is now known as ‘For
Development’. The name of the associations changed along with their activities
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(Interviews).

This trend is not limited to NGOs in Lebanon, to NGOs in developing countries, or to
NGO relationships with foreign donors. Rather, it is common across donors, sectors, and
nations. Several studies warn about the risks of such practices (Brainard and Brinkerhoff
2004; Brouwer 2000; Chambers and Pettit 2004; Doornbos 2003; Hanafi and Tabar 2003;
Morfit 2011; Murphy and Bendell 1997; Rahman 2006). In particular, research on
nonprofits in various sectors, such as community development, arts organizations, and
museums, among others, suggests that adjustment for the purposes of obtaining external
funding can lead to goal displacement (Alexander 1996; Barman 2008; DiMaggio1986a,
1986b; Froelich 1999; Grønbjerg 1993; Lipsky and Smith 1989/1990; Useem 1987).
Interviewed experts also criticized this trend. As one stated, these organizations “hop
from one activity to another because funding is available, covering environment, women,
education, and so... This is a weird mix. The goal is securing money and the motivation is
self-sustainability. NGOs invest minimum time and effort into it just because they know
this is temporary. It is a seasonal practice. This is neither natural nor healthy; it is short
lived” (Interview # 27). Therefore, adjustment could be minor, and considered to be a
transparent compromise. However, it could also pose a substantial risk, resulting in a
blind co-optation of the organization by the funder (Eade 1993). In such situations, NGOs
may lose touch with their own missions as their “roles are determined … by donor
fashion” rather than by other important factors (Edwards et al. 1999: 130).

In summary, I build on Hirschman’s (1970) typology of exit, voice, and loyalty to capture
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NGO reactions to shifts in donor funding. As the visual illustration in Figure 4.4 exhibits,
I propose a modified typology that encompasses four responses, including:
1. Exit: An NGO decides not to seek funding from a particular donor due to
divergence of interests, and therefore suspends the relationship.
2. Voice: An NGO decides to negotiate with the donor to balance the interests of the
two parties and maintain the relationship.
3. Loyalty: An NGO automatically complies with changes due to dilution of its
interests and attachment to the donor.
4. Adjustment: An NGO practices agency and voluntarily alters its activities to
accommodate donor interests and retain funding.

Exit
Voice
Shifts in
Funding

NGO
Decision
Loyalty
Adjustment

Figure 4.4: Changes in NGO-Donor Relationship

The analysis of the cases reveals several points worth discussing. First, in the modified
typology, exit and voice represent a form of agency, which refers to the intention and
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ability to both take an action and then change the action (Caldwell 2006; Giddens 1984:
9). Loyalty also arguably displays agency, since it is an intentionally passive, resigned
behavior. However, the cases in this current study showed NGOs practicing more agency
when they communicated with the donor and negotiated agreeable terms for the
relationship. Thus, voice is a more effective expression of agency for two reasons. First, it
prolonged positive results (i.e., obtaining funding and maintaining a relationship) that
were not available to an NGO practicing exit. Second, an organization that practiced
voice retained the ability to alter its decision if the donor did not tolerate the
communication. Basically, an NGO that practices voice can still exit at a later time, while
an NGO that practices exit no longer has the option of using voice.

The reported cases also show that when NGOs did not practice exit, they did not
necessarily use voice, and none engaged in passive loyalty. Rather, some NGOs altered
their activities in response to the changing funding environment—they purposively and
deliberately decided to practice adjustment. However, adjustment can be both passive and
active. Some NGOs set up projects that conceded to the donors’ new interests; others
used the donor interests for their benefit, especially in a complementary fashion. The
founder of NGO4 makes this point well. “We might submit the same project idea to
multiple donors but we tweak it a bit. We want to get the funding but also to market
ourselves in this new domain” (Interview #13). Therefore, adjustment is more agential
than one might initially assume.
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Second, voice was not a common practice across the four NGOs. This may be because
voice is neither an easy option nor a simple mechanism to employ. Voice requires
bargaining power that is not accessible to all NGOs (Dowding et al. 2000; Gehlbach
2006; Hirschman 1970; Nooteboom 1999). In addition to accessible information, the
exercise of voice requires a certain degree of trust between an organization and the donor.
In cases where voice was practiced, it was due to “[working] hard to build trust with the
donor. We have distinct objectives but always try to bring them together because we
value this ongoing relationship” (Interview # 9). Voice also requires some creative
thinking to bridge the diverse objectives of the funder and the NGO (Nooteboom 1999).
As an NGO representative commented, “through dialogue, we can come up with creative
solutions to reach compromise where we manage our high demands and the donor
ensures that its priorities are relevant. It is a labor-intensive process which needs to be
completed in a short period of time” (Interview #6). Thus, voice is costly, but the costs
can turn into a benefit (Hirschman 1980).

In addition, voice does not occur instantly or in isolation. An NGO might explore options
and use its members’ personal contacts with donor officials to test the waters for waiving
certain requirements. Such communication is labeled as informal voice (Dyck and Starke
1999; Olson-Buchanan and Boswell 2002). In addition, an NGO might succeed in
practicing voice with a donor when other organizations are exiting their relationship.
Here, the NGO would fill a gap in the demand the donor should be receiving, and at that
point, the donor may become more ready to listen and tolerant of the requests. A donor
representative illustrated this issue:
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Donors have to spend the allocated budget within a fiscal year otherwise
the budget will be cut. This might mean that donors would loosen their
grip and be more lenient to listen to NGOs’ needs, if they cannot select
local partners or if local NGOs are no longer interested or capable to
execute projects (Interview #4).
Therefore, an exit decision of one NGO might support the voice decision of another
(Dowding et al. 2000; Farrell and Rusbult 1992; Gehlbach 2006; Light et al. 2003).

Third, exit was viewed as a more favorable economic option, centered on self-interest and
rational calculations. As Figure 4.3 reveals, exit was practiced by all four NGOs at some
point in time. However, in the cases discussed above, exit is far from being neat,
impersonal, and less costly (Hirschman 1970: 15). On the contrary, exit is a risky
decision that NGOs considered based on non-economic calculations. In some cases, an
exit decision was taken despite the lack of other alternatives. For example, NGO1 was
driven by its commitment to organizational missions and values when it made the
decision to exit its relationship with Donor A after the first funding cycle. The
organization suffered the consequences of its decision. The management team had to
freeze many of its projects or stretch its human resources thin in order to complete those
in progress. However, as Gehlbach (2006) points out, we should not dismiss the notion
that a donor might be encouraging exit and discouraging other modes of behavior to
reduce pressure or demands for various reasons (budget constraints, workload,
emergencies, and so forth). In such a case, exit is not an NGO’s independent decision
based on self-interest, but rather might be due to manipulation by the donor.

As noted earlier, Hirschman (1970) discussed boycott as a “phenomenon on the border
line between voice and exit” (Hirschman 1970: 86). When a consumer is not satisfied
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with a certain product but does not have an available alterative, s/he boycotts the service
to express dissatisfaction. Boycott might explain the cases of exit we are witnessing in
some of the NGO-donor relations. An NGO that is practicing exit due to dissatisfaction
with shifts in funding is actually doing so for a short period of time (the duration of the
funding cycle). The NGO might reconsider its relationship with the donor during the next
funding cycle and reapply for funding. In such a case, the NGO was actually boycotting
the donor to express its frustration; when causes of dissatisfaction were addressed, the
NGO was willing to resume the relationship. Boycott might be a compelling argument
that merits a more longitudinal and in-depth study.

Similarly, Lehman-Wilzig (1991) and Mizrahi and Meydani (2003) discuss the idea of
‘quasi-exit,’ where a consumer tries to find a substitute supply or a parallel channel for
the service when s/he is unable to exit or express voice. Quasi-exit might also be worth
considering in the NGO-donor relationship. None of the cases covered under this
research explicitly exhibited such behavior; however, there are other cases of NGOs that
were interested in sustaining funding from a donor but failed to communicate with the
representative office about how to continue their cooperation. Instead, these organizations
bypassed the representative office and directly approached the donor to secure funding.
In some other cases, the donor allows such practices when funding is structured at two
levels: the national level, which is associated with the shifting objectives, and the
regional or international level, which is characterized with broader objectives and more
flexibility.
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Finally, there are at least two sides to any story. Hirschman’s (1970) typology captures
only the responses of those who are dissatisfied with a relationship. The typology does
not accommodate the responses of those on the other side of the relationship (e.g.,
management, leadership, partner, or organization). Dyck and Starke (1999) address this
gap and present a typology of dismissal, protection, tolerance, and blocking as counter
responses that run parallel to exit, voice, loyalty, and neglect respectively. Dismissal
reflects the attempt to sustain the status quo by forcing dissatisfied members or customers
to exit. Protection is used to defend the status quo in response to voice communicated by
the dissidents. Tolerance is similar to loyalty in the sense that both responses are passive;
tolerance recognizes that the dissidents’ attitude will eventually change and improve.
Finally, while neglect means withdrawal from active participation, blocking is a response
that prevents dissidents from such participation (Dyck and Starke 1999). According to the
authors, these responses do not need to occur or shift simultaneously with exit, voice,
loyalty, and neglect.

This dissertation does not tell the story of donor responses, but acknowledges the
theoretical importance and intellectual rewards of such an endeavor. Dyck and Starke
(1999) consider the possibility that management of an organization uses dismissal as a
means to sustain the status quo in response to dissatisfaction among members and/or
consumers by forcing them to exit. This particular scenario questions the basic argument
underlying the choice of exit by a dissatisfied member/consumer: i.e., the practice of
agency in satisfaction of one’s own interest and benefit. In-depth analysis of the behavior
of a service provider opens the doors for a counter-argument: exit is not a neat economic
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response by which a service-receiver demonstrates full agency to resign from a
dissatisfactory relation, but rather it is a reaction that is either imposed upon an
organization or one that the organization is driven to. The complexity of the subject
matter requires additional investigation beyond this dissertation; however, the decision
tree analysis discussed in the next section exposes and tries to address some sides of this
complexity.

It is important to note that by focusing only on bilateral donors, the scope of this research
is limited and excludes certain reactions in other contexts that may be important. For
example, several interviewees discussed examples where organizations exercised voice
and were able to convince donors to alter their funding objectives to meet the interests of
the NGO. These cases mostly involved international organizations and philanthropic
foundations, not bilateral donors. However, future research ought to explore modes of
behavior of foundations, in particular, in response to changes in their relationships with
grant-recipient organizations.

DISCUSSION OF POSSIBLE OUTCOMES OF
EXIT, VOICE, LOYALTY, AND ADJUSTMENT
In this section, I cover several outcomes of the modified typology. I discuss certain
underlying conditions and possible consequences. First, the proposed framework is casespecific. It does not provide an explanation of the general behavior of a particular
organization towards all of its donors. By and large, this framework seeks to explain an
NGO’s relation vis-à-vis a specific donor when that donor decides to change its funding
objectives. This means that there is variation in the way that an NGO reacts to multiple
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donors. While an organization might select exit in its relationship with one donor, it could
practice voice or adjustment with another. The importance of funding obtained from a
specific donor could be particularly relevant for the NGO’s decision making. This issue is
discussed further in the next chapter.

Second, this framework is applicable to voluntary reactions initiated by NGOs as a result
of a shift in donor funding. NGOs’ decisions induced by other donor actions (e.g.,
rejection of grant applications or suspension of aid to recipient country) should be
cautiously verified before this framework is applied. In addition, donor grant-making
mechanisms should be thoroughly considered to see whether a rolling-basis system has
different effects on NGO behavior than a fixed deadline system.

Third, some organizations might use exit as a strategy towards adjustment. While none of
the cases studied exhibits this, the experts in the field provided a few examples. “Some
NGOs claim they are no longer receiving funds from a donor but surprisingly you see
inactive groups associated with these organizations suddenly applying for a grant from
the same donor” (Interview #3). Such organizations might be interested in keeping a good
public image or buffering demands and pressure on their legitimacy. It is better for them
to end an existing relationship with a donor and form a new entity such as a sister or
branch organization that appeals to the donor’s interests without being concerned about
the public perceptions. Another expert commented, “one person can be the member of an
environmental NGO and the director of a newly established organization working on
democracy and so on NGOs exit from one door and use the law to access the same donor
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from another door and in no time” (Interview #20).

Fourth, a reasonable approach to the subject matter is to explore the interrelationship of
these responses and ask if pursuing one option (voice for example) diminishes the
possibility of the exercise of another (adjustment for example). In addition, because
Hirschman (1970) points out that the categories of the typology overlap at times, such as
when boycotting is an expression of voice and a threat to exit, one should question
whether a clear-cut distinction between modes of reactions exists. To do so, one might
map NGOs reactions into a decision analysis tree. When a decision does not yield
positive results, the NGO has to reconsider its options.

For example, in their interactions with other international organizations (i.e., neither
Donor A nor Donor B, NGO1 and NGO2 had two different experiences practicing voice.
NGO1 reported an attempt to practice voice that ended up with exit. When the funding
was available for a certain subject, the management team carefully studied the subject to
see if there was a match with organizational interests. There was not. “We were not
financially saturated and needed the funding. We communicated with the donor to see if
there was any possibility to still get the funding while we continued doing what we used
to do. The response was negative. We then had to choose between working on this new
subject and forgetting the funding. We decided not to seek the funding” (Interview #15).

In contrast, when NGO2 practiced voice, the donor was not receptive, so the organization
chose adjustment. The organization was phasing out a project when the donor notified the
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director that it could no longer fund such projects. NGO2 negotiated with the donor to
sustain some funding. However, the donor was facing financial pressure and had to
refocus its budget. The director explained “it became clear to us that if we wanted to
sustain our partnership with the donor, we had to move a little bit away from our original
work. It was a new experience and domain that we had not explored before” (Interview
#2).

In addition, the NGO decision to adjust is not necessarily favorably accepted by the
NGO. Exit then might become the only other alternative. As a member of NGO4 recalled,
“we once applied to implement a creative idea targeting children and lined up an
excellent team. We did not get the funding because the donor considered we did not have
a track record” (Interview #17). Likewise, a donor official said,
One thing we try to do when we talk to local organizations is to help them
understand what type of project is more likely to be successful. However,
some projects do not fit the mission. We usually question the motive,
purpose and ability behind these projects. To be honest; in one case the
project idea was very attractive and we funded it (Interview #23).
As sketched in Figure 4.5, an NGO (but not a Donor-NGO) has to make one of three
decisions when a specific donor channels funding into a different focus: exit its existing
relationship and stop seeking and receiving donor funds, voice its concerns and balance
its interests with the donor, or adjust its activities to accommodate the donor’s emerging
interests. Exit is an easy decision (Dowding et al. 2000; Light et al. 2003). The NGO
simply makes the decision; the donor does not need to respond. Such a decision does not
give voice a chance; the relationship is suspended (Gehlbach 2006). Thus, exit is a
dichotomous (i.e., yes or no), less messy reaction mode (Dowding et al. 2000; Hirschman
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1970).

In contrast, voice is political action that can present several options, making this
particular mode far messier and complicated. As the above examples indicate, voice
depends to a large extent on the response of the donor, as well as on the perception the
organization holds about the effectiveness of the decision (Hirschman 1970). A favorable
response makes voice an effective mode; an NGO succeeds in convincing the donor to
take into account its interests and work out a more balanced arrangement to secure
funding. However, an unfavorable donor response makes voice a costly and inefficient
decision. When an NGO fails to convey its concerns, it has to either exit the relationship
or, alternatively, adjust to the new situation and reapply for donor funding. Likewise, an
NGO that practices adjustment as a first choice might face the same situation, except that
the only other alternative in response to an unfavorable donor decision is exit.

NGO Decision

Exit

Exit

Voice

Voice

Adjustment

Adjustment

Figure 4.5: NGO Decision Analysis Tree

Given this brief analysis, Dowding and colleagues’ (2000) proposal of a decision tree is
worth considering. Hirschman’s (1970) focus is on the behavior as the outcome. This

169
economic argument resonates with an interviewed donor representative who considered
that when an NGO decides to apply for projects beyond its focus, then it is practicing
adjustment regardless of whether the NGO ends up actually shifting its work. However,
in reality, the final mode of action might not be the first an organization decided on. A
decision is a result of a process initiated by the organization but responded to by a donor.
Thus, some NGOs try several options that, in the end, shape the final action or apparent
behavior. Accordingly, the decision tree helps understand the deliberative process that an
NGO goes through to reach a final outcome in reaction to donor funding (Light et al.
2003).

Another approach to analyzing NGOs’ behavior focuses on the nuance of the change.
Experts in the sector agreed that all NGOs adjust; the point of divergence is the level of
adjustment and the justification provided. One expert commented, “some NGOs modify
10% of their activities to get the new funding and preserve their core functions; others
make a 50% change, and you can find NGOs that completely transform themselves and
start working in new areas that have nothing to do with their mission” (Interview #12).
Another expert added,
We are talking about shades of the same behavior. There is a minor
behavior where an NGO working on environment accommodates other
interests and there is a drastic one where the NGO abandons its stated
mission. One example is of an environmental project that has impact on
women; this is just minor change that still suits the NGO but appeals to the
donor. Another example is an NGO that changed even its name because its
members notice that funding is not coming their way anymore (Interview
#18).
Furthermore, some NGOs are thought to shift activities in an abrupt way while others do
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it more subtly. This variance is in the eyes of the beholder. Some NGOs positively
respond to shifts in donor funding after considering different options, evaluating their
capacities, and preparing themselves. Such a decision does not happen frequently or
abruptly. The organization should have a strategy and follow a process of evaluation.
“The difference between our organization and other NGOs is that I can decide not to
apply for funding. When you can prove you have a track record and been working and
can work in a certain field, then you request funding as long as the projects build on and
complement each other” (Interview #26).

Consequently, except in cases of the complete abandonment of a donor’s funding (exit),
NGOs’ behaviors fall on a spectrum (Figure 4.6). At one end, voice reflects mild
adjustment. At the other end, loyalty indicates a situation of robust changes in the mission
and activities of an organization according to emerging donor preferences. Such an
analysis brings loyalty and voice together (O’Leary 2006), and underscores scholarly
debates about whether loyalty is a distinct reaction mode.

In the three cases of voice, loyalty, and adjustment, there is an interest in sustaining the
relationship with the donor. First, few organizations exhibit unconscious loyalist
behavior, which makes voice and adjustment more common responses (Drigota et al.
1995: 596). Second, an NGO that practices voice values the relationship with the donor.
Third, an NGO that practices adjustment perceives an inimitable benefit from the
relationship. This attachment (or loyalty) then deters exit and allows an organization to
consider a different alternative (Hirschman 1970; Leck and Saunders 1992). On one side,
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the alternative can be voice to prevent the worst from happening (Hirschman 1970); that
is, suspending a valued relationship that is often described as a partnership. On the other
side, the alternative can be an opportunistic behavior to secure benefits the relationship
could generate (O’Leary 2006). Here again comes adjustment.

Therefore, practicing voice or adjustment requires a certain level or form of loyalty
(Hirschman 1970). Associated costs or repercussions may also encourage the practice of
any of the modes (Gehlbach 2006). On one end of the spectrum (below), both the level of
loyalty to the donor and the cost of practicing voice or exit are high. Here lies the
unconscious loyalist behavior that is “free from felt discontent [and] will not lead to
voice” (Hirschman 1970: 91). The level of loyalty starts to change towards the middle of
the spectrum with more potential to explore other options through adjustment without
encountering severe repercussions. On the other end, practicing voice is common, since
the level of loyalty is acceptable and any associated costs and repercussions are
manageable.

Exit

Voice

Adjustment

Figure 4.6: NGOs’ Spectrum of Responses

Loyalty
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CONCLUSION
The NGO-donor relationship is clearly complicated. To better understand the dynamics
of the relationship, this chapter focused on the change in the quality or associated benefit
of donor funding, which compels a certain response or reaction from an NGO. To better
explain the variation in NGO reactions to shifts in donor funding, I added the category of
adjustment to Hirschman’s (1970) typology of exit, voice, and loyalty. This is the main
contribution of this chapter.

Despite the potential limitations discussed above, observations from the fieldwork and
interviews used in this study fit well with this new conceptual framework, suggesting that
the exit, voice, loyalty, and adjustment typology has merit. Whether some perceive the
added category of adjustment as an extension of loyalty is a subject for continuous
debate, but it should not be totally discredited. Even in such a case, this research makes a
sufficient contribution by exposing, further developing, and applying the categories in the
typology (Withey and Cooper 1989).

In this chapter, I also shed light on some of the overarching challenges that NGOs around
the world face. The sector is definitely not flawless and suffers from a variety of
problems. One of these problems is high dependability on donors, who can be
manipulative. This research study portrays to donors the consequences of their policy
decisions through the variations in responses from local NGOs; such a variation should
be appreciated and factored into future policy-making. Edwards and Sen (2002) confirm
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that a transformation needs to start from within NGOs and spread into the systems and
circles of power (donors) as a key to a sustainable future.

A final point about generalizability of the results needs to be made. This research focuses
on one industry within the NGO sector (environment). Nevertheless, the supplementary
cases covered through the interviews present enough evidence to confirm that NGOs
operating in other industries demonstrate the same responses towards donors, regardless
of the nature and type of work that they perform. Moreover, all of the NGOs are in
Lebanon. Variations in recipient countries’ conditions, whether historical, political,
social, economic, cultural or otherwise, as well as in donor countries’ ideologies and
interests, inhibit deriving conclusions in support of any specific dominant argument.
However, other studies provide additional cases that exhibit similar trends among NGOs
in other developing countries or regions, including the West Bank and Gaza (Brouwer
2000), Kazakhstan (Hanafi and Tabar 2003), Bangladesh (Loung and Weinthal 1999),
and Latin America (Rahman 2006), which increases the likelihood of generalizability. Of
course, more research is needed. However, generalization is a challenge in exploratory
research, and I believe that I have laid the groundwork for future studies.
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CHAPTER FIVE: EXPLAINING NGO BEHAVIOR
INTEGRATING RESOURCE DEPENDENCE THEORY
AND THEORY OF WEAK TIES
INTRODUCTION
In Chapter Four, I proposed building on Hirschman’s (1970) typology of exit, voice, and
loyalty as a conceptual framework to capture variation in NGO responses to changes in
their resource environment, specifically shifts in donor funding. Based on the findings
from multiple units of analysis derived from cases of four environmental NGOs in
Lebanon, I proposed a modified typology, whereby I introduced adjustment as a fourth
mode of reaction. Thus, the modified typology includes:
•

Exit when an NGO no longer seeks funding from a particular donor due to
divergence of interests and suspends the relationship;

•

Voice when an NGO expresses its feedback to and negotiates with the donor to
balance the interests of the two parties and maintain the relationship;

•

Loyalty when an NGO automatically and unconsciously complies with changes
due to dilution of its interests and attachment to the donor;

•

Adjustment when an NGO practices agency and voluntarily and deliberately
alters its activities to accommodate donor interests and retain funding.

This chapter introduces the second research question: Why do NGOs react differently to
shifts in donor funding? Several existing conditions shape such reactions. The second
phase of the dissertation uses resource dependence theory, or RDT (Pfeffer and Salancik
1978), and the theory of weak ties (Granovetter 1973, 1983) to construct an integrated

175
theory that predicts NGO response to changes in funding priorities based on its reliance
on external funding and the ties it has within a donor network. First, the chapter begins
with an examination of the factors that Hirschman (1970) argued are the determinants of
modes of behavior under his typology. Second, it reviews the two theories with the goal
of providing a theoretical justification for the choice of reaction. Third, it presents an
alternative perspective that integrates the two theories for greater parsimony. Finally, the
chapter concludes with propositions derived from the integrated theory. These
propositions are translated into hypotheses and tested in Chapter Seven.

EXPLAINING BEHAVIOR ACCORDING TO HIRSCHMAN
According to Hirschman (1970), the key determinant of the choice between exit and voice
is the elasticity of demand for a particular product or service. If the demand is inelastic,
then exit is a less likely choice (Dowding et al. 2000; Hirschman 1970). In economic
terms, demand does not change as the price of a certain product falls or rises. In cases of
quality deterioration, expressing dissatisfaction through exit does not generate any
positive outcome. The product provider is unlikely to notice the reaction because the total
profit is maintained and even might increase with a rise in price. In such a case, voice is a
more favorable option.

In application to the NGO-donor relationship, the demand for funding, as a product or
service, is supposedly elastic due to the fluctuation in NGO reliance on external resources
and the growth in operations. Thus, the assumption is that exit could be a common option
because demand is changing. However, previous chapters showed that the four NGOs

176
chose different modes of reaction at different time intervals, and this does not necessarily
satisfy the demand elasticity argument.

During the interviews, NGO representatives referenced some of the factors in the choice
between exit and voice on (Gehlbach 2006; Hirschman 1970; Matland 1995; Nooteboom
1999). One factor is availability and access to information. NGO2, for example, was
more likely to practice voice because it enjoys a long relationship with donors, has access
to information about donor interests and plans, and has made investments in their
organizational capacities to comply with donor requirements. As the director of NGO2
explained,
We have a long relationship with some of our donors. The longer the
relationship, the more you know about the donor. You are then able to
understand what is going on and what is coming next. We have systems in
place that allow us to respond to donor requirements of reporting,
accounting, monitoring and evaluation. We invested in these systems
because we wanted to relax our relationship with the donors. I can confirm
that our investment is paying us back (Interview #2).
Therefore, dissatisfaction with a donor decision is not critical enough to warrant exiting a
relationship in which the NGO invested time, efforts, and resources. Using a bargaining
power and relying on available information, the organization can practice voice and not
necessarily concede to donor interest. Nevertheless, that same organization has practiced
exit and adjustment with the same donor during different funding cycles.

Furthermore, although the NGO-donor relationship is comparable to a consumerproducer relationship, it is not ultimately the same. The differences are large enough to
expect variations in reactions. This is clear when talking about availability of standards or
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the penalty for certain behaviors. There are no specific standards for funding, besides
funding criteria that are imposed by donors. A donor does not impose any penalty for a
behavior. An organization that decides not to apply for funding and exits the relationship
is not penalized, nor is an organization that practices voice rewarded beyond an approved
grant. For example, interviewed members of NGO1 recalled a donor encouragement to
apply for funding, despite the organization having declined funding from that donor
during a previous funding cycle. This also means that the price of reentering a
relationship with the donor is affordable, contingent on a solid grant proposal. Therefore,
based on the discussion in the previous chapter, these factors help explain some reactions
some of the times, but not all reactions all times. They also delineate the choice between
exit and voice, but do not sufficiently explain adjustment (and loyalty).

One criticism of Hirschman’s (1970) typology is that it is top down, with an emphasis on
actors as rational, return-maximizing, cost-minimizing entities driven by economic
factors. There are ongoing attempts to address this criticism. For example, Hodson ’s
work (1991a, 1991b) builds on ethnographic studies to dramatize the ‘active worker’ and
build the social context around the worker who engages in various forms of voice.
Hodson (1991a, 1991b) talks about good soldiers who commit to the organization and
adopt its goals, smooth operators who prioritize their goals, and saboteurs who neither
achieve their own goals nor advance those of the organization. This classification of
modes of adaptation goes beyond what Farrell and Rusbult (1981) suggested in their
modified typology of exit, voice, loyalty, and neglect to advocate for the integration of the
characteristics of the job and work environment. Therefore, employees’ behavior is not
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always contingent on the amount of investment in the job or the presence of other
alternatives, which are economic factors by nature. O’Leary’s (2006) guerilla government
follows the same line of thought. Brower and Abolafia (1995) worked in a similar way to
show a variety of forms of voice without attempting to extend Hirschman’s typology. The
authors studied resistance in organizations where employees rarely render absolute
compliance. Employees reported a variety of strategies that include exit, but reflected
different shades of voice such as foot dragging, withholding of commitment, enactment
of alternative channels, facilitation of external constituencies, and sabotage (Brower and
Abolafia 1995: 154). The authors argue that social embeddedness constitutes the right
structure for resistance; in other words, employee actions of resistance are determined by
how and where they are embedded in the network. Therefore, these strategies are
dependent on the network relations that managers are able to construct. The discussion on
embeddedness will be further expanded later in this chapter and is used as one of the
theoretical pillars of the dissertation.

In sum, Hirschman’s typology views organizations more as sites for sociological and
political life than as sites of economic life. Any serious endeavor to explore how exit,
voice, and loyalty show up in actual everyday behavior among nonprofits needs to
confront the ways that labeling organizations as ‘nonprofit’ is heavily laden with
economic bias. That is the assumption that these organization are best understood for
what is distinctive about their internal economic characteristics rather than their internal
social or political dynamics or the external impact of the society around them.
Accordingly, this dissertation asks whether acts of exit, voice, loyalty, or adjustment are
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primarily economic behaviors, as opposed to political or social behaviors. Resource
dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) provides insights into the economic
behavior, and the theory of weak ties (Granovetter 1973, 1983) balances the
sociopolitical behaviors. From this, the dissertation will depart to analyze the behavior of
NGOs in response to a changing—and to some a deteriorating—relationship with donors
as donor agencies switch their funding objectives.

RESOURCE DEPENDENCE THEORY
Organizational theories (Thompson 1967; Scott 1987; Donaldson 1999; Baum and
Rowley 2002) consider organizations to be open systems. In Scott’s (1987) words, an
organization is a “coalition of shifting interest groups that develop goals by negotiation
[…] influenced by environmental factors” (Scott 1987: 23; see also Thompson 1967;
Baum and Rowley 2002). Organizational behaviors and decisions are rooted in the
surrounding environment. Driven by a rationality bounded by constraints and
contingencies, an organization aims to reduce uncertainty in the environment and to
protect its core technology. Pfeffer and Salancik’s (1978) work on resource dependence
is strongly rooted in the open system framework. The authors assert, “to understand the
behavior of an organization, you must understand the context of the behavior” (Pfeffer
and Salancik 1978: 1). Unveiling organizational processes and practices requires focusing
on interactions with the environment (Thompson 1967).

RDT maintains that organizations are resource-insufficient. They strive to acquire and
maintain resources from their external environment. Resources are controlled by external
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actors who exert demands on the organization. These actors perceive certain advantages
in their relationship with the organization and exercise power through control over
resources. The heavier the dependence of the organization on external resources, the
more influential the demands of particular actors controlling these resources.

The organization encounters incompatible and competing demands and becomes a
‘market for influence and control’ (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). Pfeffer and Salancik
(1978) suggest a list of ten conditions in this market.
1. The organization should be aware of the external demands.
2. The organization is receiving resources from the actors making these demands.
3. The organization needs the resources for its operations.
4. The organization cannot find substitutes for these resources.
5. The organization does not control resources critical to external actors.
6. The organization’s actions are visible and assessable.
7. The organization can balance and satisfy multiple demands at the same time.
8. The organization cannot determine external actors’ demands.
9. The organization has the capacity to meet demands.
10. The organization wishes to survive (44).

For the organization, the challenge is to proactively and effectively manage external
demands within existing patterns of constraints and contingencies (Guo and Acar 2005;
Pfeffer 1982). The challenge becomes paramount as “the turbulence, instability, and
stringency of the resource environment within which it resides increase” (Oliver 1991:
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259). Organizations, then, become coalitions buffering demands by “altering purposes
and domains to accommodate new interests, sloughing off parts of themselves to avoid
some interests, and when necessary, becoming involved in activities far afield from their
stated central purposes” (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978: 24).

An organization can employ a variety of measures to manipulate and reduce uncertainty
in its external environment or to try to influence demands and flow of critical resources
(Oliver 1991: 148). However, three dimensions determine the degree of dependence on
external resources and confine these measures (Cho and Gillespie 2006: 495); these
dimensions are depicted in Figure 5.1 below and include:
•

The importance or criticality of resources assessed through the relative magnitude
of the exchange in the relationship (proportion of total output or input) and the
criticality of the input or output to the organization;

•

The concentration of resources, or the availability of other sources for the same
resources or of alternative resources since the availability of alternative sources
increases an organization’s power and autonomy by decreasing its dependence
upon other organizations;

•

External actors’ discretion over resource allocation and use (possession of, access
to, actual use of, and abilities to regulate the employment of resources) (Cho and
Gillespie 2006; Cook 1977; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978).
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Figure 4: Dimensions of Resource Dependence

Several strategies could be used to buffer environmental pressures and reduce
uncertainty. This can be done through managing demands of external actors or bridging
between the organization and these actors (Scott 1987). Before these strategies can be
employed, the organization must scan and learn about its environment, and select and
process information to give meaning to the environment (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978).

To start, an organization can manipulate its environment. Three challenges need to be
addressed (Cho and Gillespie 2006; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Pfeffer 1982). First, the
resource criticality challenge could be addressed in a threefold strategy: 1) increase
output production with available input, 2) identify and increase alternative input suitable
for the existing output, and 3) alter the output if possible. The purpose of this strategy
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should be to protect the core of the organization (Thompson 1967). Efficiency plays a
vital role here. External actors still control resources needed in the ‘production’ process.
However, efficiency centers on doing a better job in producing outputs. The focus then is
not on the output itself or its quality but on improving the organization’s internal input to
output ratio (Oliver 1990; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978).

Second, diversification is the most obvious and commonly granted recommendation for
managing the resource concentration challenge (Dunn 2008; Froelich 1999). According
to Oliver (1990), “theory and research indicate that diversified links to sources of funding
[…] augment an agency’s power, influence, and decision-making autonomy” (258). That
means an organization needs to diversify the sources of external resources. The more
diverse these sources are, the less dependent an organization is on any one external actor.

Third, the resource discretion challenge could be managed through social sanctions
(Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). Organizations depend on their environment for both support
and acceptance. Introducing regulations and encouraging professionalism would deter
excessive demands through promoting the legitimacy of the organization. Legitimacy is
exogenous to the organization, conferred by external actors based on social norms and
values (Oliver 1990). Another solution is change in structure and size through loose
coupling, cooptation of units with interest groups, and slacking of resources (Astley and
Zajac 1991; Beekun and Glick 2001; Greenley and Oktemgil 1998; Hannan and Freeman
1984; Seifert, Morris and Bartkus 2004; Simon 1964). The body of nonprofit research
provides evidence for these solutions. Guo (2007) and McCarthy (2004), for example,
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theorize that changes in nonprofit governance structures are means or results of managing
resource dependence. Similarly, several studies address how faith-based organizations
altered the mode of actions to become more secular due to reliance on government
funding (Chambre 2001; Ebaugh, Chafetz, and Pipes 2005; Vanderwoerd 2004).

Organizations could also manipulate the illusion of satisfaction. Such illusion is created
when the organization exaggerates the importance of its performance or adds more value
to the substance of its work (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978: 97-8). The success of such an
approach probably depends on the service or output an organization delivers. The
organization can rely on the equivocality and ambiguity of its work to frame its
achievements or present its services in order to control additional demands from external
actors (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978: 99-100). An example here would be a company
entering a new market with a new service. The provision of a service by itself would be
satisfactory to consumers; the level of sale could be exaggerated into service necessity.
Another basic example is the claim of success in bringing development to a local
community; development by itself is an ambiguous and contested term that an
organization can manipulate.

Organizations should also balance conflicting demands (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). First,
an organization can give sequential attention to external actors through prioritizing its
responses to demands based on the importance of resources controlled by these actors at a
point in time. This gradual process constitutes an opportunity for the organization to
enhance its capacities, acquire other resources, and probably buy time. Second, an
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organization can manipulate disclosure. Visibility of actions exposes the organization and
allows external actors to assess its work and, consequently, better utilize the resources
they are providing. An organization could manipulate the degree of visibility; in other
words, an organization can have different levels of visibility vis-à-vis different actors, be
selective in disclosing what information and to whom, and try to censor information
transmitted in different directions. The other side of the coin is to reduce input from
external actors (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). This means that while resources are still
flowing, information on demands is communicated at a reduced pace or through
disoriented channels. These scenarios could enable the organization to balance
conflicting demands as long as it does not risk its transparency and jeopardize its
relationship with stakeholders.

Third, an organization can play one group against another (Oliver 1991). A market of
influence and control where multiple actors generate different demands on an
organization infers both the possibility that these demands are conflicting and
contradictory and that external actors might be engaged in similar interdependence vis-àvis others (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). If the demands on the organization are explicitly
clear and if the organization acquires information on challenges encountered by its
external actors, it can manipulate the situation to its advantage. An organization can then
ward off pressure on an issue by relying on the other actors who are resilient on this
issue. For example, it can possibly pit a minor demand it can comply with against other
demands and interests in order to avoid compliance.
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The acquisition and sustainability of financial resources continue to be paramount
challenges for nonprofit organizations. Contrary to for-profit organizations that solely
rely on generating profits from services and sales, nonprofit organizations seek financial
resources from diverse sources. However, this pool does not contain the steady water;
financial resources to nonprofits continuously fluctuate threatening the performance of
the organizations. As Reed (1999) states, “resource allocation is a primary determinant of
organizational behavior and design” (39).

Extant research on nonprofits relies on RDT to explain funding, planning, and
performance (Barman 2008; Delfin and Tang 2008; Dunn 2008; Mosley 2011; Thomson
2010; Stone and Brush 1996; Verbruggen, Christiaens, and Milis 2011; Webster and
Wylie 1988), governance (Hudock 1995; Stone 1996; Miller-Millesen 2003; Stone,
Hager and Griffin 2001; Tschirhart, Reed, Freeman, and Anker 2009), policy engagement
(Schmid, Bar and Nirel 2008); self-regulation (Bies 2010), and collaboration (Borman
2010; Guo and Acar 2005; Sowa 2009; Yanacopulos 2005), among others.

NGOs and Resources
Saidel (2000) defines the resources that nonprofits need as “anything of value, tangible or
intangible, that can be exchanged between organizations” (Saidel 2000: 381). As an
illustration, Saidel (2000) identifies the exchange of resources in the relationship between
government and NGOs in terms of those provided by government, such as revenues,
information, and access to policy processes, and those controlled by NGOs, such as
service-delivery capacity, political support, and legitimacy (Saidel 2000: 381; Cho and
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Gillespie 2006). Ebrahim (2005b) distinguishes among resources exchanged in the donorrecipient relationship, and suggests that this ‘capital exchange’ can be of two forms:
economic material resources such as money, property, and infrastructure, and symbolic
non-material resources including authority, technical advice and expertise, reputation,
information, and connections (Ebrahim 2005a: 52, 71-3).

Exchange of resources between organizations is characterized by interdependence (Victor
and Blackburn 1987)—one organization’s output is another organization’s input. An
organization cannot produce its output unless and/or until another organization generates
its own. Thus, interdependence transpires by behavior. In such a situation, the activities
of one organization depend on those of another. That is “why nothing comes out the way
one wants it to” (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978: 40). Interdependence moderates the
steepness of dependence that characterizes an NGO’s relationship with a single funder
(Ebrahim 2005b; Saidel 2000). Accordingly, organizations try to manage their resource
dependence through the creation of interdependencies “which involve the exchange of
resources rather than a flow that is predominantly in one direction” (Ebrahim 2005b: 60).
Nevertheless, although the motive is to reduce uncertainty, interdependence might create
additional uncertainty and unpredictability, restructure relations but sustain power
imbalances, and increase control between organizations. Borman (2010) ratifies this
argument in a case study of a shared-services partnership in local government in
Australia. Such a partnership was an effective vehicle for these authorities to manage one
type of dependency but ended up creating new dependencies.
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An NGO balances its internal revenues with external funding, diversifies external
sources, and avoids concentrating the flow of funding from a specific source. To
illustrate, an NGO with diversified external sources of funding is in a better position to
respond to and balance external demands, especially when the demands are different. If
one source alters conditions for funding, an NGO can fend off the pressure to comply by
relying on other sources that are more resilient, including its internal revenues. An NGO
can also sequentially attend to the demands of various funders, which allows the
organization to positively respond to what suits its interests and defer other demands until
further developments occur. An NGO can explicitly play one donor off against another or
benefit from available information to strengthen its position and influence or moderate
donor demands. On the other hand, as NGO dependence on resources increases, the
ability of donors to constrain the organization’s behavior increases, while the ability of
the organization to buffer external demands decreases. In such a case, an NGO does not
enjoy many options to respond to changes in funding conditions. The NGO complies with
donor interests, whether immediately when the donor monopolizes the resource
environment of the NGO or eventually when the NGO realizes its limited ability to find
an alternative route. In such a case, adjustment becomes a leeway from excessive control
and a strategy to buffer and moderately appeal to donors’ demands and ensure the
continuity of funding.

In brief, RDT indicates that the organization can comply, adapt, manage, or attempt to
manipulate and alter its resource environment. It needs to assess the anticipated
repercussions of non-compliance with external demands, the cost of abandoning the
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available resources and securing others, and the degree of conflict between the various
demands of actors on whom the organization is dependent (Oliver 1990). Given this
discussion, a proposition about the relationship between resource dependence and an
NGO’s response to shifts in its funding environment is offered:
RDT Proposition: An organization characterized with high resource
dependence is more likely to practice loyalty or adjustment. An
organization characterized with low resource dependence is more likely to
practice exit or voice.

THEORY OF WEAK TIES
While RDT remains “silent on power structures and struggles in and through which
organizations respond to putatively objective and neutral economic pressures” (Reed
1999: 40), the organization’s environment is not deemed as “a set of intractable
constraints; it can be changed and manipulated to fit the objectives of the organization”
(Astley and Van de Ven 1983: 249). Power structures are significantly determined by
network ties that an organization is able to build. Some of these ties are with actors
controlling resources, while other ties extend to different stakeholders. These ties then
help the organization manipulate environmental constraints. This is where social network
analysis comes to the picture.

Social network analysis is gaining a stronghold in interdisciplinary and organizational
studies (Knoke and Yang 2008; Milward and Provan 1998, 2000, 2003; Nohria and
Eccles 1992; O’Toole 1997; Powell 1990; Provan and Milward 2001; Provan and
Sebastian 1998; Wasserman and Galaskiewicz 1994; Wellman and Berkowitz 1988), as
well as in nonprofit research (Ashman, Brown and Zwick 1998; DeFilippis 2001; Foley,
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McCarthy, and Chaves 2001; Schneider 2007, 2009; Paarlberg and Varda 2009; Varda
2010). The primary focus of social network analysis is the interdependence of actors in
an open system characterized by uncertainty. In contrast to resource dependence theory,
which focuses primarily on economic factors, social network analysis focuses on how
patterns of relations and positions in networks influence opportunities, constraints, and
behaviors (Wellman 1988; Wasserman and Galaskiewicz 1994; Rowely 1997; Dunn
2004).

In an influential piece, Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of
Embeddedness, Granovetter (1985) endeavors to find a middle ground between economic
under-socialization and sociological over-socialization. Organizational Economics
(Coase 1937; Williamson 1991, 2005; Barney and Hesterly 1999) explores relationships
among organizations by focusing on transactions. Institutional arrangements (such as
markets and hierarchies) take place to reduce uncertainty and control problems created by
bounded rationality and opportunism. All behaviors—including trust and malfeasance—
are controlled by these arrangements. The sociological perspective considers institutional
arrangements to be an interaction effect of formal arrangements and informal norms that
shape power structures and influence decision-making (North 1990, 1991). Informal
norms are generated through interactions in a network structure where actors interact and
influence each other in complicated ways.

Granovetter (1985) strongly favors and argues for an economic rationality ‘embedded’
within social relationships. Social norms and structures should not be exclusively
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dominant, substituting economic rationality with over-determinism. People would miss
the mark by going to one or the other extreme: traditional economic view or social norms
and morality. People behave and decide as actors within a certain social or institutional
context. Actors “engage not merely in the pursuit of self-interest but also in
opportunism—self-interest seeking with guile” (487). Past actions guide actors’ decisions
and interactions with those they trust and work “in a timely and conscientious fashion”
(Carolan and Natriello 2005: 2; Haythornthwaite 2002).

Therefore, the essence of Granovetter’s (1985) argument for embeddedness lies in its
equal recognition of both economic rationality and social norms and how the
amalgamation of the two form behavior, decisions, and actions. Briefly stated, actors—
individuals or organizations—are embedded in certain structures and systems that
influence their behavior (Granovetter 1985). The structures are composed of “a wide
variety of networks that both constrain their actions and provide them with opportunities
to achieve their goals” (Guo and Acar 2005: 348). The focus then shifts to these relations.
Emerson and Cook (1974) considered relations joining actors in an exchange category to
be a set of alternatives for the actors which reflect on the power and dependence within
the network, “since these relations represent alternative paths for access to needed
resources” (Cook 1977: 70).

Relations and ties between actors are constructed into networks. Granovetter (1973,
1983) argues that the strength of relationships ranges from very weak ties to very strong
ties. Tie strength is a function of a “combination of the amount of time, the emotional
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intensity, the intimacy (mutual confiding), and the reciprocal services which characterize
the tie” (Granovetter 1973: 1361). Lazzarini and Zenger (2002) provide a clarified
definition of tie strength that is suitable for organizations. Tie strength is defined as “the
degree of commitment that supports an exchange relationship for the transfer of goods,
services, or information” (Lazzarini and Zenger 2002: 4). Such a definition relies on
relational power (Blau 1964; Cook and Emerson 1978).

Granovetter (1983) further explains, “our acquaintances (weak ties) are less likely to be
socially involved with one another than our close friends (strong ties). Thus, the set of
people made up of any individual and his or her acquaintances comprises a low-density
network (one in which many of the possible relational lines are absent) whereas the set
consisting of the same individual and his or her close friends will be densely knit (many
of the possible lines are present)” (201-2).

Networks are of two types, as depicted in Figure 5.2. First, a dense network of strong ties
creates a closed world with fewer entities and redundant relations (Granovetter 1973,
1983). Such a network is characterized by similar or shared identity, reciprocity, and
equality in interaction, adequate information and resource sharing, possible cooperation,
and endurance over time. The characteristics of such a network are plainly visible if it
already includes a donor as a source of funding (Ashman et al. 1998). Second, a lowdensity or open network is diffuse, with more entities and many weak ties. Accordingly,
low-density networks are more heterogeneous and produce more information benefits and
autonomy for members, but interactions are less frequent.
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Figure 5: Dense and Open Networks

As such, weak ties add randomness to interactions while strong ties ensure order in these
interactions (Watts 2003). These patterns of interaction promise long-term payoffs based
on a well-established and committed history of past exchange. Clusters or cliques of
actors start to form as results of these patterns (Scott 2000). Blau (1974) states that strong
ties “tend to be confined to small and closed social circles… they fragment society into
small groups” (623). In a big network, therefore, there are multiple networks or
subnetworks, each with a different focal point. Interaction within subnetworks is more
frequent, which “will close them off from one another, so that they would develop into
cliques” (Granovetter 1983: 221-2). Interaction across the group depends on the weak ties
or the bridges between groups.

Paarlberg and Varda (2009) succinctly state that the quality—and not quantity—of
relations is advantageous to the organization. The focus is not on the number of ties to
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other actors, but whether these ties enable the organization to bridge clusters or cliques.
“Connecting across these kinds of clusters increases access to resources, promotes
diversity, and promotes access to hard-to-reach populations” (Paarlberg and Varda 2009:
604). Actors will be confined with repeated interaction and content with strong relations
with other actors that they relax the search of other resources (Lazzarini and Zenger
2002). The driving motive is certainty and stability in the environment, which strong ties
more likely provide.

In either of the two types of the network, “those receiving many choices [or enjoying
many ties] are characterized as central, those with few as marginal” (Granovetter 1973:
1366). The number of links developed determines the level of centrality (Provan et al.
2005: 607), and the level of centrality symbolizes power. The ‘center’ exercises control
over resources and information flowing inside the network (Boje and Whetten 1981).
However, the other side is that an actor who is least central in a network has more weak
ties that allow them to access information and resources outside the network and,
consequently, control the flow into the network.

Furthermore, when the actors are connected to the same others, they are considered
structurally equivalent. In such a case, they are expected to share similar conditions,
constraints, and outcomes due to frequency of interaction and duration of time spent for
resources to flow and reach any of them (Burt 1976). In other words, actors connected to
the ‘same’ others function under the same conditions, receive similar flow of inputs and
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resources, and encounter similar opportunities and challenges (Burt 2004; Carolan and
Natriello 2005; Paarlberg and Varda 2009; Varda 2010).

Comparing Strong and Weak Ties
Provan and colleagues (2005) label a network of strong ties as ‘mature’. Relationships are
developed and repeatedly confirmed; interactions frequently occur; exchange is extended
and reciprocal (Paarlberg and Varda 2009). This ensures sustainability and impact on the
organization. Strong ties satisfy the requirement for embeddedness (Granovetter 1985).
Being embedded in a network and connected through strong ties discourages
opportunism and generates positive long-term payoffs compared to possible costs of
engagement or any benefits of disengagement. Strong ties often develop among
homogeneous actors sharing similar attributes, such as mission, targeted groups,
proximity, and resource streams such that “they find it natural to work together”
(Paarlberg and Varda 2009: 605; Gulati 1995).

In this capacity, strong ties encourage investment in a relationship. Actors are inclined to
put efforts and resources into a strong and ongoing interaction knowing that the
likelihood of suspending these relations is diminishing. This is especially true in light of
the comparative advantages of the actors involved (Dyer and Singh 1998; Brinkerhoff,
Smith, and Teegen 2007). Strong ties reinforce trust, which in turn promotes existing
relations and proliferates the benefits of these ties. Trust is a complicated concept
(Sheppard and Sherman 1998); it requires a long process and long-standing relationships
to blossom (Provan et al. 2005). It is reasonable to expect that strong ties build trust,
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reduce conflict and disagreements, and yield cohesion (and higher density) towards
compromise and negotiations (Carolan and Natriello 2005; Krackhardt 1992; Nelson
1989). As Stiles (2002) notes, the results will be shared language and common norms and
values that might be even distinct from the surrounding environment. Therefore, strong
ties are extremely uneasy to disrupt.

Adler and Kwon (2002) note that the continuous interaction with the same partners,
which strong ties yield, restricts exposure to new ideas, information, and resources. With
transitivity being dominant, actors are locked together but locked out of external
opportunities, diminishing their capability to absorb what is going on beyond their
immediate relation (Cohen and Levinthal 1990). Routines start to emerge from repeated
interaction and capture actors into redundancy (Krackhardt 1992). Therefore, “weak ties
circumvent the dysfunctional outcomes unleashed by the escalating commitment of
strong ties” (Lazzarini and Zenger 2002: 6).

Why Weak Ties?
Weak ties characterize “heterodox actors at the periphery of […] social networks who are
able to move between groups and thereby become bearers of new ideas and information”
(Fukuyama 2001: 9). The central advantage of weak ties is they create avenues for
accessing additional resources. To tap into new ideas, knowledge, and resources, or to
open gateways […], “organizations rich in ties to organizations outside the network—or
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even outside the community—are essential” (Provan et al. 2005: 608). Weak ties allow
access to novel information, unique resources, and new populations that are not already
consumed and absorbed within an actor’s network (Varda 2010).

Weak ties provide autonomy and flexibility. Actors can maneuver their relations to
engage with other actors who belong to different circles and possess unique and
distinctive capabilities (Granovetter 1973, 1982). Such engagement promises valuable
exchange opportunities; “since agents connected through weak ties are not committed,
they can adjust or sever their existing ties to benefit from new external opportunities”
(Lazzarini and Zenger 2002: 6).

Weak ties also enhance efficiency (Krackhardt 1994; Provan et al. 2005). Networks are
not fully connected as Provan and colleagues (2005) note: “organizations can maintain
only a small number of close, strong ties” (608). This reality generates a network of a
mixture of strong and weak ties with several holes (Granovetter 1973; Burt 1992, 2004).
These holes allow infiltration of resources and information into the network through the
bridges developed between clusters or cliques (Provan and Sebastian 1998); otherwise,
the network risks running into redundancy. Finally, given the possibility of developing
into strong ties over time, weak ties require less maintenance and cost. These relations are
neither frequent nor regular, which relieves much pressure and cost for actors or
organizations (Coleman 1988; Paarlberg and Varda 2009).
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Weak ties also come with costs. The main challenge for weak ties—and consequently
their benefits—is reflected in their number. Krackhardt (1994) notes that the increase in
the number of network ties will have a negative impact on the ability to manage ties and
actively engage in the network. Weak ties are also at risk to decay quickly because they
are difficult to maintain when actors invest more in strong ties (Burt 2000, 2002).
Ashman and colleagues (1998) and Lawrence and Hardy (1999) find similar challenges
in their studies on legitimacy. Organizations face a difficulty maintaining balance
between strong ties needed for their legitimacy and weak ties that provide access to
unconsumed resources.

It is an oversimplification to conclude that strong ties are preferred over weak ties; the
conditions that actors find themselves in determine the value or preference of the strength
of the ties. “Communities may benefit […] by possessing a stock of both strong and weak
ties between organizations, simultaneously increasingly resilience (strong ties) while
increasing diversity (weak ties)” (Paarlberg and Varda 2009: 605). An actor should reap
the benefits of strong ties when the interest is in long-term enduring cooperation. Weak
ties allow access to new information and solutions, and yet are easily set up and easily
amputated (Lazzarini and Zenger 2002).

NGOs and Network Ties
The takeaway from this discussion is that “instead of analyzing individual behaviors,
attitudes and beliefs, [the focus is] on how these interactions constitute a framework or
structure that can be studied and analyzed in its own right” (Galaskiewicz and
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Wasserman 1994: xii). Behavior is determined by both embeddedness within a network
and an actor’s ability to tap its strong or weak relationships within a network. “The
number of links between network members can indicate how easy or difficult it might be
to exchange resource and coordinate information sharing” (Paarlberg and Varda 2009:
604).

Organizations exist in an open system of uncertainty and are embedded in certain
structures that influence their behavior (Varda 2010). These structures are loosely
coupled, allowing clustering of some organizations but maintaining certain connectivity
between the clusters to sustain the overall structure (Burt 1992; Carolan and Natriello
2006). Organizations develop ties within these structures that either bestow a power of
centrality and influence or allow the organization to bridge out and connect with others
(Saz-Carranza and Ospina 2010). These ties are either strong or weak; they determine
organizational behavior and influence the trust organizations build based on repeated
interactions and prior experiences.

Therefore, NGO behaviors and decisions do not depend only on organizational needs and
preferences. The behaviors and decisions are influenced by the parameters of the network
within which the organization’s relations are embedded (Galaskiewicz and Wasserman
1994; Paarlberg and Varda 2009). The behavior of one environmental NGO could be
analyzed based on its position in the broader network of all environmental NGOs and on
its ties with a donor within the network.
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Ashman and colleagues (1998) note that the relative strength of ties an organization has
among its members predicts the governance structure it should have, as well as the
additional resources it will need. Strong tie networks are more likely to need external
resources like financing and information. Weak-tie networks, in contrast, were formed
around relationships that convey finances and information between nonaffiliated groups
(Ashman et al. 1998: 161-2). Özman and Findik’s (2008) research on Turkish women’s
organizations reveals the motive to engage in dense informal networks with groups other
than women groups is to secure legitimacy and search for comparative advantage or
complementarities from organizations with knowledge and expertise in other domains.
Stiles (2002) described these dense networks as ‘intermestic development circles’. The
circles have gradually emerged into social structures separate from the rest of the society,
imposing certain changes and conditions on their members. As key players, donors
reposition themselves to accommodate demands from other members. However, the
change donors undergo is subtle compared to that NGOs undertake. As implementing
partners and receivers of funding, NGOs dramatically transform their organizational
interests and cultures to align with those of other members in the circle. In doing so, they
lose much of their identity and interaction with constituents.

An NGO response to shifts in donor funding requires triggering its existing relations; the
response relies to a certain extent on the strength of ties with external stakeholders. The
response can reaffirm the NGO position based on what the organization already has.
Otherwise, the response can help the NGO assume another position to acquire what it
does not have. An exit, voice, adjustment, or loyalty response is associated with the
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location of the NGO in a donor’s network. In other words, the NGO might be outside,
peripheral, or central in a network that might be dense with strong ties or open with weak
ties. An NGO at the center of the circle or network will only exercise loyalty. The NGO
has strong ties with the donor and the other ‘like-minded’ NGOs might become captured
by the donor network, leading to the risk of information redundancy (Watts 2003), which
does not allow the organization to access information on other sources of funding. An
NGO close to the circle is likely to exercise voice. Such a situation ensures adequate flow
of resources. At the same time, the organization can benefit from access to information to
coordinate with donors, project changes, and prepare for future projects. Moving away
from the center of these circles, an NGO enjoys more weak ties with a donor network.
The weak ties grant the organization accessibility to more diversified information and
contacts outside the network that could be tapped as additional funding opportunities.
The way an NGO utilizes these weak ties results in either practicing exit or adjustment. In
the former case, the weak ties open gateways to additional resources that might
compensate what an NGO is giving up if it drops funding from one donor. In the latter
case, an NGO fails to tap substitute sources of funding, but the weak ties might allow the
organization to generate new knowledge and ideas (Provan et al. 2005) that it can use as
it re-approaches an existing donor with a project proposal. In other words, weak ties
allow some NGOs to line up multiple donors to get loose and prevent co-optation (Tvedt
1998), while these ties help others shop for a project idea (Stiles 2002).
TWT Proposition: The location of an NGO in the densely knit network of a
donor agency will affect the behavior or response of the NGO. An NGO
more centrally located in a dense network with more strong than weak ties
is likely to exhibit loyalty or voice. An NGO at the periphery of the
network with more weak ties is more likely to exhibit adjustment or exit.
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AN INTEGRATED THEORY AND ITS APPLICATION TO NGO BEHAVIOR
Organizational responses to the external environment are contingent on the organization
itself. It is true that an organization exists in a market for influence and control, but the
“organizational environments are not given realities; they are created through a process of
attention and interpretation” (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978: 13). Pfeffer (2003) advises
departure from “situations in which organizations were located and the pressures and
constraints that emanated from these situations” (Pfeffer 2003: xi). The response is
largely molded by learning about the environment and selecting and processing
information that gives meaning to what is going on in the environment (Pfeffer and
Salancik 1978). Gulati, Dialdin, and Wang (2005) point out a drawback of resource
dependence work: “it assumes an atomistic environment in which information about
other organizations is widely available and freely accessible to all” (282).

Another limitation of the resource dependence theory is highlighted by Davis and Powell
(1992). The authors could not confirm whether the theory is concerned more with
managing uncertainty or ensuring profitability and efficiency. The theory does not
elaborate on the cost of a certain organizational resource that has direct implication on net
profit, if that is what an organization is aiming for. When it comes to managing
uncertainty, Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) themselves drew attention to ‘situational
contingencies’ (16) that constrain organizational behavior. The authors considered that
although such constraints are disparaging, they at times facilitate organizational decision
processes by limiting the effect of the organization.
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These three limitations (constraints, cost, and information) could be addressed if we lean
on the network perspective. The main premise of the network perspective is that
organizations are embedded in a wide variety of networks (Granovetter 1973, 1983).
These networks are composed of structures that “both constrain [...] actions and provide
opportunities to achieve goals” (Guo and Acar 2005: 348). This should provide insight on
situational contingencies and constraints and determine how much effect an organization
retains on the surrounding environment.

The second issue is cost. Transaction cost theory (Coase 1937; Williamson 1975, 1991,
2005; Barney and Hesterly 1999) provides a strong justification of organizational
decisions based on the cost of transactions in relationship among organizations. However,
as North (1990, 1991) contended, these costs are shaped by formal arrangements and
informal norms. The formal arrangements reflect economic rationality while informal
norms are generated within structures and interactions. Therefore, an organizational
decision is not based on calculation of transaction cost driven by pure economic
rationality. This rationality is ‘embedded’ within social relationships (Granovetter 1985)
where organizations make decisions based on trust or past actions they prefer to continue
pursuing (Carolan and Natriello 2005; Haythornthwaite 2002).

The third issue is the availability of information. The network perspective also explains
why information is widely available and freely accessible to some organizations but not
to others. Organizations are interconnected in a dense network of strong ties or open
network through weak ties (Granovetter 1973, 1983). In a dense network, the interaction
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endures over time and information flows among fewer entities and through closed
relations. Such a scenario leads to redundancy of information and restricts exposure to
novel ideas (Adler and Kwon 2002; Cohen and Levinthal 1990; Krackhardt 1992). An
open network allows more flexibility and mobility. New information is available rather
than redundant or recycled, organizations have access to diverse and less consumed
sources, and there are more venues for innovation (Fukuyama 2001; Lazzarini and
Zenger 2002; Provan et al. 2005; Varda 2010).

The network perspective focuses on analyzing relationships or ties that exist among
actors within a certain network (Scott 2000). The perspective explores relational
properties that “focus on the content of the relationship between network members and
on the form of these relationships (Streeter and Gillespie 1992: 202) as well as the
structural properties, which “describe the way members fit together to form social
networks” (Streeter and Gillespie 1992: 202). In other words, relational properties
describe the types of relations among actors, while structural properties are derived from
the characteristics of actors, groups of actors, or a whole network.

Relational properties explain the existence of a network through understanding the
purpose of the relations among actors. Relational properties are analyzed through the
transaction content and the nature of the relationship. The transaction content refers to the
substance of the exchange among actors and can take the form of resources, information,
influence, and social support. The nature of the relationship refers to the inherent quality
in terms of its importance or significance to involved actors, frequency and recurrence of
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interaction, degree of formality, level of standardization, and procedural requirements
(Streeter and Gillespie 1992). For example, the relational properties of networks may
explain the flow of funding throughout a network by measuring grants made and
partnerships NGOs establish to execute a funded project. In such a case, the content of
the transaction is financial resources and the nature of the relationship is characterized as
important, formal, and standardized.

Structural properties explain how relations and ties shape and differentiate the
characteristics of actors (Streeter and Gillespie 1992). For an individual actor, the
analysis is on the role assumed, such as a broker, bridge, gatekeeper, synthesizer or
facilitator (Agranoff and McGuire 2001; Kickert, Klijn, and Koppenjan 1997; Lorenzoni
and Baden-Fuller 1995; Paulson 1985; Saz-Carranza and Ospina 2010; Scott 2000; Tichy
and Fombrun 1979). Another point of analysis is the position in the network: whether at
the center or periphery of the network and vis-à-vis other actors (Borgatti and Everett
1999; Burt 1976; Comrey 1962; Freeman 1979; Provan et al. 2005; Valente and Foreman
1998). At the group level, the interest moves to the concentration or association of several
actors to form subgroups within the broader network (Watts 1999) and the interaction and
fitness of the subgroup within the entire network. The structural properties of the total
network tackle issues like degree of homogeneity (Krackhardt and Stern 1988), density of
interaction (Hanneman and Riddle 2005; Provan et al. 2005), and existence of structural
holes (Brut 1976). For example, in the exchange of resources through funding grants, we
can use the same network data to identify an NGO that is more central in the exchange
and in which one is the gatekeeper in terms of allowing access to funding. The data
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allows exploring whether certain NGOs are clustered together, i.e. collaborating together
on more projects than others. Finally, structural properties reveal the tendency of NGOs
to associate and bond with other organizations of the same size or in the same industry.

Combining the relational and structural properties garners a strong hold of the context of
inter-organizational relationships. Although the relational properties help understand the
purpose of a relationship in terms of the content and quality of interaction, the analysis
remains, at the surface, of assessing the importance, frequency, and formality of
relationship (Streeter and Gillespie 1992). A thorough analysis needs to go beyond that
into assessing the significance of the content being exchanged through these relations.
With its focus on criticality, availability, and discretion over the content of relations (i.e.
resources), resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) promises to even out
the limitations of the network perspective.

Therefore, integrating resource dependence theory and the theory of weak ties has the
potential to move research forward and approach organizational behavior in a more
comprehensive way. The two theories conceptualize an organization’s environment as a
set of external actors. RDT (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) focuses on the dyadic relation an
organization has with a set of actors in its environment. The manipulation of these dyadic
relations against one another to secure the flow of resources to the organization
determines the behavior of the organization. Nevertheless, the organization is constrained
by the interaction of these dyadic relations. Here, the theory of weak ties (Granovetter
1973, 1983) provides a lens to examine an organization’s behavior beyond the dyadic
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level. The primary focus of the theory is the ties among actors and how the positions of
organization in a network influence decisions and behaviors. The two theories combined
provide a better understanding of the environmental influences on NGO behavior. These
influences are dependence and control over resources and ties the organization has within
its surrounding environment (network).

In his call for ‘A Good Network Theory of Organization,’ Salancik (1995) assesses the
potential of network analysis in supporting RDT. However, a major unaddressed concern
of the theory is “the collective nature of organizational action and the role of networks in
maintaining stable collective structures” (Salancik 1995: 346). Interactions among
organizations, based on their positions in a network could be ‘purposeful strategic
action’; this determines the collective nature of organizational actions. Salancik (1995)
recognizes that control over resources is not the only source of power in an interorganizational relationship. “Network positions are related to power... Some network
positions are better to be in than others, namely, those that provide for least constraint
and take least effort to maintain while still providing the most access to flows of
information or other goods” (345-6).

Rowley (1997) agrees with Salancik (1995) that control over resources is the source of
power according to RDT. He diligently elaborates on RDT being focused on “relational
content-the power/dependence flowing across relationships” (Rowley 1997: 907).
Establishing a balance or completing the picture, network analysis focuses on “relational
context-the structure of relationships” (Rowley 1997: 907). Therefore, the integration of
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resource dependence theory and theory of weak ties yields better prediction of the mode
of behavior an NGO adopts as a donor decides to shift funding focus. Figure 5.3 ties the
various theoretical and conceptual perspectives to the integrated theory.

Integrated Theory
Resource Dependence Theory
(Pfeffer and Salancik 1978)

Content

Relational
properties

Theory of weak ties
(Granovetter 1973, 1983)

Context

Structural
properties

Figure 5.3: Theoretical and Conceptual base of the Integrated Theory

Presenting an integrated theory, this dissertation considers that an NGO’s response is not
separately determined by the NGO’s dependence on the donor or its location in the
donor’s network. The proposed integrated theory confirms that organizations are
dependent on resources that are controlled by other organizations (in this case, donors).
Funding, as a resource, is the basis of power exercised by a donor. However, the
integrated theory argues that the dependence of an NGO is not necessarily equal to the
power of a donor. This is mainly because the NGO is embedded in a network of other
actors where the location and connections of the organization grant the NGO its own
power.

The degree of NGO dependency on external resources is the most obvious determinant of
a reaction. Relying on the findings presented in the previous chapter, the two NGOs with
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more diverse portfolios of donors (NGO1 and NGO2) exercised adjustment less
frequently than the other two NGOs. However, NGO1 practiced more exit than NGO2,
although both organizations have low levels of resource dependence. Therefore, even
NGOs with comparable resource dependence still vary in their responses to changes in
their external resource environment. Therefore, resource dependence does not fully
prompt the variation in responses among the NGOs studied in the exploratory phase of
the dissertation.

The integrated theory then should verify NGO responses to shifts in donor funding as
captured in the modified typology of exit, voice, loyalty, and adjustment, elaborated in
Chapter Four. This produces a matrix, with the four modes falling in place along two
dimensions: relational content and relational context (see Table 5.1 below). According to
Rowley (1997), relational content refers to the dependence on external resources and the
associated power or demand resource holders possess. Such resource dependence can be
either high or low. Relational context refers to the structure of relationships. The structure
is the result of institutional arrangements (North 1990, 1991) in which the strength of
network ties an organization builds in its surrounding environment determines power
asymmetry (Granovetter 1973, 1983; Reed 1996; Rowley 1997).

In this matrix, exit is practiced when resource dependence is low and the network ties are
weak. Voice is practiced when resource dependence is low and the network ties are
strong. Adjustment takes place when resource dependence is high and ties are weak.
Loyalty is common when resource dependence is high and network ties are strong.
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Table 4.1: Matrix of NGOs’ Reponses to Shifts in Funding
Relational Context-Network Ties

Relational ContentResource
Dependence

Weak

Strong

Low

Exit

Voice

High

Adjustment

Loyalty

To elaborate, the following discussion considers scenarios of high and low resource
dependence and weak or strong ties in a network. Using the modified Hirschman’s (1970)
typology presented in Chapter Four, I predict how NGOs will respond to shifts in
funding.

Low Resource Dependence/Weak Ties: Exit
Low resource dependence denotes the ability of an organization to buffer the influence of
external actors. External actors’ discretion over resource allocation is relatively limited;
the relative magnitude of exchange in the relationship between the organization (NGO)
and external actor (donor), measured by its proportion of total input, is low. In addition,
there are other alternative sources that an organization can approach for the resource
(funding in this case) (Cho and Gillespie 2006; Oliver 1990; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978;
Pfeffer 1982).

Let us consider a case selected from the findings discussed in Chapter Four. NGO1 was
implementing a project on environmental standards and regulations funded by Donor B’s
institutional development program when the donor interest diverted and shifted to human
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rights in the following funding cycle. NGO1 decided to practice exit and not apply for
funding. At that time, the organization maintained a low resource dependence and had
weak connections in the donor network.

To elaborate, the former director of NGO1 discussed the financial situation of the
organization at that point in time. Since inception, NGO1 tried to sustain a certain degree
of financial autonomy. Several means were utilized to achieve that end. First,
membership fees were to be the main source of income (and in the beginning the only
source). Second, the organization was not to accept a substantial amount from a particular
source, in order to eschew influence on decisions. Third, NGO1 secured funding for
particular activities within each project it was implementing, which helped the
organization avoid large budgets and administrative costs that risk running into a deficit
when funding is not available. The executive committee debated revisiting these
imperatives. One point of view favored recruiting more staff instead of relying on
volunteers, opening up to donors instead of being picky in the choice, and accepting
bigger grants instead of tying funding to specific activities. This view was rejected, and
NGO1 renewed its commitment to the concept and practice of volunteerism in its work.
Instead of recruiting project-based paid staff and worrying about their retention,
volunteers ran and implemented projects with the support and under the supervision of
members of the executive committee.

From this brief description, we notice that NGO1 was addressing the criticality and
concentration of resources by relying more on internal resources (membership fees) and
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restricting substantial flow—and control—from any single source (Cho and Gillespie
2006; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Pfeffer 1982). Another key strategy here was to
increase organizational efficiency (Oliver 1990; Thompson 1967), specifically through
identifying volunteerism as an input and using funding to cover only the costs of
activities.

Concerning inter-organizational relations, NGO1 assessed its ties as weak across
different categories (donors, environmental organizations, and other NGOs). NGO1 is
mainly floating alone; its inter-organizational relations are contingent on the moment and
the perceived benefits. Donors are perceived as partners when the agendas of the two
sides match. The relationship is restricted by the NGO’s policy on funding and a
conviction that funding is not constant. An NGO1 representative commented,
We continuously analyze and break down the nature and background of
any funding—not just the donor. That is why I said that there is no
continuous donor. Even with donors as partners, we understand that the
relationship is still limited. I do not want a donor to interfere in my
business and I do not want to interfere in his. Actually, a donor wants us to
stay at a distance. You asked about consultations. You would think we
would have, but our donor has not involved us in one (Interview #1).
When NGO1 had to make a decision about Donor B’s new funding objective, the
organization did not see much value or have much interest in building strong relations
with other NGOs. In general, its relations to other NGOs were sporadic, limited to shortterm campaigns on emerging environmental problems. In fact, NGO1 worked on the
environmental standards funded by Donor B in the previous funding cycle because of a
coalition of local NGOs the organization was leading. A member of NGO1 assessed the
experience saying, “it was an exhausting experience. We should have not done the whole
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project or we should have done it with a completely different approach” (Interview #15).
Interestingly, NGO1 was more inclined to establish and maintain connections with
international organizations and foreign NGOs. One NGO1 member’s remark was direct
to this point, “we see the value and benefit of these connections far more from any
partnership with local organizations” (Interview #1). International entities are perceived
as channels for scientific knowledge, expertise, and information, as well as potential
channels of funding when needed.

As an organization with more weak ties, NGO1 belongs to an open network. The position
of the NGO in this network thus equips it with broader connections beyond the
boundaries of the network. The implications or benefits for NGO1 here are threefold.
First, an open network includes more entities of heterogeneous characteristics that an
organization can interact with (Granovetter 1973, 1983). These interactions are
considered alternative sources for resources that an organization needs (Emerson and
Cook 1974), and consequently result in more power and independence within the
network (Cook 1977). Therefore, the weak ties of an organization directly feed into its
level of resource dependence tolerance.

Second, the organization’s weak ties render better access to information and/or resources.
Because the ties are among nonaffiliated groups, the information received is likely to be
unique and novel (Fukuyama 2001; Provan et al. 2005). An organization can use the
information for its own benefit, including manipulating or disclosing it vis-à-vis other
actors within the network. Weak ties provide access to new resources that the
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organization has not tapped before and that are not consumed and absorbed within its
network (Ashman et al. 1998; Varda 2010). This is beneficial to the organization since it
does not need to compete for a limited pool of resources within the network.

Third, the absence of strong ties indicates that the organization does not share the same
identity with other actors within the network (Ashman et al. 1998; Granovetter 1973,
1983). With less frequent interaction, the organization has more autonomy to determine
its own course of actions that does not necessarily align with the common culture within
the network. Sustainability of relationships and reciprocity of trust are not peculiar
motives behind organizational behavior.

As a result, NGO1 realized a divergence of interests with the donor. The organization
could escape the pressure to comply with new funding criteria by not applying for
funding and suspending the interaction with the donor, which is already not strong or
frequent. The NGO buffered such pressure due to limited reliance on external resources
from any particular donor, as well as its ability to utilize weak ties to have the flexibility
in decision-making and to seek resources or information on other sources of funding
elsewhere.
Proposition 1: The lower the organization’s resource dependence and the
weaker its ties, the higher the likelihood that an NGO will adopt exit as a
response to shifts in donor funding, in an attempt to avoid complying with
new funding criteria.
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Low Resource Dependence/Strong Ties: Voice
An organization with low resource dependence but with strong network ties can exhibit
another type of behavior: voice. Such an organization has balanced its reliance on
external sources of funding. There is diversity in the pool of external resources and the
discretion of an external actor over resource allocation is constrained (Pfeffer and
Salancik 1978). To elaborate, let us consider the decision of NGO2 to launch an
environmental advocacy campaign with funding from Donor A’s good governance
program.

The financial situation of NGO2 witnessed several turning points. In the beginning, the
organization did not pay much attention to its financial autonomy and struggled in its
search for funding. With the expansion in work, NGO2 started to run a deficit and hired
staff whose sole responsibility was to secure funding. On the verge of Donor A’s funding
shift, the organization was working on balancing its dependence. What was happening
back then?

The executive director explained two contributing factors. “We realized we cannot work
like other NGOs getting funding for several months to execute a project and then looking
for another funding. We took the decision to launch self-sustainable projects that cover
their costs and generate some profit” (Interview #2). This is an obvious and efficient
solution for criticality of resources through rethinking of means to increase internal
revenues (Cho and Gillespie 2006; Oliver 1990; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). The other
factor was diversity of donor funding. Specifically, around the time when NGO2 decided
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to implement the environmental advocacy project, the executive director faced the
general assembly with an inevitable decision:
I illustrated how the diversity in sources of funding could help NGO2. We
used to have three donors. If we have any disagreement with one of them,
at least one third of the budget is suspended and if a relation is terminated,
we might need to dissolve the organization. With multiple donors, we are
safer. The total budget might still be the same but diversity diminishes the
risk especially that even among donors we are not reliant on one more
than others (Interview #2).
This decision was approved and ultimately reduced the dependence of the organization
on a handful of donors. Diversification and limiting discretion and concentration
manifested into more organizational influence and decision-making autonomy (Dunn
2008; Froelich 1999; Oliver 1990; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978).

In addition, NGO2 was driven by the motivation for institutionalization. The organization
adopted certain practices that could be interpreted as a means to manage resource
dependence and buffer external demands, specifically from donors. NGO2 members
highlighted the level of professionalism they have reached in the organization, especially
when complicated systems of monitoring and reporting often requested by donors are
concerned. According to Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), professionalization is one way to
buffer external demands and give the organization more flexibility of action.

Furthermore, NGO2 is one of the few organizations that recognize the importance of
symbolic, non-material resources in its relationship with donors (Ebrahim 2005b).
Credibility and legitimacy as reflected in the record of accomplishment, expertise, and
connections are symbolic resources that the organization was not hesitant to put to
practice. As one NGO2 member explained, “When donors want to work on
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environmental issues in Lebanon, the first name they mention is NGO2. NGO2 is
credible and can offer technical expertise to conduct and submit studies and needs
assessments and to discuss action plans” (Interview #26). Through the use of technical
information and expertise, NGO2 was able to manage resource dependence; first by
creating a relationship of interdependence with donors, and second by potentially adding
more value to the substance of its activities (Cho and Gillespie 2006; Pfeffer and Salancik
1978; Saidel 2000).

When faced with a shift in donor funding priorities, and with a low level of resource
dependence tolerance (like NGO1), NGO2 practiced voice. Voice was practiced due to
the organization’s ties with donors and other actors within the network. NGO2 had been
building a strong network with donors, local organizations, and government agencies.
The members of the organization describe their relationships as strong, ongoing, and
cooperative. As one NGO2 member reported, “Donors are partners. We have a long
history with some donors who contribute to shaping, designing, and implementing the
project from A to Z. I value such involvement because there is a chance then for an
ongoing relationship in the future” (Interview #6). The relationship with Donor B, for
example, went beyond funding a single project into participation in meetings and
consultations or even monetary donation and technical support provided by donor
personnel. That is why an outside observer commented, “the donor identified NGO2 as a
strategic partner. This permitted the NGO to become familiar with the donor, its
priorities, and work formats and requirements. So, we can notice this connectivity and
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stability among the group of NGOs working with a donor, although from time to time
there are few newcomers” (Interview #12).

NGO2 valued the importance of inter-organizational cooperation and support. The
interviewed members of NGO2 strongly believed that the strength and success of their
organization were not going to be sustained unless a broader change took place through
collective action and not separate initiatives. Other NGOs were not viewed as
competition and relationships were based on respect, support, and partnership.
It is in our interest to strengthen the capacity of other NGOs. NGO2 was
the first to set-up a consortium of NGOs to work on a big-funded
environmental project. When we see there is a local NGO in an area we
want to work in, we do not establish a working unit but rather collaborate
with the NGO. Finally, we use an open donor policy with these NGOs; we
assist them through our connections, put them in contact with donors, and
even help them get funding (Interview #2).
This approach was needed for two reasons. The first reason is the interest in being
perceived as an institution and in becoming a reference for peer organizations working
with a certain donor. The second reason is the organization’s interest in further building
and entrenching the credibility, legitimacy, and representativeness of the organization.
All these inter-organizational relations accumulate to strong ties that characterize the
networks to which NGO2 belongs.

The theory of weak ties describes strong ties to a dense network, where an organization
enjoys several advantages. A network of strong ties includes fewer entities with similar or
shared identities, where interaction is frequent and relations are repeated and enduring
(Granovetter 1973, 1983). In such a situation, the actors experience the same conditions,
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share the same information, and benefit from the same flow of resources (Ashman et al.
1998; Carolan and Natriello 2005; Varda 2010). The diffusion of information and
communication within the network is redundant but efficient (Granovetter 1973, 1983).
Actors enjoy better opportunities and structures to facilitate information exchange. An
NGO can access the right information through different channels before a donor makes a
final decision. The NGO has the advantage of communicating its feedback and concerns
to the donor in an attempt to influence the final decision. Moreover, because the
exchange is reciprocal and communication is two-way (Paarlberg and Varda 2009), one
actor (e.g., a donor) would listen to another actor (e.g., an NGO) as the latter receives
information.

Strong ties increase the visibility and transparency of actions. Frequent interaction and
extended relations serve as a form of checks and balances and are more likely to prohibit
malfeasance, manipulation, and opportunism among actors (Granovetter 1983, 1985).
What is generated is a willingness to cooperate. This willingness is reconfirmed by the
actors’ preference to work with those they trusted in past experiences instead of trying to
figure out new partners and undergo new experiences (Carolan and Natriello 2005;
Haythornthwaite 2002; Krackhardt 1992; Nelson 1989; Provan et al. 2005). Therefore,
strong ties renew trust among actors, which in turn reinforces the ties. This renewal of
trust and reinforcement of ties provides additional incentives for actors to sustain the
relationship. Actors solve disputes through negotiation and compromise rather than
conflict and separation. Actors need to invest efforts and resources in the relationship in
order to manage it. The level of investment associated with the strength of the ties makes
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it hard and expensive for any actor to suspend the relations (Dyer and Singh 1998;
Provan et al. 2005).

It is common in a network for centers of power to emerge. An actor with a large number
of ties becomes focal or central within the network. This centrality is a source of power
as the actor controls the flow of resources and information inside the network (Boje and
Whetten 1981; Provan et al. 2005). Such a position further reinforces the ability of an
actor to sustain its activities while maintaining strong ties with other actors. Centrality
promises a certain degree of flexibility in decision and behavior.

Accordingly, network ties could constrain actions as much as garner opportunities for
organizations (Guo and Acar 2005). Backed up with trust and potential power in a donor
network, an NGO is better equipped with information as a resource; it is also less
dependent on the donor for external resources due to the availability of other sources or
the low ratio of external resources to internal resources. As a result, the NGO can
manipulate its surrounding environment and buffer external demands, especially if it has
a central position in a donor network. The NGO advocates its own interests, attempting to
influence the donor to partly reconsider shifts of funding. It is in the best interest of the
organization to try to challenge the donor’s objectives and to influence the funding
decision. Complying with one donor’s expectations might lead to disregarding the
expectations of other donors with whom the organization also has strong ties.
Proposition 2: The lower the organization’s resource dependence and the
stronger its ties, the higher the likelihood that an NGO will adopt voice as
a response to shifts in donor funding, in an attempt to influence donor’s
decision and sustain the relation.
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High Resource Dependence/Weak Ties: Adjustment
An organization with high resource dependence is characterized by a high ratio of
external to internal resources, fewer external sources of resources, and control over
resources by a particular source (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). Such an organization has
limited ability to manipulate external pressure. The organization is more likely to comply
with the demands of the actor controlling resources after it elaborately attempts to buffer
these demands (Cho and Gillespie 2006; Cook 1977; Oliver 1990; Pfeffer and Salancik
1978).

Let us consider the situation of NGO3. The organization approached Donor A with a
project on citizenship when the funding objective changed to good governance. In
general, NGO3 had always been financially dependent on external sources of funding.
Membership fees were minimal and did not account for a considerable percentage of the
budget. Many members either did not pay the fee or volunteered their time, expecting the
fee to be waived. The organization did not have any other internal sources of revenue.
Reliance on the expertise of its members could have been an internal asset, but was
quickly exhausted and then witnessed a drop due to member attrition. The president of
NGO3 complained that it was impossible to continue the work if the NGO did not have a
donor to fund its activities. “Our resources depend on projects. If we write a good
proposal and get funding, we can say we have money; otherwise we do not” (Interview
#11). The organization had a limited pool of donors and failed to diversify its sources.
Therefore, NGO3 had a constrained ability to manipulate its environment and to resist or
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buffer the demands of donors providing financial support for the operations of the
organization (Cho and Gillespie 2006; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Pfeffer 1982). Unless
NGO3 were to bring its operations to almost a complete halt, which was not the case or
interest at the time Donor A started to focus on good governance, the organization was to
be dependent on Donor A, especially since the bulk of external funding was channeled
from that donor.

Not only did NGO3 suffer from limited resources, it also had weak ties within the
network of donors and local NGOs. The president of the organization described the
NGO-donors relations as weak. “They are the money makers that when you need money
you knock on their doors. Donors consider they are subcontracting you and you are
responsible for implementation. At the end of the project, they do a technical and
financial audit” (Interview #11). Other NGO3 members complained that their
organization was less advantaged and always struggling to get funding because it was not
connected to ‘the right actors’, including the donors and their local partners.

In fact, NGO3 has yet to establish any lasting partnerships with other local NGOs. The
lack of adequate human and financial resources needed to manage partnerships could
explain NGO3’s weak inter-organizational relations. However, members of the
organization also claimed that most NGOs are captured by political and personal agendas
and not working for the public benefit. This hostile opinion drives NGO3 away from
other groups. Relationships are weak and limited to information exchange and
coordination on specific environmental issues. What NGO3 has been trying to do is to
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compensate for that weakness by exploring networking opportunities, regionally and
internationally, through the contacts of its members. These opportunities have not always
been rewarding, but the fact that NGO3 does not need to make a considerable investment
to sustain a connection encourages the organization to keep an eye open—but with
caution and modest expectations.

The challenge then is for an NGO with high resource dependence and weak ties to
explore ways to avoid compliance with external demands. Weak ties may relieve some
pressure on organizations. The fact these ties do not require high maintenance or costs
should encourage organizations to possess more weak ties as a means to increase
diversity and accessibility (Paarlberg and Varda 2009). Weak ties are pipelines to
information outside the network (Granovetter 1973, 1983). They provide a window of
opportunity for the NGO to screen any other available alternatives—although few. An
organization has the chance to manipulate information it gets from one source (the donor)
against what it gets from another. The organization enhances its standpoint and considers
possible alternatives to complacency.

Furthermore, weak ties characterize a less dense network. The interactions between
organizations within the network are less frequent. Therefore, an organization has some
autonomy (Granovetter 1973, 1983). The organization is not closely checked or
monitored by other members of the network. It enjoys flexibility in choosing its course of
action (Lazzarini and Zenger 2002) without being too concerned with possible
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repercussions on sustainability, transparency, and visibility within the network, which
prevail when the organization is strongly connected to other actors.

As a result, an NGO with high resource dependence relies on its weak ties for marginal
autonomy and flexibility. Novel information might be of limited use or has been shared
among donors. The NGO realizes it can no longer buffer the external pressures of donors
if it is interested in sustaining services. The organization might consider “adjust[ing] or
sever[ing] their existing ties to benefit from new external opportunities” (Lazzarini and
Zenger 2002: 6). The NGO is ready to pay a higher price to get the funding, “altering
purposes and domains to accommodate new interests […] and when necessary, becoming
involved in activities far afield from [its] stated central purposes” (Pfeffer and Salancik
1978: 24). The NGO then voluntarily and consciously complies with the donor’s
demands or new funding criteria.
Proposition 3: The higher the organization’s resource dependence and the
weaker its ties, the higher the likelihood that an NGO will adopt
adjustment as a response to shifts in donor funding, in an attempt to
sustain services to the community by complying with new funding
requirements.
High Resource Dependence/Strong Ties: Loyalty
While the previous scenario affords an NGO some flexibility in selecting a course of
action, an organization with high resource dependence and strong ties within a dense
network lacks discretion for maneuvering. The reader should note here that the current
research does not provide a case example for this particular situation.
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First, the main motive for a resource dependent organization is certainty and stability in
its environment. Strong ties are more likely to satisfy the motive by providing direct and
frequent access to the right actors in the network. However, as Lazzarini and Zenger
(2002) point out, the degree of commitment is key. In other words, the circulation of trust
between the actors in a network of strong ties ensures the flow of services and resources
(Carolan and Natriello 2005; Haythornthwaite 2002; Krackhardt 1992; Nelson 1989;
Provan et al. 2005). As these strong ties generate the positive results hoped for, the
organization becomes distracted with the frequent interactions strong ties impose, and
relaxes its search for other resources (Lazzarini and Zenger 2002).

Therefore, strong ties constitute constraints on organizational behavior. However, the
impact is also on organizational identity. Dense networks usually form among actors with
homogeneous characteristics (mission, values, culture, and so forth). Organizations that
are alike might find it natural to be connected and work together (Gulati 1995; Paarlberg
and Varda 2009). However, the risk, as Blau (1974) points out, is that the society could
be divided into small groups that are loosely connected through weak ties. Stiles (2002)
labels this form of interaction as a maturation stage characterized by a coherent social
structure. A coherent structure identifies an NGO with a donor and separates it from the
rest of society. Accordingly, an NGO is likely to behave like the donor and dissolve its
own identity and autonomy.

The proximity to the donor does not allow flow of new information from outside the
network (Granovetter 1973, 1983). An NGO will be occupied with the information being
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fed from within the existing network. Although the NGO’s interests and objectives might
be different, filtered, or redundant, information brings it closer to the donor. The
organization will not know what is going on beyond its immediate network (Adler and
Kwon 2002; Cohen and Levinthal 1990; Krackhardt 1992). The problem here is
information insufficiency or unavailability, not just redundancy.

Finally, a dense network of strong ties allows the actors to closely and efficiently monitor
each other’s behavior. Granovetter (1973; 1983) underscores how embeddedness in
networks, especially those of strong ties, discourages malfeasance and malpractice.
Hence, having access to information, a donor controlling the limited funds of an NGO
can immediately detect any attempt by the NGO to act against the stated objectives or
interests of the donor. Consequently, the donor takes immediate measures to deter or
punish such behavior.

As a result, the combination of strong ties and high resource dependence leaves an NGO
no discretion to buffer any external demands. An NGO is captured in a trap of
dependence: shared or almost isomorphic identity and culture, limited resources,
restricted accessibility, redundant information, and monitored behavior. The acceptance
of confinement within a network of strong ties in order to ensure a certain degree of
stability and certainty comes with a high price. The pressure toward automatic
conformity with donor demands is ever intensified and never relaxed.
Proposition 4: The higher the organization’s resource dependence and the
stronger its ties, the higher the likelihood that an NGO will choose loyalty as a
response to shifts in donor funding, in an attempt to continue satisfying the donor.
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Theory Propositions
To recap, NGO behavior is determined by both relational content and relational context.
In other words, NGO responses to changes in donor funding result from the interaction
between the two forces: its dependence on resources and its ties in the relevant network.
The likelihood of an organization adopting exit as a response to shifts in donor funding is
higher with lower resource dependence and weaker network ties (proposition 1). The
likelihood of an organization practicing voice is higher with lower resource dependence
and stronger ties (proposition 2). The likelihood of an organization practicing adjustment
is higher with higher resource dependence and weaker network ties (proposition 3).
Lastly, the likelihood of an organization adopting loyalty as a response to shifts in donor
funding is higher with higher resource dependence and stronger ties (proposition 4).

These four propositions can be translated into testable hypotheses. However, as noted in
the first and exploratory phase of this dissertation, loyalty is typically found in NGOs that
are established by donors. The possibility of the recurrence of such a behavior among a
limited sample of NGOs (as is the case in the Lebanese environmental arena) is small;
therefore, this particular proposition will not be tested with a hypothesis. Therefore, the
following three hypotheses are proposed for testing in this dissertation:
H1: The lower the resource dependence and weaker the ties, the higher
the likelihood of practicing exit.
H2: The lower the resource dependence and stronger the ties, the higher
the likelihood of practicing voice.
H3: The higher the resource dependence and weaker the ties, the higher
the likelihood of practicing adjustment.
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It is necessary to bear in mind that organizational behavior is not static. NGO responses
to shifts in funding change over time as Chapter Four illustrates. For example, an NGO
practiced voice during one funding cycle and then decided to exit in the following cycle.
Based on the integrated theory, this means NGO’s ties were strong in the first case, and
became weaker in the second, while the organization maintained low resource
dependence. Another NGO practiced voice followed by adjustment. This means that the
organization had a low level of resource dependence and strong network ties; in the
following funding cycle, resource dependence increased while the ties in the donor
network became weak.

These scenarios are highly plausible given what we know from organization theory. First,
an organization is a “coalition of shifting interest groups” (Scott 1987: 23) making
decisions to protect its core technology and adapt to better fit its environment
(Thompson 1967; Baum and Rowley 2002). However, we do expect the interests within
an organization to shift and the core technology to undergo certain changes. Specifically,
if we are talking about financial resources, it is very likely that internal revenues increase
or decrease over time, as does reliance on external resources. At the same time, the
surrounding environment is also changing. The demands of external actors are
continuously modified. Therefore, it is also likely to witness cases when external sources
of funding become more or less diversified and more or less concentrated. This means
that the dependence of an NGO on external resources might change over time, from one
funding cycle to another.
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Second, organizations are embedded in networks of relations that shift over time. These
networks are constructed of weak or strong ties based on existing relationships.
Relationships are built and developed over time through exchange and interactions.
Starting as weak connections, relationships are confirmed and ties evolve, strengthen, and
mature when interactions become more frequent, exchanges become more extended, and
trust becomes reciprocal (Paarlberg and Varda 2009; Provan et al. 2005). An alteration in
the frequency of interaction or a drop in reciprocal trust and exchange could bring back
the relationship to square one, where ties are weak. This means the type of ties (strong or
weak) an NGO has in a donor network might change over time, from one funding cycle
to another.

In conclusion, the modified framework of exit, voice, loyalty, and adjustment was casespecific in the sense that it explains an NGO relation vis-à-vis a specific donor, but not all
donors. The integrated theory explains an NGO reaction at a specific point in time, e.g.
when the donor decides to change the nature of its funding. This means the reaction is
temporal and subject to change in the next funding cycle due to changes in either the
NGO’s resource dependence, or its ties in a donor network, or both.

CONCLUSION
Resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) suggests that the mode of
response is a reflection of the NGO’s management of its dependence on an external
resource and the ensuing demands of a donor controlling the resources. The level of
resource dependence determines an NGO’s response. In contrast, the theory of weak ties
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(Granovetter 1973, 1983) suggests that the location of the organization in a donor
network indicates the strength of its ties to the donor; consequently, the response of the
NGO is determined by the dominance of strong or weak ties.

This chapter integrated these theories to recognize that not all organizations will
necessarily have the same resource dependency or same nature and structures of
relations, which can make it difficult to agree upon the reaction to changing donor
priorities. This chapter made the case for an integrated theory, which stipulates that an
organizational response to changes in its external environment depends on the level of
resource dependence tolerance as well as the strength of ties in a network of actors. In
particular, NGO responses of exit, voice, loyalty, and adjustment to shifts in donor
funding result from dependence on external resources (broadly defined) and the ties an
NGO has in a donor network. The following chapter turns to verify the propositions
derived from the integrated theory by testing the abovementioned hypotheses. Before
such testing, however, the methodology is discussed in Chapter Six.
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CHAPTER SIX: QUANTITATIVE AND NETWORK ANALYSIS
METHODOLOGY
INTRODUCTION
In the preceding chapters, I showed how NGO responses to shifts in donor funding could
be captured in a conceptual framework that builds on and modifies Hirschman’s (1970)
typology of exit, voice, and loyalty through the introduction of a fourth category,
adjustment. I further argued that although resource dependence theory presents a sound
justification for reasons underlying a specific response, integrating the theory with the
theory of weak ties provides a compelling case.

This chapter explains how the propositions generated in the previous chapter are tested.
To proceed, I first present network analysis as the analytical research method. Then, I
discuss research design, including the sample characteristics and data collection. Next, I
move to explain the dependent and independent variables and their measurement. I
provide a descriptive analysis of the plotted network sociograms and calculated
independent variables. The chapter concludes with a discussion of ethical considerations
and potential methodological limitations.

NETWORK ANALYSIS
Network analysis uses relational data to describe connections or ties that exist between
nodes (actors or organizations) within a certain network (Scott 2000). Network analysis
as an analytical tool yields two types of relevant information: relational properties and
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structural properties (Streeter and Gillespie 1992). The former describe what is
exchanged in network relationships and how these relations change; the latter cover
structural mechanisms on which relationships are based and accordingly identify actors’
roles. This dissertation draws on both properties of the NGO-donor network. The network
ties are operationalized as: 1) partnerships and joint organizational memberships among
NGOs and 2) funding relations that exist between NGOs and donors. The relational
properties reveal funding channeled in the network. The structural properties indicate the
position or location of each NGO in the network in terms of centrality (Freeman 1979).

Network analysis, as a methodological approach, serves two main functions. First, it
allows plotting different network diagrams based on various characteristics or attributes
(Borgatti, Everett, and Freeman 2002; Freeman 2000; Scott 2000). The network diagrams
depict ties between different actors and “require careful investigation to reconstruct the
meaning” (Diani 2002: 174). To this end, qualitative interpretation is germane. Second,
network analysis permits operational measurement of network concepts that, in turn,
allows to empirical hypothesis testing. The dependent variables in these hypotheses are
derived from the conceptual framework developed by the exploratory approach: exit,
voice, loyalty, and adjustment.

Research Design
This research focuses on organizational decisions, inter-organizational relations, and
organizational position. It is designed to map a network of environmental NGOs in
Lebanon. The first issue to tackle in network analysis is the identification of the
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boundaries of the network. Diani (2002), Knoke (1994), and Knoke and Kuklinski (1982)
present two strategies: normalist and realist. The normalist strategy grants the discretion
to the researcher based on the research question that “is imposed by the researcher’s
conceptual framework that serves an analytic purpose” (Knoke and Kuklinski 1982: 22).
The researcher defines the criteria, selects actors involved, constructs the ties, and then
studies the interaction (Diani 2002; Knoke 1994; Marsden 1990). This imposed boundary
risks the exclusion of other actors that might be involved but is an effective and efficient
way to complete the research. The realist strategy, on the other hand, leaves it up to the
actors involved to define the boundaries of the network as they practically experience the
limits. The discretion here shifts to the actors and risks a lack of a common understanding
of what a network is and what ties should be included.

I adopted the normalist strategy in identifying the network boundary. Environmental
NGOs in Lebanon are the general population, controlling for the variable of industry. As
mentioned in Chapter Three, the rationale of focusing on these organizations is that an
environmental NGO, more than any other NGO working in a different industry, has a
focused mission and scope of work, i.e., the environment.

Sample Design
The second issue to address in research design of network analysis is sample design.
“Network sampling should be fairly limited” (Diani 2002: 183). Sampling a certain
percentage of the general population means excluding the remaining percentage of the
ties in the whole network. This means, “the amount of ties lost through sampling is
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approximately 100-p where p is the proportion nodes in a network for which we have
been able to collect data” (Diani 2002: 183; Barnes 1979; Burt 1983; Marsden 1990).
Therefore, the targeted sample for this part of the dissertation is the whole population of
environmental NGOs in Lebanon. This step is feasible because the number of registered
environmental NGOs is relatively small.

The Lebanese Ministry of Environment provided a list of 310 civil society organizations
that are doing some work in the environment industry in Lebanon. The list was filtered
using two criteria. The first criterion is that only self-governing, non-governmental, notfor-profit, and non-political NGOs working on the improvement of services and public
benefit were to be included (Lewis 2001: 60; Vakil 1997). Student clubs, for example,
were excluded since they are not self-governing. The second criterion is that of
organizational mission. The primary mission has to be environmental. Hospitals and
universities, for example, were excluded. To verify the environmental status, two sources
were used: the online database (www.lebanon-support.org) and the United Nations
Development Program directory. The total number of registered NGOs that are primarily
environment-oriented in their mission is 153.

The research was scheduled to take place in Summer 2010. The political situation in the
country was tense. Political debates placed the subject of foreign funding on the table.
Accusations were made that foreign funding was being used for political purposes.
Threats were made to publish a list of more than 800 individuals and NGOs collaborating
with foreign donors against their fellow citizens. Many NGOs that were to be invited to
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participate in the research expressed concern with data collection. To overcome this
challenge, the backup plan was to limit the focus to a specific region where the research
could be carried out, buffering the political pressure (while respecting the decision of any
organization not to participate). This is the region of Mount Lebanon, which hosts 60 out
of the 153 registered environmental NGOs in the country. At the end, 58 environmental
NGOs formed the total population targeted in this research, since the Lebanese cabinet
was in the process of suspending the registration of two organizations for violation of
enacted laws.

Box 1 provides a general profile of the 58 environmental NGOs targeted in this research.
As elaborated in Chapter Three, the major sources of funding of the NGO sector are
membership fees, foreign donors, and the Lebanese government. In general, internal
resources (e.g., membership fees, sales of products) provide about 38% of total revenues,
while foreign donor funding is the largest single source of revenues. This manifests
NGOs’ ability to secure funding without restrictions or government control.
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Box 6.1: Brief Profile of the Targeted Population
Total number of environmental NGOs in Lebanon: 153; Targeted Sample: 58
Environmental NGOs founded after 2000: 35%
Affiliation with political parties: 5.2%; religious affiliations: 4.7%
Satellite offices or branches: 17.2%; affiliated centers and institutes: 12%
Organizational structure is formed of a general assembly that elects an executive
committee
NGOs with a separate board of directors or trustees: 0%
NGOs without an executive committee: 4.7%
Average size of executive committee: 8 members
Appointment/No elections of executive committee: 8.8%
Executive director is chair or member of executive committee
Same president since establishment: 52%
Less than two executive committees since establishment: 55.5%
Female members serving on Executive Committee: less than 17% in 53.6% of NGOs
NGOs with less than 56 members: 70.9%; conditional membership: 62.1% (21.9% have
age as the main condition)
Average number of paid staff: 8
NGOs with volunteers: 82.8%; only 10 NGOs with more than 50 volunteers
Some form of cooperation with the government: 48.4%; with other NGOs: 83.2%
Members of network or umbrella bodies: 20.8%— joining 37 bodies in total
Annual budget of less than $50,000: 71%; only 2.9% manages an annual budget of more
than one million
Total numbers of donors: 32
Application of some form of self-regulation: 70.1%
Financial and administrative systems in place: 23%
Publication of annual reports: 82%
Sources: Dissertation survey 2010; UNDP 2009; UNDP Survey 2005

Data Collection
The data was derived from a single-point survey administered to the whole population
(58 NGOs) (Diani 2002; Marsden 1990; Varda 2011). Lebanon does not have a database
on NGOs or laws that guarantee access to information. Therefore, several techniques
were used for data collection:

1. A survey targeting the 58 environmental NGOs was developed and launched;
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2. Information on NGOs’ relationships (partners, donors, stakeholders, etc.) was
directly requested from NGOs during interviews; and,
3. Desk research was conducted to collect secondary data through reviewing public
documents (reports, publications, websites, etc.). These are public records that are
easily accessible and available.

Data collection was based on a survey instrument that was developed in English and then
translated into Arabic. A back translation was necessary to ensure accuracy. The survey
was tested to ensure validity and cultural sensitivity. The survey instrument requested
responses to 50 questions categorized under five headings (Appendix D):
•

Organizational structure: membership, governing bodies, decision-making
process, self-regulation, and perceptions of legitimacy and credibility

•

Human resources: paid staff, volunteers, consultants, training, and management
systems

•

Programs: planning, needs assessment, and activities

•

Financial resources: annual budget, sources of funding, and financial reporting
and systems

•

Institutional relations: partnerships and networking, relations with government
agencies, and evaluation of strength and value of inter-organizational relations.

To ensure a better response rate, I approached the Ministry of Environment for support.
The Minister was enthusiastic about the prospects of the research and issued a letter
encouraging the local organizations to cooperate. The letter indicated that the findings of
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the research could be used to enhance the Ministry’s relations with environmental NGOs.
The survey was administered between July 10 and September 30, 2010. Most NGOs
received two versions of the survey questionnaire. The organizations were granted the
right to not participate in the research. The confidentiality of the data and findings was
underscored and supported by enacted legal clauses.

The participating organizations had the option to complete either a paper survey or an
online survey. The paper survey was sent via the national postal service. Organizations
were instructed to complete the form and then return it in a prepaid return-envelope that
was included in the package they received. It was necessary to ensure that organizations
did not incur any postal cost. The online survey was sent via email. Here, the
organizations were also given two options: complete an electronic version of the survey
and return it via email or complete it online by accessing the web link
http://www.surveymonkey.com/s/envstudy. A special email account was created for this
research.

After continuous follow up and bi-weekly reminders, 50 responses were returned. This
approximates 86% of the targeted population. Three out of the eight organizations that
declined to participate expressed lack of interest or trust in such research or lack of time
and resources to complete the survey. Three other organizations had invalid contact
information. Despite several attempts, it was impossible to reach any member of these
organizations. Finally, two organizations should be considered inactive. When contacted,
one NGO replied that the executive committee had been dissolved since 2007 without
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any serious attempt to hold elections in a near future. The other NGO was mainly
managed and supported by its founder. Since the death of the founder several years ago,
members had not been involved to sustain the organization.

Of the 50 responses received, 23 responses required cleansing for missing information
through direct contact with the NGO or from secondary data (publications or website).
The information gathered from the desk review was at times sufficient and helped verify
and complete the data. One returned questionnaire was dropped because of insufficient
information despite continuous follow up with the organization. This resulted in a
working dataset containing information on 49 NGOs.

The collected data covered: years of operation, size, location, number of beneficiaries,
staff, and volunteers, sources and volume of funding (including membership fees),
stakeholders (including donors, other NGOs, and members as one block/group), number
of ongoing projects, and memberships in partnerships and networks. The data helped in
the analysis of both the relational and structural properties of NGO-donor network.
NGOs’ partnerships, joint organizational memberships, and the funding relations with
donors are network ties. For the purpose of this dissertation, funding is considered a
relational property, and the position or location in the network as the structural property
at the level of individual actors (Streeter and Gillespie 1992).
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Variables Measurement
As noted earlier, the location and connections of an NGO (node) in a network determine
the way it reacts to shifts in donor funding. Therefore, the analysis relies on the
assessment and comparison of several measurements in network relations. This research
aims to assess the generalized causal weight of each of the specific variables—derived
from network relations—on the formation of the observed outcomes. Table 6.1 lists the
dependent and explanatory variables along with the measurements.

Table 6.1: Variables and Measurements
Variable
Dependent Variable
NGO response

Explanatory Variable
Resource Dependence

Explanatory Variable
Tie strength

Measurement
A multiple variable measured by a subjective
classification based on most recent NGO
response
Dependence on external sources measured by
ratio of internal to external revenues
Diversity of sources measured by number of
external sources
Control over resources measured by ratio of
donor funding to total external funding
Closeness centrality

Dependent Variable
In determining the unit of analysis, Pfeffer (1982) considers that the “the unit of analysis
should correspond to the level of the theoretical mechanism that is presumed to be
affecting the dependent variables” (15). We acknowledge that organizations are
embedded in networks of ties that restrict or enhance their behaviors (Granovetter 1985),
and that external actors exert pressure on organizations as they control and manipulate
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resources (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). The focus here is on the decision of individual
organizations vis-à-vis shifts in donor funding. Accordingly, the unit of analysis is the
NGO as an organization. The dependent variable here is NGO response to shifts in donor
funding.

Based on the modified typology presented in Chapter Four, NGO response as the
dependent variable is defined as an ordinal variable with four categories: exit, voice,
adjustment or loyalty. Scores 1, 2, 3, and 4 were assigned to these four modes of
response. The cases when NGOs did not have any prior relationship with the donor were
scored as 0 (7 in total). The categorization of NGO responses into one of the four
categories was based on data the organizations provided in the survey. Respondents were
asked to list their main projects over the 7 years during which donors shifted the focus of
their funding in Lebanon. The respondents were also asked to classify the nature of each
project (e.g., environment, social development, human rights, democracy).

Measuring the dependent variable required a subjective judgment guided by the
information provided by NGOs and donors and the expertise of two informants. The two
informants enjoy a long history working in the NGO field in Lebanon and are authorities
on environmental NGOs. Bearing in mind that project implementation might overlap over
calendar years, the first step was to anonymously list all the implemented projects along
with the classification provided by the respondent NGOs.
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An approach similar to the one used by Rusbult and colleagues (1988) to measure exit,
voice, loyalty, and neglect through self-reporting on a list of items was used here. A list
of items was developed to measure exit, voice, and adjustment. Year 2008 was taken as
the basis for comparison. In that year, Lebanon was preparing for the 2009 parliamentary
elections; donors were investing resources into human rights and democracy (noted in
Chapter Four). The focus again is on the two donors (covered in Chapter Four) who are
the primary donors of Lebanese NGOs.
Based on the qualitative data from Chapter Four, the patterns that justify exit are:
divergence of interests between the NGO and the donor as funding priorities change, the
NGO decision not to apply for funding, and suspension of the NGO-donor relationship. A
different set of patterns is noticeable for voice: engagement in negotiation and dialogue
on ideas and activities, a balance between NGO interest and donor priority, and
sustainability of the NGO-donor relationship. The emergence of adjustment as a mode of
NGO response is due to the following patterns: accommodation of donor interests,
alteration in the nature of activities, and retention of the funding stream.
For exit,
NGO been receiving a grant from the donor during a particular funding cycle
Funding priorities have become different
NGO not applying for funding from the donor in the following funding cycle
For voice,
NGO project being environmental
NGO project satisfying NGO mission
NGO project serving the donor objectives
Relationship maintained
For adjustment,
NGO project not related to the environment
NGO project not fitting NGO mission
NGO project serving donor objectives
Funding sustained
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The second step was to orient the two expert informants on the typology of exit, voice,
loyalty, and adjustment and provide them with information on the NGOs’ mission and
projects and on Donors A and B’s objectives. The informants were separately asked to go
through the same exercise of categorizing the projects of the 49 NGOs funded by the two
donors based on the list of items mentioned above. The three sets of categorization (the
two informants’ and the researcher’s) were compared for verification.

The behavior of an NGO that used to be funded by the donor but did not apply for a grant
was categorized as exit (1). Projects that were environmental, satisfied the NGO mission,
and, at the same time, served other objectives were compared to donor objectives to
verify compatibility. These were categorized as voice (2). Projects that were classified as
non-environmental were considered to demonstrate adjustment as a response (3). Exit
was the only clear-cut, neat categorization of behavior. Cases of adjustment were also
obvious and agreed on, except in one case that was further verified through relying on
secondary data (project description available on the website of the organization). Cases of
voice were not as obvious and required additional verification, through contacting the
organization or relying on published material. There was an agreement, however, that
none of the reported projects is an exhibition of loyalty as a behavior.

To control for potential bias, a list of applicants was secured from Donor A. The purpose
here is to ensure that observations made by the informants and researchers do not
overstate the practice of a specific behavior, for example counting cases of NGOs
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applying for funding and being rejected as a practice of exit. A similar list was not
secured from Donor B. However, it should be noted that Donor B follows a fixed
deadline application system, which does not give organizations the flexibility to resubmit
a different grant proposal. At the end, 98 observations or decisions were categorized as
exit (1), voice (2), adjustment (3), or no relationship. The no relationship observations
were then dropped. The final n for the sample that was used in the analysis is 91.

Independent Variables
The independent variables are resource dependence and strength of ties. Resource
dependence is discussed first. Resource dependence is measured by three factors which
influence an organization’s decision to comply with external pressure; these are: degree
of dependence on external resources (magnitude), diversity of external sources
(concentration), and volume of funding from a donor (discretion) (Pfeffer and Salancik
1978). The three factors separately suggest a certain degree of dependence, and were
used alternately in several studies on nonprofits (Alexander 1998; Barman 2008; Delfin
and Tang 2008; Froelich 1999; Guo and Acar 2005; Mosley 2011; Moulton and Eckerd
2012; Nicholson-Crotty 2009; Verbruggen et. al. 2011). To fully capture Pfeffer and
Salancik’s (1978) resource dependence, the three factors are used and measured as
follows:
•

Criticality: degree of dependence on external resources, reflected in the ratio of
internal to external revenues. Alternatively, it is possible to calculate the
percentage of internal revenue from the total annual budget. Any figure smaller
than 0.5 reflects high dependence on external sources. The survey includes data
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on the total budget of a particular year as well as the percentage of membership
fees, sales profit, and other income-generating programs.
•

Concentration: diversity of external sources, measured by the number of external
sources of funding. The presence of at least more than one external source of
funding indicates a relative diversity. The data collected through the survey
includes the number of external sources of funding for particular years.

•

Discretion: volume of funding from one particular donor. This is particularly
noteworthy since the mere presence of multiple sources of funding does not
reflect a real diversity. One single source could control the bulk of such funding.
Discretion is assessed on the reliance on one particular source and measured by
the percentage of funding form the principal external donor to total external
funding. A percentage larger than 0.5 indicates critical discretion.

The internal sources of revenues for the Lebanese NGOs are membership fees and
income-generating activities (sales or services). The external sources of funding are
individual donations, local philanthropies or foundations, the private sector, government
agencies, and international donors. Individual donations and private sector funding are
considered easy money. Therefore, each source represents an aggregate. Funding from
philanthropies, government, and international donors is considered hard money. The
sources are listed separately and the funding is not aggregated by source. Surveyed NGOs
receive funding from different government agencies and multiple international donors
(international organizations, foreign embassies, foreign government agencies, etc.).
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The second independent variable is tie strength. The strength of ties is measured through
centrality based on Lazzarini and Zenger’s (2007) definition of tie strength as “the degree
of commitment that supports an exchange relationship for the transfer of goods, services,
or information” (4). Centrality is defined as an individual actor’s position or location in
the network relative to other actors (Boje and Whetten 1981; Friedkin 1991; Wasserman
and Galaskiewicz 1994). It reflects the power derived not from the attributes and
characteristics of the actor but through the structure of the network the actor belongs to
(Brass and Burkhardt 1993; Cook 1977; Ibarra 1993).

The literature on social network discusses several types of centrality. However, Marsden
and Campbell (1984) suggested closeness centrality as a measurement of tie strength. The
authors departed from Granovetter’s (1973) definition of the strength of a tie as a
“combination of the amount of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual
confiding), and the reciprocal services which characterize the tie” (1361). The authors
considered frequency and duration as indicators of the strength, among others such as
homogeneity, reciprocity, and acknowledgement. Marsden and Campbell (1984) posed
the question whether these indicators are derived from researchers’ intuitions while they
in fact refer to one concept. The authors used multiple indicator methods to
operationalize their question and concluded that closeness is the best indicator of
strength, free of contamination by other indicators.

The suggestion was echoed in several studies (Baer 2010; Hansen 1999; Hurlbert, Beggs,
and Haines 2001; Levin and Cross 2004; Tsai and Ghoshal 1998; Wellman and Frank
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2001). This research relies on closeness centrality to measure the strength of ties.
Closeness centrality reflects the ability of an actor (node) to independently access all
other actors of the network (Borgatti 2005; Freeman 1979; Valente and Foreman 1998;
Wasserman and Faust 1994). “A central actor can reach other actors through a minimum
number of intermediary positions and is therefore dependent on fewer intermediary
positions than the peripheral actors” (Brass 1984: 521). This means that as closeness
centrality decreases, an actor becomes less connected to the network and more dependent
on others to connect back. The benefits of closeness are direct connection, shorter
transaction times, lower costs, and direct access (Freeman 1979: 225); but the risk of
redundancy always exists (Granovetter 1973, 1985). Following such an approach, the
closeness centrality for each NGO was generated. The following section provides
additional details on this step.

DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS
The collected data was extracted into UCINET (Borgatti et al. 2002), an analytical
software package for social network analysis. UCINET allows drawing the network of
the environmental NGOs and alters (partners, donors, stakeholders) and facilitates
analysis of connections. Attributes are associated to the organizations (nodes) in the
mapped network. Networks are plotted according to the need and based on various
attributes (Borgatti et al. 2002; Freeman 2000).

To yield better results, I first start by compiling a 1-mode ego-centric network data. The
1-mode network links a set of actors to the same set of actors. Actors are identified by
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each other through certain ties. Ties of a network represent relationships between and
among actors (nodes) and their interplay yields positions and roles for each node (Burt
1992, 2004; Fararo and Skvoretz 1986; Huston and Robins 1982; Marsden 1990). In
addition, relations among NGOs and between them and other actors are non-confirmed
links. Non-confirmed links refer to “relationships listed by an organization in the
network, regardless of whether that organization was also named by the organization it
identified” (Provan, Veazie, Staten, and Teufel-Shone 2005: 606). In other words, these
are the symmetric and asymmetric ties between nodes. Symmetric ties result from the two
organizations naming each other while asymmetric ties are generated when only one
organization names the other and not vice versa. As we are studying inter-organizational
relations, the ties stand for common affiliations (partnerships, joint memberships, and
funding) among organizations.

Second, I relied on the ego-centric approach to network analysis to report ties among
actors (alters) and each NGO in the population (ego) (Hanneman and Riddle 2005). Only
the ego (NGO), the core network members, were asked to participate in the survey, and
not all other actors identified by those core members (Varda 2011). This approach
provides a broad but not complete picture of what is going on. Therefore, I had to shift
the focus down to sub-networks, which are complete ties. The ego-centric network is
formed of several sub-networks, some of which are complete networks (Stefanone,
Hancock, Gay and Ingraffea 2004). In a complete network, all egos (NGOs) identified
connections among each other. In other words, a complete network of the 49 NGOs could
be constructed based on the ties that exist among these organizations.
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Two matrices were developed. I am testing the behavior of each NGO vis-à-vis a specific
donor and how its ties in the donor network shape the behavior. It is paramount then to
focus on specific actors or clusters rather than others. In other words, the focus should be
on the two donors (covered in Chapter Four). Each of the two matrices represents the ties
among the 49 NGOs as they connect in a donor network. One matrix represents the
network of ties between the 49 NGOs, their identified partners, and Donor A. The second
matrix represents the network of ties between the 49 NGOs, their identified partners, and
Donor B. The two matrices (and their plotted networks) are not identical or similar. The
49 NGOs are connected in different ways across the two networks. Not all of these
organizations received grants from both donors. This procedure isolated the effect of the
other donor (being excluded from the network) and made it possible to detect variation in
the position and role of each core NGO across the two networks (Diani 2002; Scott
2000). Consequently, the centrality of each NGO will vary from one network to another
(Freeman 2000; Scott 2000).

Plotting the Networks
In the first step, I plotted the ego-centric network of the 49 NGOs and the two complete
networks of these organizations with Donors A and B, respectively. Freeman (2000)
highlights how plotted network sociograms are “used both to develop structural insights
and to communicate those insights to others” (15). The purpose of depicting the egocentric sociogram is to provide a visual image of the broader network of the 49 NGOs.
The complete networks with Donors A and B are parts of the ego-centric network and
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show the interactions, connections, and locations of these 49 organizations in a specific
donor network. Using the spring embedding algorithm in NetDraw (Borgatti 2002), I
plotted these sociograms following Freeman’s (2000) guidelines for visualizing, drawing,
and interpreting network plots.

Figure 6.1 depicts the plotted ego-network of the 49 environmental NGOs (nodes marked
as red circles) and their ‘alters’. The alters are: 1) other local or international NGOs—
environmental and others, the private sector, local institutions, local governments, and
government agencies the 49 NGOs are connected to through partnerships, 2) members,
the private sector, and local and international donors through funding, and 3) national or
international networking and umbrella bodies through organizational membership.

Figure 6.1: Plotted Eco-Network of NGOs and Alters
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Focusing on a specific donor, the next two figures (Figures 6.2 and 6.3) show how the 49
NGOs are connected among each other in the networks of Donor A and Donor B,
respectively. The blue nodes in the two networks are the NGOs that lack ties with other
actors and become isolated from the rest of the network. There are three isolates in the
Donor A network and one in the Donor B network. These NGOs also do not receive
funding from the donor. This means that the impact of donor funding is non-existent.
Other NGOs look like they are ‘dangling’ from the sociogram (Hanneman and Riddle
2005). These are ‘pendants’ that connect to the network only by a single tie. Several
pendants are connected to the network only through the funding they receive from the
donor. However, few pendants are connected through another NGO. The impact of donor
funding is indirect. The presence of these organizations is important, but their limited
number should not divert the analysis from where most of the action is: the channeling of
funding and its implications on NGO behavior.
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Figure 6.2: Plotted Complete Network of NGOs and Donor A

Figure 6.3: Plotted Complete Network of NGOs and Donor B
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Calculating Independent/Explanatory Variables
Descriptive statistics were calculated for each independent variable listed in Table 6.1.
The mean and standard deviations for each of the independent variables are presented in
Table 6.2 below. To determine resource dependence, the three measures were used.
Several studies on nonprofits used one or two measurements at a time: total internal
revenues, number of external sources, and percentage of a specific external funding to the
total budget (Alexander 1998; Barman 2008; Froelich 1999; Guo and Acar 2005; Mosley
2011; Nicholson-Crotty 2009; Verbruggen, Christiaens, and Milis 2011). Here, I am
using all three measurements to provide more in-depth analysis.

Resource criticality is reflected in the degree of dependence on external resources. It is
calculated as the percentage of internal revenue from the total annual budget. Any figure
smaller than 0.5 reflects high dependence on external sources (Mosley 2011; NicholsonCrotty 2009; Verbruggen et al. 2011). Concentration of resources signifies diversification
of external sources and is measured by the number of external funding sources
(Alexander 1998; Barman 2008; Froelich 1999; Guo and Acar 2005). The presence of
one external source of funding indicates no diversity. Discretion stands for the ability of a
specific source to control funding. This is measured by the percentage of funding from an
external donor to total external funding (Delfin and Tang 2008; Mosley 2011; NicholsonCrotty 2009; Verbruggen et. al. 2011). A value larger than 0.5 indicates critical
discretion.
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To determine tie strength, closeness centrality was measured (Marsden and Campbell
1984). Centrality is defined as an individual actor’s position or location in the network
relative to other actors (Boje and Whetten 1981; Brass 1984; Friedkin 1991; Wasserman
and Galaskiewicz 1994). Unlike resource dependence, which is a fixed organizational
characteristic regardless of network ties and positions, closeness centrality is a structural
property that varies from one network to another (Streeter and Gillespie 1992). Therefore,
it is necessary to calculate the centrality of the 49 NGOs using data of the Donor A
network and then of the Donor B network. The two sets of centrality measurement were
stacked into the complete dataset.

Table 6.2: Means and Standard Deviations of Variables
Variable
Resource Dependence
Criticality
Concentration
Discretion
Tie strength

Mean

Standard Deviation

.22
4.39
.54

.16
3.00
.25

5.35

3.984

The probability-probability plot (P-P plot) was performed (Field 2009; Griffiths, Hill, and
Judge 1993; Michael 1983). As the four graphs in Figure 6.4 indicate, the variables of
discretion and closeness centrality are slightly skewed. However, log transformation to
normalize the variables was not performed for this study.
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Criticality

Concentration

Discretion

Closeness Centrality

Figure 6.4: Probability-Probability Plots
The descriptive analysis sets the stage for the modeling analysis and theory testing that
the next chapter covers. Before proceeding, it is crucial to address limitations and ethical
considerations.
ETHICAL CONSIDERATION AND POTENTIAL LIMITATIONS
Ethical considerations and other matters of protection of human subjects are imposed and
governed by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) review process at Syracuse University.
Accordingly, participation in the research through the completion of the survey was
voluntary. Organizations were reminded throughout the process that their participation
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was encouraged and preferred but not mandatory. The letter issued by the Minister of
Environment did not allude to any repercussion if an NGO declined.

In addition, to maintain confidentiality and trust, I assumed the responsibility to generate
and report the data and at the same time protect the authenticity of information and
confidentiality of organizations, in accordance to IRB guidelines and the applicable laws
in Lebanon (clauses of the laws were included in the survey for further assurance).
Organizations were randomly assigned numbers and the data was saved on the
researcher’s work computer, which is password protected. Access to the data is restricted.
No reference to specific organization or any other identifying information was made. All
information and data were strictly used to produce general statistical results, tables, and
figures.

On another point, the research recognizes several limitations. The main limitation relates
to measurement of the dependent variable. NGOs’ responses, the dependent variable,
were measured through subjective judgment based on data provided by the NGOs and
donors. To control for researcher’s bias, two informants were involved in assessing the
98 decisions of the NGOs. Another risk was that a particular behavior might have been
overstated. This could be due to the focus on the visible outcome: the final result that
might have resulted from a donor reaction and not an NGO’s original decision. To
mediate this risk and improve the measures for the quantitative data, additional data was
collected. A list of applications received by Donor A was secured. The observations
made by the informants and the researcher were verified by comparing them to the names
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of applicant organizations. However, the setback is that Donor B did not provide a similar
list.

Second, the sample size could constitute a limitation. There were 98 observations in total
and 7 were dropped out of the analysis due to no existing relationship with any of the two
donors. Tied to this is the absence of any observation pertaining to the mode of loyalty.
The informants who worked on categorizing the 98 decisions of the NGOs could not
classify any case as that of loyalty. This is a weakness that should be addressed in future
research, especially if using simulation exercises.

Third, identifying the boundary of the network could always be challenged. Regardless of
the strategy used to set a network boundary (Diani 2002; Knoke and Kuklinski 1982), the
difficulty to identify all actors and ties constituting a network always exists (Rowley
1997). The snowball technique would be a useful approach to address this challenge (e.g.,
Scott 2000; Wasserman and Faust 1994). However, the risk here is that the network will
divert from the specific focus of this research, i.e., environmental NGOs. The other
aspect of this limitation is imposing a boundary on the 49 NGOs to construct a connected
network among them and then to test the hypotheses. The risk here is the connected
network will be isolated from a broader network (the donor’s, for example), which
underplays other possible effects.
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CONCLUSION
With the proposed methodological approach, I have set the stage for testing hypotheses
derived from the integrated theory of resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik
1978) and the theory of weak ties (Granovetter 1973, 1983). The theory should predict
behavior based on reliance on external funding and network ties, and, therefore, verify
responses to shifts in donor funding as captured in the modified typology of exit, voice,
loyalty, and adjustment, elaborated in Chapter Four.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: ANALYSIS AND THEORY TESTING
INTRODUCTION
This chapter concludes the discussion on the second research question: ‘Why do NGOs
react differently to shifts in donor funding?’ The purpose here is to test the integrated
theory by supporting it with statistically significant evidence based on observations of the
responses of 49 NGOs to shifts in funding of two donors. The chapter begins by
reiterating the propositions put forward in Chapter Five. Second, the statistical model
used to test the hypotheses is presented. Third, the results are then analyzed to strengthen
the argument for the integrated theory. The chapter concludes with a discussion of
alternative explanations of NGO response to shifts in donor funding.

PROPOSITIONS AND TESTABLE HYPOTHESES
A theory that integrates resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) and the
theory of weak ties (Granovetter 1973, 1983) should predict NGO responses to shifting
demands. The theory should verify the four responses to shifts in donor funding (exit,
voice, loyalty, and adjustment), based on NGOs’ reliance on external funding and ties
they build within a network.

Four propositions were put forward. The likelihood of an organization adopting exit as a
response to shifts in donor funding is higher with lower resource dependence and weaker
network ties (proposition 1). The likelihood of an organization practicing voice is higher
with lower resource dependence and stronger ties (proposition 2). The likelihood of an
organization practicing adjustment is higher with higher resource dependence and weaker
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network ties (proposition 3). Lastly, the likelihood of an organization adopting loyalty as
a response to shifts in donor funding is higher with higher resource dependence and
stronger ties (proposition 4).

This means that an NGO that generates more internal revenues than external resources,
has a diversified pool of external sources, and does not rely on one donor is more likely
to practice exit if the organization has weak ties in the donor network. If these ties are
strong, then the NGO is more likely to practice voice. On the other hand, an NGO with a
high percentage of financial resources secured externally from one particular donor is
more likely to practice adjustment if the organization has weak ties in the donor network.
If these ties are strong, then the NGO is more likely to practice loyalty.

As explained, loyalty classifies behaviors of NGOs that (in most cases) are established by
donors. Based on qualitative research, there is a small possibility of the recurrence of
such a behavior among a limited sample such as the Lebanese environmental NGOs.
Therefore, the proposition on loyalty was not tested. Propositions 1 through 3 were
translated into testable hypotheses using network analysis. These hypotheses are:
H1: The lower the resource dependence and weaker the ties, the higher the
likelihood of practicing exit.
H2: The lower the resource dependence and stronger the ties, the higher the
likelihood of practicing voice.
H3: The higher the resource dependence and weaker the ties, the higher the
likelihood of practicing adjustment.
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RESULTS
A series of steps was taken to test the hypotheses. As reported in the previous chapter, I
first started by plotting network sociograms. Second, I generated values of the
independent variables. Table 7.1 lists the relevant independent variables and the measures
employed. Data for the first three measures were directly gathered from the survey
questionnaire the 49 NGOs completed or from secondary sources such as desk research
when needed. The data for tie strength was based on relationships identified by these
organizations in the questionnaire. Closeness centrality was computed using UCINET.

Table 7.1: Description of Independent Variables
Variable
Resource Dependence
Criticality- dependence on external
resources
Concentration- diversity of external
sources
Discretion- a donor control over
resources
Tie strength

Description
Percentage of internal revenue from the total
annual budget: from 0 (no internal revenueshigh dependence) to 1 (no external revenueslow dependence)
A continuous variable- Number of external
sources: 1 (no diversity) or more (some
diversity)
Percentage of donor funding from total
external funding: from 0 (no control) to 1 (total
control)
Closeness centrality- the reciprocal of the sum
of length of ties in a network

The purpose here was to predict NGO response of exit, voice, and adjustment based on
the level of response dependence and the strength of ties in a donor network. To test the
hypotheses, I performed multinomial logistic regression analysis. This analysis is used to
predict the probabilities of the different possible outcomes of a categorically-distributed
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dependent variable, given a set of independent variables (Greene 2003; Hosmer and
Lemeshow 2000; Long 1997; Peng, Lee, and Ingersoll 2002). The analysis is suitable
here because the dependent variable (response) is nominal or categorical, consisting of
more than two categories (exit, voice, and adjustment) that cannot be ordered in any
meaningful way.

I used the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) to run a multinomial
regression analysis using the 91 observations (Field 2009; Pallant 2007). Table 7.2
reports the frequency and percentile distribution of the 91 observations or modes of
response.
Table 7.2: Frequency Distribution of Responses
Response

Frequency

Percentage

Exit

29

31.87

Voice

24

26.37

Adjustment

38

41.76

Total

91

100

This model assumes NGOs are faced with a decision with more than two choices (exit,
voice, and adjustment). The results are k-1 sets of parameter estimates for each term in
the model, where k is the number of decision outcomes; here, k=3. Like the logistic
model, the dependent variables are conceptualized as probabilities of selecting specific
outcomes conditional on values for the independent variables or predictors (resource
criticality, concentration, and discretion and closeness centrality). In addition, since the
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observations are derived from NGOs’ decisions vis-à-vis two donors (Donor A and
Donor B), a binary independent variable for ‘donor’ was included in the model as dummy
variable.

One of the three decision outcomes is arbitrarily selected as a referent category. In this
instance, SPSS selected exit as the referent category. Each set of parameters is associated
with a specific outcome relative to the base outcome: Prob(Exit)/Prob(Voice) and
Prob(Exit)/Prob(Adjustment). The analysis predicts the probability of occurrence of voice
and adjustment outcomes relative to exit outcomes, based on each of the independent
variables, while holding others constant. The standard interpretation here is “that for a
unit change in the predictor variable, the logit of outcome m relative to the referent group
is expected to change by its respective parameter estimate (which is in log-odds units)
given the variables in the model are held constant” (UCLA). The results reported in Table
7.3 include the coefficient, the standard errors, along with the odd ratios for the
predictors, which will be used in the analysis. The difficulty here is in interpreting the
parameters because we are not talking about the likelihood of adopting a certain response
based on a set of variables. Rather, the odd ratio reflects how changes in the predictor
increase or decrease the likelihood or probability ratio of the outcome falling in the
comparison category in contrast to falling in the referent category (Allison 1999; Pampel
2000).
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Table 7.3: Test of Response Model
Intercept
Voice
Adjustment

21.697**
(12.251)
22.677**
(4.344)

Criticality
–.685
(.611)
1.411***
(0.833)

.504
4.100

Concentration
–.772
(.728)
.302**
(.201)

.462
1.352

Discretion
.427*
(.031)
–1.909*
(.669)

1.521
.148

Closeness
Centrality
.846***
2.330
(.806)
–.222
.801
(.114)

Chi-square 88.837
Cox and Snell R2 .71
Note: The reference category is Exit. The coefficients and standard errors (shown in parentheses) are
reported in the left-hand column under each variable. The odd ratios are reported in the right-hand side
column.
*
p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01

Resource Criticality. With the other variables in the model held constant, an increase of
resource criticality by one unit decreases the odds for choosing voice over exit by a factor
of .504. The odds of preferring adjustment to exit would be expected to increase by a
factor of 4.100. Resource criticality is measured as the percentage of internal revenues
from total revenues. An increase in resource criticality means a decrease in the
percentage of internal revenues. This means we can say as an NGO’s internal revenues
decrease, we would expect the organization to be more likely to prefer exit to voice or
adjustment to exit as a response. However, the results are significant only in the
preference of adjustment to exit.

Resource Concentration. Given the other variables in the model are held constant, a oneunit increase in resource concentration decreases the odds of preferring a voice response
to an exit response by .462. On the other hand, the odds of choosing adjustment over exit
as a response would be 1.352 times more likely. Resource concentration is measured by
the number of external sources of funding an NGO has. An increase in resource
concentration reflects fewer sources. Some of the results here are significant. If an NGO
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decreases the number of its external sources of funding, the organization is more likely to
choose adjustment over exit as a response. However, the results are not significant
enough to make the claim that the organization is more likely to choose exit over voice.

Resource Discretion. Given that the other variables in the model are held constant, a oneunit increase in resource discretion score means that the odds of practicing voice would
be 1.521 times more likely than practicing exit. Under the same condition, the relative
risk for preferring adjustment to exit would be expected to decrease by a factor of .148.
We know that resource discretion is measured as a percentage of the main donor funding
from total external funding. The higher the percentage, the higher the discretion practiced
by that donor and the higher the NGO reliance on the donor. The results are marginally
significant. However, in general, we can say that an NGO is more likely to choose voice
over exit or exit over adjustment as a response when it relies more on one specific
external source of funding.

Closeness Centrality. Given that the other variables in the model are held constant, an
increase of closeness centrality by one unit substantially increases the likelihood of
preferring voice over exit as a response by a factor of 2.330. The same increase does not
have the same significant effect when practicing adjustment, which is .801 times less
likely than practicing exit. Closeness centrality reflects the strength of ties an NGO has;
strong ties yield a higher centrality score while weak ties results in a lower score. We can
say that if two organizations have identical resource criticality, discretion, and
concentration levels, an organization with the higher centrality score is more likely to

266
prefer voice to exit (as well as exit to adjustment) as a response than an organization with
the lower centrality score.

Therefore, if responses to shifts in donor funding are ordered as follows:
Voice
Exit
Adjustment
then, other things being held constant, being less dependent on external resources makes
it more likely for an NGO to choose the response relative to the next lower response on
the list. The same applies when an NGO has more external sources of funding, is more
reliant on a single actor for the bulk of its external resources, and enjoys more strong than
weak ties in a donor network.

Consistent with predictions of the integrated theory, the results indicate that the variation
in three variables of resource dependence does not have a significant effect on the choice
between exit and voice as a response, compared with substantial effect the strength of
ties, reflected in closeness centrality, has. One variable of resource dependence that
shows marginal significant effect on the choice between voice and exit is resource
discretion—the control over resources by a single actor. This finding does not come as a
surprise. A substantial volume of funding resembles a commitment from the donor to
work with a certain NGO. This would drive the organization to invest in its managerial
capacity in order to administer the funding (Carothers and Ottaway 2000; Mawdsley et al.
2002; Wallace et al. 2006). It becomes too hard for either side to suspend the relationship.
The cost of exit here is much higher than the cost of voice (Hirschman 1970).
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Comparing exit and adjustment, the results indicate that the ties an NGO has in a donor
network are not as prominent as its dependence on donor funding in preferring
adjustment over exit. Relatively speaking, as the centrality score drops down, the NGO
prefers to adjust its activities to accommodate donor demands rather than to suspend
(exit) the relationship. This is somehow expected, but should be the focus of further
exploration. The behavior of an organization is influenced by its weak ties, especially
through accessing unconsumed opportunities for resources (novel information, new
sources, etc.) (Granovetter 1973). However, the organization needs to have enough strong
ties to be able to utilize these opportunities, play a more active role in connecting groups,
and control information for its benefit. An organization with weaker ties (and a lower
centrality score) might actually be ‘dangling’ from the network (Hanneman and Riddle
2005) and is not in an adequate position to do so.

The likelihood to practice adjustment compared to exit significantly depends on resource
criticality and concentration. NGOs with weaker ties are more likely to practice
adjustment and not exit if resource dependence is higher. Increased reliance on external
resources increases the likelihood of practicing adjustment over exit upon dissatisfaction
with a donor. The same is the case with fewer external sources of funding. The findings
here corroborate arguments made for diversification as a powerful strategy to buffer
demands and augment organizational autonomy (Cho and Gillespie 2006; Dunn 2008;
Oliver 1990; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). The variable that surprisingly challenges the
proposition is resource discretion. However, this result is only marginally significant and
could be related to a weakness in the measurement. Two NGOs whose external resources
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are controlled by a single actor might substantially differ if one of them mainly depends
on internal revenues. In such a case, the effect of resource discretion is minute. Resource
discretion should not be analyzed in isolation from the other factors of resource
dependence, especially resource criticality.

DATA ANALYSIS
In this chapter, I am testing several hypotheses that predict NGO responses to shifts in
donor funding. Focusing on the relational content and context of these NGOs (Rowley
1997), I analyzed the relational and structural properties (Streeter and Gillespie 1992) to
these organizations. The results lend good support for the predictions of the integrated
theory proposed in Chapter 5.

The results exhibited a higher tendency to engage in voice as a function of centrality. In
other words, the more central an NGO is in a donor network (i.e. connected through
strong ties), the more likely it will practice voice than exit, if resource dependence is low.
This line of reasoning is intuitively compelling. Several studies (Dowding et al. 2000;
Gehlbach 2006; Hirschman 1970; Nooteboom 1999) condition the practice of voice, as a
mode of reaction, on adequate communication structures, a certain degree of trust and
openness, and a strong bargaining power. The findings discussed in Chapter 4 highlighted
these requirements for an increased practice of voice among the four studied NGOs.

We know that centrality is a network concept, derived from the location of an
organization in a network and the ties it constructs to other actors. Not only do network

269
ties promise enhanced access to sources of funding, but also, as Oliver (1990) explains,
ties developed through inter-organizational relationships develop the bargaining position
of the organization relative to the environment (Oliver 1990). On one hand, the network
literature talks about trust as a product of dense networks where ties are strong and
everyone is connected. Organizations are embedded in networks of relations (Granovetter
1985). Relationships are built and developed over time through exchange and
interactions, to become confirmed. Ties evolve as strong and mature into a dense
network. Trust becomes more reinforced and reciprocal; in a dense network where
interaction occurs more frequently, exchanges become more extended (Carolan and
Natriello 2005; Granovetter 1983; Paarlberg and Varda 2009; Provan et al. 2005).
Common culture and practices start to formulate (Stiles 2002). Here, leaders of the
organization find themselves exposed and attracted to the culture. Decisions they take are
not necessarily in response to external pressure but rather are proactive steps to ensure
legitimacy and to sustain association with other actors. That is why there is an incentive
to make compromises (Carolan and Natriello 2005; Nelson 1989) and voice is an obvious
symptom of compromise. Therefore, a dense network of strong ties satisfies two
requisites to practice voice: adequate communication and solid trust.

On another hand, connections are considered as a symbolic non-material advantage used
to balance asymmetric relations with donors (Ebrahim 2005a). In their study of a United
Way organization and 46 of its member agencies, Provan, Beyer, and Kruytbosc (1980)
concluded, “other linkages between an organization and its environment may modify its
dependency on a resource supplier like United Way. These elements need not themselves
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be direct suppliers of scarce resources to the organization in order to affect its relations
with a resource supplier” (219). The authors differentiate between different types of
power that an organization faces and needs to deal with. Resource control, acquisition,
and reliance contribute to the so-called perceived and enacted power of an organization.
The former is related to the perception of other actors, while the latter is determined by
the ability of the organization to verbalize and practice its power. Provan and his
colleagues (1980) argued that organizations also have potential power, which should be
predicted through links with the communities in which they are operating. In assessing
the ability of the organization to interact with and resist the demands of its resource
supplier, it is necessary to calculate the potential power the organization possesses,
particularly those linkages in the environment on which the resource supplier also
depends. Therefore, since voice requires bargaining power, network ties garnish
organizations with potential power that can be used in negotiating with a donor.

Nevertheless, expectations of the potential power should be realistic. Not all
organizations that are connected in network possess such a power and those who do may
choose not to use it. Organizations need to consider the importance of the issue at stake,
the consequences on future interactions, the difficulty to mobilize tangible resources to
exert power, and the cost of exerting it (Provan et al. 1980). These factors can confirm
the distinction between cases when voice or loyalty is practiced among organizations of
potential power in a donor network.
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More significant is the diversity of external sources. RDT argues that an organization can
manipulate its environment pending the availability of other sources (Cho and Gillespie
2006; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). I departed from the assumption that NGOs with more
diverse external sources of funding are likely to use exit and voice. Diversification
increases the organizational power, which smoothens the sharpness of the asymmetry that
characterizes the NGO’s relationship with a single external donor (Oliver 1990). An
NGO with diverse external sources of funding is in a position to avoid donor demands.
For example, if an NGO is requested by one donor to meet new funding conditions, the
organization can resist the pressure by exiting the relationship and relying on other
available sources that are more lenient on funding requirements. An NGO can also
possibly play off the interests of other donors against this requirement in order to avoid
compliance.

Revenue diversification has been viewed positively to manage dependence (Oliver 1990;
Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). However, with the availability of multiple funding, the
operational costs and efforts of the NGO increase. There is a need to recruit and train
personnel to deal with more funding criteria, more confusion in meeting requirements,
more complexity in evaluation of performance and effectiveness. The NGO then becomes
so concerned with retaining the personnel that it becomes hard to resist donor interest
(Froelich 1999; Henderson 2002; Ishkanian 2006; Petras and Veltmeyer 2001; Tuckman
1998). Diversification is a double-edged sword, since it reduces concentrated
dependence—but only by creating more interdependencies that NGOs struggle with and
need to negotiate (Borman 2010; Ebrahim 2005a, 2005b; Oliver 1991; Saidel 2000). That
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is why the results reveal a moderate likelihood of preferring voice to exit with an increase
in diversified sources, reflecting a commitment to a relationship and interest to negotiate
its sustainability.

Therefore, we need to carefully scrutinize diversified external sources of funding.
Froelich (1998) distinguishes between private contributions, government funding, and
commercial activities, and shows how each has different implications on financial
dependency. Private funding is highly volatile compared to others and will generate
strong effects towards goal displacement. If diversification leads the organization to
secure funding from only international donors, then it will more probably be associated
with negative effects in the long run. International aid is a highly fluctuating market
(Bryant and Kappaz 2005; Malhotra 2000). If diversification allows the NGO to secure
easy funding, which requires limited managerial structure, monitoring, and reporting
(UNDP 2009), then we should continue to expect NGOs to practice exit.

Some of the results were surprising, albeit having weak or marginal significance. I
expected NGOs that rely on external sources of funding more than on internal revenues to
exhibit exit more than voice. I also expected an NGO that allows an external actor to
control the bulk of its external revenues to more likely practice adjustment than exit or
voice. Since NGOs deal with volatile needs and demands and face instability in the flow
of internal revenues (many NGOs’ services are free of charge and some NGOs are unable
not collect their membership fees), they rely more on external donors. The lesser the
reliance on external resources, the greater the ability to resist or buffer pressure. The
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greater the reliance on a specific donor, the lesser the ability to buffer pressure. However,
controlling for the combined effect of all factors, the results indicate that the criticality of
external resources has a minute effect on preferring exit to voice. The discretion over
resources has a reverse effect on preferring adjustment to exit.

The results echo some challenges. The first challenge is how to measure resource
dependence. Does one single factor, resource discretion for example, suffice to capture
the level of dependence? We find mixed results and notice that resource dependence is
not uniformly measured across different studies. For example, Guo and Acar (2005)
counted the number of external sources in their research on motivations behind
collaboration among nonprofits. Delfin and Tang (2008) measured dependence based on
nonprofits’ annual budget sourced from foundations as a whole, while Mosley (2011)
calculated the percentage of the annual budget coming from a specific entity (government
agency). In this dissertation, I tried to rely on the three factors together to have a better
understanding of what is happening in the NGOs’ external resource environment.

The other challenge is how we understand or define what a resource is. I think we need to
look more broadly into the concept of resources. We should take into consideration both
the economic material resources (funding) and the symbolic non-material resources
(information) that Ebrahim (2005) and Saidel (2000) accentuated in relations NGOs have
with donors and government. In the three theories this dissertation relies on, information
is central. In Hirschman’s (1970) individual self-interest theory, availability and access to
information are used as factors that influence the choice of mode between exit and voice
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(Dowding et al. 2000; Gehlbach 2006; Matland 1995; Nooteboom 1999). In Pfeffer and
Salancik’s (1978) resource dependence theory, information could be used to buffer
external demands. To illustrate, the broken feedback loop between aid providers
(taxpayers) and receivers (beneficiaries) allows the intermediary channels (implementing
organizations and grant-making agencies) to be selective in the disclosure, censorship,
and manipulation of some information. The purpose here is to magnify achievements and
exaggerate results and successes to ensure continuous flow of support and funding
(Ebrahim 2005b; Svensson 2008). The theory of weak ties (Granovetter 1973, 1983)
focuses on information as a resource that is either redundant and filtered as it is circulated
among all actors in a dense network, or noble and new to some actors that have weak ties
in an open network. Information is expected to be less germane to an organization in the
former situation and more productive in the latter.

Therefore, we might need to count information as a resource as we verify NGO responses
to shifts in donor funding. This should be done at two fronts: information as an external
resource the NGO receives and information as an internal input that the NGO possesses.
By doing so, we will be including all alternative resources that would then place further
restrictions on or provide additional opportunities for organizations. We should also
include all assets that increase the input an organization uses in the production of outputs.
The inclusion of information on the two sides of the equation has an effect on the level of
resource dependence. Although the availability of information might yield favorable
results for the NGOs, there are three interrelated issues to ponder. The first issue is how
to measure information as a resource (the information available to the organization or that
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provided by the organization). The second issue is how to assess the quality of the
information. Poor-quality information might have reverse effects; it asserts further
asymmetries in relations and increases resource dependence. The third issue is how
organizations process information internally. Availability of good-quality information is
not automatically translated into a ready-to-use resource. Therefore, the focus should also
shift into organizational capacity, which by itself could explain NGO response,
particularly the exercise of voice (Dowding et al. 2000; Hirschman 1970; Light el al
2003; Matland 1995; Nooteboom 1999).

One final point to bear in mind is that the interaction of resource dependence and tie
strength shapes NGO-donor relationships in two ways. First, as I have argued, the relative
importance of each of these factors to the organization, and especially their salience at the
time when an NGO needs to make a decision vis-à-vis shifts in donor funding, will
influence NGO response. For example, when an NGO is not highly dependent on
external sources, but connected through strong ties in a donor network, it is more likely to
practice voice. Second, the mode of response an NGO adopts may reinforce or alter the
configuration and salience of these factors, and consequently the NGO’s choice of
response might recur or be modified. For example, the practice of voice might strengthen
the NGO’s relationship with a specific donor and hence increase its reliance on funding
from that donor at the expense of other sources. Such a scenario leads to less diversified
sources of funding and pushes the NGO into the high resource dependence category.

The impact of resource provider on the performance and practices of nonprofits has been
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confirmed in extant research (Borman 2010; Ebaugh et al. 2005; Delfin and Tang 2008;
Hughes and Luksetich 2004; Powell and Minkoff 2006; Stine 1996; Stone and Brush
1996; Stone, Hager and Griffin 2001). However, several studies (Alexander 1996;
Edelman 1992; Grønbjerg 1993; Tschirhart 1996) nod to the fact that nonprofits are
proactive in managing their institutional and resource environments. These organizations
are equipped with social missions, viable information, and strong connections to
stakeholders (Ebrahim 2005b; Hansmann 1980; Saidel 2000).

ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS
The dissertation takes into consideration that there are several underlying reasons or
existing conditions that might shape organizational behaviors. I am not claiming here that
the integrated theory I proposed is the only explanation for how NGOs respond to shifts
in donor funding. However, the results discussed above show a satisfactory level of
confidence in predicting behavior based on the organizational characteristic of level of
resource dependence and a structural or relational context of strength of network ties. In
this final section, I consider alternative explanations. The Principal-Agent Theory
(Eisenhardt 1989; Moe 1984; Shapiro 2005) and the neo-institutional theory (DiMaggio
and Powell 1983; Meyer and Rowan 1977) could challenge the theoretical argument
presented in this dissertation. Other conceptual frameworks, including Oliver’s (1991)
will also be discussed.
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Principal-Agent Theory
Inter-organizational relations become complicated when the issues of heterogeneity of
participants, conflict of interests, and asymmetry or gap of information are raised. This is
particularly why Principal-Agent Theory (Eisenhardt 1989; Jensen and Meckling 1976;
Moe 1984; Shapiro 2005) is used to interpret alterations in and implications of the
relationship between donors and recipient organizations (Ashman 2001; Ebrahim 2003b;
Miller-Millesen 2003; Olson 2000; Van Puyvelde, Caers, Du Bois, and Jegers 2012).

The main premise of the Principal-Agent Theory is that an actor (principal) considers
entering in into a relationship with another actor (agent), expecting that the agent will
carry out its agendas and produce the desired outcomes (Eisenhardt 1989; Moe 1984). A
donor (principal) is driven by the interest to benefit from the expertise of local
organizations to meet both the societal needs and the strategic objectives that have been
identified for recipient communities. The donor then attempts to have the local NGOs
(agents) implement the donor agenda and perform the work.

The relationship is a contractual agreement that outlines expectations, incentives, and
forms of control. The goal is to minimize the agency costs incurred by the principal in
establishing, maintaining, and sustaining the relationship (Jensen and Meckling 1976;
Shapiro 2005). The decisive factor is that the principal does not know and cannot
ultimately trust what an agent is doing. An agent might engage in opportunistic behavior
(Barney and Hesterly 1996; Shapiro 2005) “If both parties to the relationships are utility
maximizers, there is a good reason to believe that the agent will not always act in the best
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interests of the principal” (Jensen and Meckling 1976: 5). Here, utility maximizing
should not be mistaken for or limited to profit-making or personal benefit. Utility
maximizing can encompass the broader interest or goals any of the two actors (principal
and agent) is trying to achieve.

In order to limit the agent’s opportunity to self-serve, the principal could use either a
behavior-based or outcome-based contract. The former is contingent on the performance
and actions of the agents that should satisfy the principal and the latter is based on
realized outcomes that should be compatible with the principal’s goals (Bergen, Dutta
and Walker 1992; Eisenhardt 1985, 1989). The choice of the contract depends on several
factors, including the nature and importance of the work, availability of information, and
length of relationship. In donor-NGO relationships, the two types of agreements are used.
The first type of grant agreement specifies activities an NGO needs to implement. The
organization is then evaluated according to its performance. The second type of grant
agreement lists the expected outcomes or deliverables. An NGO works towards these
results in order to meet donor threshold (Bogart 1995; Ebrahim 2003a).

Two propositions are derived from the Principal-Agent theory. The first proposition is:
When the contract between the principal and agent is outcome based, the agent is more
likely to behave in the interests of the principal. The second proposition is: when the
principal has information to verify agent behavior, the agent is more likely to behave in
the interest of the principal (Bergen et al. 1992; Eisenhardt 1985, 1989). These
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propositions could be germane in explaining NGO behavior upon incongruence between
its interest and donor agenda.

To elaborate, exit and voice, on one side, reflect situations when the NGO (agent) is a
utility maximizer and interested in pursuing self-serving activities that do not align with
the interests of the donor (principal). We can deduce that exit and voice are more
common when the donor-NGO relation is governed by behavior-based agreements. These
agreements focus on the general performance of the NGOs. They grant the NGO more
flexibility in work and reduce the agency cost on the donor. On the other side, loyalty and
adjustment occur when an NGO (agent) continues to satisfy the goal of the donor
(principal). We can deduce that loyalty and adjustment are more common when the
relationship is managed by outcome-based agreements. These agreements measure
performance through quantifiable deliverables. The donor is more concerned with the
agreed-on outcomes and much less with the general impact and the performance of the
NGO (Lindenberg and Bryant 2001; Markowitz and Tice 2002). In this case, the NGO
becomes outcome oriented: conducting economic activities and not mission-driven
programs. The attention is shifted to what the NGO can produce more of, focusing on
short-term activities that satisfy a donor, not necessarily on broader impact or vision.
Such a behavior unfolds into “inefficiencies, downgraded quality, misuse of resources,
and goal displacement” (Enjolras 2009: 774).

What might differentiate the two modes on each of the two sides is the degree of
information available to the donor. In the case of loyalty, the donor possesses enough
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information to control and restrict the behavior of the NGO. The organization does not
have any flexibility but to comply with shifts in donor funding. In the case of exit, the
donor does not have sufficient information to predict the decision of the NGO and deter it
from suspending the relationship. In practicing voice, the donor uses the available
information while communicating with the NGO to find common grounds and balanced
interests. Finally, an NGO that practices adjustment might benefit from the limited
information the donor has to fulfill its opportunistic self-interest by modifying its
activities, although these activities do satisfy donor objectives.

However, the Principal-Agent Theory contains some limitations. One limitation is the
congruence of interests. The case of adjustment is demonstrative. At the surface, the
NGO is behaving in the interest of the donor by altering its activities to fit the donor
objectives. However, as explained in Chapter 4, the NGO is practicing adjustment in
pursuit of self-benefit and not necessarily to satisfy the donor as a principal. This is an
illusion of congruence that might not be recognized. In addition, the complexity of the
situation that Ebrahim (2003b) draws attention to results from the impact of political
processes on the donor (as a principal). A donor might deemphasize certain objectives
and conditions associated with its funding to serve a political agenda. For example, some
donors in Lebanon pay less attention to certain agency cost in order to support the
platform of a political ally. Finally, we need not forget that NGOs are involved in
multiple principal-agent relations; “while business organizations are accountable
primarily to shareholders, nonprofits are expected to respond to the interests of their
donors, boards, clients, and contracting agencies” (Ebrahim 2003b: 198). These
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organizations simultaneously function as both principals and agents, which has direct
implications on their general behavior.

The Neo-Institutional Theory
The Neo-Institutional theory (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Meyer and Rowan 1977)
argues that rational actors within an organization aim to seek approval from their
surrounding environment. “The operation of social influence processes, such as imitation
or [conformity…], might mitigate or limit autonomous decision-making and
consequently determine the response to demands” (Tolbert and Zucker 1999: 173-4).
Therefore, organizations are vulnerable to social influences and will then respond to
uncertainty by conforming with and increasingly becoming similar to their institutional
environment (Astley and Van de Ven 1983; Oliver 1997).

Conformity is processed through isomorphism, which is either coercive due to stronger
external pressures and concern with legitimacy, mimetic resulting from replication of
innovations and best practices, or normative associated with professionalization
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Guler, Guillen, and MacPherson 2002). Isomorphism
favors institutional rules that are legitimated externally. These rules function as myths
that organizations incorporate into their structure and behavior aiming at enhancing
survival prospects, ensuring stability, gaining legitimacy, and securing resources. Further,
the more an organization’s structure is derived from institutionalized myths, the more it
maintains and displays confidence, satisfaction, and good faith, both internally and
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externally. Consequently, the organization’s subjection to internal or external inspections
and evaluations is relaxed (Meyer and Rowan 1977).

Based on this perspective, external demands on an NGO are moderated since the NGO is
no longer a market of interests and powers as Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) argued. NGO’s
behaviors are spurred by the interest to be socially fit or acceptable. Organizations would
comply with institutional pressures pending “why these pressures are being exerted, who
is exerting them, what these pressures are, how or by what means they are exerted, and
where they occur” (Oliver 1991: 159). NGOs might not respond to external demands in
the same way. Responses are contingent on how NGOs perceive and assess consequences
of noncompliance and benefits of compliance. However, we should expect dense interorganizational relations to intensify the isomorphism process. Behaviors become similar
as connected organizations search for social acceptance and legitimacy (Galaskiewicz
and Wasserman 1989; Rowely 1997).

We can rely on the institutional perspective to interpret NGO response to shifts in donor
funding. Mimetic isomorphism encourages adjustment, when an NGO observes positive
results encountered by another organization that went down a specific route. That was the
case with NGO4, for example. One representative mentioned that when the NGO noticed
that other organizations were successful in securing donor funding for projects that did
not align with their mission, the organization was encouraged to adopt the same approach
and applied for funding that required altering the nature of its work. To a great extent,
NGO4 created an internal myth that its legitimacy is preserved. First, other peer
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organizations are caught in the same practice. The organization was imitating their
behaviors (Galaskiewicz and Wasserman 1989). Second, the organization argued that it
was still serving its constituents, but through the provision of different types of service.

Coercive isomorphism, which adopts external influences, such as the control over
resources as a driving force of NGOs’ compliance with certain requirements and norms,
could explain the choice of loyalty. An NGO established by a donor relies on donor
funding and derives its legitimacy from that donor. Resource-dependence as a source of
coercive isomorphism drives an NGO to be primarily accountable to donors. The
congruence between NGO interests and donor objectives becomes the determinant of
organizational legitimacy. If the organization were to distance itself from the donor, it
would become vulnerable in the surrounding environment. The safe practice is to accept
the association with the donor as an institutional rule that could ensure survival and
secure resources.

Exit and voice could be interpreted as results of mimetic and normative isomorphism
processes. These are cases when NGOs scan their surrounding environment to learn what
worked and what did not for other organizations. For example, NGO1 representatives
repeatedly distinguished their organization from other local organizations in terms of the
way it applies for funding or executes projects. The NGO abides by strict values and
principles that deter it from replicating practices that it criticizes as transformative and
destructive. Exit and voice are also suitable choices when professionalism drives the
organization to be more faithful to its own mission and objective. For example, NGO2
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representatives underscored professionalism as a source of bargaining power vis-à-vis a
donor. Organizational values and professionalism become institutional rules that become
legitimated externally and then empower the organization not to be over-fixated with
accountability towards a specific donor.

Oliver’s Six Determinants and Typology
Oliver (1990) relies on both the resource dependence theory and the institutional theory
to explain organizational reactions to uncertainty in the surrounding environment. There
are six determinants of inter-organizational relationships. First, necessity refers to
mandated requirements dictating certain behavior that would not occur otherwise.
Second, asymmetry refers to the potential of the organization to exercise power or control
over another organization. Third, reciprocity “emphasizes cooperation, collaboration, and
coordination among organizations, rather than domination, power, and control” (Oliver
1990: 244). Fourth, efficiency is solely conditioned on the improvement of internal input/
output ratio. The fifth determinant is stability. What drives most of the organizations in
their actions is the uncertainty in their environment; “uncertainty prompts organizations
to establish and manage relationships in order to achieve stability, predictability, and
dependability in their relations with others” (246). Legitimacy is the final determinant.
Legitimacy is a desirable social good that dictates each entity seek beyond mere selfperception and strive towards “a generalized perception or assumption that actions […]
are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms,
values, beliefs, and definitions” (Mitchell, Agle, and Wood 1997: 867).
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The NGO-donor relationship is one form of inter-organizational relations. Consequently,
the analysis of NGO responses to shifts in donor funding priorities could be guided by
these determinants: necessity, asymmetry, reciprocity, efficiency, stability, and
legitimacy. Let us consider the response of exit. Exit represents a situation when an NGO
decides not to comply with donor demand and suspends its relationship with a donor due
to divergence of interests. In such a case, there are no legal requirements that necessitate
the NGO maintain the relationship beyond the specific timeframe of a grant agreement,
for example. Second, an NGO relies on its technical expertise and achievements as
sources of power vis-à-vis the donor. If the NGO cannot hold to these sources in the new
field of donor interest, the relationship becomes more asymmetric and the organization
prefers to exit.

Third, contrary to the previous case, some NGOs might realize their individual interests
through coordination of efforts and engagement with donors. If the disadvantages and
management costs of a relationship with a donor outweigh the expected benefits, then the
organization is more likely to extricate itself from the relationship (Oliver 1990). Fourth,
when an NGO is interested to produce more outputs or increase the number of targeted
beneficiaries, it relies on donor funding to expand the quantifiable impact of its projects.
NGO1, for example, focused less on how funding could increase the efficiency of
projects and more on how it could divert the broader impact of the work when the
decision was made to suspend relationship with the donor.
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Finally, legitimacy is not necessarily associated with resources. The mere fact that a
donor funds an NGO does not mean that the donor determines legitimacy. NGO1, for
example, defines legitimacy in terms of adherence to principles and values, while NGO2
associates legitimacy with effectiveness through commitment to achieve and deliver.
Therefore, as an NGO locates legitimacy, internally and away from the donor, the more
likely it is to practice exit. While resource scarcity and fluctuations in needs and demands
continue to undermine the stability in NGOs’ environment, Oliver’s (1990) other five
determinants could well-explain the variation in response to shifts in donor funding.

The Typology
Oliver (1991) has another substantial contribution that has guided extant nonprofit
research (see for example, Crittenden 2000; Dunn 2010; Elbers and Arts 2011; Never
2011; Provan, Isett, and Milward 2004; Ramanath 2009; Rauh 2010; Tschirhart 1996;
Wallace et al. 2006). The author converges resource dependence and institutional
perspectives to identify a typology of five strategies that organizations use to respond to
institutional processes. These responses range from passivity to active resistance:
acquiescence, compromise, avoidance, defiance, and manipulation.

Acquiescence is a response of accidence to institutional pressures when expectations of
potential gain and reinforced legitimacy are high. Acquiescence takes three forms: habit,
or the unconscious adherence to taken-for-granted rules that have been historically
accepted, practiced, and reproduced; imitation, which corresponds to the institutional
concept of mimetic isomorphism of replicating of successful practices; and compliance,
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which is a conscious and strategic choice to comply to external pressure due to perceived
benefits (Oliver 1991: 152-3).

The second strategy is compromise. This more active response allows the organization to
partially comply and engage with external stakeholders. The goal is to balance
conflicting external pressures, pacify pressure by appeasing some interest, or bargain the
external actor through a constructive process of negotiation and concession that benefits
the organization. Oliver’s (1991) third strategy is avoidance. Avoidance is more active
than compromise in the sense that an organization needs to find ways to circumvent
conforming to external pressure. One way is to conceal acceptance while, in reality, the
organization does not intend to comply. Another way is buffering where the organization
decouples activities from formal structure, or, in other words, hides some of its work
from external actors. The organization can also escape pressure by exiting institutional
processes all together. This is a more conscious and proactive choice (154-5).

Defiance reflects a more active strategy to fend off external pressure. Defiance can be
practiced through dismissing or neglecting regulations and demands that are coming from
external actors. An organization can also challenge these regulations and demands
through counter-argument. The response intensifies when the organization attacks what is
being imposed on it; the tactic is to undermine external demands through proving the
validity and dominance of the organization’s perspective. The last strategy Oliver (1991)
suggests is manipulation. This active response is carried out by an organization that
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purposefully would benefit from the opportunity to turn the tables and try to co-opt,
exercise power, and control and impose change in expectations and demands (157).

Without doubt, Oliver’s (1991) typology would lend a robust argument for the research
questions addressed in this dissertation: the ‘how’ and ‘why’ NGOs respond to shifts in
donor funding. As a matter of fact, the typology encompasses Hirschman’s (1970)
typology and its consequent modifications. Exit is embedded in the compromise strategy
when the organization escapes the institutional processes. Voice is a form of bargaining
and compromise. Defiance encompasses both Rusbult and Farrell’s (1982) neglect and
O’Leary’s (2006) guerrilla actor’s behavior: the former as dismissal and the second as
challenge or attack. Loyalty perfectly aligns with acquiescence through the form of habit.
Finally, the proposed addition of adjustment is also a strategy of acquiescence through a
deliberate and conscious decision of compliance. Here again, loyalty and adjustment are
similar yet distinct forms of behavior, although they both fall under the Acquiescence
strategy.

I fully recognize the theoretical and empirical value of Oliver’s (1991) typology. The
typology can be easily applicable to donor-NGO relations. It does capture variations in
NGO behavior into the different 5 strategies, although some forms of responses, such as
co-optation, might be hard to justify and verify in donor-NGO relations. However, this
dissertation has not relied on the typology as a theoretical or conceptual framework, to
avoid replicating Rauh’s (2010) research on the dynamic of change Southern NGOs go
through as a consequence of their relationship with donors. Nevertheless, I will benefit
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from Oliver’s (1991) typology in future research that expands on lessons this dissertation
affords.

To conclude this section, the same phenomenon could be observed using different
theoretical lenses. That is the case herein, where Principal-Agent Theory, Institutional
Theory, or a convergence of resource dependence and institutional perspective can
explain NGO response to shifts in door funding. Variation in the response could also be
explained by Stinchcombe’s (1965) liability of newness phenomenon, where younger
organizations are at risk of failure in the early years of operation, which might impact
their strategies and decisions, including the decision to respond to shifts in donor funding.
Other alternative explanations that should be considered in future research include the
type of organization (membership or service or issue-based organizations), internal good
governance, internal decision-making processes, and organizational specialization and
capacity. These ideas for future research should not be taken as signs of weakness of the
conclusions derived from the integrated theory proposed herein nor should they
undermine the contribution made. On the contrary, multiple perspectives could portray a
more comprehensive picture of an existing phenomenon.

CONCLUSION
In this chapter, I tested propositions using network and regression analysis. I compared
how four variables or predictors (of resource dependence and tie strength) influenced the
likelihood of choosing one of the three responses (exit, voice, and adjustment), taking exit
as a referent category. Changes in resource criticality have a significant effect in
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positively increasing the odds of practicing adjustment in contrast to exit. Another
significant effect is that of resource concentration. An increase in this predictor, which
reflects a diminishing pool of external donors, means that the NGO is more likely to
choose adjustment over exit as a response. The effect of closeness centrality was highly
significant when contrasting the probability ratio of choosing voice over exit when the
centrality score, which indicates the tie strength, increases.

Any shortcomings in predications could be a result of deficiencies in the sample size or
the measures used. As mentioned before, another challenge is the difficulty to interpret
results of the multinomial logistic regression since we are not predicting the likelihood of
adopting a specific response based on a set of variables but rather contrasting the
likelihood of choosing one response versus the other as each predictor changes. However,
this should not undermine the contribution of the integrated theory to the study of
organizational behavior. The NGO-donor relationship is complicated and the picture is
broader; it is useful to approach the subject from different perspectives in order to
construct a comprehensive conception. Even with its attempt to do so, this research had to
narrow down its focus and angle of analysis. This research should be taken as an initial
exploration of complex questions.
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CHAPTER EIGHT: RECAP OF ANALYSIS
AND AGENDA FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
INTRODUCTION
The NGO-donor relationship is complicated. This dissertation focuses on NGO reactions
to shifts in donor funding. In chapters three and four, I focused on the first research
question of how NGOs react to these shifts. I added the category of adjustment to
Hirschman’s (1970) typology of exit, voice, and loyalty to decipher the variation in
reactions. Findings from interviews and fieldwork suggest that the exit, voice, loyalty,
and adjustment typology has merit. In Chapters Five through Seven, I focused on the
second research question of why NGOs react in different ways. The degree of NGO
dependency on external resources and the strength of ties an organization has in a donor
network jointly influence outcomes. Quantitative analysis combined with observations
from the fieldwork provides considerable support for the integrated theory proposed in
Chapter Five.

This chapter serves multiple purposes. First, the conceptual framework this dissertation
relies on is recapitulated. Second, the chapter presents the main contributions of this
research. Then surprising findings and basic limitations are discussed as an agenda for
future research.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: RECAP
In this section, I present the conceptual framework based on the foregoing review of
literature pertaining to NGO-donor relations and the theoretical perspectives used to
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generate a new explanatory theory of NGO reactions to changes in their resource
environment. The framework is depicted in Figure 8.1. The conceptual framework drew
on three theories and an area of scholarship and practice. Starting at the left of Figure 8.1
and moving clockwise, the areas are: Hirschman’s (1970) individual self-interest theory,
the integration of resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) and the theory
of weak ties (Granovetter 1973, 1983), and scholarly work on NGO-donor relationships.
At the center of the framework is the convergence of those areas: a modified Hirschman’s
typology of four elements: exit, voice, loyalty, and adjustment. The modified typology
explains how NGOs respond to changes in donor funding based on environmental
constraints, i.e., organizational need of external resources and organizational ties
reflected in the embeddedness in a broader network of actors in the local environment.

Specifically, there is a variation in NGOs’ responses to shifts in donor funding, as the
interests of both parties divert, converge, or balance out. In one case, the NGO decides to
suspend the relationship for funding cycle. In a second case, an NGO communicates with
a donor to balance interests and maintain the relationship. In a third case, an NGO
unconsciously complies with the wishes of a donor. Finally, an NGO deliberately and
consciously alters its activities in an attempt to accommodate changes in donor funding.
This dissertation argues that NGO response depends on two forces: the NGO’s resource
dependence and the NGO’s ties in the densely knit network of a donor agency.
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Figure 8.1: Conceptual Framework

In his typology, Hirschman (1970) expresses the need to focus on repairable lapses.
Organizations decline as a result of random causes; the behaviors or responses of
stakeholders (members or customers) should guide the organization to rise and—as
important—to alter its decisions and performance (or those of the stakeholders) to avoid
further decline. This matter relates to the need to focus on repairable lapses. Thus, exit
and voice are seen as potential correctives that tell managers and firms to repair some
aspect of the organization lest the organization become inefficient or unproductive or the
relationship with stakeholders become unsatisfactory (Brower and Abolafia 1995).
Therefore, the deterioration is not perennial or irreversible but could be repaired.
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This is particularly crucial in the unbalanced and unstable NGO-donor relationship. A
donor should be concerned about any deterioration in its relationship with local NGOs
and should take immediate measures to improve the situation. As one NGO
representative commented,
Donors without NGOs are not donors. […] Donors need NGOs as much as
NGOs need the donors. NGOs need donors for the money. Donors need
NGOs to ensure that the budget gets allocated and funds dispersed; they
also need NGOs to implement activities to demonstrate their support to
developing countries. NGOs offer the donors a presence in Lebanon and
an opportunity to build a positive public image (Interview #28).
After all, donors favored NGOs as partners to reinstate the legitimacy of assistance in
developing countries (Edwards and Hulme 1996; Kharas 2007; Robinson 1995; Smith
and Lipsky 1993; Thomas 2008).

The fact that NGOs react differently to shifts in funding across time and donors is
interesting, though perhaps not surprising. This variation demonstrates that the process of
transformation is neither universal nor inevitable. The process could be reversible and
repairable. Responses to a changing or deteriorating relationship should serve as a guide
for the organization to rise, alter its decisions and performance, and avoid further decline.
This is particularly crucial in the unbalanced and unstable NGO-donor relationship. Shifts
in donor funding affect the relationship directly, and NGO autonomy and performance
indirectly. Both sides should learn from the variation of responses captured in the
typology of exit, voice, loyalty, and adjustment. An NGO reaction is an indicator of a
change in an existing relationship. Accordingly, the NGO may wish to signal, not only to
the immediate donor, but also to other donors and peer organizations, that necessary
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actions should be considered to avoid further deterioration of the relationship and
possibly to remedy a situation. In this case, the practice of exit may have results that are
more favorable. Such signals, over time, may lead to longer-term improvements in NGOdonor interactions and mitigate the perceived necessity, of either party, to completely
dissolve what had previously been a strong and useful relationship.

CONTRIBUTION OF THE RESEARCH
The literature on NGO-Donor relationships is quite abundant. The impact of donors on
NGOs, NGOs’ multiple—and sometimes conflicting—accountabilities, and the tripartite
relationship between donors, government, and NGOs are among the most extensively
discussed themes. Even forging or declining a relationship—whether a partnership or an
unequal interaction—between the two parties has attracted enough attention; however,
donors should be interested in understanding why this relationship undergoes certain
transformations as donors decide to modify strategic funding objectives.

Nevertheless, the NGO-donor relationship is complicated. To better understand the
dynamics of the relationship, this research focuses on the change in the quality or
associated benefit of donor funding to an NGO which compels a certain response or
reaction. Therefore, the main contribution here is the application of Hirschman’s (1970)
typology to organizations versus individuals, with the possibility of modifying or
expanding the typology to fit the variation in NGOs’ reactions to shifts in donors’
funding objectives into a typological framework.
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The second, yet major, contribution is to organizational theory. As mentioned earlier, this
dissertation verifies the arguments that resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik
1978) and the theory of weak ties (Granovetter 1973, 1983) separately provide to
understand organizational behavior. Then, the dissertation builds and tests theory to
provide a mechanism for describing the simultaneous effect of the NGO’s dependence on
external resources and its ties within a network, and for predicting its response to a shift
in donor funding.

The third contribution is the mapping of a network of environmental NGOs in Lebanon,
which is an unprecedented step. The mapped network would provide a descriptive
analysis of the NGO-donor relationship. It also constitutes valuable data for future
research in the same field.

The fourth contribution of this study is the fact that it sheds light on some of the
overarching questions that NGOs have not yet tried to tackle seriously. One of these
questions is existential: is the sector just one consequence of distribution of power in
states and societies, or is it self-existent (Van Rooy 1998)? Many postures about the
NGO sector are taken for granted and serve as foundations to build on without contesting.
The sector is suffers from a variety of problems. One of these problems is high
dependence on donors, who can also be manipulative. This research aims at portraying to
donors the consequences of their policy decisions through the variations in responses
from local NGOs; such a variation should be appreciated and factored into future policymaking. This study further contributes to scholarly debates on variation in and diversity
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of NGO governance and management towards a better idea of where NGOs should be
heading. Edwards and Sen (2002) confirm that a transformation needs to start from
within NGOs and spread into the systems and circles of power (donors) as a key to a
sustainable future.

AGENDA FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
In this section, I discuss some surprising findings that emerged from observations during
fieldwork and from analysis of the data. Then, I present the limitations of the study. Other
limitations were discussed in the two methodology chapters (Chapters Three and Six). I
consider that both the surprising findings and research limitations to be valuable
opportunities for potential research ideas and further explorations.

Unexpected and Surprising Findings
Fieldwork and data analysis revealed some unexpected findings. One surprising
observation that goes unnoticed but yet is noteworthy is the gender factor. Currently, the
percentage of female members serving on executive committees is less than 17% in
53.6% of the environmental NGOs covered in this study (UNDP 2009). There are fewer
organizations currently headed by women. A quick survey of the history of the
relationships with donors indicates that these organizations were more likely to practice
voice when a female executive director managed the organization. An expert in the NGO
sector argued that donors want to encourage women in decision-making positions as part
of their broad objectives of women empowerment. One way of empowerment is to listen
to those leaders and allow them to express their voice and concerns. A female executive
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director agreed; “several donors are pleased that women are leading organizations and
they are more willing to work with us” (Interview #2). Such an attitude opens doors of
opportunities and allows more flexibility that (some would argue) would diminish if the
organization was headed by a male leader. Such an observation is worth considering in
future research on the role of gender in organizational behavior, decision-making, and
inter-organizational relations.

The second intriguing finding is derived from interviews with some organizations that
practiced exit. In Chapter Five, I tried to interpret the variation in NGO behavior by
integrating resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) and the theory of
weak ties (Granovetter 1973, 1983). In addition, in Chapter Seven, I referred to other
theoretical alternatives. Nevertheless, the underlying factors behind NGOs’ behavior
(such as exit) could be quite straightforward and uncomplicated. Some NGOs no longer
secured funding because the relationship with a donor was exhausting. Exhaustion was
provided as a reason by small and large organizations, including some with low resource
dependency and well-developed managerial capabilities.

Donor funding could have a positive impact on the organizational capabilities towards
more professionalism and managerial expertise (Mawdsley et al. 2002; Wallace et al.
2006). However, NGOs could divert from their main focus to attend to time-consuming
and complicated systems and procedures (Carothers and Ottaway 2000; Henderson 2002;
Markowitz and Tice 2002; Jellinek 2003; Martens 2008). Donors’ administrative
requirements force an NGO to invest more time, efforts, and resources on management
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than on the program itself. These requirements can easily inflate project cost and
underestimate the benefits, according to an NGO representative. One donor requirement
that was cited by many interviewees is the multiple bids for procurement. Some NGO
professionals did not see the practicality of this requirement for small size procurements.
Others considered that the productivity and efficiency of an ongoing relationship with a
supplier is not calculated into this donor requirement. An NGO representative
commented, “on the contrary, our work with a local supplier was impaired because of this
requirement. On top, the donor does not pay overhead cost. So you end up with the donor
funding only 80% of the project. The whole relationship with that particular donor was
really draining us that we decided to get out” (Interview # 17). Exit is not necessarily a
calculated economic choice here but rather a mode of behavior driven by social and
psychological motivations.

The third and last interesting observation is that adjustment, which entails a degree of
transformation in organizational identity and work, could be embraced by donors. I talked
to experts in the NGO sector who argued for recognizing the organic development of
these organizations. Denying the opportunity of shifting and diversifying activities is
counterproductive to developing the overall organizational capacity. To those experts,
there is not a disconnection in the activities of the NGOs but rather a logical progression
in their work. The shift in donor funding would then be an opportunity for growth and
expansion. One expert elaborated, “this is a rational decision that we have to accept. It is
hard to argue against it because we are not sitting in the meetings of the organization and
we do not have access to a strategic plan to verify the decision” (Interview #3).
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The same viewpoint resonates with some donors. For a donor, it is more cost-effective to
fund an existing partner NGO that shifts activities into a new domain. The organization
already has the credibility, capacity, and constituency to do the work, and the donor has
already experienced the work of that organization. There is a mutual benefit in accepting
adjustment practiced by the NGO. However, three other justifications donor
representatives provided are of particular interest. First, a donor should not substitute for
the Lebanese government in supervising local NGOs. The regulation of the work and
missions of local organization should be the responsibility of a national government
through the enactment and enforcement of relevant legislations. The power dynamics in a
donor-NGO relationship grants the donor a monitoring role. However, it should not be
expected of a donor to practice a more active role beyond its own interest. Second, some
donors believe in free enterprise. In a free market, organizations decide on their actions
and are driven by an interest to expand. According to a donor representative, the donor
should not constrain the NGO’s activities. Rather, it is the market dynamics, in terms of
either the success or failure of the NGO or a sectoral-initiative towards self-regulation.

Third, donors are usually accused of meddling in the business of NGOs. A donor
representative played the devil’s advocate and explained, “hands off means that if an
NGO decides to shift its work to an entire new domain, then the donor should not
interfere to encourage or reverse the NGO’s decision. On the contrary, the donor should
accept the new change and deal with it” (Interview #25). The main point here is that the
NGO has the right to decide on its activities. In the handbook on democracy and
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empowerment, this right should be respected and not modified. These three justifications
are critical because they could overshadow responses of exit and voice, which more
explicitly reflect a certain degree of NGO’s dissatisfaction in donor action.

Limitations
This research focused on actual behavior of organizations in real settings and sufficiently
captures what is going on in reality through observing and analyzing NGO activities. To
address the challenge of the small sample size, future research could be based on
simulation exercises. Participants would be randomly assigned to different entities and
would be instructed to react to a certain scenario that involves changes in the external
resource environment of these entities.

The research focused on the result of reactions initiated by NGOs towards shifts in donor
funding. This means the possible original intentions of an NGO and consequent response
of a donor were downplayed. Hirschman’s typology (1970) addresses the final or visible
behavior as the outcome. However, Dowding and colleagues (2000) consider the
deliberative process that leads to the final outcome important to analyzing the mode of
response. The authors propose a decision analysis tree. Chapter Four discussed the
decision analysis tree. A decision is a result of a process initiated by the NGO and
requires a response from the donor. Based on the response, an NGO might have several
options that, in the end, lead to or shape the final visible action. The qualitative data
provided some supporting evidence. However, the evidence was derived from cases of
experience with funding from international organizations and not Donor A or B. Having
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said that, I acknowledge that this issue constitutes a limitation in the second phase of the
dissertation. There is a measurement problem in the possibility of overstating exit, being
assessed by the informants based on the visible outcome. While various measures were
taken to address this problem, future research should cautiously delve into the decision
tree analysis and account for additional variables, particularly donor behavior (rejection
of grant application) and processes (grant-making mechanisms). The fact that practices of
adjustment are more common vis-à-vis a donor that follows a fixed deadline (compared
to a rolling-basis application system) could be a valuable research idea to ponder.

The research focused on an NGO’s relation vis-à-vis a specific donor. The research
neither provided an explanation of the general behavior of a particular organization
towards all of its donors nor analyzed the correlation between responses to shifts in
funding of multiple donors, although resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik
1978) and the theory of weak ties (Granovetter 1973, 1983) provide some insights. In
other words, the decision of an NGO to select exit in its relationship with one donor was
not analyzed in reference to the choice of voice or adjustment with another. This could be
considered a limitation that should be thoroughly addressed in future research. The
interplay between responses to different donors might explain and be explained by the
elasticity of supply and demand that Hirschman (1970) considered a key factor in the
choice between exit and voice.

This research focused on NGOs in a developing country. The research was limited to a
specific population to carry out the network analysis exercise. Another delimitation
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imposed by the research was the industry or field of operation of these organizations, i.e.,
the environment. Organizational mission or field of work might have a direct implication
on organizational behavior (Brown and Moore 2001; Ebrahim 2003a). Therefore, we
might expect developmental NGOs whose primary focus is to sustain services-provision
to practice adjustment in order to secure the operational capacities more than
organizations working on governance issues. Even within the same sector, an NGO’s
mode of response might be contingent on the nature of its work. Advocacy organizations
working on education policy making and contesting face different imperatives than
NGOs providing educational services. Future investigation should assess the validity of
the present model across varied sectors and scope or nature of work.

This research focused on a specific period of time, especially in the second phase of the
dissertation; the focus was static. However, there might be a probability for one mode to
be reinforced at the verge of every funding cycle. This means that not only the responses
are mutually exclusive but also the organization itself becomes mutually exclusive. In
other words, a voice NGO keeps practicing voice or adjustment NGO keeps changing the
focus of its activities. Nevertheless, there may also be a temporal aspect in NGO response
to shifts in donor funding, as I highlighted in Chapter Five. It is not only that the response
I am focusing on here is the end result or behavior, which means that the organization
might have consumed other alternatives before taking (and exhibiting) the behavior that
we recognized (Dowding et al. 2000). It is also “possible that there are natural
progressions in response mode […] if dissatisfaction persists or conditions decline

304
further” (Rusbult et al. 1988: 616). This requires additional research through longitudinal
studies.

This research focused on organizations as the level of analysis. Organizational
characteristics in terms of resource dependence and network ties were used as predictors
of NGO responses. The research relaxed or set constant the effect of individual-level
characteristics on the choice of responses. The analysis in Chapter Four departed from the
assumption that an organization is an aggregate of individuals (Pffefer 1982) in order to
apply Hirschman’s typology. However, we should not forget that organizational behavior
could be understood by considering the behaviors, characteristics, and values of
individuals within the organization (Collins 1981; Padaki 2000, 2002; Pffefer 1982;
Schelling 1978). As in any research that involves humans, it is necessary to consider
personal dispositions that might influence organizational decisions. In the NGO sector,
especially in Lebanon, there is a revolving door between local NGOs and donor missions
or intermediary organizations; the donors become interested in recruiting qualified local
staff who are experienced in the NGO sector and can provide inside information and
insights (Stiles 2002).

Furthermore, the importance of personal connection is amplified when we include
network relations in the analysis. Along the networks that are formed among
organizations through inter-organizational relations, there are personal networks formed
among individuals from across different organizations. These personal networks might be
formal (membership in professional organizations for example), or informal (friendship
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and kinship). The formal and informal personal networks among individuals might
sometimes substitute for, strengthen, or weaken networks among organizations.
Inevitably, personal networks have a direct impact on decisions made regarding
relationships among organizations. Grønbjerg and colleagues (2000) underscore the
embeddedness of the funding process in the relations that philanthropic foundations have
with their grantees; the personal connections between staff at both sides might be
productive and welcomed but could also turn problematic and inexpedient. Therefore, it
is necessary to consider expanding future research to focus on and/or incorporate
personal networks into the analysis.

I do consider both the surprising findings and research limitations to be valuable
opportunities for potential research ideas and further explorations. Of specific importance
are the gender factor, strategic management, internal governance, degree of
specialization, and organizational capacity. In addition, from the raw data and the
findings of this dissertation, there are several pending research questions around NGO
management on my agenda for research post dissertation. These questions concern
conflicting accountability mechanisms, internal governance issues (such as selfregulation), inter-organizational relations (such as partnerships), NGO-government
relationships, and impact on public policies. Many of these issues afford cross-sector and
country comparative analysis. This dissertation has laid the ground for a rich theoretical
development.
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CONCLUSION
The lack of resources is not the core problem Lebanese NGOs face. Funding fluctuates;
NGOs with compelling ideas do not find a problem getting funding. The NGO-donor
relationship is healthier than elsewhere where an enormous dysfunction in the NGO
sector exists because of donor funding. The problem lies somewhere else. Besides the
fragmentation in the country which is reflected in civil society, there has not been a
prolonged period of stability in Lebanon for the civil society to appropriately mature and
adapt to a peaceful environment where NGOs can deal with issues that affect people’s
lives on a daily basis. These organizations are unusually responsive and work best during
crises and emergencies. An extended period of stability is needed for the society to place
its demands and for NGOs to be more focused and responsive.

I want to conclude by pointing out common questions NGO practitioners and scholars are
asking. Is there a structural problem in NGO-Donor relationship? Is the dependency trap
inevitable? Some practitioners believe that if NGOs do not respond favorably to donors
they will not be able to continue their operation, provide employment opportunities, and
serve the public. NGOs who want to be relevant, credible to get donor funding, and seek
such funding will respond favorably to donors.

My contribution to scholarly debates on NGO-donor relations could suggest different
answers. We need to dig deeper in order to understand how NGOs behave. Regardless
how dependent NGOs are, these organizations can still practice agency in their decisionmaking. The integration of RDT and the theory of weak ties indicates that there is not
necessarily a structural problem or that NGOs are stuck in a dependency trap. Financial
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resources are not the only key determinant of behavior, and, consequently, of survival. To
echo other scholars, “a key to organizational viability and integrity is to understand the
opportunities and tradeoffs, choose revenue strategies that are consistent with the
mission, and conscientiously respond to management challenges presented by each
strategy” (Froelich 1999: 261; Gronbjerg 1991). Drawing on Hirschman’s argument, the
decline in the relationship should be a good lesson to the actors involved. The practice of
exit and voice might be costly in the short term but might yield better results in favor of
the NGOs in the long term. NGOs should learn and practice that. Donors should keep an
eye open and notice that the recurrence of voice and exit are chances for revitalizing
development. Loyalty and adjustment might eventually be more inefficacious—not to the
NGOs but to the donor itself.

To conclude, a healthier donor-NGO relationship is much needed. This is the
responsibility of both actors—as well as of the silent or invisible actor, the government.
A national strategy that outlines local needs and priorities is a prerequisite and is the main
responsibility of the government. Donors should revisit their funding strategies and
mechanisms with an eye towards relaxing conditionality on funding and engaging local
partners in a more inclusive and effective manner. However, in my opinion, the heavy
lifting should be by the NGOs themselves. There is no time or benefit in blaming others.
NGOs should acquire a strong voice and practice that voice by saying ‘no’ to a donor.
This is not a common practice. NGOs should empower themselves through a solid vision,
internal good governance, a degree of financial autonomy, and within- and cross-sectoral
collaboration. Only then can an NGO could resist shifting tides in their surrounding
environment.
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APPENDIX A: E-V-L TYPOLOGY IN APPLICATION
The exit-voice-loyalty typology has been popular in several scholarly research studies
following its inception in 1970. Hirschman (1978; 1980; 1993) himself extends
consideration of the uses of economic modes of exit, voice and loyalty to dissect political
phenomena whether in terms of the state role in organizing public services (1980) or in
understanding the political developments in the German Democratic Republic (1993). In
his 1978 piece, “Exit, Voice, and the State”, Hirschman (1978) discusses how exit—and
in particular mobility of property or wealth—could be a threat to the existence of the
small modern state and could lead to the introduction of a new public good as a defense
mechanism by the state. The new public good which has low entry cost, is labeled as an
‘understood complexity’ which allows citizens to navigate expertly and knowingly
through their country’s constraints and frustrations (Hirschman 1978:107).
Exit and voice are dominant in the study of decentralization. The Tiebout model
considers only exit or voting by one’s feet as a means of expressing consumer discontent.
Another possibility for voters in a democracy is exerting voice in the decision-making
process, i.e. political participation (Oates 1972; Hirschman 1978; Feld 1997). Sharp
(1984, 1986) builds on the exit-voice choices to study the interplay of individual
expectation, level of education, and social status on political participation at the level of
local governments and then in urban settings as an expression of exit, voice, and loyalty.
Moynihan (2007) discusses participatory budgeting as a voice mechanism, because
people are invited to participate in the budget process of their local government under the
assumption that if local people are involved in deciding what they need, how much
should be spent, and how much should be charged for local services, they will more
likely be satisfied and willing to pay their local taxes. Andrews (2005) indicates a broad
accountability effect was evident in cases where voice mechanisms facilitated influential
expression of civic voice, and those expressing their voices were from a broad section of
society. Wilson and Taub (2006) use Hirschman’s typology in their book, ‘There Goes
The Neighborhood.’ The focus is on demographic changes by analyzing how different
neighborhoods with distinct characteristics respond to such changes. Studying four
working and lower middle-class class neighborhoods in Chicago, the author notices that
some neighborhoods go through several stages before they reach a ‘tipping point’ of
rapid ethnic change, which is reflected in a family’s decision to leave the neighborhood.
The key determinant here is the presence and strength of social organizations that work to
delay or thwart the process.
In his 1992 piece on accountability in public services, Paul (1992) is adamant that the
impact of public accountability on public service performance and governance could only
be possible if we move away from an exclusive reliance on control mechanisms and use
of exit and voice as incentives. Dowding and John (2008) study citizen satisfaction with
local public services. The authors present a modification of Hirschman’s typology (1970)
with three types of exit: moving location, moving from the public sector to a private
provider, and moving between public sector providers. Also, they model three types of
voice: private voice through complaining, voting, and collective action. To the contrary,
Ackerman (2004) argues that both exit practiced through marketization or privatization
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and voice expressed in such forms as co-production, social protest, or consultation are
insufficient. To a great extent, Hirschman’s (1970) typology is dismissed to allow for cogovernance in public service delivery, which involves inviting social actors to participate
in the core activities of the state.
The modified typology that includes neglect is extensively used in studies on employees’
behavior. For example, Zhou and George (2001) use a sample of 149 employees to show
that high level feedback from co-workers, co-worker help and support, or perceived
organizational support influence responses to job dissatisfaction and can be actually
channeled into a favorable outcome of employee creativity in a petroleum drilling
company. Vigoda-Gado and Meisler’s (2010) study of a sample of 380 Israeli local
government employees suggests that emotions in management and the management of
emotions play a significant role in the outcomes of public administration personnel
including job dissatisfaction and the consequential responses of exit, voice, or loyalty.
Davis-Blake, Broschak, and George (2003) study job dissatisfaction using a blended
workforce as a mediating factor. Using the General Social Survey and the National
Organizations Survey, the results show that employees’ loyalty decreased and their
interest both in leaving their organizations and in exercising voice through unionization
increased with the introduction of non-standard employees into the work force. The
effects were moderated by the job security of the standard employees, their salaries and
responsibilities and training, as well as by the length and type of non-standard workers
(temporary or contract).
Ferris, Harrell-Cook, and Dulebohn (1998) and Vigoda (2000) rely on Hirschman (1970)
to study reactions to organizational politics (OP) defined as “behavior strategically
designed to maximize self-interests and therefore contradicts the collective organizational
goals or the interests of other individuals” (Ferris, Russ, & Fandt 1989 in Vigoda 2000:
327). The first group of authors postulated the relationship between OP and job outcomes
such as job satisfaction. Vigoda (2000) examined the concept among 303 public sector
employees in Israel. Vigoda (2000) finds that OP has a negative relationship with job
attitudes (e.g., job satisfaction and organizational commitment), a positive relationship
with intention to leave the organization (exit), and a stronger positive relationship with
negligent behavior (neglect). It is suggested that public personnel will tend to react to
workplace politics with negligent behavior rather than by leaving. In a follow-up
comparative study between two samples of public personnel in Israel and Britain, Vigoda
(2001) finds that OP is rooted in the cultural environment surrounding an organization;
the analysis reveals that OP leads to higher intentions of exit and neglect and lower levels
of loyalty, job satisfaction, and met expectations in Britain than Israel.
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APPENDIX B: LEBANON BACKGROUND INFORMATION
Lebanon is relatively a small country in the Middle East with an area of 4,035.5172 sq.
miles and a population of 3,759,136 (CSA 2007). The geographical location at the
Mediterranean Sea and the diversity in the socio-cultural milieu favored Lebanon as a
bridge between the East and the West. Before the civil war (1975-1990), the country
witnessed an economic boom and was the spotlight of the world; Lebanon was labeled as
the Switzerland of the East to characterize its unique status.
Lebanon has a very rich history. The history could be traced back to the Phoenicians, as
evident in the various archeological excavations, and has been definitely shaped and
transformed by the Arab heritage and civilization. Lebanon was ruled under the Ottoman
Empire for more than 400 years but distinctively enjoyed an autonomous status, which
set the cornerstone for the country’s political and administrative structure. After WWI,
Lebanon was under the French mandate, which shaped the country’s political, economic,
and social norms.
Political Environment
Lebanon is a democratic republic. The people are the source of authority and sovereignty;
the constitution governs state affairs and ensures that the relations among citizens are
regulated and governed through constitutional institutions. The Republic is headed by a
president elected by the parliament that is, in turn, popularly elected by the citizens. A
prime minister is designated and forms a cabinet upon a vote of confidence by the
Parliament.
In principle, all Lebanese are equal before the law, enjoying equal civil and political
rights as well as public obligations and duties. Nevertheless, influenced by the French
mandate, the 1943 Independence established an unstable political system characterized
by consociational democracy (Lijphart 1969; Salamey 2008), where power in
government is divided among the country’s 18 officially recognized sectarian
communities. Political and administrative positions were equally and proportionally
distributed among Christians and Muslim religious communities.
Although all Lebanese are supposedly equal before the law, in reality there are serious
limitations on citizens’ rights. For example, citizens have a quota for parliamentary seats
or administrative positions according to the sect of which they are members. Appointees
to public offices are made based on religion regardless of qualifications, abilities, or
expertise.
The political picture would not be clear without recognizing the influence of Lebanon’s
neighbors. Israel invaded South Lebanon in 1978 and then Beirut in 1982. Israeli
occupation remained in Lebanon until 2000, which was marked by the withdrawal from
South Lebanon. Nevertheless, Israel launched a series of attacks against Lebanon and its
sovereignty; many of these attacks were destructive—in terms of human casualties and
infrastructure. The most recent was the summer war of 2006 between Israel and
Hizballah.

	
  

311

On the other hand, Syria has had a major influence on Lebanon. The Syrian army was
present in Lebanon for more than 25 years and Syria had the upper hand in controlling
and running the country’s political game. This was manifested in elections of presidents,
formation of cabinets, or appointments to public office, as well as cracking down on any
political or civic opposition. The Syrian army left Lebanon in 2005 after the assassination
of late Prime Minister Hariri and the uprising of the Cedar revolution, under the pressure
of UN resolution 1559.
According to the Global Peace Index (GPI), Lebanon’s rank has been ranging between
132 and 134 among all countries of the world since 2008. This reflects the unstable
political situation and the security unrest. After the 2006 war, the opposition organized a
sit-in and withdrew its representatives in the cabinet. The Lebanese government was
paralyzed and businesses in that particular vital area of Lebanon were impacted. The
Parliament was not convened, and a president was not elected for more than 6 months.
Assassinations continued to target prominent political figures and tension intensified
politically and religiously. In 2008, the country witnessed a mini-civil war between
different factions where Hizballah practiced its force and was able to tighten its fist on
the Lebanese political life. Civil society organizations stood helpless and could not act or
react to stop the deteriorating situation or to address its aftermaths.
On another hand, unfair electoral laws and controlled elections had discouraged political
participation. The opposition was isolated; citizens were discouraged to exercise their
rights of association or expression. Civil society organizations were not allowed to play a
role in monitoring elections until the last two elections, and only with mounting pressure
from the international community and its observers. Nevertheless, Lebanon recognized
the rights of association and expression. NGOs are formed relatively easily and function
without direct control or supervision by government. They can secure funding from
different local and international sources and conduct activities in a wide array of fields
and domains, which might not favor the government. Lebanon has one of the most active
media sectors in the region. There are tens of newspapers, hundreds of journals, dozens
of local TV stations and other broadcasting companies stationed in Beirut. However, the
dominance of religious doctrines and the fact that many of these media outlets are
controlled or sponsored by politicians forced Lebanon to score +0.43 on the Freedom
House index.
Added to this, widespread corruption in the public sector caused further citizens’
alienation. The public sector was perceived as Ali Baba’s cave where nepotism,
favoritism, and bribery were widespread without any control or reprimand, further
alienating citizens. The public sector is oversized, with many vacancies and a high
average age of older employees. Many ministries are unable to perform duties effectively
due to lack of human and technical resources or due to duplication of work and
authorities. The judicial system was undermined and its hands tied up in any efforts to
combat corruption. Efforts to fight corruption and introduce reform into the public sector
by local reformists and civil society organizations with support from the international
community are yet to be productive.
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To conclude, the following indicators reflect the political situation in Lebanon.
Government effectiveness was rated at -0.64 and the control of corruption at -0.83,
according to the World Bank’s 2008 Governance Indicators, on an international range of
-2.5 to + 2.5. Lebanon’s political stability was estimated to be -1.94 and the rule of law at
-0.73, according to the same source.
Social background
The population of Lebanon is less than 4 million with a population density of 404/km2.
Since 1932, there has not been any national census; the ethnic background of the
Lebanese is divided as 83% Arab, 4% Armenian and 13% other. 18 religious sects are
recognized. However, conflicting figures confuse the percentile distribution by religion
and sect. Cautiously reporting, Lebanon is composed of 56% Muslims and 39%
Christians, with a remaining 5% Druze.
There is no separation between state and religion. On the contrary, religious leaders are
key players in the political arena and even in the civil lives of people. Each religion has
its traditions and institutions recognized and supported by the government. Civil status
affairs are strictly organized according to and by each of the 18 religious communities;
seculars have failed to introduce a voluntary civil marriage into the Lebanon society due
to the furious opposition of religious leaders. In many cases, publications and productions
are withdrawn and suspended under the pressure of religious institutions. These
institutions also own material properties and have extended arms in the private and NGO
sectors.
Lebanon is ranked 88th out of the 177 countries on UNDP’s 2008 Education Index (EI),
which measures the country’s relative achievements in both adult literacy and combined
primary, secondary, and tertiary gross enrolment. According to the Central
Administration of Statistics, one third of the Lebanese population attended school in
2007; the illiteracy rate (10 years and above) was 9.3 %: 6% among males and 12.4%
among females. Lebanon has around 1,400 schools; some of these schools are private and
others are managed by NGOs. The educational system is governed by the Ministry of
Education, which controls curriculum and manages public schools. There are a
considerable number of private schools with certain discretion on curriculum. Currently,
forty-one nationally accredited universities enroll students, and several of these
universities are internationally recognized, including a prominent American university in
the region (American University of Beirut.)
Lebanon is also known for excellent health services with several leading medical centers
serving the region. However, the Central Administration of Statistics reports that only
44.9% of the Lebanese benefit from health insurance, mainly the National Social Security
Fund’s services (23%); the remaining 53% is left uninsured and benefit from health
services that are provided on an ad hoc basis by NGOs and other organizations, as well as
the Ministry of Public Health. In addition, in a country that witnessed a long civil war, it
is interesting to note that 2.3% of the population (around 90,000) haves some kind of
disability.
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Lebanon only witnessed a 0.11% population growth between 2004 and 2007. According
to the Central Administration of Statistics, 39.5% of the population lives in Mount
Lebanon, 9.6% in Beirut, around 20% in the North, 13% in Beqaa and 17.5% in the
South. The demographic comparison between 2004 and 2007 reveals minimal mobility
between regions despite war and political instability. 49.4% of the population is male and
50.6% is female; 45% are under the age of 24 and around 13% above 60. There is a main
drop in the number of males aged 24 and above which could be caused by immigration
and soliciting jobs abroad. This is reflected in the increasing number of single females
and the drop in marriage rate.
Unofficial sources set the unemployment rate at 9.2%. The Central Administration of
Statistics reports the employment to population rate at 39.5% (19% among women),
while the employment rate is 43.4% of the total male population and 21.1% of the total
female population. Lebanon ranks 83 on the Human Development Index. The UNDP fact
sheet on Lebanon states that “poverty estimates place extreme poverty at 8% of the
Lebanese population in 2005 where around 300,000 individuals in Lebanon are unable to
meet their basic food and non-food needs and around 28.5 % are below the upper poverty
line of US $ 4 per capita per day”. The CIVICUS 2006 Report states that 7% of the
taxpayers provide around 87% of the income tax base, and 1% of the Lebanese owns
about 30% of the deposits in Lebanese banks. Such information needs to be further
verified. Civil society organizations strive to provide assistance to the marginalized group
along with or in the absence of governmental programs.
Despite the dire economic conditions, political turmoil, and security instability that
Lebanese face, it is said that Lebanon’s main asset and reason for survival is its human
capital. The Lebanese are known to be talented and well educated. Lebanon has a vibrant
market economy and a cosmopolitan, diverse, socio-cultural environment. There is a high
level of entrepreneurial spirit, especially with half of the population under 25. Lebanese
are leaders in the fields of marketing, communication, design, medicine etc. In addition,
there is an evident growing culture of leisure and consumerism favoring hi-tech products
and fashion, and more openness towards western norms and lifestyle than any other
country in the Arab world. This is reflected in the nature of work some recently
established NGOs undertake.
Economic Situation
Due to its geographical location, Lebanon has served as a bridge between the East and the
West; this shaped the role of the country into a service-oriented economy with limited
natural resources. However, Lebanon remains a developing country1; its weak economy

1

Fiscal indicators reflect the situation. The 2008 total revenue was around 7.5 billion USD; the GDP
(purchasing power parity) is US$44.07 billion while GDP (official exchange rate) is US$28.2 billion. By
the end of 2008, the public debt constituted 163.5% of the GDP; the gross public debt stood at US$47.01
billion while the net public debt reached US$41.52 billion.

	
  

314

suffered from a civil war2 and several wars and confrontations with Israel3 and Syria
(CIVICUS 2006).
The country heavily relies on external sources of revenues rather than on nationallygenerated tax revenues. This is reflected in the foreign currency debt, which totaled US$
21.24533 billion in 2008. Around 9% of that debt is in the form of foreign loans and
more than 65% in market-issued treasury bonds. It is useful to refer to two precursors.
First, the government’s executive body responsible for finding funds for and supervising
the reconstruction and development efforts (CDR) is fully funded from external sources
and not from government internal revenues; in the 2009 budget, the CDR’s budget was
estimated to be only US$300,000. Second, a conference for the Friends of Lebanon
organized in 2007 promised US$7.5 billion in assistance for development projects and
budget support.
This signifies the volume of foreign funding being channeled to Lebanon. In periods of
crisis, foreign funding takes the forms of grants or soft loans. Following the 2006 summer
war, US$590.2 million was pledged for relief and reconstruction efforts in the form of
grants, and US$121 million in the forms of soft loans.
As mentioned earlier, the Lebanese economy is service-oriented with a strong
commercial tradition and heavy reliance on tourism. The country has a strong private
sector that leads the economy and a vibrant NGO sector that substituted for the
government in providing public services during the 15 years of civil war. Many Lebanese
families—and consequently the economy—rely on remittances coming from the
Lebanese Diaspora. Although there is not a reliable number, Lebanese immigrants and
descendants are spread all over the world; many retain strong ties and commitments to
the country. They continue to send remittances to their immediate families but also want
to participate in the development of their villages and areas of their mother land; the
development of schools, hospitals, and small businesses in some of the areas of Lebanon
in the past could be contributed to Lebanese migrants who built these institutions and
offered them to the government or NGOs to provide the staff to administer and run the
services or who decided to come back and live in the country.
However, Lebanon’s economy remains vulnerable. It is highly connected to the region’s
economies; Lebanon’s exports are mainly to the Gulf countries and the country relies on
transit services to the Arab Gulf. The country cannot accommodate the supply of local
labor that becomes a human capital export to the Gulf countries. Lebanon’s geographical
location at the sea and surrounded by Syria and Israel leaves the country with one exit
through land: via Syria. Throughout the history between the two countries, including
recent history, this reality was manipulated by the Syrian authorities during incidents of
tension by suspending traffic or delaying transit services. In addition, domestic and
regional politics, as well as civil unrest, further jeopardize the economy.
2

The war broke out on April 13, 1975 and ended in 1990 through reconciliation imposed by foreign
countries.
3
The latest was in summer 2006 between Israel and Hizballah.

	
  

315

APPENDIX C: IRB PROTOCOL

	
  

316

	
  

317

Interview Protocol
Khaldoun AbouAssi
PhD Student, Public Administration
Maxwell School of Syracuse University
abouassi@maxwell.syr.edu

Preliminary questions/Informed Consent (see Appendix B)
Read to interviewee: defining NGOs and Donor Agencies
A donor agency is an organization that provides funding for projects of a certain nature.
In general, there are three kinds of donor agencies: 1) national governments are the major
donor agencies; they usually channel funds through their foreign aid departments (CIDA
–Canada, DFID- United Kingdom, SIDA- Sweden, USAID- United States, and recently
Delegations of the European Commission); 2) Multilateral agencies such as World Bank
and UN agencies; and 3) international organizations and philanthropic foundations such
as OXFAM, the Ford Foundation, and the Gates Foundation. This research focuses on the
first type of donor agencies.
Traditionally, donor agencies have channeled funds through government agencies. Since
the early 1980s, a growing amount of development money is being channeled through
NGOs. NGOs have been the favored channel or alternative for four reasons: 1) they
facilitate access to funds at the grass-roots level; 2) efficiency- these organizations are
able to do the same job at a cheaper cost than the private sector and more efficiently than
the bureaucracy; 3) NGOs’ values suggest that they are natural vehicle towards inspired
change; 4) ‘discard costs’ as NGOs could be easily discarded when donors decide on alter
their obligations versus the complicated and binding formal relations with governmental
institutions (Edwards and Hulme 1996, p. 962-4; Smith and Lipsky 1993, p. 44).
A donor agency usually sets its strategic objectives based on the local needs and the
socio-economic and political conditions in a specific country. NGOs need financial
resources for survival and for service delivery; donor agencies place a certain demand in
the market; the NGOs act as suppliers of ‘in-kind services’. In order to get out of this
‘dependency trap’, NGOs push for change from a ‘supply-led’ to a ‘demand-led’
framework of relationship where they could become partners. As donor agencies change
their strategic objectives, they shift the bulk of their aids to fund programs and activities
that best serve these objectives without necessarily completely abandon previous
objectives. Local partner NGOs have to react to this change. Usually, the funding cycle is
three years.
Based on this, the purpose of this research is threefold: 1) to evaluate the effects of
change in the focus in donor agencies’ funding on NGOs’ mission and scope; 2) to
classify NGOs’ consequent categories into a conceptual framework; and 3) to understand
the underlying reasons or existing conditions that shape such decisions.
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Individual Background
First I would like to know about more about you and your role at ________.
1. Could you describe your current position and its tasks to me?
2. Could you tell me a bit more about your background and how you come to
occupy your current position?
3. Why did you choose this line of work?
4. What do you think you shape the organization through your individual work?
Mission and Scope of Work
Next I would like to know more about (the organization the interviewee is working for).
5. How is the mission statement of the organization defined?
• A mission statement can be general to allow the organization enough
flexibility in work or it can be specific in order to focus efforts.
• The mission statement can be defined and decided on by the board or the
general assembly?
• The mission statement can be closely or loosely tied/linked to the scope of
work and activities being carried out by the organization.
a. In your opinion, does this mission play a powerful role in shaping
______’s activities?
b. What about shaping your personal day-to-day activities?
6. To the best of your knowledge, has the mission of ______ changed since its
genesis?
• If yes, how and why?
a. Each organization has a different mechanism to revise the mission
statement; in some cases the process is easy and in others it is too
complicated that the members might be inclined to establish a sister
organization instead.
b. The process might also be frequent and tied to certain events and
outside requisites. Tracking the revision of the mission statement is
important for the research. Revealing the causes of such revision is
critical.
7. What are the major tasks or projects that ______is presently involved in?
8. How legitimate and credible does the organization perceive itself?
9. Does the organization have any mechanism of accountability towards its clients in
place?
10. Who is the organization’s main stakeholder? (Whom is the organization trying to
serve?)
11. What is the number of professional staff running the organization?
12. How strong are personal contacts in ensuring successful work of the
organizations?
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Financial Dependency
13. How does the organization define/see financial autonomy versus financial
dependency?
• Is the organization financially dependent, autonomous, or stable?
• The status can be described as a pendulum, unless the organization ensures a
certain degree of sustainability of financial resources; the strategy towards
such sustainability is of importance (seek more support, cut down on
expenditures, reduce number of beneficiaries)
14. What are the major sources of operational and/or program funding?
• How are decisions regarding resource allocation typically made?
• How are these sources identified, approached and selected?
• Who is the main donor among donor agencies?
15. Has funding typically been a challenge for your organization? If so, in what way?
16. How diversified are the financial resources of your organization?
• Do you think a diversified basis of funding is useful and why so?
• Are there other sources available but not tapped on?

Relationship with Donor Agencies
Next I would like to ask you some more specific questions regarding (the focus of my
research).
17. How do you describe your organization’s relationship with donor agencies?
• Organizations look at donor agencies as partners, allies, or sources of financial
or technical support.
• Another interesting element is how the organizations think donor agencies
look at and define them.
• The key issues here are how the relationship has developed; how long and
strong is it; has it changed?
18. What are the strengths and weaknesses in the relationship?
• How would an organization build on these strengths or work on these
weaknesses?
• What changes should be introduced to the relationship if any?
19. How is the flow of communication between you and donor agencies?
• NGOs are expected to submit proposals to secure funding; they are obliged to
prepare periodic reports on the progress of work and financial expenditures.
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Some NGOs are approached by donor agencies to consult with in a way or
another on strategic objectives and revision of funding focus.
20. How do you respond to the changes in the donor agencies’ funding?
• A response in a certain way might result in positive feedback that the
organization adapts the same response when in the same situation.
• What was the main argument behind each alternative? What were the
expected payoffs of the different alternatives?
• Who were the key actors shaping the decision?
• Were there any external forces or events at the time of the decision that you
think pushed the decision forward? If the situation was the opposite, do you
think the organization would have adopted a different decision?
• What could be the consequences if another course of action were adopted?
• How do you describe the relationship with the donor agency before and after
the change?
21. How do you describe the impact of donor agencies on the community in
Lebanon?
• Donor agencies might be perceived as exploiting local community to push
forward their local agendas; others are warmly welcomed. There might be
various reasons behind these different perceptions; what are these reasons?
22. How do you perceive the relationship between donor agencies and the NGO
sector?
• The framework of the relationship is best described as ‘supply-led’ or
‘demand-led’ (explain the concept if need be)
• NGOs are in a ‘dependency trap’? (Explain the concept if need be)
• NGOs work on changing the situation.
23. Do you think donor agencies help NGOs to better impact public policies in
Lebanon?
• NGOs become trained and empowered to approach authorities and work on
shaping public policies.
• Donor agencies ally with NGOs in advocating certain policies that meet their
own agenda.
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Informed consent

Pre-interview assurance that participation is voluntary
Respondents will be informed in the first introductory email that participation is
voluntary. Here is a script for this introductory email:
Dear Mr./Ms. -----,
I am emailing you because of your expertise and experience with ------------. I found
your contact information through ----------.
My name is Khaldoun AbouAssi. I am a PhD student in Public Administration at the
Maxwell School at Syracuse University, and my research is on the non-governmental
organization NGO sector in Lebanon, focusing on the relationship with donor
agencies. I would very much like to interview you in person as part of my research.
My schedule is flexible so, if this is ok, you could pick a date and time for us to meet
during the month of December 2008. I would expect the interview to take about one
hour (potentially shorter depending on your interest and time constraints).
PLEASE NOTE: Your participation in this study is voluntary. You may decline to
participate. If you decide to participate, you may decide to withdraw at any time, in
which case any information you provided will be discarded. You may also choose not
to answer certain questions.
If your response to this request is positive, the information you provide will be kept
strictly confidential. Your name, the name of your organization, and any identifying
information will not be associated with any of your responses. I would also appreciate
your approval to record the interview. This makes it much easier for me to conduct the
interview and minimizes the risk that I misrepresent your views. Again, strict
confidentiality applies to the recorded information.
Below I am pasting a short description of my project, but I would be happy to provide
you with more information. I am also attaching the interview questions and my CV, in
case you want to know more about me.
You may also contact my faculty advisor Jeremy Shiffman1 at
jrshiffm@maxwell.syr.edu or (001) 315-443- 4928. Or, if you have further questions
about confidentiality and research participant's rights, please feel free to contact the
Syracuse University Institutional Review Board (IRB) at (001) 315-4430-3013 or
orip@syr.edu.
Thank you very much for your time. I look forward to hearing back from you!

1

There was a change in faculty advisor in April 2010. Modifications were made to the Interview Protocol
and other related materials to reflect the change: Prof. Stuart Bretschneider, Associate Dean and President,
Department of Public Administration, Email: sibretsc@maxwell.syr.edu; Tel: (001) 315-443-4000
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Best regards,
Khaldoun
Khaldoun AbouAssi
PhD Student in Public Administration
Campbell Public Affairs Institute
The Maxwell School at Syracuse University
306E Eggers Hall Syracuse, NY 13244
)Mobile (Lebanon): (961

Email: abouassi@maxwell.syr.edu Cell (US): (001) 315-879-2319
389-2453

Arabic Translation

ﺣﻀﺮﺓة ﺍاﻟﺴﻴﯿﺪ/ﺓة:
ﺃأﻛﺘﺐ ﺇإﻟﻴﯿﻚ ﺑﺴﺒﺐ ﺧﺒﺮﺗﻚ ﻭوﻣﻌﺮﻓﺘﻚ ﺑﺠﻤﻌﻴﯿﺔ

 .ﻟﻘﺪ ﺇإّﺳﺘﺤﺼﻠﺖ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻋﻨﻮﺍاﻥن ﺍاﻹﺗﺼﺎﻝل ﺑﻚ ﻋﺒﺮ

.

ﺍاﺳﻤﻲ ]ﺧﻠﺪﻭوﻥن ﺃأﺑﻮﻋﺎﺻﻲ[ .ﺃأﻧﺎ ﻁطﺎﻟﺐ ﺩدﻛﺘﻮﺭرﺍاﺓة ﻓﻲ ﺍاﻹﺩدﺍاﺭرﺓة ﺍاﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻛﻠﻴﯿﺔ ] –[Maxwellﺟﺎﻣﻌﺔ ].[Syracuse
ﻳﯾﺘﺮﻛﺰ ﺑﺤﺜﻲ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻗﻄﺎﻉع ﺍاﻟﺠﻤﻌﻴﯿﺎﺕت ﺍاﻷﻫﮬﮪھﻠﻴﯿﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻟﺒﻨﺎﻥن ،٬ﻭوﺧﺎﺻﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍاﻟﻌﻼﻗﺔ ﺑﻴﯿﻨﻬﮭﺎ ﻭوﺑﻴﯿﻦ ﺍاﻟﺠﻬﮭﺎﺕت ﺍاﻟﻤﺎﻧﺤﺔ.
ﺃأﻭوﺩد ﺇإﺟﺮﺍاء ﻣﻘﺎﺑﻠﺔ ﺷﺨﺼﻴﯿﺔ ﻣﻌﻚ ﻛﺠﺰء ﻣﻦ ﺍاﻟﺒﺤﺚ ﺍاﻟﺬﻱي ﺃأﺟﺮﻳﯾﻪﮫ .ﺟﺪﻭوﻝل ﻣﻮﺍاﻋﻴﯿﺪﻱي ﻣﺮﻥن ،٬ﻓﻔﻲ ﺣﺎﻝل ﺍاﻟﻤﻮﺍاﻓﻘﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ
ﺍاﻟﻤﺸﺎﺭرﻛﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻫﮬﮪھﺬﺍا ﺍاﻟﺒﺤﺚ ،٬ﺍاﻟﺮﺟﺎء ﺗﺤﺪﻳﯾﺪ ﺍاﻟﺘﺎﺭرﻳﯾﺦ ﻭوﺍاﻟﻮﻗﺖ ﺍاﻟﻤﻨﺎﺳﺒﻴﯿﻦ ﻟﻨﻠﺘﻘﻲ ﺧﻼﻝل ﻟﺸﻬﮭﺮ ﻛﺎﻧﻮﻥن ﺍاﻷﻭوّﻝل  .2008ﺃأﺗﻮﻗّﻊ ﺃأﻥن
ﺗﺴﺘﻤﺮ ﺍاﻟﻤﻘﺎﺑﻠﺔ ﺣﻮﺍاﻟﻲ ﺳﺎﻋﺔ ﻭوﺍاﺣﺪﺓة )ﻭوﻣﻦ ﺍاﻟﻤﻤﻜﻦ ﺃأﻗﻞ ﻣﻦ ﺫذﻟﻚ ﻭوﻓﻘﺎ ً ﻟﺪﺭرﺟﺔ ﺇإﻫﮬﮪھﺘﻤﺎﻣﻚ ﻭوﻭوﻗﺘﻚ(.
ﺍاﻟﺮﺟﺎء ﺍاﻟﻤﻼﺣﻈﺔ :ﺇإﻥن ﻣﺸﺎﺭرﻛﺘﻚ ﻓﻲ ﻫﮬﮪھﺬﺍا ﺍاﻟﺪﺭرﺍاﺳﺔ ﻣﺤﺾ ﺇإﺧﺘﻴﯿﺎﺭرﻳﯾﺔ .ﻟﻚ ﻛﻞ ﺍاﻟﺤﻖ ﺑﺮﻓﺾ ﺍاﻟﻤﺸﺎﺭرﻛﺔ .ﻓﻲ ﺣﺎﻝل ﻗﺮّﺭرﺕت ﺃأﻥن
ﻱي ﻣﻌﻠﻮﻣﺔ ﺗﻜﻮﻥن ﺯزﻭوّﺩدﺗﻨﻲ ﺑﻬﮭﺎ .ﻛﻤﺎ ﻟﻚ ﻛﻞ ﺍاﻟﺤﻖ
ﺗﺸﺎﺭرﻙك ،٬ﻳﯾﻤﻜﻨﻚ ﺍاﻹﻧﺴﺤﺎﺏب ﻓﻲ ﺃأﻱي ﻭوﻗﺖ ،٬ﻭوﻓﻲ ﻫﮬﮪھﺬﻩه ﺍاﻟﺤﺎﻟﺔ ﻳﯾﺘﻢ ﺗﺠﺎﻫﮬﮪھﻞ ﺃأ ّ
ﺑﻌﺪﻡم ﺍاﻹﺟﺎﺑﺔ ﻋﻦ ﺃأﻱي ﺳﺆﺍاﻝل.
ﻓﻲ ﺣﺎﻝل ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﺇإﺟﺎﺑﺘﻚ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻫﮬﮪھﺬﺍا ﺍاﻟﻄﻠﺐ ﺇإﻳﯾﺠﺎﺑﻴﯿّﺔ ،٬ﺳﻴﯿﺘﻢ ﺣﻔﻆ ﺍاﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎﺕت ﺍاﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﺰﻭوّﺩدﻧﻲ ﺑﻬﮭﺎ ﺑﺴ ّﺮﻳﯾّﺔ ﻛﺎﻣﻠﺔ .ﻟﻦ ﻳﯾﺘﻢ ﺍاﻟﺮﺑﻂ ﺑﻴﯿﻦ
ﻱي ﺷﻲء ﻳﯾﺒﻴﯿﻦ ﻫﮬﮪھﻮﻳﯾﺘﻚ ﻭوﺑﻴﯿﻦ ﺍاﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎﺕت ﺍاﻟﻮﺍاﺭرﺩدﺓة .ﻛﻤﺎ ﺃأﻗﺪﺭر ﻣﻮﺍاﻓﻘﺘﻚ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺃأﻥن ﻳﯾﺘﻢ
ﺇإﺳﻤﻚ ﺍاﻟﺸﺨﺼﻲ ،٬ﺇإﻭو ﺇإﺳﻢ ﻣﺆﺳﺴﺘﻚ ،٬ﺃأﻭو ﺃأ ّ
ﺗﺴﺠّﻴﯿﻞ ﻫﮬﮪھﺬﻩه ﺍاﻟﻤﻘﺎﺑﻠﺔ ﻣﻤﺎ ﻳﯾﺴﻬﮭﻞ ﺍاﻷﻣﻮﺭر ﻭوﻳﯾﻘﻠّﻞ ﻣﻦ ﻋﺪﻡم ﺍاﻟﺪﻗﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺗﻔﺴﻴﯿﺮ ﺁآﺭرﺍاﺋﻚ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺎ ﺑﻌﺪ .ﺃأﻋﻮﺩد ﻭوﺃأﺅؤﻛﺪ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺗﻄﺒﻴﯿّﻖ ﺍاﻟﺴﺮﻳﯾﺔ
ﺍاﻟﻜﺎﻣﻠﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍاﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎﺕت ﺍاﻟﺘﻲ ﻳﯾﺘﻢ ﺗﺴﺠﻴﯿﻠﻬﮭﺎ.
ﻓﻲ ﻣﺎ ﻳﯾﻠﻲ ﻭوﺻﻒ ﻣﺨﺘﺼﺮ ﻋﻦ ﻣﻮﺿﻮﻉع ﺍاﻟﺒﺤﺚ ﺍاﻟﺬﻱي ﺃأﺟﺮﻳﯾﻪﮫ؛ ﻛﻤﺎ ﻳﯾﺴﻌﺪﻧﻲ ﺃأﻥن ﺃأﺯزﻭوّﺩدﻙك ﺑﺎﻟﻤﺰﻳﯾﺪ ﻣﻦ ﺍاﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎﺕت .ﻛﻤﺎ
ﺳﺘﺠﺪ ﺃأﺳﺌﻠﺔ ﺍاﻟﻤﻘﺎﺑﻠﺔ ﻭوﻧﺒﺬﺓة ﺷﺨﺼﻴﯿﺔ ﻋﻨﻲ ﺇإﻥن ﻛﻨﺖ ﺗﻮﺩد ﻣﻌﺮﻓﺔ ﺍاﻟﻤﺰﻳﯾﺪ.
ﻣﻦ ﺍاﻟﻤﻤﻜﻦ ﺍاﻹﺗّﺼﺎﻝل ﺑﺎﻟﻤﺸﺮﻑف ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍاﻟﺒﺤﺚ ﺩد Jeremy Shiffman2 .ﻋﺒﺮ ﺍاﻟﺒﺮﻳﯾﺪ ﺍاﻹﻟﻜﺘﺮﻭوﻧﻲ
 jrshiffm@maxwell.syr.eduﺃأﻭو ﺍاﻟﻬﮭﺎﺗﻒ  .(001) 315-443- 4928ﻓﻲ ﻣﺎ ﻳﯾﺘﻌﻠﻖ ﺑﺄﺳﺌﻠﺘﻚ ﺣﻮﻝل ﺍاﻟﺴﺮﻳﯾﺔ ﻭوﺣﻘﻮﻕق
ﺍاﻟﻤﺸﺘﺮﻛﻴﯿﻦ ﻓﻲ ﺍاﻷﺑﺤﺎﺙث ،٬ﺍاﻟﺮﺟﺎء ﺍاﻹﺗﺼﺎﻝل ﺏب ) Institutional Review Board (IRBﺍاﻟﺘﺎﺑﻊ ﻟﺠﺎﻣﻌﺔ Syracuse
ﻋﺒﺮ ﺍاﻟﻬﮭﺎﺗﻒ (001)315-4430-3013ﺃأﻭو ﺍاﻟﺒﺮﻳﯾﺪ ﺍاﻹﻟﻜﺘﺮﻭوﻧﻲ orip@syr.edu
ﻣﻊ ﺟﺰﻳﯾﻞ ﺍاﻟﺸﻜﺮ،٬
ﺧﻠﺪﻭوﻥن ﺃأﺑﻮﻋﺎﺻﻲ

2

There was a change in faculty advisor in April 2010. Modifications were made to the Interview Protocol
and other related materials to reflect the change: Prof. Stuart Bretschneider, Associate Dean and President,
Department of Public Administration, Email: sibretsc@maxwell.syr.edu; Tel: (001) 315-443-4000
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Oral consent before interview begins
This consent conversation will be recorded; however, if the interviewee declines to be
recorded, the recording will be shut off immediately. Here is a script:
As we discussed before, this interview is voluntary. You may refuse to answer a
question or withdraw from the study at any point. Also, the information you
provide will be kept confidential and will not be linked to your name, the name of
your organization, or any other identifying information.
Do you consent to this interview?
Is it ok to tape record this interview?
Do you have any questions for me before we start?
Arabic Translation

 ﻟﻚ ﻛﺎﻣﻞ ﺍاﻟﺤﺮﻳﯾﺔ ﺑﺮﻓﺾ ﺍاﻹﺟﺎﺑﺔ ﻋﻦ ﺃأﻱي ﺳﺆﺍاﻝل ﺃأﻭو. ﻫﮬﮪھﺬﻩه ﺍاﻟﻤﻘﺎﺑﻠﺔ ﺇإﺭرﺍاﺩدﻳﯾّﺔ،٬ًﻛﻤﺎ ﺳﺒﻖ ﻭوﺗﻢ ﻣﻨﺎﻗﺸﺘﻪﮫ ﺳﺎﺑﻘﺎ
ّ ﺍاﻹﻋﺘﺬﺍاﺭر ﻋﻦ ﺍاﻟﻤﺘﺎﺑﻌﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺃأ
.ﻱي ﻟﺤﻈﺔ
ّ  ﺃأﻭو ﺃأ،٬ ﺇإﻭو ﺇإﺳﻢ ﻣﺆﺳﺴﺘﻚ،٬ﺇإﻥن ﺍاﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎﺕت ﺍاﻟﺘﻲ ﺳﺘﺰﻭوّﺩدﻧﻲ ﺑﻬﮭﺎ ﺗﺒﻘﻰ ﺳ ّﺮﻳﯾّﺔ ﻭوﻟﻦ ﺗﻘﺘﺮﻥن ﺑﺈﺳﻤﻚ ﺍاﻟﺸﺨﺼﻲ
ﻱي
.ﺷﻲء ﻳﯾﺒﻴﯿﻦ ﻫﮬﮪھﻮﻳﯾﺘﻚ
ﻫﮬﮪھﻞ ﺗﻮﺍاﻓﻖ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺇإﺟﺮﺍاء ﻫﮬﮪھﺬﺍا ﺍاﻟﻤﻘﺎﺑﻠﺔ؟
ﻫﮬﮪھﻞ ﻣﻦ ﺍاﻟﻤﻤﻜﻦ ﺗﺴﺠﻴﯿﻞ ﻫﮬﮪھﺬﺍا ﺍاﻟﻤﻘﺎﺑﻠﺔ؟
ﻫﮬﮪھﻞ ﻟﺪﻳﯾﻚ ﺃأﻱي ﺃأﺳﺌﻠﺔ ﻗﺒﻞ ﺍاﻟﺒﺪء ﺑﺎﻟﻤﻘﺎﺑﻠﺔ؟

Informed consent for participants in meetings and events that are observed
Direct observation will be restricted to meetings and events that are open to the public or
to which Mr. AbouAssi is personally invited by the organizers; in any case, Mr.
AbouAssi will get permission from the chair to attend and observe. Still, this script will
be delivered orally before the start of the meeting:
Hello, my name is Khaldoun AbouAssi. I am a researcher from the Maxwell
School of Syracuse University. My research is on the non-governmental
organization NGO sector in Lebanon, focusing on the relationship with donor
agencies. I am here because I am specifically interested in listening to your
perspectives on the issue. I will simply observe and take notes.
Any information I obtain will be kept strictly confidential. This means that your
name, the name of your organization, and any identifying information will not be
associated with what you say here. If there is anything you say that you would
like to exclude from publication (even under strict confidentiality), please let me
know and the information will be discarded.
Feel free to ask me any questions about research participants’ rights or about my
research in particular. If you think of something later, here is a card with my
contact information. On the back is contact information for my faculty advisor
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and for the Syracuse University Institutional Review Board (IRB), to which you
can address questions about research participant’s rights. [HAND OUT CARD].

Arabic Translation

.[Syracuse] [– ﺟﺎﻣﻌﺔMaxwell]  ﺃأﻧﺎ ﻁطﺎﻟﺐ ﺩدﻛﺘﻮﺭرﺍاﺓة ﻓﻲ ﻛﻠﻴﯿﺔ.[ ﺍاﺳﻤﻲ ]ﺧﻠﺪﻭوﻥن ﺃأﺑﻮﻋﺎﺻﻲ,ﻣﺮﺣﺒﺎ
 ﺃأﻧﺎ ﻫﮬﮪھﻨﺎ. ﻭوﺧﺎﺻﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍاﻟﻌﻼﻗﺔ ﺑﻴﯿﻨﻬﮭﺎ ﻭوﺑﻴﯿﻦ ﺍاﻟﺠﻬﮭﺎﺕت ﺍاﻟﻤﺎﻧﺤﺔ،٬ﻳﯾﺘﺮﻛﺰ ﺑﺤﺜﻲ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻗﻄﺎﻉع ﺍاﻟﺠﻤﻌﻴﯿﺎﺕت ﺍاﻷﻫﮬﮪھﻠﻴﯿﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻟﺒﻨﺎﻥن
. ﺳﺄﻗﻮﻡم ﺑﺎﻹﺳﺘﻤﺎﻉع ﺇإﻟﻰ ﻣﻨﺎﻗﺸﺘﻜﻢ ﻭوﺃأﺧﺬ ﺍاﻟﻤﻼﺣﻈﺎﺕت.ﺍاﻟﻴﯿﻮﻡم ﻷﻧﻨﻲ ﺃأﺭرﻏﺐ ﻓﻲ ﻣﻌﺮﻓﺔ ﺭرﺅؤﻳﯾﺘﻜﻢ ﺣﻮﻝل ﺍاﻟﻤﻮﺿﻮﻉع
 ﺇإﻭو ﺇإﺳﻢ،٬ ﻫﮬﮪھﺬﺍا ﻳﯾﻌﻨﻲ ﺃأﻧﻬﮭﺎ ﻟﻦ ﺗﻘﺘﺮﻥن ﺑﺈﺳﻤﻚ ﺍاﻟﺸﺨﺼﻲ.ﻱي ﻣﻌﻠﻮﻣﺔ ﺗﺮﺩد ﻫﮬﮪھﻨﺎ ﺑﺴ ّﺮﻳﯾّﺔ ﺗﺎﻣﺔ
ّ ﺳﻴﯿﺘﻢ ﺍاﻟﺤﺎﻓﻆ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺃأ
ﻱي ﺷﻲء ﻳﯾﺮﺩد ﻓﻲ ﺍاﻟﺤﺪﻳﯾﺚ ﻻ ﺗﻮﺩد ﻧﺸﺮﻩه )ﺑﺎﻟﺮﻏﻢ ﻣﻦ ﺍاﻟﺴﺮﻳﯾﺔ
ّ  ﻓﻲ ﺣﺎﻝل ﻫﮬﮪھﻨﺎﻙك ﺃأ.ﻱي ﺷﻲء ﻳﯾﺒﻴﯿﻦ ﻫﮬﮪھﻮﻳﯾﺘﻚ
ّ  ﺃأﻭو ﺃأ،٬ﻣﺆﺳﺴﺘﻚ
. ﺍاﻟﺮﺟﺎء ﺇإﻋﻼﻣﻲ ﺑﺬﻟﻚ ﻟﻜﻲ ﺃأﺗﺠﺎﻫﮬﮪھﻞ ﺍاﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺔ،٬(ﺍاﻟﻤﻄﻠﻘﺔ
 ﻓﻲ ﺣﺎﻝل ﻭوﺭرﺩد.ﺍاﻟﺮﺟﺎء ﻋﺪﻡم ﺍاﻟﺘﺮﺩدﺩد ﻓﻲ ﺍاﻟﺴﺆﺍاﻝل ﻋﻦ ﺣﻘﻮﻕق ﺍاﻟﻤﺸﺘﺮﻛﻴﯿﻦ ﻓﻲ ﺍاﻷﺑﺤﺎﺙث ﺃأﻭو ﺣﻮﻝل ﻫﮬﮪھﺬﺍا ﺍاﻟﺒﺤﺚ ﺑﺎﻟﺘﺤﺪﻳﯾﺪ
 ﻛﻤﺎ ﻳﯾﻤﻜﻦ ﺍاﻟﺘﻮﺍاﺻﻞ ﻣﻊ ﺍاﻟﻤﺸﺮﻑف ﻋﻠﻰ،٬ ﺇإﻟﻴﯿﻚ ﻫﮬﮪھﺬﻩه ﺍاﻟﺒﻄﺎﻗﺔ ﺣﻮﻝل ﻛﻴﯿﻔﻴﯿﺔ ﺍاﻹﺗﺼﺎﻝل ﺑﻲ،٬ﺃأﻱي ﺷﻲء ﻓﻲ ﺑﺎﻟﻚ ﻓﻴﯿﻤﺎ ﺑﻌﺪ
 ﻓﻲ ﻣﺎ ﻳﯾﺘﻌﻠﻖ ﺑﺄﺳﺌﻠﺘﻚ ﺣﻮﻝلSyracuse  ﺍاﻟﺘﺎﺑﻊ ﻟﺠﺎﻣﻌﺔInstitutional Review Board (IRB) ﺍاﻟﺒﺤﺚ ﻭو
.ﺣﻘﻮﻕق ﺍاﻟﻤﺸﺘﺮﻛﻴﯿﻦ ﻓﻲ ﺍاﻷﺑﺤﺎﺙث
Pre-survey assurance that participation is voluntary
Survey takers will be informed in the introductory email that participation in the survey is
voluntary. Here is a script for this introductory email:
Dear Mr./Ms. -----,
You have been randomly selected to participate in this survey due to your expertise and
experience in the field of civil society in Lebanon.
My name is Khaldoun AbouAssi. I am a PhD student in Public Administration at the
Maxwell School at Syracuse University, and my research is on the non-governmental
organization NGO sector in Lebanon, focusing on their relationship with donor agencies.
Your participation in this survey will contribute to a better understanding of the relationship
between NGOs and donor agencies and how that might impact development management in
general- in terms of its quality and potentials.
You will be asked to complete a short survey about the kind and nature of the relationship
between your organization and the donor agencies. Other questions are related to the lessons
learned and the challenges perceived during the course of this relationship as well as from the
management of developmental programs (whether based on your own experience or your
knowledge and assessment).
PLEASE NOTE: Your participation in this survey is voluntary. You may decline to
participate. If you decide to participate, you may decide to withdraw at any time, in which
case any information you provided will not be saved and consequently discarded.
Responses to the survey will be strictly confidential. Your name, the name of your

organization, and any identifying information are not required to complete the survey.
Finally, all findings will be reported in aggregate across all participants.
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The survey will take 15 minutes or less to complete. If you would like to complete the

survey in Arabic please go to
http://www.surveymonkey.com/s.aspx?sm=2yLQgiX8L72hV9zIxpSi1Q_3d_3d . If
you like to complete the survey in English please go to:
http://www.surveymonkey.com/s.aspx?sm=XIExw80vO7tYIxWxZmU6NA_3d_3d
If you are interested in receiving a copy of the summary report, please send a request by
email to abouassi@syr.edu . I will be more than happy to share the results with you.
You may also contact my faculty advisor Prof. Stuart Bretschneider at
sibretsc@maxwell.syr.edu or (001) 315-443-4000. Or, if you have further questions about
confidentiality and research participant's rights, please feel free to contact the Syracuse
University Institutional Review Board (IRB) at (001)315-4430-3013 or orip@syr.edu.
!Thank you very much for your time. I look forward to hearing from you
Best regards,
Khaldoun
Khaldoun AbouAssi
PhD Student in Public Administration
Campbell Public Affairs Institute
The Maxwell School at Syracuse University
306E Eggers Hall Syracuse, NY 13244
)Mobile (Lebanon): (961

Cell (US): (001) 315-879-2319

email: abouassi@maxwell.syr.edu
389-2453

Arabic Translation

ﺣﻀﺮﺓة ﺍاﻟﺴﻴﯿﺪ/ﺓة:
ﻟﻘﺪ ﺗﻢ ﺍاﻧﺘﻘﺎﺋﻜﻢ ﻋﺸﻮﺍاﺋﻴﯿّﺎ ﻟﻠﻤﺸﺎﺭرﻛﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻫﮬﮪھﺬﺍا ﺍاﻹﺳﺘﻄﻼﻉع ﺑﻨﺎ ًء ﻋﻠﻰ ﺧﺒﺮﺗﻚ ﻭوﻣﻌﺮﻓﺘﻚ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺠﺎﻝل ﺍاﻟﻤﺠﺘﻤﻊ ﺍاﻟﻤﺪﻧﻲ ﻓﻲ ﻟﺒﻨﺎﻥن.
ﺍاﺳﻤﻲ ]ﺧﻠﺪﻭوﻥن ﺃأﺑﻮﻋﺎﺻﻲ[ .ﺃأﻧﺎ ﻁطﺎﻟﺐ ﺩدﻛﺘﻮﺭرﺍاﺓة ﻓﻲ ﺍاﻹﺩدﺍاﺭرﺓة ﺍاﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻛﻠﻴﯿﺔ ] –[Maxwellﺟﺎﻣﻌﺔ ].[Syracuse
ﻳﯾﺘﺮﻛﺰ ﺑﺤﺜﻲ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻗﻄﺎﻉع ﺍاﻟﺠﻤﻌﻴﯿﺎﺕت ﺍاﻷﻫﮬﮪھﻠﻴﯿﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻟﺒﻨﺎﻥن ،٬ﻭوﺧﺎﺻﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍاﻟﻌﻼﻗﺔ ﺑﻴﯿﻨﻬﮭﺎ ﻭوﺑﻴﯿﻦ ﺍاﻟﺠﻬﮭﺎﺕت ﺍاﻟﻤﺎﻧﺤﺔ.
ﺗﺴﻬﮭﻢ ﻣﺸﺎﺭرﻛﺘﻚ ﻓﻲ ﻫﮬﮪھﺬﺍا ﺍاﻹﺳﺘﻄﻼﻉع ﻓﻲ ﻓﻬﮭﻢ ﺃأﻋﻤﻖ ﻟﻠﻌﻼﻗﺔ ﺑﻴﯿﻦ ﻫﮬﮪھﻴﯿﺌﺎﺕت ﺍاﻟﻤﺠﺘﻤﻊ ﺍاﻟﻤﺪﻧﻲ ﻭوﺍاﻟﺠﻬﮭﺎﺕت ﺍاﻟﻤﺎﻧﺤﺔ ﻭوﺇإﻧﻌﻜﺎﺱس ﺫذﻟﻚ
ﻋﻠﻰ ﺇإﺩدﺍاﺭرﺓة ﺍاﻟﺘﻨﻤﻴﯿﺔ ﺑﺸﻜﻞ ﻋﺎﻡم.
ﻳﯾﺘﻀﻤﻦ ﺍاﻹﺳﺘﻄﻼﻉع ﻋﺪﺩد ﻣﺤﺪﻭوﺩد ﻣﻦ ﺍاﻷﺳﻠﺌﺔ ﺣﻮﻝل ﻧﻮﻉع ﻭوﻁطﺒﻴﯿﻌﺔ ﺍاﻟﻌﻼﻗﺔ ﺑﻴﯿﻦ ﻣﺆﺳﺴﺘﻚ ﻭوﺍاﻟﺠﻬﮭﺎﺕت ﺍاﻟﻤﺎﻧﺤﺔ ﻭوﺣﻮﻝل ﺍاﻟﺪﺭرﻭوﺱس
ﺍاﻟﻤﺴﺘﺨﻠﺼﺔ ﻭوﺍاﻟﺘﺤﺪﻳﯾﺎﺕت ﺍاﻟﺘﻲ ﻳﯾﻤﻜﻦ ﺃأﻥن ﺗﺘﻄﺮﺃأ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻫﮬﮪھﺬﻩه ﺍاﻟﻌﻼﻗﺔ ﻛﻤﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺇإﺩدﺍاﺭرﺓة ﺍاﻟﺒﺮﻧﺎﻣﺞ ﺍاﻟﺘﻨﻤﻮﻳﯾﺔ.
ﺍاﻟﺮﺟﺎء ﺍاﻟﻤﻼﺣﻈﺔ :ﺇإﻥن ﻣﺸﺎﺭرﻛﺘﻚ ﻓﻲ ﻫﮬﮪھﺬﺍا ﺍاﻟﺪﺭرﺍاﺳﺔ ﻣﺤﺾ ﺇإﺧﺘﻴﯿﺎﺭرﻳﯾﺔ .ﻟﻚ ﻛﻞ ﺍاﻟﺤﻖ ﺑﺮﻓﺾ ﺍاﻟﻤﺸﺎﺭرﻛﺔ .ﻓﻲ ﺣﺎﻝل ﻗﺮّﺭرﺕت ﺃأﻥن
ﺗﺸﺎﺭرﻙك ،٬ﻳﯾﻤﻜﻨﻚ ﺍاﻹﻧﺴﺤﺎﺏب ﻓﻲ ﺃأﻱي ﻭوﻗﺖ ،٬ﻭوﻓﻲ ﻫﮬﮪھﺬﻩه ﺍاﻟﺤﺎﻟﺔ ﻟﻦ ﻳﯾﺘﻢ ﺣﻔﻆ ﺍاﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎﺕت ﻭوﻳﯾﺠﺮﻱي ﺗﺠﺎﻫﮬﮪھﻠﻬﮭﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﻜﺎﻣﻞ.
ﻱي
ﺳﻴﯿﺘﻢ ﺣﻔﻆ ﺍاﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎﺕت ﺍاﻟﺘﻲ ﻳﯾﺘﻢ ﺇإﻳﯾﺎﺭرﺩدﻫﮬﮪھﺎ ﺑﺴ ّﺮﻳﯾّﺔ ﻛﺎﻣﻠﺔ .ﻣﻦ ﻏﻴﯿﺮ ﺍاﻟﻤﻄﻠﻮﺏب ﺫذﻛﺮ ﺇإﺳﻤﻚ ﺍاﻟﺸﺨﺼﻲ ،٬ﺇإﻭو ﺇإﺳﻢ ﻣﺆﺳﺴﺘﻚ ،٬ﺃأﻭو ﺃأ ّ
ﺷﻲء ﻳﯾﺒﻴﯿﻦ ﻫﮬﮪھﻮﻳﯾﺘﻚ ﻟﻠﻤﺸﺎﺭرﻛﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻫﮬﮪھﺬﺍا ﺍاﻹﺳﺘﻄﻼﻉع .ﻛﻤﺎ ﺇإﻥن ﺍاﻟﻨﺘﺎﺋﺞ ﺍاﻟﻨﻬﮭﺎﺋﻴﯿﺔ ﺳﻴﯿﺘﻢ ﻋﺮﺿﻬﮭﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﻤﺠﻤﻞ ﻭوﻟﻴﯿﺲ ﺑﺼﻮﺭرﺓة ﻓﺮﺩدﻳﯾﺔ.
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: ﻟﻠﻐﺔ ﺍاﻟﻌﺮﺑﻴﯿﺔ ﺍاﻟﺮﺟﺎء ﺯزﻳﯾﺎﺭرﺓة ﺍاﻟﻤﻮﻗﻊ،٬ ﻓﻲ ﺣﺎﻝل ﺭرﻏﺒﺖ ﺑﺎﻟﻤﺸﺎﺭرﻛﺔ. ﺩدﻗﻴﯿﻘﺔ15 ﻻ ﻳﯾﺴﺘﻐﺮﻕق ﻣﻞء ﺍاﻹﺳﺘﻄﻼﻉع ﺃأﻛﺜﺮ ﻣﻦ
. http://www.surveymonkey.com/s.aspx?sm=2yLQgiX8L72hV9zIxpSi1Q_3d_3d
: ﺍاﻟﺮﺟﺎء ﺯزﻳﯾﺎﺭرﺓة ﺍاﻟﻤﻮﻗﻊ،٬ﻟﻠﻐﺔ ﺍاﻹﻧﻜﻠﻴﯿﺰﻳﯾﺔ
http://www.surveymonkey.com/s.aspx?sm=XIExw80vO7tYIxWxZmU6NA_3d_3d
 ﺍاﻟﺮﺟﺎء ﺇإﺭرﺳﺎﻝل ﻁطﻠﺐ ﻋﺒﺮ ﺍاﻟﺒﺮﻳﯾﺪ ﺍاﻹﻟﻜﺘﺮﻭوﻧ ّﻲ،٬ﻓﻲ ﺣﺎﻝل ﺍاﻟﺮﻏﺒﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺇإﺳﺘﻼﻡم ﻧﺴﺨﺔ ﻣﻦ ﺍاﻟﺘﻘﺮﻳﯾﺮ ﺍاﻟﻤﺨﺘﺼﺮ
. ﺇإﺫذ ﻳﯾﺴﻌﺪﻧﻲ ﺃأﻥن ﺃأﺷﺎﺭرﻙك ﺍاﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎﺍاﺕت ﺍاﻟﻤﺴﺘﺨﻠﺼﺔ ﻣﻌﻜﻢ. abouassi@syr.edu
 ﻋﺒﺮ ﺍاﻟﺒﺮﻳﯾﺪ ﺍاﻹﻟﻜﺘﺮﻭوﻧﻲStuart Bretschneider .ﻣﻦ ﺍاﻟﻤﻤﻜﻦ ﺍاﻹﺗّﺼﺎﻝل ﺑﺎﻟﻤﺸﺮﻑف ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍاﻟﺒﺤﺚ ﺩد
 ﻓﻲ ﻣﺎ ﻳﯾﺘﻌﻠﻖ ﺑﺄﺳﺌﻠﺘﻚ ﺣﻮﻝل ﺍاﻟﺴﺮﻳﯾﺔ ﻭوﺣﻘﻮﻕق.(001) 315-443-4000  ﺃأﻭو ﺍاﻟﻬﮭﺎﺗﻒsibretsc@maxwell.syr.edu
Syracuse  ﺍاﻟﺘﺎﺑﻊ ﻟﺠﺎﻣﻌﺔInstitutional Review Board (IRB)  ﺍاﻟﺮﺟﺎء ﺍاﻹﺗﺼﺎﻝل ﺏب،٬ﺍاﻟﻤﺸﺘﺮﻛﻴﯿﻦ ﻓﻲ ﺍاﻷﺑﺤﺎﺙث
orip@syr.edu ( ﺃأﻭو ﺍاﻟﺒﺮﻳﯾﺪ ﺍاﻹﻟﻜﺘﺮﻭوﻧﻲ001)315-4430-3013ﻋﺒﺮ ﺍاﻟﻬﮭﺎﺗﻒ
،٬ﻣﻊ ﺟﺰﻳﯾﻞ ﺍاﻟﺸﻜﺮ
ﺧﻠﺪﻭوﻥن ﺃأﺑﻮﻋﺎﺻﻲ
Front and back of card:

Khaldoun Abou Fleishman
PhD Candidate
Department of Public Administration
400 Eggers Hall Syracuse University
Syracuse, NY 13244
202-384-4405 (cell)
rkfleish@syr.edu

Faculty advisor:3
Dr. Jeremy Shiffman, Associate Professor of Public Administration
jrshiffm@maxwell.syr.edu
(001) 315- 443- 4928
For questions about confidentiality and research participant's rights, please
feel free to contact the Syracuse University Institutional Review Board (IRB)
at (001)315-4430-3013 or orip@syr.edu.

3

There was a change in faculty advisor in April 2010. Modifications were made to the Interview Protocol
and other related materials to reflect the change: Prof. Stuart Bretschneider, Associate Dean and President,
Department of Public Administration, Email: sibretsc@maxwell.syr.edu; Tel: (001) 315-443-4000
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APPENDIX D: PROFILES OF THE FOUR NGOS
The following are detailed profiles of the four environmental NGOs that were the case
studies of this dissertation. For confidentiality purposes, the names of the organizations
are substituted with NGO1, 2, 3, and 4. Any reference to the organization and/or its
partners in the direct quotations is edited.
NGO1: The NGO of ‘NO’
NGO1 was established in 1991 after a long process of internal debate and discussions. A
group of educated people from different backgrounds shared a common interest in
sustainable development. The group extensively deliberated on the best way to approach
the subject; forming a political party was a preference for some group members but was
then dismissed, mainly due to the bad image associated with political parties during the
civil war. The group decided on establishing an NGO and consensually agreed on its
mission.
NGO1’s mission is to ensure environmental suitability and the protection of natural
resources through a scientific framework that is designed around engaging local
communities and using all democratic means to express opinions and demands. NGO1
presents itself as a scientific organization that conducts lobbying and advocacy activities
based scientific evidence and arguments.
The members then had to debate the best approach to apply the mission. Some members
believed in empowerment and grassroots work, where the organization only sets a broad
framework; others were interested in policy change and enforcement, requiring more
active involvement through designing projects with specific duration, focus, and
objectives. One of the founders recalled the early history of the organization saying, “ We
did not necessarily see eye to eye on the approach. The interest was then to find a balance
between the two approaches. However, our grassroots work has not been very stable and
diminished over since it requires certain readiness, mentality, structure, and mechanism”
(Interview #1).
NGO1’s projects address environmental hazards, the exploitation of natural resources, air
pollution and climate change, which directly threaten natural resources, public
environment, and human health. In many of these projects, NGO1 conducted scientific
research and studies and provided technical assistance through its specialized members
and volunteers. Many of these projects are implemented at the local level through
engaging and empowering local communities. In addition, NGO1 is actively engaged in
lobbying and advocacy campaigns against government policies, ministerial decisions, and
private sectors projects based on the conviction that a better and safe environment is a
core human right.
NGO1 has a mixed vertical and horizontal structure. There are a general assembly and an
elected administrative committee. Membership is open without any conditions. Currently,
the NGO1 membership base is 100 members. The administrative committee is composed
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of 7 elected members. The turnover in leadership is noticeable. Five different people
headed the organization over 17 years, which is not very common among Lebanese
NGOs. Currently, a male member heads the organization, supported by a group of highly
educated people who bring their expertise to the organization. Decisions are made after
extensive deliberation and through voting, if necessary.
All NGO1's activities are managed by a team headed by a coordinator. Each team is
composed of volunteer members and enjoys a full authority over the activity. “We want
decisions to be bottom-up coming from the people working on the ground. Those people
participate in and shape the decision-making process and then implement the work. We
do not want NGO1 to be run by one or two people”, explained one of NGO1 founders
(Interview #1). As such, NGO1 considers its members and volunteers to be its major
stakeholders; their participation in the work of the organization is formalized through the
horizontal structure of activity teams.
NGO1 adopts a major principle: it is a voluntary association. Volunteerism is recognized
as a value in the mission and work. Volunteers contribute to a great extent in managing
and implementing any medium or small-size projects. This allows the organization to
implement these projects without any external funding or donor support. In big projects,
funding covers costs of scientific studies and logistics (materials, publications,
equipment). NGO1 does not overload the budget with paid staff. Currently, NGO1 runs a
small team of 3 paid staff. An NGO1 member commented, “We want to avoid becoming
institutions of staff and projects, where the board is a power arena and people are
benefitting from employment” (Interview #7).
However, the reliance on volunteers exposes the capabilities NGO1 enjoys. There is a
critical drop in the number of committed and serious volunteers working for NGO1. In
some cases, the administrative committee members had to step in and take over projects
that were managed by volunteers who no longer could commit to the organization. This
created an ongoing debate within NGO1 on the role and level of involvement of
volunteers. Some members wanted to sustain the volunteerism spirit and practice. Other
members were more concerned with the credibility of the organization in implementing
its activities. One of the founders reflected on the situation,
They were convinced of moving into institutionalizing NGO1 which would
transform our approach into designing projects, running after funding, and hiring
staff. Volunteerism would become secondary. It would not be easy to maintain the
momentum of volunteerism when you are busy running several projects with paid
staff (Interview #1).
However, this debate has not been settled, and NGO1 is still caught up in this grey area.
According to NGO1 members, the organization aims to adopt best practices in the work
of NGOs. First, the organization is adamant about the principles and values it follows in
its work. These are the determinants of its legitimacy and the pillars for its accountability.
As much as the organization adheres to these values, it proves its credibility. Second,
NGO1 voluntarily follows certain self-regulation mechanisms such as a code of conduct
and formal standards. Third, NGO1 recognizes the importance of transparency in its
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work; information is accessible to all members and reports are published publicly and
online. Fourth, NGO1’s work is guided by an annual plan; activities are designed and
conducted based on scientific studies and needs assessments. The organization revisits its
policies, activities, and working guidelines and procedures through frequent strategic
planning. “This is very normal in the work of NGOs since it interacts and reacts to its
surrounding environment where change takes place all the time and in all fields, not only
just pure environment, but also in the social, economic, and humanitarian arenas” an
NGO1 member explained (Interview #15).
The fact that NGO1 relies on volunteers in its work relieves the organization from
considerable financial burden. NGO1 is not in a dire financial situation. The organization
considers that it has been able to reach an impact with the limited internal resources, and
external resources are not essential to sustain its work. Internal sources are from
membership fees as well as considerable individual donations. According to an
interviewed member, “Members are convinced of NGO1’s mission and the principles.
They donate more than the membership fee. The dilemma is that we do not want to
accept a substantial donation from a specific person because we do not want that to
influence our decision” (Interview #7).
NGO1 first approached donors when the members believed the organization built its
credibility through work and achievements. The number of external donors varies from
one year to another, but NGO1 does not constrain itself to a limited pool of donors. Two
distinctive aspects in selecting donors are noticed. First, there is a clear preference to
work with philanthropic foundations and, to a lesser extent, international organizations.
NGO1 secures funding from eight donors, including only three bilateral. Second, NGO1
has developed an unwritten policy on donor funding based on its principles and values;
the policy stipulates that the source of funding should not be a contributor to pollution, or
have a political agenda, or violate human rights and social justice. The administrative
committee screens donors based on these criteria, debates the subject, and then votes on
which donors to approach with a project proposal.
This elaborate process of deciding on and approaching donors necessarily yields a
relationship based on mutual benefit, capacity building, and exchange of ideas. NGO1’s
donors are perceived as partners. “When our agendas are compatible, objectives of
funding match our goals, and donor’s plans accommodate our programs” (Interview #7).
However, although NGO1 aspires to strengthen the relationship with donors into
partnerships, donors do not continuously involve NGO1 in their consultations and
planning strategies, and NGO1 continuously evaluates its relations to ensure autonomy
and credibility.
Besides the organization’s critical policy on donor funding, NGO1 has been involved in a
confrontational relationship with government, politicians, and the private sector. NGO1
goes after the private sector for its abuse and violation of the environment. It condemns
the government for its disability and compliance. It also condemns politicians for
exploitation and interest in narrow political gain. One of the founders portrayed the
general picture,
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Unlike other NGOs, it is the essence of the role of NGO1 to raise its voice. If
there is a problem, you do not just talk about the problem or who causes the
problem or hinders the solution. If you have the ability to find a solution and to
influence your surroundings towards making a change, then you should be
proactive. We point out the problem and the responsibilities regardless of who
and where (Interview #1).

As such, NGO1 does not see much value or interest in building strong relations with
other NGOs. These relations are sporadic, limited to short-term campaigns on emerging
environment problems, and channeled through international (and a few national)
networking bodies. The media, on the other hand, is sympathetic to NGO1 and is more
likely to support its efforts, especially when there is a media hit.
As this brief description shows, interviewed members and external observers jointly
agree that NGO1 maintains a reputation of being the NGO of NO: NO compromise, NO
concession.
NGO2: An Institutionalized NGO
NGO2 was formed in the early 1990s as a response to an urgent situation at a very local
level. A group of energetic youths decided to join efforts to work on the situation. The
work was voluntary and not formally organized. It was based on trial and error, focusing
on very specific issues, such as plantation and forest firefighting.
The efforts of the group were successful and attracted attention. Different neighboring
communities contacted the group for support. The group started doing more projects in
different areas addressing the same issue. The group members decided on becoming a
formally recognized NGO with a certain specific vision aiming to protect natural
resources through fighting forest fires and planting trees.
A few years later, the group started to carry out projects and activities beyond the
immediate scope of the original interest. An NGO2 member elaborated on the history.
“The work evolved over time; it was smooth, natural and demand-driven. People were
following our progress and satisfied with it. There was a vertical change, if you want to
call it that, as well as a horizontal change. We started doing more advanced projects other
than basic planting and we expanded into other geographical areas” (Interview #6). At the
same moment, the organization benefited from the personal connections of its members
within the public sector and with international donors, and the process of expansion was
exacerbated. The member added,
We are growing at a rapid pace as if we are drowning. There are things that
consume you so much. We cannot just drop everything and focus on internal
issues when all stakeholders (people, ministers, donors) are interested in
cooperating and working with us. In such a situation, you would put your internal
management on hold and work on the broader issues. It is the time for change and
not management (Interview #26).
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In brief, NGO2’s portfolio outgrew its immediate mission and internal managerial
capabilities. The organization had to reorganize itself internally, rethinking what it was
doing in order to focus on the broader picture of its mission rather than on the narrow
specifics of the projects and practical issues in which it was caught. This internal process
of reorganization was incremental and happened in different stages. At the beginning,
minor changes were introduced to the work approaches, and then to the name of the
organization. Finally the objectives were changed to reflect the actual work. An NGO2
member reflected on the process saying,
The mission did not change but was updated and clarified. We started as an
environmental NGO and I think we still are. However, our perspective changed as
we grew and our experience broadened. We now understand the interrelatedness
between environment and everything else. NGO2’s mission is the protection,
conservation of natural resources in partnership with local communities, taking
into account the quality of livelihood of these communities (Interview #6).
The process was characterized by its collaborative nature, where the whole organization,
including its staff and volunteers, was involved in providing their perspective and
reaching a consensus by its internally-driven incentive. Members of the organization
stress that the process was a voluntary internal initiative and did not come as a response
to any external pressure or demand. One member considered that from the outside,
people did not see any difference in their work but NGO2 was conscious about what was
happening and wanted to pause and organize themselves. “The people working on the
ground were the most interested in moving this process forward because they were
experiencing what they were doing compared to what they want NGO2 to be doing”,
added another member (Interview #26).
NGO2 stakeholders are considered to be the local communities the organization partners
with in most of its projects. These local communities include a diverse group of direct or
indirect beneficiaries, depending on the project, but they are part of the general public
NGO2 aims to serve. The stakeholders are actively involved in projects in two different
ways. First, NGO2 involves the local communities in a Participatory Rural Appraisal
(PRA) to gather information about needs, situations, and possible solutions. An NGO2
member commented, “This is how we start to envision possible projects to implement in
this village based on what was proposed by most of the villagers. It is different from a
prefabricated project people do not understand. The project will definitely fail”
(Interview #6). Second, this local participation in the earlier stages of projects is
institutionalized into voluntary units established to follow-up on implementation of the
work.
Their perception of accountability tends to reflect this reality. NGO2 representatives
consider their organization to be accountable to the stakeholders. The sensitivity to local
needs and the bottom- up initiatives allow the local communities to follow-up on the
work of the organization and to hold its staff responsible for the implementation and
results. However, perceptions of credibility and legitimacy do not necessarily align with
those of accountability. Legitimacy is associated with effectiveness through commitment
to achieve and deliver. A member of the organization explained, “When we decide to do
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a project, we are really on the ground; we deliver something tangible and do not just sell
ideas. The deliverables of all our projects, as well as those external, are up to our own
standards” (Interview #26). In turn, credibility is perceived as the NGO public image,
measuring the ability of the organization to present itself as successful and a reference in
the field. “ Everyone knows us; local NGOs want to work with us and government
agencies and international organizations approach us for funding and consultations. It is
hard to find a project we are not a part of” (Interview #2).
NGO2’s structure is based on a general assembly that elects an administrative committee
for a three-year term. Membership of the general assembly is open to the public without
any conditions. Currently, the general assembly has 50 members. The administrative
committee appoints an executive who heads the administrative staff. The turnover of
leadership is relatively high with the current executive, a professional female with
graduate level of education and an old member of the organization since its
establishment, serving for two terms.
Responsibilities are clearly divided with administrative committee members assigned to
specific tasks or to oversee certain projects, assisted by 20 full-time staff and short-term
project-based external consultants. However, the work is being carried out in a collective
manner where everyone is involved and feels part of a big team, according to members of
the organization. Voluntary self-regulation mechanisms guide the work; these
mechanisms include public reporting, a code of ethics, and performance standards and
appraisal. As mentioned earlier, the members of the general assembly take part in making
strategic decisions, in the presence of an influential leadership, but are less involved in
decisions related to project design and implementation. Here, NGO2 adopts a quasidecentralized system where decisions are made by the administrative committees and
then implemented by units of around 500 volunteers around the country. These units have
certain autonomy in their work within the broader framework defined by the
administrative committee. For example, these units conduct the PRA and then, under the
supervision of a staff person, work on projects the administrative committee considers a
priority for funding.
Currently, NGO2 is running ten projects focusing on protection of natural resources:
forestation, conservation, advocacy, awareness, and some income-generating and
ecotourism projects. As mentioned earlier, these projects are the result of both a demand
and analysis expressed through the PRA process. The projects fit within a broader annual
plan and are part of a long-term strategy the organization has developed and periodically
revised. One of the interviewed members elaborated,
We do not copy-paste our projects; what works in one area does not in another.
However, we work by long-term strategies. We need indicators to guide the work
and help avoid any problems in the future whether coming from changes in
policies or lack of funding. When you know what you want, you will be able to
avoid most problems (Interview #26).
Most of NGO2’s projects are donor-funded. Nevertheless, NGO2 is not necessarily
donor- dependent or driven. It does enjoy a certain degree of autonomy, with promising
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potentials of financial self-sustainability. First, NGO2 has 9 donors, without being reliant
on one more than others (almost equal percentile distribution). The director explained,
“Diversity of funding is key to our success. Any disagreement with one of three donors
means at least one third of our budget is suspended. With multiple donors, the total
budget might still be the same but we are not as much at risk” (Interview #2). Second,
NGO2 is among the few NGOs in Lebanon that has launched income-generating projects.
The organization runs three projects that are currently self-financing, anticipating they
will contribute to the administrative costs of the organization in the short to long run.
“We think like a business”, said an NGO2 member,
Businesses make capital investment; we do the same. We are very conscientious
about our ability to survive without the external funding which is like begging to a
great extent. We launched several income-generating projects that will make us
self-sustainable and less dependent on a donor and at the mercy of fluctuating
donor interests in granting us some funding (Interview #6).
Third, NGO2 has a well-developed and active fund development strategy in place. The
organization made an investment in its human capital and took a risk hiring and retaining
staff whose sole responsibility is to look for financial resources, match funding
requirements with organizational objectives, and develop competitive grant proposals.
The organization tapped corporate social responsibility and approached the private sector
with ideas for partnership and support. Several companies and businesses are responsive
and currently contribute to NGO2.
Such a strategy places NGO2 in a unique position vis-à-vis its donors. Interviewed
members admitted that in the beginning, the organization had to struggle while looking
for funding. Lately, the situation is balanced out. NGO2 still pursues funding sources and
submits grant proposals. Donors also approach the organization for consultations,
available funding, or brainstorm project ideas. This balanced situation empowers NGO2
to deal with the donor in a more open way. Donors are perceived as partners. The director
commented,
Our relationship with donors has evolved; they are not the money makers who
give you money when you knock on their doors. Donors have objectives. We do
too. As the objectives meet, we become partners. Although donors might want to
support smaller NGOs, we are involved together and they look at us as a
reference. We worked hard to build this trust and we continue to value this
ongoing relationship although sometimes donors’ prerequisites and requirements
were cumbersome. However, we were able to adapt and be transparent and
professional with them (Interview #2).
As mentioned earlier, personal relations were able to open doors for NGO2 in the public
sector and to facilitate linkages with government agencies. The organization enjoys a
very healthy relationship with the government. Various ministries, especially the Ministry
of Environment (MOE), are keen to collaborate and support NGO2. The interviewed
members relate this to the organization’s credibility, which bestows confidence in
achieving impact and deliverables. Other external observers do not deny the factor of
personal contacts. Coupled with support from donors and partnership with the media,
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NGO2 has been able to play a very active role in the national policy arena. The
organization is engaged in continuous dialogue with government and has been working
on formulating public policies and plans in partnership with several public agencies.
NGO2 tries to engage other organizations in its dialogue with the government as well as
in its projects. The organization highlights the value and importance of interorganizational cooperation and support. While local networking is not particularly
favored, the interviewed members of NGO2 strongly believe that the strength and success
of their organization is not going to be sustained unless a broader change takes place
through collective action and not separate initiatives. Other NGOs do not cause any
competition. Relationships are based on respect, support, and partnerships. It is in their
interest to strengthen the capacity of other NGOs. NGO2 was the first to set-up a
consortium of NGOs to work on a big-funded environmental project. As the executive
director explained, NGO2 does not establish a working unit in areas where other local
organizations are working but rather partners with these groups. Finally, NGO2 uses an
open donor policy with these NGOs, providing assistance through their connections with
donors and even helping them get funding.
The accumulation of organizational and relational factors distinguishes NGO2 from the
other researched organizations. NGO2 thinks as and aspires to be an institution more than
an NGO.
NGO3: An NGO of A Struggling Commitment
NGO3 is the result of a natural progression of the founders’ involvement at the local
level. After the civil war (1975-1990), several ad-hoc committees were formed between
local municipalities and the civil society to manage public service provision in the areas.
Several civil society activists contemplated the idea of transforming their involvement
with municipalities into an organized form; however, they were hesitant. The situation
was very sensitive at the local level as people were politically divided. The life span of
NGOs functioning at that time was short and several organizations became either inactive
due to internal disputes or affiliated with a family or a political party, ultimately
excluding all others.
Upon the formal registration of the NGO, interest grew rapidly. More than 100 people
wanted to form and join the NGO. However, one of the founders said, “There was high
enthusiasm but no clear awareness or knowledge on what the NGO was to focus on”
(Interview #11). “We were trying to find our niche by working on almost everything like
exhibitions and trips, awareness activities on using water and garbage disposal, and a
small irrigation project. I believe these activities had primitive and generic environmental
aspects”, another member elaborated (Interview #16).
For several years, NGO3 remained small focusing on the very local level and doing
secondary basic activities that were not necessarily related to environment. At the same
time, the organization started to witness internal disputes, as originally feared. Some of
the members wanted to use the NGO as a platform for personal interests and establishing
a good reputation. One of the remaining founders explained, “Some members were not
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serious or credible in their intention to be involved and serve and work for the NGO.
Some of the founders never attended any meetings and the quality and mentality of
people was not up to my aspiration” (Interview #11).
Less than 10 years after its genesis, NGO3 passed through a critical phase threatening its
existence. Several members, including some of the six main founders, started to drop out.
There was a serious consideration to dissolve the organization; however, things took a
different course when a group of young people joined NGO3 bringing in expertise and
specialization and a clear perspective on what the NGO should do and how it should be
run. “By then, people who wanted to leave had left. We held elections and started the real
work. That was the rebirth of NGO3”, the founder recalled (Interview #11).
NGO3 was then able to redefine a focused mission towards developing environmental
awareness. The organization started implementing projects serving this mission directly
and in a more scientific manner. NGO3 now focuses on awareness campaigns and
implements environmental projects funded by international donors and organizations.
The advocacy efforts are more localized, targeting municipalities, unless channeled into
national coalitions, which bring together several NGOs working on particular issues.
NGO3’s impact on national public policy depends on its contributions to the efforts and
sources of such coalitions.
The second turning point in the organization’s history was its success in stopping a
construction project from being implemented. The project had negative implications on
the environment. NGO3 launched a lobbying campaign that brought together citizens,
local groups, and national NGOs to oppose the project. The efforts were fruitful and the
project was cancelled. An NGO3 member stated, “That gave us a big boost and push in
our work; everyone started to take us seriously and we proved we knew what we were
doing” (Interview #16).
NGO3 representatives identify the organizational stakeholders as the direct beneficiaries
of their projects. The member elaborated, “ They are the people we interact and deal with.
They benefit from the goals of the projects as well as from the employment and business
opportunities projects provide” (Interview #16). Accordingly, the stakeholders are the
source of legitimacy for NGO3. As the founder explained, “NGO3 focuses on the needs
of the people and works for their best interest. They are interested in our projects and feel
we represent them” (Interview #11). Nevertheless, this perception of legitimacy does not
necessarily reflect on perceptions of accountability or credibility. Both accountability and
credibility are external. NGO3 representatives consider that although their organization
represents and works for the beneficiaries, people do not care or know how to hold any
organization accountable due to the lack of a culture of accountability in the Lebanese
society. Accountability is usually towards the donors and the government, to a lesser
extent. The good reputation among donors and international organizations is the main
indicator of NGO3’s credibility. NGO3 adopts a code of conduct as a voluntary standard
of self-regulation to enhance its own accountability and credibility.
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The organizational structure of NGO3 is not different from any other NGO in Lebanon.
Membership is open to everyone without screening or prior approval. Currently, a general
assembly of 60 members elects an administrative committee of 7 members for a two-year
term. The president of the administrative committee also serves as the head of NGO3; the
same person, a male with a graduate degree, has been elected as president for more than
five terms. The other members of the executive committee have clear jurisdictions and
perform their tasks under the supervision of the president. However, members are
involved in the decision making process since the meetings of the administrative
committee are open to everyone. Decisions are made with agreement and consensus by
everyone. “We did not reach any stage where we had to vote”, an NGO3 member
explained (Interview #16).
NGO3 does not recruit any paid staff. The president explained, “ Besides the lack of
enough resources, Lebanese regulations do not encourage us to hire. The law requires the
NGO to pay social security for any staff on the payroll even if we do not pay them and
they do not benefit from the social security service. So, we only recruit for the period of a
project” (Interview #11). NGO3 compensates the lack of full-time staff with the time and
efforts of members who are professional experts and highly specialized in specific
environmental fields and domains. This relieves the organization from contracting or
relying on external experts when projects require such resources. In addition, NGO3
relies on volunteers and interns for the implementation of basic activities.
NGO3 relies on the knowledge and expertise of its members to determine the local needs
and the types of projects it needs to implement. Unfortunately, the organization has not
carried out any scientific needs assessment or strategic planning exercises. Projects are
implemented on an ad-hoc basis when an idea is identified and funding is secured, and
not according to any annual plan. The organization does not publish annual reports,
besides those reported to members of the general assembly. The use of technological
resources is also very basic. NGO3 does not have a social media presence.
NGO3’s financial situation depends on projects. In general, NGO3 is financially
independent. Membership fees are used to cover the basic costs of office rent and
utilities (electricity and phone) and the organization’s website. NGO3’s president noted,
“We do not have administrative costs to seek funding to cover. If we have projects we
work on them and if there are no projects, we do not have expenses” (Interview #11).
NGO3’s annual budget ranges between $150,000 and $300,000. All projects are
implemented through donor grants. However, NGO3 has a limited pool of donors, mostly
bilateral donors. The NGO3 member reiterated, “If we write a good proposal and get
funding, we can say we have money; otherwise we do not. We keep looking and apply
for funding since we would like to have more funding to do more projects” (Interview
#16). NGO3’s president admitted that,
The organization does not have any fund development strategy. Donation depends
on the initiatives and contributions of the members. Finding a donor is a
challenge. We need someone trained and specialized in looking for funding and
writing good proposals. The information of available donor funding might not
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always be accessible. There are only few in a closed circle that know about the
funding, how to apply for and get a grant to fund projects (Interview #11).

NGO3 relations with donors are described as both formal and correct. The NGO develops
proposals and then implement approved grants according to donors’ requirements and
procedures. The donor is strictly perceived as a donor. Such perception is reinforced by
three factors. First, NGO3 has never been approached by any donor for consultations on
local priorities. Second, NGO3 criticizes donors on their focus on administrative
requirements rather than on the idea and impact. As NGO3 president stated,
Funding standards and criteria are so different between donors and sometimes
between grant programs of the same donor. If I am applying for funding, I will be
more focused on these criteria than on my own project. There is a need for us to
work not just according to the criteria but also with the criteria. You cannot
change or amend or discuss. It is like you are dealing with a bank and taking a
private loan (Interview #11).
Third, personal relations are downplayed, as they are often associated with political
affiliations and connections. NGO3 prefers to be portrayed as apolitical or politically
independent.
NGO3’s relations with other external actors are conditioned by its human capacity,
available resources and projects, and strong interest in remaining independent. NGO3
does not necessarily perceive the government as an adversary. The president discussed
the opinion towards the government saying, “The work of NGOs is important but should
not take over the responsibility of the government. We created parallel or substitute
agencies during the civil war. This should be over now. NGOs should be supporting the
government and monitoring its activities” (Interview #11).
NGO3’s relationship with the private sector and media is underdeveloped, based on
sponsorship and reporting on activities. The relationship with other NGOs is limited to
exchanging support and coordinating on specific environmental issues. NGO3 is yet to
establish any partnerships. The organization is more active in identifying national and
international networks although the experience is not very rewarding. A member
commented, “A network is supposed to bring together functional and successful
organizations. Most networks in Lebanon do not have such organizations and are
captured by political and personal agendas. Eventually, what remains of a network is the
net to strangle with and you lose the work” (Interview #16).
NGO3 has been struggling since its genesis. Financial resources are not the only problem.
Members have to deal with basic organizational challenges. Nevertheless, commitment to
the organization and its mission has been renewed throughout its history.
NGO4: The NGO of A Ruling Core
NGO4 was established in the mid 1990s by a group of professionals with technical
background working on issues related to the environment and sustainable development
with various international organizations. “As friends, we were discussing some of the
challenges we faced in our jobs; we knew what was needed and had several creative ideas
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that someone should do something about. So we thought that with our technical expertise
we would have the advantage to do a better job than what we were seeing out there”,
explained one member of NGO4 (Interview #17).
NGO4’s mission statement was set up from the early beginning based on the technical
background of the founders. The mission focused on promoting environmental
development to ensure sustainable development. The NGO executed projects on solid
waste and environmental awareness at a local level. The youth was the main target group
of these projects and there was a clear intention to involve the youth throughout the
project, from the initiation of the idea to the implementation of activities.
Not too long after the establishment of the NGO, several of the founding members went
their own way and became less involved in the work of the organization. The bulk of the
responsibilities was handled by two people: a president who played a more ceremonial
role and a member who was more active and actually managed the NGO. That was the
key turning point in the history of NGO4. After that, the organization continued its work
and started to branch out its activities without any changes in its governance and
management structure. As the activities of the organization expanded, there was a need to
attend to two issues: first, the mission, which was perceived to be too technical; and
second, the leadership of the organization.
NGO4 took adopted a unique approach to these issues. The mission was neither changed
nor revised. The founder explained,
We did not change it but I can say we framed it in a certain way by developing
slogans for the organization based on discussion between the president and
myself. Slogans like quality of life and people’s well-being are clearer and easier
and appealing to the public and can be understood. I believe we just changed the
words but retain the same meaning (Interview #13).
On the other hand, the organization chose a new executive committee. The two founding
members retained their positions: a president heading the organization for formality
purposes and a member practically doing most of the work.
Currently, NGO4 has less than 30 members forming its general assembly. Membership is
restricted, requiring both invitation and endorsement by a current member and approval
of the executive committee. The executive committee is elected for a period of three
years. As explained earlier, the same two people (both well-educated males) have been
elected for several terms or the ratio of turnover in elected offices does not exceed 50% at
every election. Responsibilities are not clearly distributed among members of the
executive committee according to assigned positions. Such a set-up paves the way for an
influential leadership to practice tight control over decisions. However, it does not allow
for much opportunity to involve members in the process or for any self-regulation
mechanism to be effective.
The same person manages all programs assisted by two full-time paid staff, project-based
part-time employees and expert consultants, and several volunteers when needed. The
organization lacks strategic and annual plans and has not conducted any needs
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assessment. Project ideas come up through brainstorming or even personal experience.
“We develop the idea further into a proposal and then look for funding. Sometimes it
works and sometimes it does not. Once you score then things roll”, explained a member
of the organization (Interview #17). Most of the work of NGO4 is project-based with
awareness as a key component in many of these projects. The NGO works in various
domains including health, social services, good governance, the environment and
democracy. However, as the member admitted, “NGO4 has been shy at the public policy
front. Other NGOs are working on legislation and advocacy but we have many projects
that do not allow us to be involved with these issues but rather prefer us to work on
practical issues” (Interview #17).
NGO4 considers the public in general as its main stakeholder. The founder identifies
stakeholders as “Those who we intend to serve and design our projects and activities
based on their needs. They are not just the people who directly benefit from a specific
project but those who are impacted directly or indirectly with our work as much as they
influence our future programs. NGO4 works for the public and not any specific group”
(Interview #13).
However, this romanticized identification of stakeholders does not materialize itself into
any mechanism to ensure accountability to the general public or to involve the public in
the work of the organization through a participatory approach. On the contrary,
accountability is basically upwards to donors to whom the NGO usually submits any of
its reports. Legitimacy is perceived as the ability to implement projects effectively and
efficiently—regardless of impact and sustainability. Credibility is assessed through the
rate of securing additional grants from donors.
NGO4’s financial health depends on projects and the ruling core. Membership fees add to
a small amount of the annual budget, which reaches around $200,000. All projects are
funded through bilateral donor grants due to the absence of any strategy to attract
alternative funding. An NGO4 member explained the situation saying, “We are a good
NGO but we cannot do big projects unless there is a donor. However, no donor will
finance your overhead all the time. That is why NGO4 is financially stable as long as the
president and I contribute to cover expenses. There are no projects that generate income”
(Interview #13).
The relationship with donors is project-based. Donors have financial resources and follow
specific guidelines to fund projects. The NGO4 president elaborated:
We cannot find donors all the time and no one donor can finance you all time.
When we are working with a donor, there are certain guidelines that I believe
hinder the work. There are continuous reviews of objectives and requirements as
well as lots of restrictions including branding and visibility. The communication
with the donor is ongoing but is at a certain level and might be slowed down
many times (Interview #13).
Furthermore, donors are not perceived as partners. Donors are not involved in project
details. A member of the organization noted, “no matter how much you try, donors keep a
distance. A partner on the other hand, has major input. A partner follows up with

	
  

340

activities, gives and shares ideas and feedback and links you with other people”
(Interview #17).
Contrary to the developed relationship with the media, which is progressing into a
partnership, based on mutual agreement and joint efforts, NGO4 maintains a low-key
profile in its interaction with other NGOs. The founders did not utilize their personal and
professional contacts to connect their organization with other NGOs working in the field.
This resonates with the justification for establishing the organization in the beginning (‘to
do a better job’), which reflects a certain distrust in the capacities and performance of
other NGOs. On the other hand, the relationship with the government, and MOE are
bitter sweet. The MOE had lent financial and moral support to NGO4’s projects in the
past. According to the founder, “NGO4 always aspires to a more developed relationship.
Environmental NGOs rely on MOE and MOE knows that NGOs should be its partners of
the policy making process. MOE needs to have the right structure and capabilities, to be
the transparent and participatory channel for donor funding to NGOs, and to host all
NGOs morally and financially giving them a certain presence and voice” (Interview #13).
In brief, a ruling core captures NGO4, with one key person managing the operations and
making decisions in consultation or coordination with one or two other members.
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APPENDIX E: SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE
A Study on the Status and Needs of Environmental NGOs in Lebanon
In coordination with the Ministry of Environment
August-September 2010
Dear Madam/Sir:
In reference to the enclosed letter from His Excellency Minister of Environment,
In recognition of the role and leadership of the civil society in the development process in
Lebanon, and in my capacity as a doctoral candidate at the Maxwell School of Syracuse
University, New York, I proposed to the Ministry of Environment to conduct a
comprehensive and scientific study on the status and needs of Environmental NGOs
working in Lebanon.
This study fits the principal objective of the Ministry of Environment: to enhance the
relationship with civil society organizations working on the environment in Lebanon,
through understanding the status, activities, and needs. Here it is important to refer to the
letter of H.E. Minister of Environment that indicates that the Ministry shall rely on this
study to prepare its strategies and plans.
Therefore, the cooperation of your organization in providing the complete required
information is critical. The gathered information on status and needs of environmental
NGOs will be used to enhance dialogue and direct communication and ensure partnership
with the Ministry of Environment; to set certain standards and classifications towards
better efficiency and transparency; and to develop mechanisms for planning and strategic
collaboration between the Ministry of Environment and your organizations.
The letter addressed to you from H.E. Minister of Environment reveals the possibility of
convening a special meeting with your organizations in the coming few months. The
purpose of the meeting will be to present a detailed report on the results of this study and
its key findings, and then to proceed to develop practical recommendations and adopt of
appropriate frameworks for implementation. Therefore, once again, the cooperation of
your organization is very essential.
Your organization will be receiving two versions of the study questionnaire, on the
addresses included in the list prepared by the Ministry of Environment. You feel free to
choose which version you prefer to complete.
A. The first version of the questionnaire is sent via Libanpost. Please complete the
form by hand and then place it in the return envelope that is included in the
package you receive. The return envelope is prepaid. This means your
organization does not need to incur any cost for positing. Please drop the return
envelop at any LibanPost office.
B. The second version of the questionnaire is sent via e-mail. If you wish to
complete this electronic version, you can either:
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1.
2.

Download the attached file, complete the form and then return it to us via email: EnvStudy@gmail.com
Or
Access the following link (in
Arabic): Http://www.surveymonkey.com/s/envstudy

We hope your organization participate in this study and urge your to complete the
questionnaire in full and send it to us no later than 30 September 2010, so that we could
have enough time to prepare for special meeting referred to above. Our team will follow
up the progress. We will contact your organization to provide assistance and support.
Also feel free to contact us by phone 03-269041 or e-mail: EnvStudy@gmail.com.
Again, we appreciate all the effort and great work you are doing,
With many thanks,
Khaldoun AbouAssi and the Team
The Study on the Status and Needs of Environmental NGOs in Lebanon
Deadline: September 30, 2010
All information and data collected in this study are strictly used to produce
general statistical results and tables about Status and Needs of Environmental
NGOs in Lebanon.
Any information pertaining to a specific individual or organization shall remain
confidential, pursuant to the provisions of Decree Law No. 155 date 03/24/1942
which
States that such information is “considered confidential and only used to
prepare statistics tables, and no other individual or department can have access
to” (Article III),
AND
Determines punishment of any violations of confidentiality set forth in the
regulations in force (Article IV)
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A Study on Environments NGOs in Lebanon
-QuestionnaireInstructions

Please download this file and save it on our computer. Then provide your responses in the
highlighted areas. Kindly answer all questions according to the official documents of
your organization (registration document, bylaws, annual reports, budget, etc.); when
such documents are not available, please rely on your best judgment based on your
knowledge and experience working with/for the NGO.
This questionnaire includes 50 questions divided into six major sections. Most questions
require either specific quantifiable (numbers) or Yes/No answers. The few remaining
questions are open-ended; please use the space provide for your answer and any extra
space if needed.
In general, the expected time for completing of this questionnaire is three hours pending
the availability and accessibility of files and information.
GENERAL INFORMATION
Name of the NGO: .......................................................................
Mission and Vision:
........................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................................
Region:

Beirut

Mount Lebanon

North

Beqaa

South

Nabatiyeh

District: ......................................

City/Town: .................................................

Phone number: ..........................

Mobile Number: .........................................

Name of the Person completing this questionnaire: ........................................................
His/her position in the NGO: ...................................................................
Does the NGO have offices? Yes (please specify)

Rent

Owned property

No

Total number of branches (including main branch), if any: ...............................
Web site: .....................................................................................
Does the NGO use:

Facebook

LinkedIn

Twitter

Chat, blog

YouTube

Number of computers (including laptops) currently in use ..........................................

	
  

A.

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

1. Number of current members of the NGO (Please specify a number)

Male

Female

2. Are there any special conditions on membership?

Yes (Proceed to Question 3)
No- Membership is open (Skip to Question 4)

Total

3. Please state the conditions

4. What are the responsibilities of the General Assembly of the NGO?
Please specify:

5. Besides participating in the General Assembly, do members play
other roles in the NGO?
6. Please specify the role of members in general

Yes (Proceed to Question 6)
No- (Skip to Question 7)
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7. Frequency of meetings of NGO bodies, if applicable (Please indicate with X)
N
SemiThe Body
Weekly Monthly Quarterly
o
annually

Annually Biennial Other

General Assembly
Board of Trustees/Directors or equivalent
Administrative/Executive Committee
Specialized Committees
Founding Assembly
8. Decision-making process in NGO bodies, if applicable (Please indicate with X)
Overwhelming
The Body
Majority
Agreement
majority
	
  	
  
	
  	
  
	
  	
  
General Assembly

Consensus No vote

Other

	
  	
  

	
  	
  

	
  	
  

	
  	
  

	
  	
  

	
  	
  

	
  	
  

	
  	
  

	
  	
  

	
  	
  

	
  	
  

	
  	
  

	
  	
  

	
  	
  

	
  	
  

Specialized Committees

	
  	
  

	
  	
  

	
  	
  

	
  	
  

	
  	
  

	
  	
  

Founding Assembly

	
  	
  

	
  	
  

	
  	
  

	
  	
  

	
  	
  

	
  	
  

Board of Trustees/Directors or equivalent
Administrative/Executive Committee
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9. Composition of NGO bodies, if applicable (Please specify or indicate with X)
The Body

Number of
Members

Method of selecting
members

Term of
Service

Last elections

Appointment
Rotation
Election
Appointment
Rotation
Election

Board of Trustees/Directors or equivalent

Administrative/Executive Committee

10. Organization of NGO bodies, if applicable (Please specify or indicate with X)
Body

Board of Trustees/Directors or equivalent

Administrative/Executive Committee

11. Is the NGO committed to a particular
ideology (religious, political ...)?

Record/Minutes Keeping
Yes (Proceed to next box)
No (Skip to
Administrative/Executive
Committee)
Yes (Proceed to next box)
No (Skip to Question 11)

Yes

Years of Record
keeping
1Year
2-5 years
6 or more years
1Year
2-5 years

Records are
available
for members
to the public
for members
to the public

6 or more years

NO
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12. Does the NGO follow/apply any of the following practices (Please indicate with X)
YES
A code of ethics/conduct
Accreditation and Certification
	
  	
  
	
  	
  
Performance evaluation mechanisms
	
  	
  
	
  	
  
Accountability and Disciplinary mechanisms
	
  	
  
	
  	
  
Formal standards
	
  	
  
	
  	
  
Benchmarking
	
  	
  
	
  	
  
Other self-regulation mechanism
	
  	
  
	
  	
  
13. In your opinion, what influences decision-making in your NGO?
(Please choose the appropriate answer)

NO

A strong leadership
Importance of/presence of compromise
Need for agreement
A collective decision/approval

14. Your NGO is credible and legitimate. In your opinion, how does
your NGO define/measure credibility and legitimacy?
15. Does your NGO face any
constraints/obstacles that hinder its work?

16. What are these constraints/obstacles?
(Please choose all applicable)

Yes (Skip to Question 15)
No (Proceed to Question 16)
Internal management
Lack of necessary expertise
Lack of financial resources
Lack of human resources in general
Lack of volunteers
Lack of technology
Difficulty in dealing with government
Inability to meet the needs of target groups
Difficulty to access target groups
Lack of understanding of the nature of NGO work
Others: …………………………………………………
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B.

HUMAN RESOURCES

17. Information on Categories of human resources in the NGO (Please specify)
Category

Number

Number of
Males

Number of
Females

Enrolled in Social Security
Yes
NO
Yes
NO
Yes
NO

Full-time employees
Part-time employees
Volunteers
18. Information on NGO senior officials of (Please specify)
Position Holder
President of the NGO
Executive Director
Fund Development/Financial Officer

NA
	
  	
  
	
  	
  
	
  	
  

Gender
Male
Female
Male
Female
Male
Female

Level of
Education
	
  	
  

Total years
of experience
	
  	
  

Number of years in
the NGO
	
  	
  

	
  	
  

	
  	
  

	
  	
  

	
  	
  

	
  	
  

	
  	
  

19. Information on human resources management (please specify)
NA
YES
Special unit
	
  	
  
Staff Management
Designated Person in charge
Special unit
	
  	
  
Volunteer management
Designated Person in charge
Staff Record time
	
  	
  
	
  	
  
Human Resources Management System/Software 	
  	
  
Specify:……………………………………….
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Yes (Proceed to Question 21)
No (Skip to Question 23)

20. Does the NGO hire services of external experts/consultants?
21. Number of external experts/consultants in 2009
22. Please specify the field of expertise of external experts/consultants
23. Information on training courses for NGO staff in 2008-2010
Subject of training
# of participants in previous sessions

	
  	
  
	
  	
  
No training

Training Needed

Needs Assessment
Fundraising
Strategic Planning
Fund Development
Volunteer Management
Ethics in NGO work
Project Sustainability
Proposal Writing
Organizational Development
Risk/Crisis Management
Human Resources Management
Team Building
Project Cycle management
Budgeting/Accounting
Conflict Resolution
Communications
Institutional analysis
Leadership
Record Keeping
Customer Relationship Management
Entrepreneurship
Collaboration/Networking
Marketing
Quality Management
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C.

NGO WORK AND PROGRAMS
NGO members only
A specific Cause
A specific group
A specific town
A specific area
All Lebanon
Other:…………………………….
Yes (Proceed to Question 26)
No (Skip to Question 27)

24. Groups benefiting from NGO programs and activities
(Please select all applicable)

25. Does the NGO use any mechanisms to involve
beneficiaries in its programs and projects?
26. What are these mechanisms?

Yes (Proceed to Question 28)
No (Skip to Question 30)

27. Does the NGO prepare an annual work plan?
28. Who/which body prepares the work plan?
29. Who/which body approves the work plan?
30. Does the NGO publish periodic reports on its
programs?
(Please choose and select all applicable)
	
  	
  
	
  	
  
	
  

	
  	
  
Monthly reports
Quarterly reports
Annual reports
Prepared but not published
No reports
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31. Please provide information on the NGO’s 3 MAJOR projects carried during the specified years? (For any ongoing
project, please indicate the start and completion dates)
Percentage of
Project
Budget and Sources
Implementing # of direct
Year
Project Name
funding from each
Classification* of funding**
Partners
beneficiaries
source
2005

2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
*Example: social services, rights, development, environment
**Please list all if more than one- including internal sources
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D.

FINANCIAL RESOURCES

32. NGO's Annual budget for the following years
Year

(In Lebanese pounds)
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005

33. What is current membership fee? (in Lebanese
pounds)
34. Who/which body prepares the budget?
35. Who/which body approves the budget?
36. What is the number of annual financial reports
the NGO produces?
37. Who/which body prepares these financial
reports?
38. Who/which body approves these financial
reports?
39. Does the NGO often publish its budget and
financial reports?
40. How does the NGO publish its budget and
financial reports? (Please choose all applicable)

None (Skip to Question 39)
Please specify the annual number: .................

Yes (Proceed to Question 40)
No (Skip to Question 41)
Through the media
Through publications and other means of communication
Upon specific requests from individuals outside the NGO\
Distribute copies only to NGO members
Other: ………………………………….
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41. Information on management of financial resources (please specify)
NA
YES (Please select)
An independent unit
A designated person
Financial management
A treasurer
A treasurer also responsible for accounting
External Auditor
A special committee/unit
Fundraisng
A designated person in charge
Financial records
Records of assets and holdings
Financial resources management system/software
Specify:……………………………………….

42. Please identify the NGO’s sources of funding
Source
NO
Member Fees
	
  	
  
Income-generating activities (sales or services) 	
  	
  
Fundraising campaigns
	
  	
  
Individual donations
	
  	
  
Local Philanthropies/Foundations
	
  	
  
Private sector
	
  	
  
Assistance from municipalities
	
  	
  
Government Contribution
	
  	
  
International donors
	
  	
  

Yes
	
  	
  
	
  	
  
	
  	
  
	
  	
  
	
  	
  
	
  	
  
	
  	
  
	
  	
  
	
  	
  

Percentage of annual budget
2005
2006
2007
2008
	
  	
  
	
  	
  
	
  	
  
	
  	
  
	
  	
  
	
  	
  
	
  	
  
	
  	
  
	
  	
  
	
  	
  
	
  	
  
	
  	
  
	
  	
  
	
  	
  
	
  	
  
	
  	
  
	
  	
  
	
  	
  
	
  	
  
	
  	
  
	
  	
  
	
  	
  
	
  	
  
	
  	
  
	
  	
  
	
  	
  
	
  	
  
	
  	
  
	
  	
  
	
  	
  
	
  	
  
	
  	
  
	
  	
  
	
  	
  
	
  	
  
	
  	
  

2009
	
  	
  
	
  	
  
	
  	
  
	
  	
  
	
  	
  
	
  	
  
	
  	
  
	
  	
  
	
  	
  

2010
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E.

INSTITUTIONAL RELATIONS

43. Forms of cooperation between NGO and Government agencies (please indicate with X)
Yes
Government Agency
NO Financial
Joint
Technical support/
Patronage
support
Projects
Training
Ministry of Environment
Ministry/Agency
Specify:………………………..
Ministry/Agency
Specify: ………………………..
Ministry/Agency
Specify: ………………………..
44. Does the NGO work with other NGOs on joint projects?

Follow-up on
programs

Yes (Proceed to Question 45)
No (Skip to Question 46)

45. Please list these NGOs (Partnerships)

46. Is the NGO member in any
international/regional/national/professional networking
bodies?

Yes (Proceed to Question 47)
No (Skip to Question 48)

47. Please specify these networking bodies
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48. Classification of Institutional Relations (Please provide your personal assessment)
Networking
Partnership
	
  	
  
In your opinion, how does
the NGO define/understand
In your opinion, what is the 	
  	
  
purpose of:
In your opinion, what are
the characteristics of:
In your opinion, what are
the challenges facing:
49. Description of institutional Relations (Please indicate with X)
Strong
Weak
Ministry of Environment
Other government agencies
Private sector
International donors (international organizations,
foreign embassies, foreign government agencies ...)
Other NGOs
Networking bodies

Average

No answer

No relations

50. Assessment of Institutional Relations (Please indicate with X)
Very
positive

Somehow
Positive

Average

Negative

Very
negative

No
relations

Ministry of Environment
Other government agencies
Private sector
International donors (international organizations,
foreign embassies, foreign government agencies ...)
Other NGOs
Networking bodies
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F.

FUTURE ASPIRATIONS

How do you perceive the NGO role and work in the future? What are the requirements for that role?

What does the NGO need from the Government in general and the Ministry of Environment in particular? How can the
Ministry of Environment support your NGOs?

Thank you for your cooperation in this study on the Status and needs of Environment NGOs in Lebanon.
Please save this form and send it to us via e-mail: EnvStudy@gmail.com
Please place this form in its envelop and return the envelop to us through any LibanPost office. This is a prepaid service. You
do not required to buy any stamp.
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Participated in preparing a report on best practices in governance innovation in Lebanon
to be presented at a regional Meeting on “Sharing of Best Practices in the Mediterranean
region” as a part of UNPAN project on Innovation in Public Administration in the EuroMediterranean Region

2004

Participated in assessment study of INTERNEWS regional training and capacity building
program

2004

Participated in drafting three short booklets on transparency, corruption and
accountability as a part of Lebanese Transparency Association project

2003

Participated in the assessment of several YMCA projects in Lebanon in the fields of
vocational and technical training, youth development and participation, and
developmental services

P ROFESSIONAL E XPERIENCE
AMIDEAST
Beirut, Lebanon
Training Department Director (full time, Jan.-Aug. 2007): Managed a portfolio of $1 millionbudget programs; launched four new fee-based courses- including PMP courses- and five
trainings funded through USAID’s Professional Training; developed partnerships with two local
universities to host participants in USAID’s Iraq National Capacity Development Program; setup CISCO internship (US-Lebanon Partnership’s Workforce Development) and recruited the
first cohort of 15 young professionals; launched Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) local
alumni and recruited coordinator
Project Officer (full time, April 2001-Dec. 2006): Worked on the US Agency for International
Development funded Transparency and Accountability Grants’ Project; assessed more than 100
grant applications; monitored around 40 projects; identified best practices and potential project
ideas; advised on external environment; participated in developing strategic and contingency
plans
Project Manager (full time, January 2005-April 2006): Managed the US Department of Labor
funded ACCESS Child Labor Project; developed the content and design and launched a trilingual website; developed a large regional database of individuals and organizations interested
in the issue; organized 6 regional workshops, and meetings; mentored and provided guidance to
team members and interns

Embassy of South Korea
Beirut, Lebanon
Political Advisor and Public Relations Coordinator (full time, August 2000-March 2001):
Advised Ambassador and other diplomats on major political and economic developments in
Lebanon and Syria; managed embassy’s media and public relations; organized Embassy’s
activities; represented Embassy in official ceremonies
Office of Minister of State for Administrative Reform OMSAR
Beirut, Lebanon
Job Evaluator (full time, August 1996-August 2000): Worked on the World Bank’s ‘Position
Classification Project’ in the “Institutional Development Unit”. Interviewed Lebanese civil
servants of different grades and categories; evaluated current jobs; developed new classification
of positions in the Lebanese administration along with job descriptions; reported on
administrative and organizational problems; proposed new schemes for tasks and mandates
Program Assistant (part time, November-December 1999): Worked on the EU funded ARLA
Project for the Rehabilitation of the Lebanese Administration; surveyed organizational, financial,
administrative and technical conditions of various public institutions; developed preliminary and
inception reports for discussion with senior management and policy-makers

P ROFESSIONAL T RAINING
Ø
Ø
Ø
Ø
Ø
Ø
Ø
Ø
Ø

Organizational performance reporting
Means of combating corruption in the public sector in developing countries
Financial and managerial procedures in Civil Society Organizations
SMEs’ Financial reporting and good corporate governance
Professional ethics and code of conduct for community workers
Gender, citizenship, and participatory governance in the Arab Region
Archiving and record management
Job description and training
Team up for success

P ROFESSIONAL A SSOCIATIONS
Ø
Ø
Ø
Ø
Ø
Ø

Association for Research on Nonprofit Organizations and Voluntary Action (ARNOVA)
Academy of Management (AOM)
American Society for Public Administration (ASPA)
Public Management Research Association (PMRA)
Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management (APPAM)
Association for Middle Eastern Public Policy and Administration (AMEPPA)- member of
the Provisional Executive Committee
Ø United Nations Public Administration Network (UNPA)
Ø SU Middle East Working Group
Ø American University of Beirut Alumni Association (AUBAA)

